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 ABSTRACT 
DIDYMUS THE BLIND, ORIGEN, AND THE TRINITY 
 
 
 
Kellen Dale Plaxco, M.Div., M.A. 
 
Marquette University, 2016 
Catholic University of Leuven, 2016 
 
 
 
 This dissertation reconstructs Didymus the Blind’s theology in On the Holy Spirit 
as a pro-Nicene response to Origen’s theology of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The 
study begins by setting Origen’s speculation into a broad framework of schemes of 
emanation in Christianity and Platonism. I provide an account of Origen’s grammar of 
participation, which orders the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in a hierarchical series of 
causes. I show how Origen’s grammar of participation draws on the philosophy of 
Numenius of Apamea, and I argue that Origen uses his grammar of participation to 
oppose monarchian theologies that identify the three as a single, undifferentiated 
substance. “Participation” provides Origen the grammar he needs to establish continuity 
from the supreme God the Father to all other entities God produces, without teaching two 
supreme first principles. Origen’s hierarchical scheme yields a “low” pneumatology. 
 
 With Origen’s theology in view, I turn to Didymus the Blind’s On the Holy Spirit. I 
contextualize Didymus’s response to angelomorphic pneumatology in terms of pro-
Nicene theology. I begin by showing how Didymus transforms exegesis of a key verse in 
anti-monarchian polemic (John 16:14). I argue that Didymus opposed Eunomius’ reading 
of John 16:14, as well as Eunomius’ claim that the Holy Spirit is subordinated to the Son. 
I then show how Didymus’ doctrine of inseparable operation helps him oppose an anti-
Nicene reading of John 5:19 and John 14:16. Finally, I argue that Didymus retains certain 
features of earlier Alexandrian tradition while transforming others in light of Nicaea. He 
retains a “spiritual” participation in the Holy Spirit and a theology of the “image” of God. 
He replaces Origen’s tiered trinity with a “high” pneumatology and pro-Nicene theology. 
The Holy Spirit is the transcendent, “paradigmatic cause” of the impression of holiness in 
the soul. Didymus argues this point in pro-Nicene terms in order to ground an anti-
Manichaean asceticism: the monk can neither purify himself nor become irredeemably 
evil.  
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 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
Therefore, since it has been shown that the substance of the Holy Spirit is not 
changeable but unchangeable, he will not be ὁµοούσιος [the same in substance] 
with a creature. To be sure, even a creature would be immutable if he were placed 
with the Father and the Son, possessing the same unchangeability. For everything 
which is capable of participating in the good of another is separated from this 
substance. All such realities are creatures.1  
 
On the basis of all these passages it is proved that the activity of the Father and 
the Son and the Holy Spirit is the same. But those who have a single activity also 
have a single substance. For things of the same substance—ὁµοούσια—have the 
same activities, and things of a different substance—ἑτεροούσια—have 
discordant and distinct activities.2  
 
 Didymus the Blind flourished in Alexandria from the middle of the fourth century 
until, traditionally, 398 C.E.3 Some time after Ambrose wrote a treatise On the Holy 
Spirit, in 381, Jerome translated the two dense theological statements quoted above, and 
many like them, as a brief but compressed treatise On the Holy Spirit by Didymus, in 
order to prove that Ambrose had “plagiarized” Didymus’s thought.4 Didymus’s terse 
statements reflect a “high” pneumatology and a pro-Nicene understanding of the trinity.5  
                                               
1 Didymus, Spir. 16. PPS 43 trans. 
2 Didymus, Spir. 81. PPS 43 trans. 
3 For an introduction to what little we know about Didymus’s life, as well as an overview of the 
revelatory discovery of a cache of papyri attributable to him, see Richard A. Layton, Didymus the Blind 
and His Circle in Late-Antique Alexandria: Virtue and Narrative in Biblical Scholarship (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 2004), 1-12. 
4 Jerome, Spir. Praef. 
5 Lewis Ayres provides the following criteria for a broad set of “pro-Nicene” theologies: (1) “a 
clear version of the person and nature distinction . . .”; (2) “clear expression that the eternal generation of 
the Son occurs within the unitary and incomprehensible divine being”; (3) “clear expression of the doctrine 
that the persons work inseparably.” See Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 236. Didymus exhibits (3) a doctrine of inseparable operations in a striking way, and I detail 
this feature of Didymus’s thought in Chapter 6. Didymus’s definition of divinity as “participated but not 
participating” is a premise of various articulations of (2) the eternal generation of the Son and the spiration 
of the Spirit as occurring within the incomprehensible divine being. I discuss this feature of Didymus’s 
theology in Chapter 5. Finally, Didymus exhibits an incipient, if not a clear, version of (1) the distinction 
between “person” and “nature.” Even if one were to date On the Holy Spirit to the latest possible period of 
374-380, Didymus would have been a contemporary of comparable pro-Nicene theologies, so why has his 
treatise not received significant attention? Didymus has been eclipsed by a “Harnackian” account of the 
fourth century in which Athanasius is viewed as the most important influence on the Cappadocians, who 
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 In the study to follow I contextualize the force and significance of Didymus’s On 
the Holy Spirit by (a) arguing that, in On the Holy Spirit, Didymus reconfigured Origen’s 
theology in support of Nicaea; (b) detailing the features of the “pro-Nicene” theology 
Didymus proffered; and (c) arguing that Didymus’s “high” pneumatology conditions his 
moral psychology.  
 
Why Didymus? 
 
 
 
 As I have mentioned, features attributed to “pro-Nicene” theologians are all 
evident in writings that date from the 370s and later. Their appearance in On the Holy 
Spirit has enabled the presumption that Didymus did not compose On the Holy Spirit 
earlier than the eve of the triumph of pro-Nicene theology ensconced in the Creed of 
Constantinople, 381. However, that presumption rests on another, namely, that the 
“Cappadocians” possessed unprecedented genius. But the Cappadocians did not develop 
their own theological positions in a vacuum, and the premise that any theology 
resembling theirs must have derived from theirs, is not sound methodologically. Such 
working assumptions have resulted in Didymus’ a priori exclusion from influential 
treatments of doctrinal development in the fourth century.6  
                                                                                                                                            
adopted instead of Athanasius’s “Nicene” theology a “Neo-Nicene” theology (see Ayres, Nicaea, 237-8). 
Because Didymus’s On the Holy Spirit does not fit easily within this narrative, scholars sometimes push it 
as late as possible: 380, a year before Ambrose appropriated it. Or, at earliest, shortly after wrote his own 
On the Holy Spirit, in 374/5. The judgment is common which places Didymus in an arbitrary period 
between Basil’s On the Holy Spirit and the Council of Constantinople. Without other evidence, the dating 
is reasonable enough, but it overlooks the fact that we have a perfectly suitable impetus for Didymus’s 
authorship of On the Holy Spirit at the same time as Athanasius’s Letters to Serapion, around 360, with the 
advent of the “pneumatomachians” in Alexandria. There is no similar evidence of an Alexandrian group in 
the mid-to-late 370s. 
6 For example, Christopher Beeley’s reading of Gregory of Nazianzus takes for granted a late 
(380) dating of Didymus’s On the Holy Spirit, and asserts that Didymus cannot have influenced, directly or 
 3 
The time has come to challenge such treatments and to adjust our understanding 
of fourth-century doctrinal development accordingly. A number of detailed studies on the 
development of fourth-century doctrine mention Didymus in passing, but rarely does the 
treatment of Didymus transcend the superficial. Scholars have often associated two works 
with him: Pseudo-Basil, Against Eunomius IV-V, and an anonymous On the Trinity.7 
However, proponents of Didymean authorship of these texts have struggled, for several 
reasons, to establish a level of confidence necessary to embolden a wider scholarly 
audience for them.8 Like so many other orphaned texts from antiquity, they languish in 
                                                                                                                                            
indirectly, Gregory’s high pneumatology. See Christopher Beeley, Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and 
the Knowledge of God: In Your Light We Shall See Light (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 283-
284: “For similar reasons, we can conclude that Gregory of Nazianzus was not influenced by Athanasius’ 
younger Alexandrian colleague Didymus the Blind either. Although he studied for a year in Alexandria 
when Didymus may have worked as head of the city’s catechetical school, the scant evidence that we 
possess shows no material derivation on Gregory’s part. (The possibility that Didymus was influenced by 
Gregory is another matter.) . . . Didymus’ only surviving dogmatic work, On the Holy Spirit, draws heavily 
from Athanasius’ Letters to Serapion.” Beeley does not entertain an early dating of On the Holy Spirit, and 
in a footnote (note 62) he claims that Didymus took his exegesis of Amos 4:13 from Athanasius—when in 
fact Athanasius’s and Didymus’s interpretations of this text are not similar. Indeed, this is the same 
exegesis Mark DelCogliano has shown to have been a distinctive mark of Didymus’s influence on Basil of 
Caesarea. See Mark DelCogliano, “Basil of Caesarea, Didymus the Blind, and the Anti-Pneumatomachian 
Exegesis of Amos 4:13 and John 1:3,” Journal of Theological Studies 61 (2010): 644-58. 
7 Didymus’s twentieth-century champion, Alasdair Heron, went as far as the evidence could take 
him toward a case for Didymus’s authorship of Pseudo-Basil, Against Eunomius IV-V, and an anonymous 
On the Trinity. See Alasdair, Heron, “Studies in the Trinitarian Writings of Didymus the Blind: His 
Authorship of the Adversus Eunomium IV-V and the De Trinitate,” Tübingen Dissertation, 1972.  
8 Among those reasons is the fact that, although Alasdair Heron’s dissertation offers the strongest 
case possible in favor of viewing both De trinitate and Ps.-Basil Adversus Eunomium IV-V as influenced 
by Didymus, the textual evidence in favor of Heron’s position is thin (Heron, “Studies in the Trinitarian 
Writings”). The anonymous De trinitate associated with Didymus exists in a sole manuscript, in Rome, and 
lacks significant corroborating manuscript evidence for its being assigned to Didymus. In response to 
Doutreleau’s criticism of the parallels between Didymus’s Commentary on Zechariah, contained in the 
Tura papyri, and the anonymous De trinitate, Heron’s argument is that we do not need to prove that De 
trinitate is by Didymus; we may begin, instead, with the question of Ps.-Basil, Adversus Eunomium IV-V. 
In this case, J. Lebon discovered a Syriac manuscript (Brit Mus MS Addit 17201) that ascribes the text to 
Didymus, and Heron leans heavily on Lebon’s discovery (Heron, “Studies in the Trinitarian Writings of 
Didymus the Blind,” 181-95; J. Lebon, “Le Pseudo-Basile (Adv Eun. IV-V) est bien Didyme 
d’Alexandrie,” Le Muséon 50 [1937]: 61-83). Heron argues that, “given that Didymus had in fact been 
largely forgotten by the third quarter of the fifth century, and that at some time the beginning of AE had 
been lost, it is easy to understand how AE, if by him, could have come to be ascribed to Basil—not simply 
through its being appended to Basil’s Adversus Eunomium, nor yet by deliberate falsification, but by a 
combination of accident and forgetfulness of a kind not altogether unusual in the annals of misattribution” 
(Heron, 184). Heron goes on to refute arguments against trusting Lebon’s Syriac manuscript, put forth by 
C. Bizer and J. Leipoldt, and concludes that “the Syriac MS discovered by Lebon should be given full 
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the shadows, fascinating artifacts for the eyes of the occasional specialist. In order to 
revisit the question of these texts critically, we must take seriously Didymus’s 
contributions to the development of doctrine in the fourth century by restoring Didymus 
to full view. Without the study to follow, Didymus the Blind would remain a 
“Melchizedek” of the fourth-century doctrinal debates—“without father, without mother, 
without genealogy.”  
The question of authorship is not the only obstacle for those who would enlarge 
Didymus’s readership. There is also the question of Didymus’s polemical engagements. 
To survey scholarship on Didymus emerging in the wake of the Tura papyri discovered in 
1941 is to receive the impression that Didymus did not engage in any doctrinal 
                                                                                                                                            
weight, and regarded as an important piece of evidence from the ascription to Didymus, whereas the 
arguments which have been presented against such an ascription cannot really be supported” (Heron, 194). 
In fact, Heron’s textual argument rests on this single piece of evidence from a single Syriac manuscript, and 
his attribution of De trinitate to Didymus stands or falls on his attribution of Ps.-Basil, Adv. Eunomium IV-
V to Didymus. For this reason, his attribution of the latter text to Didymus hangs on whether the Syriac MS 
can be trusted. Though Lebon’s Syriac manuscript must be taken seriously as evidence that these two books 
were associated with Didymus at an early stage in the history of the text’s edition, a single witness 
constitutes thin grounds for resolving this case. On the other hand, working independently of Heron, Walter 
Hayes published an outline of the manuscript tradition of the text. See Walter M. Hayes, The Greek 
Manuscript Tradition of (ps.) Basil’s Adversus Eunomium, Books IV-V (Leiden: Brill, 1972). Hayes later 
argued, in spite of himself, that the text was certainly not by Basil and is by Didymus the Blind. See Walter 
M. Hayes, “Didymus the Blind Is the Author of Adversus Eunomium IV/V,” in Studia Patristica 17, Part 3 
(Elmsford, NY: Pergamon Press, 1982): 1108–14. Yet the authorship question remains unresolved. In spite 
of both Heron’s and Hayes’ arguments, Franz Risch’s German translation and commentary still holds out 
the possibility that Apollinarius might be the author of these two compressed books. See F.X. Risch, ed., 
Pseudo-Basilius, Adversus Eunomium IV-V: Einleitung, Übersetzung Und Kommentar (Leiden  ; New York: 
Brill, 1992). For his part, Wolfgang Bienert is convinced of the Didymean authorship of neither On the 
Trinity nor Against Eunomius, and he does not include these texts for consideration in his study of 
Didymus’s hermeneutics; he sidelines On the Holy Spirit presumably because it is extant only in Jerome’s 
Latin translation. See Wolfgang A. Bienert, Allegoria Und Anagoge Bei Didymos Dem Blinden von 
Alexandria, PTS 13 (Berlin, New York: De Gruyter, 1972), especially 8-31. On the other hand, Christoph 
Markschies treats the De trinitate as by “Didymus,” even if only in passing, and Andrew Radde-Gallwitz 
presumes the success of Heron’s arguments regarding the authenticity of Against Eunomius. See, 
respectively, C. Markschies, Origenes und Seine Erbe TU 160 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007), 147n121; 
and Andrew Radde-Gallwitz, “Gregory of Nyssa’s Pneumatology in Context: The Spirit as Anointing and 
the History of the Trinitarian Controversies,” JECS 19:2 (2011): 269n39. Though it is difficult to imagine a 
candidate better than Didymus for the authorship of Adversus Eunomium and De trinitate, it is not proved 
beyond doubt that he is the author of both texts, and to engage those texts would necessitate a more critical 
examination of the arguments for and against authorship than I can here provide. 
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controversies.9 Or, if he did, he was not up to the task of winning a significant following. 
Perusing a handful of books and articles on Didymus from the last fifty years yields a 
sense that when Didymus lashes out on the rare occasion at a “Eunomian” or an 
“Apollinarian,” he does so more to project authority than to wield it.10 Didymus appears 
in the pages of twentieth-century scholarship as an under-informed pretender to doctrinal 
authority, untrained in the polemical cunning of his slightly elder Alexandrian 
contemporary, Athanasius.11 Some have adduced this impression as circumstantial 
evidence against attributing to him Against Eunomius and On the Trinity.12  
                                               
9 A cache of papyri discovered in 1941, in Tura, Egypt, contained primarily material eventually 
ascribed to Didymus. The papyri contain several “commentaries” on Genesis, Job, Ecclesiastes, the Psalms, 
and Zechariah, all of which the editors finally ascribed to Didymus, and which appeared in either Sources 
chrétiennes (Genesis, Zechariah commentaries) or Papyrologische Texte und Abhandlungeni (Job, 
Ecclesiastes, Psalms) series. For more on the discovery at Tura, see Louis Doutreleau, “Que Savons-Nous 
Aujourd’hui Des Papyrus de Toura,” Recherches Des Sciences Religieuses 43 (1955): 161–93; and Layton, 
Didymus the Blind, 1-4. Doutreleau published an extensive initial comparison of the Commentary on 
Zechariah with the anonymous De trinitate previously associated with Didymus, and concluded, on the 
basis of literary differences, that the two were not the works of the same author. See Louis Doutreleau, “Le 
De Trinitate Est-Il l’Oeuvre de Didyme l’Aveugle?” Recherches Des Sciences Religieuses 45 (1957): 514-
57. 
10 As the edition of the Tura papyri were completed in the post-war period, extensive studies of 
them have focused primarily on their exegetical form and function. A few scholars have attempted to 
address the theological and philosophical context of the thought they contain. In addition to Heron’s, a 
handful of dissertations have studied Didymus’s theology (e.g. Adolphe Gesché, La christologie du 
“Commentaire sur les Psaumes” découvert à Toura. Gembloux: Éditions J. Duculot, 1962; Stephen Craig 
Reynolds, “Man, Incarnation, and Trinity in the Commentary on Zechariah of Didymus the Blind of 
Alexandria,” Harvard Dissertation, 1966; Michael Ghattas, Die Christologie Didymus’ des Blinden von 
Alexandria in den Schriften von Tura: zur Entwicklung der alexandrinischen Theologie des 4. Jahrhunderts 
[Münster: Lit, 2002]; Richard Bishop III, “Affectus hominis: The Human Psychology of Christ according to 
Ambrose of Milan in Fourth-Century Context,” University of Virginia Dissertation, 2009 [Chapter 2]). 
More recent monographs have gravitated toward Didymus’s contributions to an Alexandrian tradition of 
Origenist hermeneutics and pedagogy—for better (Bienert, Allegoria Und Anagoge Bei Didymos Dem 
Blinden von Alexandria; Layton, Didymus the Blind; Blossom Stefaniw, Mind, Text, and Commentary: 
Noetic Exegesis in Origen of Alexandria, Didymus the Blind, and Evagrius Ponticus [New York: Peter 
Lang, 2010]); or worse (Robert Hill, “Introduction,” Commentary on Zechariah FOTC 111 [Washington, 
D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2006]). If one were to read only the most recent scholarship on 
Didymus, the recent focus on Didymus’s exegetical endeavors might leave one with the unintended 
impression that Didymus was not polemically engaged in the doctrinal debates of the late fourth century. 
11 Hanson refers to the De Trinitate attributed to Didymus several times but concludes that it is not 
by Didymus and that the author of Adversus Eunomium, even if it be Didymus, “is essentially a second-rate 
theologian” (R. P. C. Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God: The Arian Controversy, 318-
381 [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988], 653-58). Henry Chadwick’s review, in 1963, of Doutreleau’s edition of 
Didymus’ Commentary on Zechariah all but sealed Didymus’s fate in twentieth-century patristic 
scholarship: “The doctrinal content is generally disappointing and meager” (Henry Chadwick, Review of 
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Students of the fourth century are familiar with a narrative of development that 
leads from early skirmishes between Arius and Alexander to the “high” pro-Nicene 
theology of the Cappadocian fathers in the 380s. At the beginning of the fourth century, 
Arius ignited what had become a tinderbox of Origenist theology, provoking a strident 
reaction by Marcellus of Ancyra, whose theology the Creed of Nicaea thinly veiled, and 
who appears to have embraced the very monarchian tendencies Origen opposed. Nicaea’s 
creed initially found few supporters at least in part for that reason. It would remain for the 
Cappadocians to provide a non-monarchian interpretation of Nicaea in the face of a more 
extreme formulation of Arius’s position in the guise of Eunomius, who radicalized latent 
dynamics in Origen’s legacy surfaced by “the Eusebian” party. So it was that the 
Cappadocians’ interpretation of Nicene theology incorporated anti-Origenist elements in 
spite of a deeply held reverence for Origen on several levels.13  
Whatever else one might say about a narrative like this—and on every point an 
erudite specialist could provide nuance—it represents the broad strokes taken by 
scholarship of the fourth-century controversies during the twentieth century. Though 
                                                                                                                                            
Didymus the Blind, In Zechariam, ed. L. Doutreleau, Journal of Theological Studies, n.s. 14 [1963] 183-
185, at 184). 
12 Such a judgment would have been superficial: neither Against Eunomius nor On the Trinity 
evinces great rhetorical polish. Both works display the characteristic rambling concatenation Jerome felt 
obliged to apologize for in the preface to his translation of Didymus’s On the Holy Spirit. On closer 
inspection, the roughly hewn structure of these anonymous texts counts as much in their favor for 
Didymus’s authorship as “genre.” 
13 For a good example of older versions of this narrative, see the dated but astute synopsis 
provided by Brooks Otis, “Cappadocian Thought as a Coherent System,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers 12 
(1958): 96-124, at 99-100. Hanson’s statement, which opens a treatment of Origen’s influence in the fourth 
century, is characteristic: “Origen was the most important theologian produced by the Eastern, Greek-
speaking, Church during the first three centuries of its existence. Until the arrival of Athanasius and the 
Cappadocian theologians in the fourth century, there was no theological mind capable of rivalling his.” See 
R.P.C. Hanson, “The Influence of Origen on the Arian Controversy,” in Origeniana Quarta, ed. Lothar 
Lies (Vienna: Tyrolia-Verlag, 1987), 410-423, at 410. A more up-to-date consensus view of twentieth-
century scholarship on the fourth century is expressed with characteristic economy by Michel Barnes, 
“Fourth Century as Trinitarian Canon,” in Christian Origins: Theology, Rhetoric and Community, ed. 
Lewis Ayres and Gareth Jones (New York: Routledge, 1998), 47-67. 
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there can be little doubt about Athanasius’s significance for later Christian theological 
tradition more broadly, evidence of his immediate impact upon his contemporaries is 
more often assumed than argued.14 Surprises await those who challenge the assumption 
that Athanasius was directly influential in the 360s. For example, it now appears that it 
was not Athanasius’s Letters to Serapion which influenced Basil of Caesarea’s anti-
pneumatomachian exegesis in Against Eunomius, Book III, but Didymus’s On the Holy 
Spirit.15 If Didymus influenced Basil in this case, as is widely conceded, might his 
writings have traveled more widely, and at an earlier stage, than previously assumed? 
The inertia that leads modern theologians to gravitate toward big names is hard to 
resist. Hardly any specialists—not to mention non-specialists—would include Didymus 
the Blind as a major figure in narratives of fourth-century doctrinal development, but his 
potential significance is not incredible. Brooks Otis wrote in a synopsis typical of 
twentieth-century scholarship that “the Cappadocians’ achievement was to recover the 
angelological and anthropological portions of [Origen’s] heritage by accommodating 
                                               
14 Consciously or unconsciously, Athanasius’s presumed influence is a sign of the impressive 
reach of Harnack’s centralization of Athanasius. See Barnes, “Fourth Century,” especially at 53: “This 
fundamental positioning of Athanasius by Harnack remains with us, I think, in the assumption that the 
distinctive substance of Athanasius’ theology must have been known by the Cappadocians and that it must 
have directly influenced their own theology, such as one sees in works by T. F. Torrance. This 
presupposition is a scholarly commonplace; unfortunately we have no real basis for this judgment since we 
have no detailed understanding of what (and when) the Cappadocians had read of Athanasius (if they had 
read anything).” See also Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
Ayres does not include Athanasius’s On the Incarnation in his revised account of “pro-Nicene” theology on 
the grounds that his reader “will . . . look in vain for any substantive evidence evidence that this treatise had 
any effect on the later fourth-century readers” (Ayres, 5) he discusses—namely, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory 
of Nyssa, and Gregory of Nazianzus. I agree with the methodological approach to adjudicating the 
complicated question of Athanasius’s influence in the late fourth century exemplified by Mark 
DelCogliano, “The Influence of Athanasius and the Homoiousians on Basil of Caesarea’s Decentralization 
of ‘Unbegotten,’” JECS 19:2 (2011): 192-223. 
15 Mark DelCogliano has demonstrated the problem with assuming Athanasius’s influence without 
proving it. In the case of Basil of Caesarea’s response to Eunomius, DelCogliano has shown not only that 
Athanasius did not influence Basil’s exegesis of Amos 4:13 and John 1:3, but that Didymus did. See Mark 
DelCogliano, “Basil of Caesarea, Didymus the Blind, and the Anti-Pneumatomachian Exegesis of Amos 
4:13 and John 1:3,” Journal of Theological Studies 61 (2010): 644–58. 
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them to the anti-Origenist theology of Athanasius.”16 In this case, instead of assuming 
that the Cappadocians were appropriating a pre-packaged “anti-Origenism” from 
Athanasius, why not consider the possibility that Didymus mediated a corrected version 
of Origen’s legacy to the Cappadocians, among others? I do not mean that Athanasius’s 
theology is unimportant in its own right, or that his influence in particular cases is 
precluded, but that an a priori judgment about Didymus’s insignificance suggests that 
Athanasius’s assumed significance has eclipsed the potential significance of Didymus. In 
the study to follow, I make Didymus’s pro-Nicene theology visible, so that we are in a 
better position to assess his place within the field of doctrinal developments in the period 
360-380 CE.  
On the Holy Spirit is the only doctrinal treatise that can be attributed to Didymus 
himself with certainty, even if only in Latin translation.17 At the heart of Didymus’s 
polemical argument in On the Holy Spirit is the concept of participation. In many ways, 
Didymus has been viewed in the shadow of Origen, his predecessor in Alexandria. For 
that reason, I began research on this topic with the intention of focusing solely on 
Didymus, his sources, and his thought, in order to remedy that imbalance. However, it 
soon became clear that it would be neither possible nor desirable to narrate Didymus’s 
doctrinal contributions without Origen in mind. Origen was every bit Didymus’s 
intellectual “master” many have presumed him to have been. Yet Origen’s authority did 
                                               
16 Otis, 100. 
17 And yet, in spite of that fact, On the Holy Spirit has been eclipsed by the anonymous On the 
Trinity associated with Didymus. For example, in his classic treatment of the Holy Spirit as “seal,” G.W.H. 
Lampe cites material from De trinitate as “Didymus,” but does not feel compelled to bother with Jerome’s 
translation for evidence. See G.W.H. Lampe, The Seal of the Spirit, 2nd ed. (London: SPCK, 1987), 249n2. 
See Mark DelCogliano, Andrew Radde-Gallwitz, and Lewis Ayres, trans., Athanasius and Didymus. Works 
on the Spirit: Athanasius’s Letters to Serapion on the Holy Spirit and Didymus’s On the Holy Spirit 
(Yonkers: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2011). The Introduction provided in this volume is useful for 
orientation and has influenced my own reading of the text. 
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not keep Didymus from quietly adjusting central tendencies in Origen’s theological 
speculation to fourth-century doctrinal winds. Because I am convinced this is the case, it 
has been necessary to provide a detailed account of Origen’s theology of the Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit, and to show how “participation” operated within that theology.  
 I do not address the question of Didymus’s authorship of Against Eunomius or On 
the Trinity. Instead, I contextualize the presence in On the Holy Spirit of several doctrinal 
themes, focusing on the doctrinal refrain that the Holy Spirit is “participated but does not 
participate.” So the journey toward Didymus’s pro-Nicene theology begins with Origen 
and philosophy.  
 
Origen and Philosophy 
 
 
 
 Origen’s theology was nothing if not influential. Both opponents and proponents 
of the Nicene Creed drew from it, and no serious consideration of fourth-century doctrine 
has failed to offer an account of that fact.18 Terms related to “participation” (µετοχή, 
µέθεξις, participatio) animate Origen’s theology and psychology at a deep level, but the 
logic governing those terms is not always evident. Yet there are dynamics in Origen’s 
theology that are inexplicable without this logic, and there are problems and limitations in 
                                               
18 For statements regarding the complicated question of tracing Origen’s wide-ranging theological 
influence, see, e.g., Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian 
Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 20; Christopher Beeley, The Unity of Christ: 
Continuity and Conflict in Patristic Tradition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 12; Khaled 
Anatolios, Retrieving Nicaea (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2011), 16; and John McGuckin, “‘Perceiving Light 
from Light in Light’: The Trinitarian Theology of St. Gregory Nazianzen,” Greek Orthodox Theological 
Review 39 (1994): 9. In addition to considering the question of Origen’s influence on nearly every figure 
covered in his extensive survey of the fourth century, R.P.C. Hanson considers the potential influence of 
Origen’s doctrine on Arius, in particular, in The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God (Grand Rapids: 
Baker Academic, 1988, reprint 2005), 61-70; see also R.P.C. Hanson, “The Influence of Origen on the 
Arian Controversy,” in Origeniana Quarta, ed. Lothar Lies (Vienna: Tyrolia-Verlag, 1987), 410-423. 
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Origen’s theology that result from it. Whoever Origen influenced inherits these problems 
and limitations, sometimes unaware that Origen’s logic of participation entails those 
problems. This matter’s complexity has produced a divergence of scholarly opinions 
about Origen’s theology.19 
The question of Origen’s debts to philosophy, and the consequences of those 
debts, presents a perennial issue in Origen scholarship. Indeed, how one answers this 
question suggests how one would answer it in the case of other figures from the period—
Eunomius of Cyzicus, Gregory of Nyssa, or Augustine of Hippo. For some earlier 
modern scholars, non-Christian philosophy was a sign of poisonous “Hellenization”—
famously, Adolf von Harnack.  
Some have moved beyond the anti-Harnackian works of the early twentieth 
century, taking it to be a foregone conclusion that Harnack’s perspective has been 
rendered obsolete. However, the issue is by no means settled, and Harnack continues to 
influence scholarship in unacknowledged, slightly altered ways.20 The extent to which a 
reader of Origen has given up characterizing philosophy’s presence in Origen’s thought 
as “poisonous” is a litmus test for whether one is rid of Harnackian tendencies.21 The 
                                               
19 Though scholars often puzzle over the question of whether Origen was or was not a 
“subordinationist,” treatments of his thought’s indebtedness to the concept of participation do not 
uniformly analyze it as a feature of his trinitarian theology. For scholarship that has treated the issue in 
some detail, see David L. Balàs, “The Idea of Participation in the Structure of Origen’s Thought. Christian 
Transposition of a Theme of the Platonic Tradition,” in Origeniana: Premier Colloque International Des 
Études Origéniennes (Montserrat, 18-21 Septembre 1973), Quaderni Di “Vetera Christianorum” 12, ed. H. 
Crouzel, G. Lomiento, and J. Rius-Camps (Bari, Istituto di letteratura cristiana antica, Università di Bari, 
1975), 257–275. 
20 For recent literature on Origen and “Middle Platonism,” see Benjamin Blosser, Become Like the 
Angels (Washington, D.C.: CUA Press, 2012), 1-13. For all its erudition, Blosser’s treatment of Origen’s 
theological anthropology still appears to accept a Harnackian choice of Origen as either a “Platonist” or a 
“man of the Church,” since Blosser proposes that Origen was a “man of the Church” as opposed to a 
“Platonist.” See Blosser, 12-13. 
21 For a provocative and strident but esoteric approach to this issue, see Mark Edwards, Origen 
Against Plato (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002). Edwards worries that Origen has been misread as a mere 
Platonist, and his warnings to that effect are well taken, but it bears noting that it is one thing to qualify 
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better one can explain the presence and impact of philosophical terms in Origen’s 
discourse, the more prepared one’s reading of Origen is to withstand such a test. The 
distance between the modern reader and Harnack grows insofar as she can read Origen’s 
philosophy as integral to his theology without concern that philosophical commitments 
have degraded, or even confused, his thought. On the other hand, those who have no 
account for Origen’s use of philosophy either do not understand that technical terms of 
any discourse—“philosophical” or otherwise—cannot stretch without breaking, or they 
have decided in advance that Origen cannot mean what he says.22  
Returning to Didymus and Origen, then, the concept of participation had played a 
central role in the Nicene controversy that preceded Didymus. How far back did the roots 
of “participation” go? Could they be traced to Origen himself? The question of whether 
the Son participated in the Father, and the consequences of that participation, surfaced as 
a key issue in the earliest stages of the “Arian crisis.” Arius could not be accused of 
straying from Origen’s theology when he interpreted the title “Logos,” along with so 
many others, as applicable to the Son only καταχρηστικῶς.23 According to Arius, the Son 
                                                                                                                                            
what it means to say that Origen owes debts to Platonism, and another to call him a Platonist without 
qualification. The latter position is one few scholars would take; the former represents a non-controversial 
consensus. 
22 As with Origen, so with Arius and Eunomius, among others: the role of non-Christian 
philosophy in a heresiarch’s system can all too easily become a derogatory device. In his magisterial 
Archetypal Heresy: Arianism through the Centuries, Maurice Wiles cites a spokesman of a Catholic-
Lutheran dialogue, in the 1960s, who repudiates Arius as holding a “doctrinal scheme [which] owed 
nothing to Scripture.” The implication was that Arius’s “doctrinal scheme” was alien to Scripture, derived 
from non-Christian philosophy and so to be resisted. Anti-philosophical biblicism of this sort is not limited 
to Protestants. The spokesman castigating Arius as a heretic by calling his thought “philosophical” was not 
the Lutheran, but a Catholic, John Courtney Murray. See Maurice Wiles, Archetypal Heresy: Arianism 
through the Centuries (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 3, where the “Catholic spokesman” is anonymous; 
his identity appears, however in Maurice Wiles, “Eunomius: Hair-splitting Dialectician or Defender of the 
Accessibility of Salvation?” in The Making of Orthodoxy: Essays in Honour of Henry Chadwick, ed. 
Rowan Williams (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 157-172, at 158. 
23 Maurice Wiles, “In Defense of Arius,” JTS (1962): 339-347, reprinted in Maurice Wiles, 
Working Papers in Doctrine (London: SCM Press, 1976), 28-37, at 32. 
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“was created by the will of God before times and ages, and he received life, being, and 
glories from the Father as the Father has shared them with him.”24  
It is striking that Alexander of Alexandria did not dispute this aspect of Arius’s 
theology. A point of agreement between Arius and Alexander was that the Son receives 
from and participates in the Father. For Alexander, too, the Son is the “image” of the 
Father’s hypostasis (Hebrews 1:3), and thus the Son reproduces all that the Father is 
except the distinctive characteristic of being “unbegotten.”25 On the other hand, for Arius, 
the Son is a creature who participates perfectly in the Father’s being just as the Father 
wills the Son so to participate.26 Now is not the time to revisit the nebulous question of 
Arius’s philosophical acumen.27 It is, however, important to emphasize that a hazy 
concept of participation lay just beneath the surface of the early Nicene debate. The study 
to follow uncovers the way the logic of participation functioned for Origen, and the way 
that Didymus renovated that logic with a “pro-Nicene” theology of the Trinity.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
24 Arius, Letter to Alexander of Alexandria, 3; W. Rusch, trans., The Trinitarian Controversy 
(Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1980), 31; Opitz, ed., Athanasius Werke 3/1 (Berlin – Leipzig: W. de 
Gruyter und Co, 1934), Urkunde 6, 3: θελήµατι τοῦ θεοῦ πρὸ χρόνων καὶ πρὸ αἰώνων κτισθέντα καὶ τὸ ζῆν 
καὶ τὸ εἶναι παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς εἰληφότα καὶ τὰς δόξας, συνυποστήσαντος αὐτῷ τοῦ πατρός. 
25 Alexander, Letter to Alexander of Thessalonica (commonly referred to as “ἡ φίλαρχος”), 
Urkunde 14, 48-52. Rowan Williams surmises that “Bishop Alexander and his circle had been using some 
sort of language about ‘substantial’ unity between Father and Son, or perhaps . . . had spoken of the Son 
enjoying metousia or metochê of the Father’s life, in a still fairly untroubled Middle Platonic fashion.” See 
R. Williams, Arius: Heresy and Tradition, Rev. ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002), 223. 
26 Williams, Arius, 228, and Mark DelCogliano, “Eusebian Theologies of the Son as the Image of 
God before 341,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 14:4 (2006): 459-484, especially 462. 
27 See, for example, the series of exchanges between Rowan Williams and Christopher Stead on 
Arius’ philosophical motivations, here listed chronologically: C. Stead, “The Platonism of Arius,” Journal 
of Theological Studies n.s. 15 (1964): 14-31; R. Williams, “The Logic of Arianism,” Journal of 
Theological Studies 34.1 (1983):60-81; R. Williams, Arius (1987), especially 215-229; Stead, “Was Arius a 
Neoplatonist?” in Studia Patristica XXXIII (Leuven, Peeters Press, 1997), 39-52; Williams, Arius, Rev. ed. 
(Grand Rapids, MI, Eerdmans, 2002), Appendix with response to Stead, 261-266. 
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Outline of the Dissertation 
 
 
 
The study falls into two parts: the first provides a detailed reconstruction of 
Origen’s theology of the trinity, which Didymus inherited in the late fourth century. In my 
account of Origen’s theology, I focus on describing in detail both the nature and 
polemical utility of the deeply-seated tendency in Origen’s thought to order the Father, 
Son, and Holy Spirit in a hierarchy. With this aspect of Origen’s theology and the low 
pneumatology it generates in view, I turn to Didymus, in order to detail Didymus’s 
reconfiguration of Origen’s legacy in the late fourth century. In this part of the study, I 
provide a detailed account of the reasons Didymus abandoned Origen’s grammar of 
participation in favor of a pro-Nicene theology of the trinity. Didymus moves beyond 
both monarchian and anti-monarchian theologies toward a pro-Nicene synthesis, which I 
describe and contextualize.  
Chapter 1 introduces two interrelated and recurrent themes. They are: (1) Platonic 
and Gnostic schemes of emanation; and (2) Platonic grammars of participation. The point 
of introducing these dynamics broadly at the outset is to provide a frame of reference for 
a constellation of key terms used in later Alexandrian theology—especially terms like 
αἴτιον, ἀρχή, εἰκών, µέθεξις, µετουσία, and πηγή. By recognizing this broad family of 
terms in earlier tradition, we will have a context for considering a trajectory of thought on 
the same themes from Origen to Didymus. Chapters 2 through 4 then show how Origen 
draws on these themes to oppose monarchian theology. In Chapter 2, I argue that 
Origen’s use of participation is influenced by Numenius’s On the Good. Specifically, I 
show how the first two books of Origen’s Commentary on John incorporate dynamics 
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from Numenius in a theology of the Son as Demiurge. As a result of Origen’s use of 
Numenius, his doctrine of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit exhibits Platonic hierarchical 
tendencies. In Chapter 3, I argue that Origen’s use of Numenius is polemically motivated. 
Returning to several key passages in the Commentary on John shows that Origen’s use of 
participation is designed, against monarchian theology, to provide an intrinsic distinction 
of Son from Father. In a final chapter on Origen (Chapter 4), I argue that Origen has a 
low pneumatology at every stage in his career—from his “early” writings in the 
Commentary on John and On First Principles to later books of the Commentary and other 
writings from Origen’s later period, in Caesarea. Origen never abandons the Platonizing 
dynamics that rendered his doctrine of the divine three vulnerable to becoming a 
binitarian hierarchy of Father-and-Son over a created, angelic Holy Spirit.  
 The first part of this dissertation forces an interpretive choice for Origen’s 
scholarly readers. One may either read Origen as having held to a logic of the Father, 
Son, and Holy Spirit governed by dynamics of participation, or pretend that the logic of 
participation employed by Origen is merely figurative speech. However, the reader who 
strips Origen’s use of participation of its philosophical valence loses an account of his 
theology as anti-monarchian, and so also loses a grip on Origen’s contemporary 
orthodoxy. One may give Origen either a proto-Nicene Trinity or an anti-monarchian 
theology, but one may not give him both, and the reason for this lies in his use of 
participation. I prefer to read Origen through the lens that sees his genius in his anti-
monarchian strategies, not in his ability to anticipate early fourth century controversies. 
 The second part of this dissertation articulates Didymus’s pro-Nicene theology of 
the Holy Spirit by contextualizing it. In Chapter 5, I contextualize the Holy Spirit’s 
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“reception” from the Son in terms of the history of John 16:14’s exegesis. In the course of 
doing so, I broaden the dossier of evidence in favor of reading Didymus’s On the Holy 
Spirit as opposed to Eunomius’s first Apology. Didymus seizes upon Scripture’s speaking 
of the Holy Spirit as “poured out” and so opposes Eunomius’s insistence that the Holy 
Spirit is “filled.” In Chapter 6, I outline Didymus’s arguments for the Holy Spirit’s full 
divinity in terms of two key strategies: inseparable operation and “single power” 
causality. I then elaborate the pro-Nicene texture of Didymus’s theology by uncovering 
the anti-Eunomian utility of Didymus’s exegesis of two key verses: John 5:19 and John 
14:16. With Didymus’s pro-Nicene theology in view, Chapter 7 shows that if Didymus 
retains and refines key aspects of Origen’s moral psychology of the human soul as a 
divine “image,” he also initiates a new tradition according to which the “archetype” to 
which the soul is conformed is not only the Logos, but the Trinity viewed as a single 
divine source. Didymus’s “high” pneumatology allows him to frame his moral 
psychology with the axiom that the soul can neither purify itself nor find itself reduced to 
irredeemable evil. 
 Taken as a whole, the second half of the dissertation provides a picture of 
Didymus’s pro-Nicene theological contribution in On the Holy Spirit and helps to explain 
why Jerome called his theology “catholicus.”28  With a contextualized reading of 
                                               
28 Hier., Apol. adv. lib. Ruf. 2.16.17-25. “What answer will you make, then, as to Didymus, who 
certainly is catholic as regards the Trinity? You know that I translated his book on the Holy Spirit into 
Latin. He surely could not have assented to the passages in Origen’s works which were added by heretics; 
yet he wrote some short commentaries on the Περὶ ᾽Αρχῶν which you have translated; in these he never 
denies that what is there written was written by Origen, but only tries to persuade us simple people that we 
do not understand his meaning and how these passages ought to be taken in a good sense. So much on the 
Son and the Holy Spirit alone. But in reference to the rest of Origen’s doctrines, both Eusebius and 
Didymus adhere to his views, and defend, as said in a catholic and Christian sense, what all the churches 
reprobate” (quid respondebis pro didymo, qui certe in trinitate catholicus est, cuius etiam nos de spiritu 
sancto librum in latinam linguam uertimus? certe hic, in his quae ab haereticis in origenis operibus addita 
sunt, consentire non potuit. et in ipsis Περὶ Ἀρχῶν quos tu interpretatus es libris, breues dictauit 
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Didymus’s “high” pneumatology and the exegetical underpinnings of his pro-Nicene 
theology, we can make better-informed judgments about the options available to later 
pro-Nicene theologians in the 370s and following. If Didymus composed On the Holy 
Spirit as early as 360, then his arguments comprise a pioneering instance of pro-Nicene 
theology, and further studies will need to consider not so much whether Didymus 
mediated the Alexandrian tradition’s insights to later figures, as precisely how he did so.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
commentariolos quibus non ab origene negaret scripta quae scripta sunt, sed nos, simplices homines, non 
posse intellegere quae dicuntur, et quo sensu in bonam partem accipi debeant persuadere conatur - hoc 
dumtaxat de filio et spiritu sancto. ceterum in aliis dogmatibus et eusebius et didymus apertissime in 
origenis scita concedunt, et, quod omnes ecclesiae reprobant, catholice et pie dictum esse defendunt) 
(NPNF 3: 510; CCSL 79, ed. Lardet, 1982). 
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Chapter 1 
Emanation, Participation, and Hierarchy 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 This chapter introduces themes that will occupy our attention for the remainder of 
this study. The basic aim is to describe how schemes of emanation, in use prior to the 
third and fourth centuries, employ a Platonic conceptual vocabulary of “participation.” 
Because a comprehensive overview of such broad issues would be unwieldy, I focus on 
the soil out of which Origen and Didymus grew.  
 I begin by surveying some of the ways early Gnostics, Christians, and Platonists 
imagined procession, or emanation. The themes of emanation and participation are 
intertwined, and disentangling them is an artificial exercise. So my description of “triadic 
procession” gives way to describing a grammar of participation and ordering implicit in 
such schemes of procession. Plato’s talk of participation initiated an influential 
conceptual vocabulary for thinking through emanative schemes and their appropriation—
especially in light of the Demiurge’s looking to a “paradigm” in creating the Cosmos.  
 In chapters to follow on Origen, we will see how Origen appropriates these 
dynamics in his own speculation about the Son’s procession from the Father and the 
creation of the spiritual Cosmos. In the second half of this study, I show how Didymus 
shifts the Alexandrian tradition toward a perspective in which no single person of the 
Trinity is identified as Creator: all three share a single divine nature and all three are 
ascribed “productive” agency. In this way, Didymus’s pro-Nicene theology dissolves the 
problems triggered by Origen’s complicated debts to Platonic schemes which arrange the 
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triad in a series of graded entities. Didymus does not discard his tradition’s debt to 
Platonism. He transforms it. 
 
Triadic Procession and Stability of the First Principle 
 
 
 
So we begin with schemes of emanation. It is tempting to associate, if not to 
identify, the term “emanation” with the genius of Plotinus and Neoplatonism, but 
emanation is older than Plotinus. His thought includes elemental concepts that turn out to 
be older than the school Platonism that nurtured him. In fact, earlier Gnostic traditions 
provide a fruitful, if somewhat unexpected and enigmatic, point of comparison for later 
Christian and pagan traditions.  
A number of common themes and terminologies suggest deep parallels between 
Gnosticism, early Christian “orthodoxy,” and Platonism.1 The parallels precede the 
second century, even if the origins of gnosticsm remain shrouded in controversy. 
Continuities between “non-baptismal” Gnostic Christianity and Platonism, each oriented 
toward “ascent,” are well known.2 Perhaps lesser known is the tradition of scholarship 
                                               
1 I place the word orthodoxy in inverted commas to disclaim any dogmatic judgments about non-
Gnostic Christians or Gnostic Christians. See Michael Williams, Rethinking Gnosticism: An Argument for 
Dismantling a Dubious Category (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1996), Karen King, What Is 
Gnosticism? (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2005), and David Brakke, The Gnostics: Myth, Ritual, and 
Diversity in Early Christianity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012), for current accounts of 
gnosticism(s). I have also found helpful Alastair Logan’s analysis of Barbelo-Gnostics, or Sethian Gnostics, 
in Gnostic Truth and Christian Heresy: A Study in the History of Gnosticism (Peabody, Mass: Hendrickson 
Publishers, 1996). The modern sorting out and classification of ancient Gnosticisms remains a topic of 
considerable scholarly debate. It is a debate I do not have space to address, but I beg my reader’s trust that I 
am aware of the necessary qualifications in using such a fraught term as “Gnosticism.” I use the term for 
convenience’s sake to refer to a family of movements which depart from one another in perhaps significant 
but complex and various ways. 
2 See John Turner and Ruth Majercik, eds., Gnosticism and Later Platonism: Themes, Figures, 
and Texts (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2000). Sethian Gnosticism’s entanglements with Middle Platonism are 
documented extensively by John Turner, Sethian Gnosticism and the Platonic Tradition (Quebec, Presses 
de l’Université Laval, 2001). For an argument that the Chaldean Oracles adapted Stoicism to Platonizing 
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that has highlighted continuities between Gnostic, Christian, and Platonist “triadology.” 
My work takes place in a scholarly trajectory exemplified by the work of Jean Pépin and 
John Whittaker.3  
Pépin’s analysis of Gnosticism normalizes Gnostic triadic theology. Gnosticism 
supported a tradition of speculation not entirely abandoned by what would become 
orthodox Christianity or later Platonism, and Pépin’s presentation of a continuity running 
from Gnosticism to Plotinus means we cannot forget this “normal” aspect of Gnostic 
theology. Though significant differences separate what would become Christian 
orthodoxy from Gnostic speculation, deep continuities remained—especially in 
Alexandria. “Triadic” Gnostics of various kinds (Valentinians, “Naasenes,” and 
“Peratics”) spoke a language and speculated about a cosmology not entirely unfamiliar to 
an emerging consensus in Alexandria.  
Pépin’s comparative research also demonstrates convincing conceptual parallels 
between Gnosticism and Plotinian procession. Pépin uses Plotinus to make many of his 
points, and the rhetorical effect of using Plotinus as a case in point is not so much that 
                                                                                                                                            
ends in order to produce the triad of “being-life-mind” characterized by Hadot as Porphyry’s innovation, 
see Tuomas Rasimus, “Stoic Ingredients in the Neoplatonic Being-Life-Mind Triad: An Original Second-
Century Gnostic Innovation?” in Stoicism in Early Christianity, ed. Tuomas Rasimus, Troels Engberg-
Pedersen, and Ismo Dunderberg (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010), 257-274. 
3 In the following synopsis, I rely on three important articles regarding Gnostic theories of 
procession. First is Jean Pépin, “Theories of Procession in Plotinus and the Gnostics,” in Neoplatonism and 
Gnosticism, ed. Richard T. Wallis (New York: State University of New York Press, 1992), 297-335. Pépin 
takes his primary evidence from several well known reports in Hippolytus’s Refutatio omnium haeresium, 
V-VI: VI, 29.5-7; V, 7.25-26; V, 17.5; V.10-12. For the sake of convenience, I will refer to the author of 
this treatise as Hippolytus even though there is some doubt as to the authorship of the treatise. Pépin cites 
evidence original to Gnostics as well as other corroborating reports from heresiologists, but Hippolytus’s 
texts form a basis for comparison with Plotinus and later Platonism. Second are two related pieces by John 
Whittaker: “Self-Generating Principles in Second-Century Gnostic Systems,” in Bentley Layton, ed., The 
Rediscovery of Gnosticism, Vol. 1: The School of Valentinus (Leiden: Brill, 1980), 176-193; and Ibid., “The 
Historical Background of Proclus’ Doctrine of the ΑΥΘΥΠΟΣΤΑΤΑ,” in De Jamblique a Proclus, ed. H. 
Dörrie (Genève: Vandoeuvres, 1974), 193-237. Both articles are collected in John Whittaker, Studies in 
Platonism and Patristic Thought (London: Variorum Reprints, 1984). Though I highlight the primary texts 
and concepts most relevant to the task of later chapters, the serious student should consult all three articles 
for fuller documentation and analysis than I have space to provide. 
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Plotinus borrowed directly from this or that Gnostic treatise.4 Rather, it is to demonstrate 
that both Gnosticism and later forms of Christianity and Platonism wove different 
garments from common spools.5 On Pépin’s view, in this regard Plotinus was more 
“Platonist” than “Neoplatonist.” 
Gnostics are well known for having taught speculative cosmogonies. An 
especially familiar theme is an elaborate procession of Eons cascading from an ultimate 
source. Gnostics also speculated about the relationship between three primary principles. 
For convenience I will refer to such Gnostics as “triadic.” Hippolytus is our primary 
source for triadic Gnostic systems.6 For Valentinian Gnostics like those represented by 
Hippolytus, the Father is a perfect, solitary entity, described as µόνος or ἔρηµος.7 The 
Father is “without need” (ἀπροσδεής, ἀνενδεής). Because of the Father’s perfection, he 
produces a “Son” in the form of “mind” or “Logos.” The production results in a “monad” 
                                               
4 It is also, I should state clearly, not meant to imply any kind of influence running from Plotinus 
to Origen. Though my presentation of material from Plotinus and Neoplatonism in this chapter prior to 
following chapters on Origen might imply a chronological progression from Neoplatonism to Origen, no 
such progression is probable given the fact that Origen died before he could have read any of Plotinus’s 
writings. On the other hand, nothing prevents generic Platonic doctrine that appears in Plotinus from having 
been available to Origen through other sources. At most, Origen and Plotinus could be analyzed as both 
emerging from a comparable Platonic school tradition, whether or not their teacher was the same 
Ammonius. For a recent treatment of both Plotinus and Origen, see Henning Ziebritzki, Heiliger Geist und 
Weltseele (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1994), especially 21-43. 
5 In fact, Plotinus serves as a point of reference for generic, as opposed to distinctively 
“Neoplatonic,” elements of Platonism. In later chapters I will leave behind the question of Gnosticism’s 
mediated influence on later Alexandrian theology. That is because the question often enough is not whether 
later Christians reworked Gnostic precedents, but how they did so, to what extent, and to what ends. 
6 For the Greek text of Hippolytus’s Refutatio, see M. Marcovich, Hippolytus. Refutatio omnium 
haeresium, Patristische Texte und Studien 25 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1986): 53-417; for English I have used 
Werner Foerster, Gnosis: A Selection of Gnostic Texts, Vol. 1. Patristic Evidence, trans., R. McL. Wilson 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972). See Foerster, Chapters 14-19 for iterations of Gnosticism with three first 
principles. We need not address the thorny matter of the Refutatio’s authorship, which need not have been 
written by Hippolytus in order to provide the data it does regarding Gnosticism. It is only for the sake of 
convenience I refer to the author of “Hippolytus” and not “(Ps.?-)Hippolytus.” 
7 Ref. VI.29.5-7. Other terms include φιλέρηµος, ἠρεµῶν, and ἀναπαυόµενος (Pépin, 301). 
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becoming a “dyad,” a theme endemic both to school Platonism and Gnosticim.8 In the 
Valentinian case, the first principle breaks out of solitude in an act of love. It “begets” 
(γεννάω) or “sends forth” (προβάλλειν) a second principle. The second principle is said to 
“proceed” (προάγειν) from the first. Ordering an entity with terms “first,” “second,” or 
“third” implies that an entity is “produced” by its prior in the series. 
Gnostics characterize the “Father” not only as producing a second principle but 
also as being the kind of source that does not depend upon its products. For example, 
Hippolytus’s Naasenes offer the following doctrine of the divine source of all things: 
As to the nature of the seed, which is the cause of all that comes into being, [the 
Naasenes] say that it is none of these, but it generates and produces all that comes 
into being; their text is, “I become what I will, and I am what I am.” Therefore 
they say that the being which moves everything does not move; for while it 
produces everything it remains what it is, without coming to be any of the things 
that come into being. Him alone he calls good, and of him was said the Savior’s 
saying, “Why do you call me good? There is one who is good, my Father in 
heaven, who makes his sun rise upon the just and the unjust, and sends rain upon 
the righteous and the sinners.”9 
 
Note the use of Matthew 5:45 to distinguish the Son from the Father, the “only good” 
(ἀγαθὸν µόνον).10 The Father does not “need” the second principle in order to be the 
Father. The Father is perfectly stable, alone good (ἀγαθόν). In this way, Gnostics can be 
read as agreeing with what is often identified as a marker of Platonism: the principle that 
a cause is greater than its effect. We will return to this notion momentarily. 
                                               
8 See Pépin, 300, as well as John Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 24-30, for background on the 
Platonic Monad and (indefinite) Dyad. The theme recurs in the fourth century, notably, in the theology of 
Marcellus of Ancyra, as reported by Eusebius of Caesarea, e.g., e. th. 3.4-5. 
9 Hippolytus, Ref. V.7.25-26. Λέγουσιν οὖν περὶ τῆς τοῦ πνεύµατος οὐσίας, ἥτις ἐστὶ πάντων τῶν 
γινοµένων αἰτία, ὅτι τούτων ἐστὶν οὐδέν, γεννᾷ δὲ καὶ ποιεῖ πάντα τὰ γινόµενα, λέγοντες οὕτως· “γίνοµαι ὃ 
θέλω καὶ εἰµὶ ὃ εἰµί.” διὰ τοῦτό φησιν ἀκίνητον εἶναι τὸ πάντα κινοῦν· µένει γὰρ ὅ ἐστι, ποιοῦν τὰ πάντα, 
καὶ οὐδὲν τῶν γινοµένων γίνεται. τοῦτον δ’ εἶναί φησιν ἀγαθὸν µόνον, καὶ περὶ τούτου λελέχθαι τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ 
σωτῆρος λεγόµενον· “τί µε λέγεις ἀγαθόν; εἷς ἐστιν ἀγαθός, ὁ πατήρ µου ὁ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς· ὃς ἀνατέλλει 
τὸν ἥλιον αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ δικαίους καὶ ἀδίκους καὶ βρέχει ἐπὶ ὁσίους καὶ ἁµαρτωλούς.” 
10 Though Marcovich notices the references, neither Wendland’s 1914 GCS edition nor Foerster’s 
German translation acknowledges this text’s overt debts to Exodus 3:14 and Aristotle (Metaphysics 
7.1012b31) for the divine name. The title ἀγαθὸν µόνον resurfaces in Clement, Strom. III.43.2. 
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A doctrine that takes its rise from the first principle’s stability is the axiom that the 
first, or “highest God,” does not participate in any higher entity. In Chapter 10 of the 
Handbook of Platonism, Alcinous discusses the “primary intellect,” or God. This 
“primary God” is “eternal, ineffable, ‘self-perfect’ (that is, deficient in no respect), ‘ever-
perfect’ (that is, always perfect), and ‘all-perfect’ (that is, perfect in all respects); divinity, 
essentiality, truth, commensurability, <beauty>, good.”11 Alcinous stipulates that these 
attributes are not invoked as referring to mutually opposed or exclusive entities, “but on 
the assumption that one single thing is being denoted by all of them.” In the next 
paragraph, he explains that God  
is ineffable and graspable only by the intellect . . . since he is neither genus, nor 
species, nor differentia, nor does he possess any attributes, neither bad (for it is 
improper to utter such a thought), nor good (for he would be thus by participation 
in something, to wit, goodness), nor indifferent (for neither is this in accordance 
with the concept we have of him), nor yet qualified (for he is not endowed with 
quality, nor is his peculiar perfection due to qualification) nor unqualified (for he 
is not deprived of any quality which might accrue to him).12  
 
“Participation” enters Alcinous’s definition of divinity as part of an effort to preclude the 
notion that God possesses attributes in the way that individuals possess generic qualities. 
The point of saying that God is not good “by participation” is that God is not a “good” 
species that partakes of a higher genus’s “goodness.” God’s goodness is simple and 
exhausts the category of goodness. God, by definition, is not the species of any genus.   
 The principle of the primal Father’s stability in comparison to the entities he 
produces, all of them derivative and dependent, is buttressed by the Platonic doctrine of 
                                               
11 Alcinous, Didask. 10; Dillon trans. 
12 Alcinous, Didask. 10; Dillon trans. 
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the “undiminished giver” and a corollary axiom of non-reciprocal dependence.13 
Numenius provides a classic expression of divine nature, which “gives without loss”: 
When . . . the Divine is communicated, and passes over from the one to the other, 
it does not leave the Giver while being of service to the Receiver; not only does 
the Giver not lose anything thereby, but he gains this further advantage, the 
memory of his giving (or generosity). This beautiful process occurs with 
knowledge, by which the Receiver profits, as well as the Giver. This can be seen 
when one candle receives light from another by mere touch; the fire was not taken 
away from the other, but its component Matter was kindled by the fire of the 
other. Similar is the process with knowledge, which by both giving and taking 
remains with the Giver, while passing over to the Receiver.14 
 
The notion of undiminished giving fits with the kind of speculation about procession dear 
to triadic Gnosticism. In Hippolytus’s quotation of the Naasenes, above, the primal 
“seed” “is none of [its products], but it generates and produces all that comes into being.” 
The primary divine principle is an uncaused cause and cannot be identified with any of its 
products. The “second principle” consequently cannot be identified with its source. The 
first principle stands alone, independent of any “lower” or “subsequent” entities. The 
second is intrinsically derivative and “subordinate” insofar as it is “second.”  
 It is well enough known that Plotinus adopts the position that the One does not 
need what emanates from it.15 It is also well known that Plotinus explicitly opposed 
                                               
13 Pépin cites Symposium 211B, Timaeus 42E, and Wisdom of Solomon 7:27 as bearing witness to 
this tradition of reflection. For fuller documentation of this doctrine and its afterlife in early Christian 
thought, see Lewis Ayres, “The Holy Spirit as the ‘Undiminished Giver’: Didymus the Blind’s De Spiritu 
Sancto and the Development of Nicene Pneumatology,” in V. Twomey, ed., The Holy Spirit in the Fathers 
of the Church: The Proceedings of the Seventh International Patristic Conference, Maynooth, 2008 
(Portland: Four Courts, 2010), 52-72. For non-reciprocal dependence, see Dominic O’Meara, “The 
Hierarchical Ordering of Reality in Plotinus,” in The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, ed. Lloyd Gerson 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 66-81, esp. 69-75. 
14 Fragment 14.6-16, ed. Des Places:  τὰ δὲ θεῖά ἐστιν οἷα µεταδοθέντα ἐνθένδ’ ἐκεῖθι γεγενηµένα 
ἔνθεν τε οὐκ ἀπελήλυθε κἀκεῖθι γενόµενα τὸν µὲν ὤνησε τὸν δ’ οὐκ ἔβλαψε καὶ προσώνησε τῇ περὶ ὧν 
ἠπίστατο ἀναµνήσει. Ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν χρῆµα ἐπιστήµη ἡ καλή, ἧς ὤνατο µὲν ὁ λαβών, οὐκ 
ἀπολείπεται δ’ αὐτῆς ὁ δεδωκώς. Οἷον ἂν ἴδοις ἐξαφθέντα ἀφ’ ἑτέρου λύχνου λύχνον φῶς ἔχοντα, ὃ µὴ τὸν 
πρότερον ἀφείλατο ἀλλ’ ἢ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ ὕλης πρὸς τὸ ἐκείνου πῦρ ἐξαφθείσης. Τοιοῦτον τὸ χρῆµά ἐστι τὸ 
τῆς ἐπιστήµης, ἐξαφθείσης. Τοιοῦτον τὸ χρῆµά ἐστι τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήµης, ἣ δοθεῖσα καὶ ληφθεῖσα παραµένει 
µὲν τῷ δεδωκότι, σύνεστι δὲ τῷ λαβόντι ἡ αὐτή; Guthrie trans., p. 30. 
15 E.g., Enn. VI.8. 
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certain “Gnostics.” However, Plotinus does not take up his position against a monolithic 
group of Gnostics, as his protestations might suggest. According to Pépin’s reading of the 
evidence, Plotinus sides with a position held by earlier Gnostics. He opposed certain 
unnamed Gnostics who described an ultimate “Good” which “turns out to be by chance 
what it is; it is not master of what it is; it does not draw from itself what it is; it cannot 
therefore have liberty, nor the freedom to produce, or not to produce, what it is forced to 
produce, or not to produce.”16 
 Both Naasene and Valentinian Gnostics opposed such views by teaching that the 
first principle is not dependent upon subsequent entities. Plotinus provides the One with 
the kind of freedom according to which the One cannot be thought of as compelled or 
incited by any higher power. In this way, he adopts a position held previously by Naasene 
and Valentinian Gnostics. The One, he says, cannot be compelled by fate, but “is as he 
himself has wished to be (ὡς ἠθέλησεν αὐτός ἔστιν).”17  
 Tertullian and Theophilus had argued that God the Father could not be without his 
“Wisdom” as a “counselor.”18 Their construal of God’s Wisdom was, in part, a reaction to 
a Valentinian position according to which God the Father does not depend in any way 
upon a “second principle.” Viewed in this light, Origen’s well-known doctrine of the Son 
as eternally-generated Wisdom crystallizes an earlier anti-Valentinian theology of the 
“Logos theologians.” Whether Plotinus, in the passage of Ennead VI quoted above, elided 
such Christians with his unidentified “Gnostics” is an enticing question that need not 
detain us. That Origen followed earlier Logos theologians in positing an “eternal 
Wisdom” suggests some such possibility at least could be entertained. We will return to 
                                               
16 Plotinus, Enn. VI, 8, 7.11-15; Pépin trans. 
17 Plotinus, Ibid. 
18 Pépin (306-307) cites Theophilus, Ad Autolycum II, 22, and Tertullian, Herm., XVIII, 1. 
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this possibility in the chapters to follow. For now it is important to turn to a group of 
themes drawn on by later Christians: participation is intellectual, or immaterial; and the 
Demiurge is a primal “participant” in the source he imitates in the construction of the 
Cosmos. 
 
Intellectual Participation 
 
 
 
 It is well known that Plato held to a theory of Ideas or Forms, and that 
“participation” was one way Plato spoke of the relationship between Ideas and 
particulars. Precisely what Plato’s theory was has been the subject of a long history of 
philosophical scholarship, the particulars of which need not detain us here.19 The point of 
using a Platonic grammar of participation is to underscore that elements or aspects of a 
“higher world” can be and are reproduced in “lower levels” of reality. Plato’s 
Parmenides, in combination with memorable passages from Republic and Timaeus, 
                                               
19 Beginning, famously, with Aristotle’s criticism that “participation” meant little. See, e.g., 
Metaph. 991A20-22: “for to say that they [the Forms] are patterns and the other things ‘participate’ in them 
is to use empty words and poetical metaphors,” or 992A28, “for ‘participating,’ as we have just remarked, 
means nothing” (τὸ γὰρ µετέχειν . . . οὐθέν ἐστιν). Artistotle’s criticism of Plato’s metaphysics is such a 
large topic that I will not take it up here. For an incisive, modern critique in Aristotle’s vein, see Kenneth 
Sayre, Plato’s Late Ontology: A Riddle Resolved (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983). Lloyd P. 
Gerson, Aristotle and Other Platonists (Cornell University Press, 2005), 1-23, in advocating for the 
provocative thesis that “perhaps the reason Aristotle appears to be a Platonist is that in fact he is one,” 
demonstrates that today scholars are not content with simplistic modern oppositions of Aristotle to Plato.  
The “Aristotle” that fourth-century Christians knew was not necessarily, at any rate, the “Aristotle” of 
modern critical history, mediated as his corpus was by commentators like Porphyry. H. Apostle notes in his 
glossary to the Metaphysics that, “Usually, A is said to participate in B if ‘B’ or its definition is a predicate 
of A, directly or derivatively, but ‘A’ is not a predicate of B.  Plato held that sensible things participated in 
Ideas, but said little about the nature of participation” (Hippocrates Apostle, Aristotle’s Metaphysics 
[Indiana, 1966], 469).  Thus, in Aristotle’s corpus, participation becomes primarily a logical affair. This 
view appears to constitute a kind of modern consensus: “While Aristotle rejects the Platonic theory of 
ideas, he uses, nevertheless, rather extensively the verb µετέχειν to express primarily the logical 
relationship between concepts of different universality, but also the more ontological relation between the 
imperfect and the perfect possession of a quality or mode of being.” See David Balàs, Metousia Theou: 
Man’s Participation in God’s Perfections according to Saint Gregory of Nyssa. Studia Anselmiana 
Philosophica Theologica 55 (Romae: I. B. C. Libreria Herder, 1966), 3. 
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established key terms for how “participation” would be explored in later Platonist school 
tradition and early Christianity.20 If Plato initiated “participation” talk, his nephew, 
Speusippus, according to E.R. Dodds, was “already well started on the road to 
Neoplatonism” with a doctrine of “One beyond Being.”21  
Participation (µετάληψις/µέθεξις) names the relationship between the One and the 
many, and Platonists would speak of gradations of this relationship of “sharing.” It would 
denote a characteristically immaterial relationship between particulars and the Ideas in 
which they share. Plato’s readers would seize upon the fact that young Socrates, in the 
Parmenides, rejects a material division of the Ideas by sensible particulars.22 The larger 
point of the Parmenides is that the immaterial is not participated in as a part; it cannot be 
“shared” materially. Being “participated in” with parts is a feature of material existence, 
and this kind of existence differs from intellectual existence. In this connection, “part” 
language is important, because even though Plato makes it clear that participation is not 
material, he retains the materialistic metaphor of “sharing” for describing the 
resemblance that obtains between intelligible causes and their respective effects.  
 Plato’s comparison of the Good to the “sun” (Rep. 509) and its production of 
“light” provides a distinction between the “unparticipating-participated” and the 
“participant.” Plato’s Republic contains the seeds of the doctrine of undiminished giving 
that would become a hallmark of later Platonic ontologies. The Good (the Sun) is not 
diminished by its production of light; light’s presence to darkness does not diminish the 
                                               
20 For further analysis of the reception of Plato’s Parmenides in the early Common Era, see essays 
collected in Turner and Corrigan, eds., Plato’s Parmenides and Its Heritage (2 Vols.) (Atlanta: Society of 
Biblical Literature, 2010). On reception of Timeaus, see Gretchan Reydams-Schils, ed., Plato’s Timaeus as 
Cultural Icon (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003). 
21 E.R. Dodds, “The Parmenides of Plato and the Neoplatonic ‘One,’” The Classical Quarterly 
(1928): 129-42, at 140. 
22 E.g., Parm. 131a-c. 
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source of light. Just so, a participant does not affect that in which it shares, that which 
causes it to be what it is. The Ideas would be known to cause their characteristics to be in 
sensible particulars, but without appeal to physical mediation; the cause here is, strictly 
speaking, intellectual. An important description of this dynamic is Phaedo 100d: 
If anyone tells me that what makes a thing beautiful is its lovely colour, or its 
shape or anything else of the sort, I let all that go, for all those things confuse me, 
and I hold simply and plainly and perhaps foolishly to this, that nothing else 
makes it beautiful but the presence (παρουσία) or communion (κοινωνία) (call it 
what you please) of absolute beauty, however it may have been gained; about the 
way in which it happens, I make no positive statement as yet, but I do insist that 
beautiful things are made beautiful by beauty.  For I think this is the safest answer 
I can give to myself or to others. . . .23  
 
This “safe answer” became the point of departure for later formulation among school 
Platonists of the so-called “paradigmatic cause.”24 Already by Philo’s day in Alexandria, 
school Platonism had come to speak of a “fifth” cause in addition to Aristotle’s traditional 
four. This fifth cause was the “paradigmatic cause,” based on the Timaeus, and which 
Seneca’s Letter 65 refers to as the exemplar cause.25 Platonists invoked this fifth cause 
because they believed Aristotle’s four were insufficient to explain the design of any 
individual entity, but especially the Cosmos: since all natural things are designed, they 
have to be designed according to some pattern. The ship-builder does not build a ship 
without a blueprint, and it was according to the “blueprint” or “prototype” that the 
Demiurge, in Plato’s Timaeus, made the world.26 The “paradigmatic cause” is the 
prototype according to which a thing is made. It is the blueprint, the ideal shape, which 
the architect has in mind when she constructs a building. The existence of a 
                                               
23 Loeb trans., 345. 
24 Jonathan Scott Lee, ‘The Doctrine of Reception According to the Capacity of the Recipient in 
Ennead VI.4-5,” Dionysius III (1979): 79–98, at 80.  Lee’s article contains a useful summary of what he 
calls “eidetic causation” in Plato and Plotinus, prior to his (challenged) criticism of Dominic O’Meara’s 
reading of Plotinus.  That account of Platonist eidetic causation is the non-controversial part of his article. 
25 See Seneca, Ep. 65.7. For discussion of this development see Dillon, Middle Platonists, 137-38. 
26 For an explicit use of this way of thinking by Origen, see Jo. 1.114-116. 
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“paradigmatic cause” implies that the actual building is ultimately outstripped by its 
intended prototype. In the context of exemplar causality, as we shall see, the language of 
“participation” refers to the fact that there remains an indelible distinction between an 
entity and its ideal character or shape. “Participation” terminology implies the recognition 
that any particular existent is ineluctably imperfect and approximates a transcendent 
perfection.   
 
Exemplar Causality & Demiurgic Imitation 
 
 
 
 What seemed like a strictly epistemological tool—Plato’s Theory of Ideas—for 
relating levels of reality, could also be couched in cosmological terms. In Platonizing 
cosmologies, participation often names a relationship between entities in a primal 
procession. An entity may participate without “imitating” what it participates, but 
imitation and participation are closely related in Platonist interpretations of the Demiurge. 
 In the opening paragraphs of his speech, Timaeus reasons as follows: “when the 
artificer of any object, in forming its shape and quality, keeps his gaze fixed on that 
which is uniform, using a model of this kind, that object, executed in this way, must of 
necessity be beautiful; but whenever he gazes at that which has come into existence and 
uses a created model, the object thus executed is not beautiful.”27 In creating the Cosmos, 
the Demiurge requires reference to a model. Timeaus’s reasoning about Being and 
Becoming indicates that the model, or “paradigm” (παραδείγµα), represents Being, and 
                                               
27 Tim. 28a-b. 
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that the Cosmos is what becomes.28 According to Timaeus, the Cosmos is a copy of an 
eternal model, and the Demiurge must use the eternal model to order the Cosmos. 
 Numenius takes Plato’s description of the Demiurge’s need for reference to mean 
that the Demiurge participates in the Good. He speaks of the Demiurge as an “imitator” 
of the Paradigm he uses to create. Numenius distinguishes between “first” and “second” 
divinities and links them by speaking of the second’s participation in the first. Numenius 
writes: 
For if the Second (Divinity) is good, not from itself (οὐ παρ᾽ἑαυτοῦ) but from the 
First (παρὰ δὲ τοῦ πρώτου), how then would it be possible that he (the First) is not 
good, if the latter derives his goodness from participation with the (other, the 
First), especially as the Second participates in him (the First) specially because he 
is the Good.29    
 
Yet the status and location of the Demiurge was not straightforward in school Platonism; 
differences developed. Dillon notes a significant difference between Alcinous and 
Numenius on the interpretation of Republic 6-7 and the Demiurge of the Timaeus: 
Alcinous identifies the Good of Republic with the Demiurge of Timaeus, whereas 
Numenius distinguishes between them.30 For Alcinous, the Demiurge and the Good are 
the same, whereas for Numenius, the Demiurge participates in the Good.    
 As the Demiurge orders the Cosmos, the Demiurge contemplates a model and 
imitates his source. The Demiurge’s contemplation of a model in creating is the chief 
                                               
28 Timeaus takes it for granted that “the Cosmos is beautiful and its Constructor good,” and if that 
is so, he reasons that “it is plain that [the Demiurge] fixed his gaze on the Eternal” (Tim. 29a). Here and 
elsewhere, Timaeus refers to this eternal object as the “Model” to which the Demiurge conforms the 
universe: “So having in this wise come into existence, it has been fashioned after the pattern of that which 
is apprehensible by reason and thought and is self-identical.” 
29 Des Places, ed., Fragment 19. Εἰ γὰρ ἀγαθός ἐστιν ὁ δεύτερος οὐ παρ' ἑαυτοῦ, παρὰ δὲ τοῦ 
πρώτου, πῶς οἷόν τε ὑφ' οὗ µετουσίας ἐστὶν οὗτος ἀγαθός, µὴ ἀγαθὸν <εἶναι>, ἄλλως τε κἂν τύχῃ αὐτοῦ 
ὡς ἀγαθοῦ µεταλαχὼν ὁ δεύτερος; Guthrie, trans., 34. Cf. also Fragments 16 and 19, ed. Des Places. 
30 Dillon, Alcinous, 106. On the other hand, this may be to provide Numenius with too much 
consistency. Certain fragments report that he speaks of multiple Demiurges, or at least of the Demiurge 
considered in different modes. Unfortunately, our evidence does not permit hard conclusions about this 
feature of Numenius’s thought. 
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example of both “exemplar causality” and graded “levels” distinguished and ordered by 
talk of “participation.” Numenius calls the second god a µιµήτης of the first.33 “The First 
God is self-sufficiently good,” he says, “but the Demiurge is good as an imitator of the 
First.”34 The title µιµήτης explains what it means for the Demiurge to be an “image” 
(εἰκὼν) of the First. Numenius’s constellation of terms (µιµήτης, εἰκὼν) resembles 
Hippolytus’s report that certain Gnostics interpreted Sophia’s desire to bear a child 
without a partner as an attempt to imitate (µιµήσασθαι) the Father.35 Plotinus is capable 
of speaking of the Intellect as “imitating the Father” (τον πατέρα µιµούµενος) in its 
ability to remain what it is.36 The theme of “imitation” invites comparison of the Gnostic 
second principle with the Demiurge in Plato’s Timaeus. Generally speaking, the source 
for imitation is the object of contemplation, the activity of focusing one’s attention on an 
object for reproduction. Going forward in Alexandrian Christianity, the pairing of 
µιµήτης and εἰκὼν will often suggest, if not directly refer to, Plato’s description of a 
“Demiurge” who looks to a “paradigm” in ordering the cosmos.37   
 The degree of the second and third principle’s resemblence to Platonic schemes 
varies among Gnostic sects. One key difference between Gnosticism and school 
Platonism is that, for triadic Gnostics, Sophia and her offspring, the Demiurge, did not 
witness firsthand the ultimate source of their own generation. Instead, Sophia and the 
                                               
33 Frag. 16.7.15, ed. Des Places. On Numenius’s triadic theology, made difficult to reconstruct by 
Proclus’s reports, see especially Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 366-72. 
34 Frag. 16.14-15, ed. Des Places: ὁ µὲν πρῶτος θεὸς αὐτοάγαθον, ὁ δὲ τούτου µιµητὴς 
δεηµιουργὸς ἀγαθός. 
35 Pépin, 301 cites Hippolytus, Ref. VI, 30.6-7. 
36 Enn. 2.9.2.4: Οὐ τοίνυν οὔτε πλείω τούτων οὔτε ἐπινοίας περιττὰς ἐν ἐκείνοις, ἃς οὐ δέχονται, 
θετέον, ἀλλ’ ἕνα νοῦν τὸν αὐτὸν ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα, ἀκλινῆ πανταχῇ, µιµούµενον τὸν 
πατέρα καθ’ ὅσον οἷόν τε αὐτῷ. Ψυχῆς δὲ ἡµῶν τὸ µὲν ἀεὶ πρὸς ἐκείνοις, τὸ δὲ πρὸς ταῦτα ἔχειν, τὸ δ’ ἐν 
µέσῳ τούτων· φύσεως γὰρ οὔσης µιᾶς ἐν δυνάµεσι πλείοσιν ὁτὲ µὲν τὴν πᾶσαν συµφέρεσθαι τῷ ἀρίστῳ 
αὐτῆς καὶ τοῦ ὄντος, ὁτὲ δὲ τὸ χεῖρον αὐτῆς καθελκυσθὲν συνεφελκύσασθαι τὸ µέσον· τὸ γὰρ πᾶν αὐτῆς 
οὐκ ἦν θέµις καθελκύσαι. 
37 Tim.39e. 
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Demiurge work on the basis of distant, mediated memories.38 Plato’s Demiurge, on the 
other hand, is supposed to reproduce the παράδειγµα κόσµου based on firsthand 
observation.39 In Platonism, then, the second principle’s imitation is intentional, knowing, 
and direct, whereas in Gnosticism the imitation is distant and clouded—and this by 
mythological design. In some forms of Gnosticism, the “Son” and the “Demiurge” are 
differentiated, but both are involved in the constitution of the cosmos; the Demiurge is 
involved to drastic and tragic effect.40   
 Consider the following example of a Gnostic scheme inspired by basic Platonic 
proclivities. Gnostic Christians could construe the second principle—i.e., the “Son” or 
Christ—as enacting imitation of the first through the embedding of divine characteristics 
within the material creation. Two prominent metaphors for such reproduction in the 
material realm are painting and imprinting. Hippolytus reports that the Peratae 
characterize the Son as a painter in the following way: 
As, however, one who paints from nature (ζωγραφῶν), though he takes nothing 
away from animals, transfers by his pencil all forms to the canvas; so the Son, by 
a power which belongs to himself, transfers paternal marks from the Father into 
Matter. All the paternal marks are here, and there are not any more. For if any one, 
he says, of those (beings) which are here will have strength to perceive that he is a 
paternal mark transferred hither from above, (and that he is) incarnate—just as by 
the conception resulting from the rod a something white is produced—he is of the 
same substance altogether with the Father in heaven, and returns thither.41 
 
The “paternal marks” (τοὺς πατρικοὺς) remaining in the creation are recognizable traces 
that lead Gnostics back, ultimately, to the true Father God.  
                                               
38 See Pépin’s discussion of a number of texts at 311-312. 
39 See Tim. 39e and, e.g., Plotinus, Enn. 5.23-27; see Pépin, 312-313, with discussion ad loc. 
40 To the extent that such forms of Gnosticism were committed to a radical dualism, they raised 
questions for Christians intent on embracing the omnipresence of a good Creator to creation. For this 
reason, later Alexandrians, such as Clement and Origen, opposed Gnosticism. However, Clement and 
Origen did not oppose the Gnostic penchant for conceptualizing the Godhead in terms of a procession of 
entities in Platonic terms. 
41 Hippolytus, Ref. V.17, 5-6; trans., 64. 
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 Another, different explanation of the “paternal marks” arises if it is not the Son 
but the Demiurge (or his Mother, Sophia) who embeds creation with images. On this 
view, the procession from God the Father is a series of paintings, copies of copies, 
descending into the world we know. The images decrease in accuracy and reliability as 
they proceed from the original in the way that a radio frequency loses power over 
distance. Participation terminology is useful for illustrating the hierarchical ontology that 
appears occasionally among Hippolytus’s reports on Gnosticism. Valentinian Gnostics 
speak of the Cross of Christ as a “Participant” (Μετοχεὺς)42, and the Peratae describe a 
series of worlds that “participate” in higher realms.43 According to one Valentinian 
tradition, the Demiurge himself is “a portrait (εἰκόνα) of the true God,” and Sophia is the 
“painter” (ζωγραφῶν) of that portrait.44 In our world “images” (εἰκόνες), “antitypes” 
(ἀντίτυποι), and “idols” (εἴδωλα) all mingle. Because the created world is a poor 
reproduction, the images that mingle here are easily misidentified. Only the Gnostic is 
privy to whether what we see here below can trace its origin to the Father.  
 If the first principle is uncaused and the second self-caused, then the Naasenes 
would link the third principle with the creation of the world.45 This generated principle 
produced the cosmos “without the Logos,” and so, produced chaos.  
For “all things were made by him, and without him was nothing made. That 
which was made in him is life” [John 1:3f.]. This life, he says, is the unutterable 
generation of perfect men, which “was not known to the former generations” 
                                               
42 Hippolytus, Ref. VI.31.6. 
43 Hippolytus, Ref. V.13.1-3. 
44 See Pépin, 317-18; the reference occurs in Clement’s report of Valentinian Gnosticism at Strom. 
IV.13, 89.6-90.1; ed. Stahlin, 287.22-25. Clement’s quotation of a Valentian doctrine also includes the 
important detail that “as much as the image is inferior to the living face, so much is the world inferior to the 
living Aeon.” The implication is that Gnostics taught that an “image” is “inferior” to that which it 
resembles. See also below regarding Numenius, who also calls the Demiurge an “image.” 
45 For Platonic precedent the Timaeus is again relevant: the term γέννητον signifies the “sensible” 
at Timaeus 52a. 
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[Eph. 3:5]; and the “nothing,” which was made without him, is the particular 
world; for it was made without him by the third (being) and the fourth.46 
 
The context of Hippolytus’s quotation does not clarify whether “the third (being) and the 
fourth” are Sophia and her own “product,” the Demiurge. According to Hippolytus, the 
Naasenes know a third, “earthly” entity. It is plausible that their understanding was not 
far from that of the Peratae: the third principle is “produced” (γέννητον). If so, the 
identification here of the “third and the fourth” might coincide with the abortive 
production of the cosmos common to Gnosticisms of various types.47 
 On this point, it is helpful to understand the role that Plato’s Timaeus played in later 
theories of participation—and especially the role played by terms for “image.” To 
understand how these terms could be used to reinforce one another, and the significance 
that became attached to them in cosmology, it is useful to turn momentarily to a late 
source: Proclus’s Commentary on the Timaeaus. Proclus, writing in the fifth century, 
post-dates the period under investigation in this study. Yet Proclus had access to a wealth 
of texts now lost, and he provides evidence of the kinds of questions pursued in earlier 
tradition. The question, of course, is how far back such questions can be traced, but their 
impetus can be found at least as far back as Numenius. Take the following passage, in 
which Proclus focuses on the nature of the so-called “Paradigm,” or paradigmatic cause, 
and its relationship to the Demiurge. After having paraphrased the conclusions reached by 
                                               
46 Hippolytus, Ref. V.6, 5 (Foerster trans., 271). 
47 The Naasene practice of sexual renunciation becomes an ontological statement: abstention from 
sexuality transcends generation because generation is intrinsically flawed. This is my own interpretation of 
Hippolytus, Refutatio V.6, 10-11 (Foerster trans., 280): “Because of these words . . . they attend the so-
called mysteries of the Great Mother, thinking that through those (sacred) actions they will best understand 
the universal mystery. For these men have nothing (to offer) beyond what is done there, except that they are 
not castrated, they only perform the function of those who are castrated. For they urge most severely and 
carefully that one should abstain, as those men do, from intercourse with women; their behaviour 
otherwise, as we have fully explained, is like that of the castrated.” 
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Iamblichus, Porphyry, and Theodore of Asine, Proclus turns to his own master 
(presumably Syrianus): 
Since some of [our teacher’s] predecessors had determined that the Demiurge 
himself was in possession of the paradigms for the universe, as in the case of 
Plotinus,48 while others placed the Paradigm either anterior to him, as in the case 
of Porphyry, or posterior to him, as in the case of Longinus, he asked whether (1) 
the Demiurge comes immediately after the One, or (2) whether there are other 
intelligible ranks [of gods] between the Demiurge and the One. If indeed (1) the 
Demiurge comes [immediately] after the One, there is the absurdity that the 
complete multiplicity of the Intelligible gods comes [immediately] after the Non-
multiple, for it is by means of the numbers that are proximate to the One that there 
is a procession towards the entire series of numbers and the entire multiplicity. 
But (2) if there are other ranks between the One and the Demiurge, we need to ask 
(a) whether the Paradigm of the universe is principally in him, or whether (b) it is 
posterior to him or (c) prior to him. If (a) it is principally in him, we shall place 
the entire intelligible multiplicity in him, for the Paradigm is the ‘fairest of the 
intelligized entities’ (30d2). This means once again that it will be intelligible and 
not intellective, as we demonstrated a little earlier. The Paradigm, however, has 
four ideas only, whereas he himself has the ideas of the entities that are more 
particular than they are, namely the sun, the moon and each of the everlasting 
beings. But if (b) it is posterior to him, he will have his gaze turned to what is 
inferior and less honorable, which it is not permissible to admit for any of the 
divine beings. The result is that the Paradigm is prior to the Demiurge. But if it is 
prior to the Demiurge, is it (α) seen by him or (β) not seen? To say that (α) it is not 
seen is the view of someone who pays no attention to Plato or to the nature of 
things. For it would be absurd if our soul were to see that Paradigm and speak 
about it, but Intellect, and the Universal Intellect at that, were not to do so. And if 
(β) the Demiurge sees the Intelligible, does he do so with his gaze turned (i) 
towards himself or (ii) outside himself only? But if he looks (ii) outside himself 
only, he sees images of Being and he will have perception rather than intuitive 
knowledge. If, however, he (i) looks towards himself, object [sic] of intellection 
will be in him as well. The result is that the Paradigm is both prior to the 
Demiurge and in him, prior to him in the intelligible mode (noêtôs), in him in the 
intellective mode (noerôs).49 
                                               
48 Cf. Plotinus, Enn. 3.9.1. 
49 Proclus, Tim., ed. Diels, 322.19-323.22. ὁ δέ γε ἡµέτερος καθηγεµὼν κατὰ τὴν ἔνθεον ἑαυτοῦ 
νοήσιν καὶ τόδε τῆς προσηκούσης διαίτης ἠξίωσεν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ τῶν παλαιῶν οἳ µὲν αὐτὸν τὸν δηµιουργὸν 
ἐποίησαν ἔχοντα τὰ παραδείγµατα τῶν ὅλων, ὡς Πλωτῖνος [Enn. 3, 9, 1], οἳ δὲ οὐκ αὐτόν, ἀλλ’ ἤτοι πρὸ 
αὐτοῦ τὸ παράδειγµα, ἢ µετ’ αὐτόν, πρὸ αὐτοῦ µὲν ὡς ὁ Πορφύριος, µετ’ αὐτὸν δὲ ὡς ὁ Λογγῖνος, ἠρώτα, 
πότερον ὁ δηµιουργὸς εὐθὺς µετὰ τὸ ἕν ἐστιν, ἢ καὶ ἄλλαι τάξεις εἰσὶ νοηταὶ µεταξὺ τοῦ τε δηµιουργοῦ καὶ 
τοῦ ἑνός· εἰ µὲν γὰρ µετὰ τὸ ἓν ὁ δηµιουργός, ἄτοπον τὸ σύµπαν εἶναι τῶν νοητῶν πλῆθος µετὰ τὸ 
ἀπλήθυντον· διὰ γὰρ τῶν τῷ ἑνὶ προσεχῶν ἀριθµῶν ἡ πρόοδος ἡ ἐπὶ τὸν ὅλον ἀριθµὸν καὶ τὸ ὅλον πλῆθος. 
εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι µεταξὺ τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τοῦ (323.) δηµιουργοῦ τάξεις εἰσί, πότερον ἐν αὐτῷ πρώτῳ τὸ 
παράδειγµα τοῦ παντὸς ἢ µετ’ αὐτὸν ἢ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ζητητέον· εἰ µὲν γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ πρώτῳ, πᾶν τὸ νοητὸν 
πλῆθος ἐν αὐτῷ θήσοµεν· τὸ γὰρ τῶν νοουµένων κάλλιστον τὸ παράδειγµά ἐστιν· ὥστε πάλιν ἔσται νοητὸς 
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Notice that Proclus worries about the relationship between the Demiurge and the 
Paradigm to which the Demiurge looks. Does the Paradigm, or intelligible model, reside 
within the Demiurge himself? Or, if it is extrinsic to the Demiurge, is the Demiurge 
secondary or inferior to the Paradigm? Furthermore, if the Paradigm is external to the 
Demiurge, does that not imply an inferior kind of knowledge of the model on the part of 
the Demiurge?  
 I do not mean to suggest that the kind of scholastic clarity Proclus provides 
circulated in third-century Alexandria—though there is little reason to doubt such a 
possibility. I do, however, suggest that the force of questions like those raised by Proclus 
would not have been lost on earlier readers of the Timaeus. Take, for example, the 
following quotations from Numenius—a figure conspicuously absent from Proclus’s 
account, but whose writings were well known to Clement, Origen, and Eusebius of 
Caesarea. Eusebius excerpted and retained the following philosophically dense 
statements.  
“Now if essence and the idea is discerned by the mind, and if it was agreed that 
the mind is earlier than this and the cause of it, then mind itself is alone found to 
be the good. For if God the Creator is the beginning of generation, the good is the 
beginning of essence. And God the Creator is related to the good, of which He is 
an imitator, as generation is to essence, of which it is a likeness and an imitation. 
“For if the Creator who is the author of generation is good, the Creator also of 
                                                                                                                                            
καὶ οὐ νοερός, ὃ µικρῷ πρότερον [p. 310 ss] ἀπεδείκνυµεν. καίτοι τὸ µὲν παράδειγµα µόνας ἰδέας ἔχει 
τέτταρας, αὐτὸς δὲ καὶ τὰς ἔτι µερικωτέρας ἐκείνων, ἡλίου, σελήνης, ἑκάστου τῶν ἀιδίων. εἰ δὲ µετ’ αὐτόν, 
ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἐστραµµένος ἔσται καὶ τὸ ἀτιµότερον, ὃ µηδενὶ τῶν θείων ὑπάρξαι θέµις· ὥστε πρὸ τοῦ 
δηµιουργοῦ τὸ παράδειγµά ἐστιν. ἀλλ’ εἰ πρὸ τοῦ δηµιουργοῦ, πότερον ὁρᾶται ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἢ οὐχ ὁρᾶται; τὸ 
µὲν οὖν µὴ ὁρᾶσθαι λέγειν καὶ τοῦ Πλάτωνός ἐστιν ἀνήκοον καὶ τῆς τῶν πραγµάτων φύσεως· ἄτοπον γὰρ 
τὴν µὲν ἡµετέραν ψυχὴν ὁρᾶν ἐκεῖνο καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν, νοῦν δὲ καὶ τὸν ὅλον νοῦν µὴ ὁρᾶν. εἰ δὲ ὁρᾷ 
τὸ νοητὸν ὁ δηµιουργός, πότερον εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐστραµµένος ὁρᾷ, ἢ ἔξω µόνον ἑαυτοῦ; ἀλλ’ εἰ µὲν ἔξω µόνον 
ἑαυτοῦ, εἴδωλα ὁρᾷ τοῦ ὄντος καὶ ἕξει αἴσθησιν ἀντὶ νοήσεως· εἰ δὲ εἰς ἑαυτόν, ἔστι καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ 
νοούµενον· ὥστε καὶ πρὸ τοῦ δηµιουργοῦ τὸ παράδειγµά ἐστι καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ, νοητῶς µὲν πρὸ αὐτοῦ, νοερῶς 
δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ. David Runia and Michael Share, trans., Proclus. Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus Volume II: 
Book 2: Proclus on the Causes of the Cosmos and its Creation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), 177-178. 
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essence will doubtless be absolute good, innate in essence. For the second god, 
being twofold, is the self-maker of the idea of Himself, and makes the world as its 
Creator: afterwards He is wholly given to contemplation.” And in the fifth Book 
[Numenius] speaks as follows: “Now as we have by our reasoning gathered 
names for four things, let them be these four. The first, God, absolute good; His 
imitator, a good Creator: then essence, one kind of the first God, another of the 
Second; and the imitation of this essence, the beautiful world, adorned by 
participation in the beautiful.” Also in the sixth Book he adds: “But the things 
which partake of Him participate in nothing, else, but only in wisdom: in this way 
then, but in no other, they may enjoy the communion of the good. And certainly 
this wisdom has been found to belong to the First alone. If then this belongs 
exclusively to Him alone, from whom all other things receive their colouring and 
their goodness, none but a stupid soul could doubt any longer. “For if the second 
God is good, not of Himself but from the First, how is it possible that He, by 
communion with whom this Second is good, should not Himself be good, 
especially if the Second has partaken of Him as being good? “It is in this way that 
Plato has shown by syllogistic reasoning to any one who is clear-sighted that the 
good is one.” And again afterwards he says: “But Plato represented these things as 
true differently in different places; for in the Timaeus peculiarly he wrote the 
common inscription on the Creator, saying, ‘He was good.’ But in the Republic he 
called the good the Idea of good: meaning that the idea of the Creator was the 
good, because to us He is manifested as good by participation in the First and only 
Good. For as men are said to have been fashioned by the idea of man, and oxen 
by that of an ox, and horses by the idea of a horse; so also naturally if the Creator 
is good by participation in the First Good, the first Mind would be an idea, as 
being absolute good.”50 
                                               
50 Numenius apud Eusebius, p.e. XI.22, 3-10. The quote that follows corresponds to Des Places, 
ed., fragments 16, 19, and 20, as translated, however, in the ANF. Ἐν δὲ τῷ πέµπτῳ ταῦτά φησιν· Εἰ δ’ ἔστι 
µὲν νοητὸν ἡ οὐσία καὶ ἡ ἰδέα, ταύτης δ’ ὡµολογήθη πρεσβύτερον καὶ αἴτιον εἶναι ὁ νοῦς, αὐτὸς οὗτος 
µόνος εὕρηται ὢν τὸ ἀγαθόν. Καὶ γὰρ εἰ ὁ µὲν δηµιουργὸς θεός ἐστι γενέσεως, ἀρκεῖ τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὐσίας 
εἶναι ἀρχή. Ἀνάλογον δὲ τούτῳ µὲν ὁ δηµιουργὸς θεός, ὢν αὐτοῦ µιµητής, τῇ δὲ οὐσίᾳ ἡ γένεσις, ἣ εἰκὼν 
αὐτῆς ἐστι καὶ µίµηµα. Εἴπερ δὲ ὁ δηµιουργὸς ὁ τῆς γενέσεώς ἐστιν ἀγαθός, ἦ που ἔσται καὶ ὁ τῆς οὐσίας 
δηµιουργὸς αὐτοάγαθον, σύµφυτον τῇ οὐσίᾳ. Ὁ γὰρ δεύτερος διττὸς ὢν αὐτοποιεῖ τήν τε ἰδέαν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ 
τὸν κόσµον, δηµιουργὸς ὤν, ἔπειτα θεωρητικὸς ὅλως. Συλλελογισµένων δ’ ἡµῶν ὀνόµατα τεσσάρων 
πραγµάτων τέσσαρα ἔστω ταῦτα· ὁ µὲν πρῶτος θεὸς αὐτοάγαθον· ὁ δὲ τούτου µιµητὴς δηµιουργὸς 
ἀγαθός· ἡ δ’ οὐσία µία µὲν ἡ τοῦ πρώτου, ἑτέρα δ’ ἡ τοῦ δευτέρου· ἧς µίµηµα ὁ καλὸς κόσµος, 
κεκαλλωπισµένος µετουσίᾳ τοῦ καλοῦ. [Ἔτι τούτοις καὶ ἐν τῷ ἕκτῳ προστίθησι ταῦτα·] Μετέχει δὲ αὐτοῦ 
τὰ µετίσχοντα ἐν ἄλλῳ µὲν οὐδενί, ἐν δὲ µόνῳ τῷ φρονεῖν· ταύτῃ ἄρα καὶ τῆς ἀγαθοῦ συµβάσεως ὀνίναιτ’ 
ἄν, ἄλλως δ’ οὔ. Καὶ µὲν δὴ τὸ φρονεῖν, τοῦτο δὴ συντετύχηκε µόνῳ τῷ πρώτῳ. Ὑφ’ οὗ οὖν τὰ ἄλλα 
ἀποχραίνεται καὶ ἀγαθοῦται, ἐὰν τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ µόνον µόνῳ προσῇ, ἀβελτέρας ἂν εἴη ψυχῆς ἔτι ἀµφιλογεῖν. 
Εἰ γὰρ ἀγαθός ἐστιν ὁ δεύτερος οὐ παρ’ ἑαυτοῦ, παρὰ δὲ τοῦ πρώτου, πῶς οἷόν τε ὑφ’ οὗ µετουσίας ἐστὶν 
οὗτος ἀγαθός, µὴ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ἄλλως τε κἂν τύχῃ αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀγαθοῦ µεταλαχὼν ὁ δεύτερος; οὕτω τοι ὁ 
Πλάτων ἐκ συλλογισµοῦ τῷ ὀξὺ βλέποντι ἀπέδωκε τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὅτι ἐστὶν ἕν. [Καὶ πάλιν ἑξῆς φησι·] Ταῦτα 
δ’ οὕτως ἔχοντα ἔθηκεν ὁ Πλάτων ἄλλῃ καὶ ἄλλῃ χωρίσας· ἰδίᾳ µὲν γὰρ τὸν κυκλικὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ δηµιουργοῦ 
ἐγράψατο ἐν Τιµαίῳ εἰπών· Ἀγαθὸς ἦν· ἐν δὲ τῇ Πολιτείᾳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶπεν ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν, ὡς δὴ  τοῦ 
δηµιουργοῦ ἰδέαν οὖσαν τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὅστις πέφανται ἡµῖν ἀγαθὸς µετουσίᾳ τοῦ πρώτου τε καὶ µόνου. 
Ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι µὲν λέγονται τυπωθέντες ὑπὸ τῆς ἀνθρώπου ἰδέας, βόες δ’ ὑπὸ τῆς βοός, ἵπποι δ’ 
ὑπὸ τῆς ἵππου ἰδέας, οὕτως καὶ εἰκότως ὁ δηµιουργὸς εἴπερ ἐστὶ µετουσίᾳ τοῦ πρώτου ἀγαθοῦ ἀγαθός, 
ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα ἂν εἴη ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς, ὢν αὐτοάγαθον. 
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The constellation of terms for ordering, participation, and creation in Numenius’ 
reflection on the Timaeus that reappears in Proclus’s Commentary belongs to a generic 
Demiurgic Platonism. The appearance of this constellation of terms in Plato’s 
cosmological discussion in the Timaeus led early Christians to seize upon this aspect of 
Platonism for interpreting their own sacred account of such matters, found in the opening 
chapters of Genesis.51 The point I wish to make in comparing these two texts is the 
following. Already with Numenius, an anxiety induced by a felt need to “locate” the 
Demiurge in an “order” or hierarchy is apparent. The anxiety results from an overarching 
logic of participation that treats effects as inferior to causes. This same anxiety is latent 
whenever Christian theologians invoke similar schemes. 
 
Causality and Hierarchy  
 
 
 
 With the Demiurge’s status as a contemplator and imitator of the Good in view, 
we are in a better position to understand why Demiurgic schemes of triadic procession 
suggest hierarchical arrangements. Although a grammar of participation and a Demiurgic 
cosmology do not amount to the axiom that a cause is superior to its effect, participation 
and hierarchy are mutually reinforcing tendencies, and in fact they often travel together 
as mutually entailing ideas.  
 Like emanation, the doctrine that a cause is superior to its effect is often 
associated with Plotinus, who, for example, closes Ennead V.5.13 with the statement that 
                                               
51 On such readings, see especially Reydams-Schils, ed., Timaeus as Cultural Icon. 
 38 
“the maker is better than what is made, because more complete.”52 However much 
Plotinus may have used the principle that a cause is greater than its effect to support his 
argument that the One transcends all things, his appeal to the principle itself was neither 
unique nor radically novel. In fact, a version of the axiom was operative in Aristotle and 
at least some of his readers in antiquity, such as Alexander of Aphrodisias and Cicero.53 
As part of an argument that nature governs the universe, Cicero says:   
Thus if anyone declared that a man’s teeth and the hair on his body are a natural 
growth but that the man himself to whom they belong is not a natural organism, 
he would fail to see that things which produce something from within them must 
have more perfect natures than the things which are produced from them.54 
 
Cicero is clear that a cause is “more perfect” (perfectior) than what it produces. 
Alexander of Aphrodisias appeals to the axiom in a psychological context. As A.C. Lloyd 
says, the active intellect “which causes the material intellect to be an intellect in habitu, 
must be the properly and above all intelligible form (i.e., form without matter); for 
always what is properly and above all φ is what causes other φ things to be φ.”55 Lloyd is 
paraphrasing this passage: 
For it is a general rule that in any order of reality, the being which best 
exemplifies the perfection of that order is the cause of there being other existents 
of this kind. Thus light, for example, is at once the most visible of all things and 
the cause whereby other visible things are visible; so too the supreme and highest 
                                               
52 LCL trans., 197. κρεῖττον γὰρ τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ ποιουµένου· τελειότερον γάρ. 
53 See A.C. Lloyd, “The Principle That the Cause is Greater than Its Effect,” Phronesis 21.2 
(1976): 146-156. Lloyd argues that one could make a case for the version of the axiom that a cause is 
greater than its effect on the basis of Aristotle, Met. 993b24-26 and An. post. 72a29-30. He appeals to 
Cicero, De nat. deor. 2.86 and Alexander of Aphrodisias, De an. p. 88, fin. Bruns, for evidence that, in fact, 
readers of Aristotle had done so with some success, though Lloyd later admits that the two passages in 
Aristotle were atypical of Aristotle’s tendencies (see Lloyd, 155). In order to prove that causal schemes 
could imply hierarchical arrangement, it is not necessary to discover the strongest version of the axiom, 
made explicit with deductive proof apparently only by Proclus, that a cause is greater than and not equal to 
its effect. 
54 Cicero, De natura deorum 2.86. Ut, si qui dentes et pubertatem natura dicat existere, ipsum 
autem hominem cui ea existant non constare natura, non intellegat ea quae ecferant aliquid ex sese 
perfectiores habere naturas quam ea quae ex iis ecferantur. LCL 268, Rackham, trans. 
55 Lloyd, 149. 
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good is the cause of goodness in other good things, since their goodness is 
measured by reference to the first good.56 
 
Note that Alexander invokes the principle with an illustration from light. This is no 
coincidence. It shows that Alexander drew on Plato’s Sun analogy (Rep. 508-509) as the 
paradigm case of the principle that a cause is superior to its effects. Given these 
precedents, it should hardly surprise to find Alexandrian use of the principle that a cause 
is greater than its effect.  
 On the other hand, we do not need to find explicit appeal to the axiom that a cause 
is superior to its effect in order to understand how the axiom is implicit in interpretations 
of the Timeaus, a chief source of inspiration for accounts of procession amongst 
Platonists, as we have seen. As Lloyd suggests, “nonphysical causation, or procession, is 
regularly seen by Neoplatonists as the divisions of genera into species, which of course 
for Plato represented the standard cases of a one and a many.”57 Might something similar 
hold for pre-Plotinian Platonism?  
 Especially if the “paradigm” to which the Demiurge looks is identified with the 
Platonic “paradigmatic cause,” the Demiurge might be thought to participate in a cause 
superior to him—such an arrangement would be the epitome of a cause’s superiority over 
its effect. Recall that Numenius describes the Demiurge as an “image.” An image is a 
faithful, if artificial, representation of the object it represents, but it implies equivocation. 
No matter how faithful, the image differs from its paradigm in terms of substance. An 
                                               
56 Alexander of Aphrodisias, de anima, 88.26-89.4. Ἐν πᾶσιν γὰρ τὸ µάλιστα καὶ κυρίως τι ὂν καὶ 
τοῖς ἄλλοις αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι τοιούτοις. Τό τε γὰρ µάλιστα ὁρατόν, τοιοῦτον δὲ τὸ φῶς, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς 
ὁρατοῖς αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι ὁρατοῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ µάλιστα καὶ πρώτως ἀγαθὸν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀγαθοῖς αἴτιον 
τοῦ εἶναι τοιούτοις· τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ τῇ πρὸς τοῦτο συντελείᾳ κρίνεται. Athanasios Fotinis, trans., 
Dissertation, 118. For the Greek text, see M. Bergeron and R. Dufour eds., Alexandre d’Aphrodise De L’ 
Âme (Paris: Libraire Philosophique, 2008). The edition of Bergeron and Dufour reproduces the Greek text 
of Bruns, ed., Supplementum aristotelicum, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, v. II, pars I (Berlin: 
Reimer, 1887). 
57 Lloyd, 149. 
 40 
educated reader would recall another classic illustration that draws on images: the 
illustration of equivocity that opens Aristotle’s Categories.58 We call both “man” and a 
“picture of a man” an “animal,” Aristotle says, but each use of “animal” indicates a 
different substance.59 The distinction between model and copy also implies a relationship 
of superior to inferior. The human being is superior to the imitation enacted by a portrait, 
however realistic the portrait may be. 
 Especially if Aristotle’s Categories formed part of a philosopher’s education, it is 
not difficult to see how a Platonist could see a cause-and-effect relationship between the 
model, or paradigm, and its corresponding image. The equivocation, taken over from 
Aristotle, would be obvious. The term “image” stands for an effect’s resemblance of its 
cause, but the fact that an image is an “effect” includes its equivocal status. To use terms 
for “participation” to name the relationship between cause and effect, model and image, 
is only to reinforce the implicit hierarchical relationship.  
 This is precisely how Numenius portrays the Demiurge, who participates in the 
Good and is inferior to Intellect. Plato’s description of the Demiurge as contemplating an 
eternal “model” suggests the Demiurge’s inferiority to what he participates in—the Good. 
For Numenius, the Demiurge’s participation in the Good and his status as the Intellect’s 
“imitator” and “image” indicate the Demiurge’s inferiority to the Good. Numenius’s 
reference to the Demiurge as an “image” and “imitation” is a sign of the Demiurge’s 
inferiority to Intellect, and explains why Numenius refers to the Intellect as “older than 
this one”: the Intellect is superior to the Demiurge because the Demiurge is an effect. 
                                               
58 Aristotle, Categories, 1a-6a. 
59 Aristotle: “Things are named equivocally if only the name applied to them is common but the 
expression of the substance corresponding to that name is different for each of the things, as in the case of a 
man and a picture when each is called ‘animal’” (Categories, 1a-3a; Apostle trans., 1). 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 I have outlined a number of remarkable features of Gnosticism that pre-date the 
Alexandrian milieu in which Clement, Origen, and Didymus took up there expositions of 
Christian doctrine. It should be clear now that the use of a constellation of terms to depict 
a primal “hierarchy” would have been natural for Clement and Origen. The point is not to 
reduce later options to those provided by Gnosticism. Rather, the purpose has been to 
underscore a deep continuity between later Christian speculation about the Trinity and 
earlier attempts to describe a primal procession. It is also important to disarm the instinct 
that sighting various Platonic parallels in Origen reduces the range of Origen’s inspiration 
to pagan sources. In fact, earlier Christian traditions, including but not limited to Gnostic 
traditions, had already incorporated elements familiar to Platonism in speculative 
schemes. Later Alexandrian similarities should appear not as something born from 
nowhere, but as innovative attempts to rework common ground to various ends.   
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Chapter 2 
Origen’s Graded Triad 
   
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 This chapter explains an important consequence of Origen’s debts to Platonic 
philosophy: he teaches a graded triad. I argue that Platonizing dynamics drawn from 
Numenius of Apamea condition Origen’s theology of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. If 
Origen’s reliance upon Clement is widely presumed, his relationship to Numenius is at 
least as intriguing. Although Origen mentions On the Good only once in his writings and 
does not name Numenius in his dogmatic or exegetical works, in apologetic moments he 
shows high regard for Numenius, and he cites passages from two of his other lost works.1  
Several passages in the Commentary on John exhibit a tendency to order first 
principles in terms of a hierarchy.2 The passages are widely discussed, but their sources 
of inspiration and the consequences they hold for Origen’s theology are not gauged 
consistently across current scholarship.3 Some dismiss them as idiosyncratic but not 
                                               
1 Origen, Cels. 1.15; see Des Places, Fragments 1b and 1c. Origen knows of Numenius’s “On the 
Incorruptibility of the Soul,” “Epops,” “On Number,” and “On Place” (Cels. IV.51). 
2 I have reservations about translating Origen’s (rare) use of the word triados as “Trinity.” The 
reason for my hesitation will become clearer in Chapter 4. Excluding instances of a form of the word in the 
Catena and Fragmenta, a search of the TLG reports that Origen uses τριάδος only three times in the 
Commentary on John (Jo. 6.145; 6.166; 10.270; and once in ComMatt. 15.31.25 (τῆς ἀρχικῆς τριάδος). 
These statements resemble what Origen says about the three “principles” in the recently discovered 
Homilies on the Psalms (see Lorenzo Perrone, “La Pneumatologia di Origene alla luce delle Nuove Omelie 
sui Salmi,” Paper presented at the conference «Il divino in/quieto», Bologna 2-3 December 2014 
(forthcoming), and, “Doctrinal Traditions and Cultural Heritage in the Newly Discovered Homilies of 
Origen on the Psalms (Cod. Mon. Graec. 314),” in Topical Issues of Ancient Culture and Its Heritage 
(Tbilisi 23-27 September 2014) (Forthcoming). 
3 I will return to a consideration of this issue and attendant scholarship in Chapter 4. The best 
single candidate for an authority motivating a current trend to downplay the significance of Middle 
Platonism in Origen is Henri Crouzel. See, for example, Henri Crouzel, trans. A.S. Worrall, Origen, (San 
Francisco: Harper & Row, 1989), Chapter 10. Some more recent scholars have followed Crouzel in his 
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problematic if placed within the broad outlook of Origen’s reverence for the Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit; others take them seriously but mitigate them by appeal to later texts and 
so suggest they do not represent Origen’s mature position. Still others overlook their 
potential significance by pretending that Origen displays no tendency toward ontological 
hierarchy.4  
 My argument is that Numenius’s On the Good influenced Origen decisively 
insofar as his statements about the Christian triad depict a hierarchical triad of Numenian 
provenance.5 In order to explain how Numenius influenced Origen’s construal of the 
Christian triad, I first identify key dynamics in the thought of Numenius and Clement of 
Alexandria. I then proceed to Origen’s Commentary on John, focusing especially on 
philosophically dense passages in Commentary on John 2. Comparison of Numenius and 
Origen leads to the conclusion that Origen’s early theology of the trinity is marked by a 
                                                                                                                                            
judgment that Origen “is constantly accused, for reasons of vocabulary which we shall explain, of making 
the Son and the Holy Spirit creatures of the Father.” Crouzel reasons that those who read Origen this way 
have failed to take into account Origen’s doctrine of eternal generation (Crouzel, 172). Crouzel does not 
take account of the fact that stating that an entity is “eternally generated” does not settle the question of 
whether the produced entity is “inferior.” After all, as we have seen, Platonists were capable of ordering 
entities in a primal series without worry that any of the series is “temporal.” For Origen, the fact that these 
two features of ontology—an entity’s being both “eternal” and ordered in a hierarchy—were not mutually 
exclusive gives his speculation a potential to support both pro- and anti-Nicene theologies. Setting Origen’s 
thought within the framework of Middle Platonism shows how this is the case, and though it is important 
not to judge Origen anachronistically, by the same token it is important not to sterilize his thought of 
dynamics that would come to be viewed as problematic in light of later doctrinal developments. 
4 For both of these tendencies at once, see Christopher Beeley, The Unity of Christ (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2012), 3-48, especially 26. Beeley dismisses these passages on the grounds that they 
conflict with, and so must be read in light of, statements Origen allegedly made later (in, e.g., Selecta in 
Psalmos and Scholia in Apocalypsin). Though Beeley cites Rowan Williams to similar effect (cf. Rowan 
Williams, Arius [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002], 142-43), he casts off the caution with which Williams 
had viewed these potentially spurious passages. Williams had the better judgment, because one cannot 
marshall other texts similar to these two from Origen’s undisputed Greek corpus. For more on this issue, 
see Chapter 4. 
5 It is appropriate to consider both Clement and Origen as potentially under the influence of 
Numenius. Clement provides the first recorded mention of his name, in Strom. I.22, and Dillon accordingly 
dates Numenius’ floruit to 150 CE. See Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 362, for a more detailed argument 
for this dating. 
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logic of participation taken from “middle” Platonism, which produces broadly 
hierarchical dynamics.  
 
Texts and Dating 
 
 
 
 Before comparing Numenius with Origen’s Commentary on John, it is appropriate 
to answer a question: in assessing Origen’s early theology, why start with the 
Commentary on John? Part of the answer is chronological; part of it is philological. The 
first two books of the Commentary date to Origen’s early period, roughly 
contemporaneous with the material Rufinus translated from the Greek original of On 
First Principles. The Latin text of On First Principles 1-2 is skewed to one direction by 
Rufinus’ sympathetic translation, to another by the hostility of the sources that allege 
Greek fragments of the original. Because the Greek text of the Commentary has survived, 
Origen’s thought there may help in evaluating Rufinus’ version of On First Principles. 
The first two books of Origen’s Commentary on John are pivotal for reconstructing his 
early speculation about the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Unlike a number of passages in 
Rufinus’ version of On First Principles, the Commentary on John contains Greek original 
to Origen. In the case of the Commentary, we do not have to worry whether we are 
dealing with Origen himself or later influences, friendly or hostile. These are Origen’s 
own formulations.  
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 So much for philological considerations; let us consider chronological issues. 
Origen composed the Commentary on John over the course of his career.6  According to 
Rufinus, Origen composed a total of thirty-two books on John, ending in open-ended 
fashion with reflections on the Last Supper. It is not clear why Origen left off when and 
where he did (at John 13.33), though John McGuckin has argued that Book 32 was close 
to Origen’s final intended production. Only books 1, 2, 6, 10, 13, 19, 20, 28, and 32 are 
extant in Greek. According to Eusebius, Origen composed the first five books (of which 
only books 1 and 2 remain) at Alexandria, presumably circa 230/1.7 Origen is supposed to 
have published On First Principles, at least in parts, earlier in the same decade. The 
controversy over this (and other) material is thought to have resulted in Origen’s 
expulsion to Caesarea by Bishop Demetrios of Alexandria in or around 331.8 At least 
with the first two books of the Commentary on John we can rest assured we have material 
dateable to years surrounding the publication of On First Principles in Alexandria.9  
 
 
 
                                               
6 For a detailed analysis of the structure of Jo. on the whole, see John McGuckin, “Structural 
Design and Apologetic Intent in Origen’s Commentary on John,” in Origeniana Sexta: Origène et la Bible, 
ed. Dorival and Le Boulluec (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1995), 441-457. 
7 Eusebius, h.e. 6.24. 
8 McGuckin, “Structural Design,” 444 n. 9. Prior to his transition to Palestine, according to 
Eusebius, Origen also produced the first eight books of the Commentary on Genesis (not extant), 
Commentary on Psalms 1-25, and the Commentary on Lamentations, “two books on the resurrection,” and 
ten books of miscellanies, or stromata. Origen wrote the rest of the commentaries on John (Bks 6-32) once 
he had taken up residence in Palestine as the head of a newly established school (so, A.D. 232: Bk 6; 235: 
Bks 13-20; 238: Bks 22-31; 248: Bk 32). 
9 Especially as opposed to the relationship between this material and what is definitely much later 
material, namely, all of Origen’s Homilies except for those on Luke, which were composed earlier at 
Alexandria (McGuckin, 17; Crouzel, Origen, 30). The Homilies on Genesis, according to this account, date 
from the last decade of Origen’s life (243/5-253/5). The lost Commentaries on Genesis 1-8, however, date 
from the earlier Alexandria period. Though Jo. 1 and 2 constitute a faithful rendition of Origen’s theology 
from his early Alexandria period, the chronological relationship between the four books of On First 
Principles and the first two books of Jo. remains undetermined. 
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Demiurgic Precedents in Numenius and Clement 
 
 
 
 Before turning to Origen, it is important to note the centrality and function of 
participation for Numenius’s aetiology.10 I will begin with several fragments from 
Numenius before turning briefly to Clement. 
 
Numenius, On the Good 
 
 
 
Several fragments of Numenius’s lost On the Good deserve close consideration in 
comparison with Origen’s Commentary on John.11 Fragment 16 is especially important. 
                                               
10 In comparing Origen with “triadic” Platonism, I have taken as points of departure two important 
articles, here listed chronologically: A.H.B. Logan, “Origen and the Development of Trinitarian Theology,” 
in Origeniana quarta (1987), 424-429; and John Dillon, “Logos and Trinity: Patterns of Platonist Influence 
on Early Christianity,” in The Great Tradition: Further Studies in the Development of Platonism and Early 
Christianity (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1997), 1-13 (Chapter VIII). I am operating with the conviction that 
Origen pre-dates the advent of “Neoplatonism” that arrived only with the wide circulation of Plotinus’s 
Enneads, nearly all of which were produced after Origen’s death. If this conviction is correct, then the 
presumption, exemplified by Herbert Musurillo, that Origen borrowed from “Neoplatonic schools” and 
“transcended the limited categories of eclectic Neoplatonism” is misleading. See Herbert Musurillo, “The 
Recent Revival of Origen Studies,” Theological Studies 24 (1963): 253, 262. 
11 On Numenius generally, see E.R. Dodds, “Numenius and Ammonius,” in Les Sources de Plotin 
(Geneva: Vandoeuvres, 1957), 3-61; and John Dillon, The Middle Platonists, Rev. ed. (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1996), 361-79. Dillon takes seriously, though not uncritically, Proclus’s report that 
Numenius teaches a triad (Dillon, 367). I follow the broad contours of Dillon’s account. Ziebritzki reads 
Numenius as having a basically “two-hypostasis” system in spite of references to a “triad” in the fragments 
of Numenius’s lost words. This is part of his larger attempt to demonstrate that both Origen and Plotinus 
represent a shift toward “tri-hypostasis” systems. One difficulty for Ziebritzki’s thesis is the pre-Origenian 
circulation among Christians of the Pseudo-Platonic Second Epistle (discussed below). Cf. Ziebritzki, 
Heiliger Geist und Weltseele, 67-92. According to Ziebritzki, when Numenius speaks of a “second” and a 
“third” God, he is only referring to the second principle, the Demiurge, in different modes of action. See 
Ziebritzki, 81-82: “Damit aber legt sich der Schluß nahe, daß die Rede von einem zweiten und einem 
dritten Gott so zu verstehen ist, daß beide nicht nur eine teilbare Einheit bilden, sondern tatsätlich identisch 
sind: es ist ein- und derselbe Gott, der als zweiter Gott die betrachtende und als dritter Gott die 
demiurgische Funktion ausübt. Die Ausdrücke “zweiter Gott” und “dritter Gott” sind also nichts anderes als 
die Bezeichnungen für die beiden relationalen Eigenschaften ein- und desselben Gottes, der in der 
Vermittlung zwischen erstem Gott und Materie auf beide in unterschiedlicher Weise bezogen ist.” One 
need not deny the applicability of this observation in order still to maintain that Proclus’s description of 
Numenius’s scheme as “triadic” is not lacking in evidence. 
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Numenius describes the relationship between the two most primal entities, the Good and 
the Demiurge. 
Now if essence and the idea is discerned by the Mind, and if it was agreed that the 
Mind is earlier than this and its cause, then Mind itself is alone found to be the 
Good. For if God the Creator is the beginning of generation, the Good is the 
beginning of essence. And God the Creator is related to the Good, of which He is 
an imitator, as generation is to essence, of which it is a likeness and an imitation. 
For if the Creator who is the author of generation is good, the Creator also of 
essence will doubtless be the absolute good, innate in essence. For the second 
god, being twofold, is the self-maker of the idea of Himself, and makes the world 
as its Creator: afterwards He is wholly given to contemplation. Now as we have 
by our reasoning gathered names for four things, let them be these four. The first, 
God, absolute Good (αὐτοάγαθον); His imitator, a good Creator: then essence, 
one kind of the first God, another of the Second; and the imitation of this essence, 
the beautiful world, adorned by participation in the beautiful.12 
 
Numenius reasons that if both “being and the Idea” are to be “intellected,” there must be 
some agent to understand them. A subject must be there to understand “being and the 
Idea,” and, Numenius reasons, this subject is Nous. In the next fragment of On the Good 
(Fragment 17), Numenius refers to the first principle as “the first Mind” (τὸν πρῶτον 
νοῦν) and “Being Itself” (αὐτοόν). Aristotle13 famously portrays his highest principle as 
“Thought-thinking-itself.”14 Numenius concludes (“Συλλελογισµένων . . .”) that 
Aristotle’s Nous is “older and more divine” (ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερος πρὸ τούτου νοῦς πρεσβύτερος 
                                               
12 Numenius, Frag. 16. Εἰ δ’ ἔστι µὲν νοητὸν ἡ οὐσία καὶ ἡ ἰδέα, ταύτης δ’ ὡµολογήθη 
πρεσβύτερον καὶ αἴτιον εἶναι ὁ νοῦς, αὐτὸς οὗτος µόνος εὕρηται ὢν τὸ ἀγαθόν. Καὶ γὰρ εἰ ὁ µὲν 
δηµιουργὸς θεός ἐστι γενέσεως, ἀρκεῖ τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὐσίας εἶναι ἀρχή. Ἀνάλογον δὲ τούτῳ µὲν ὁ δηµιουργὸς 
θεός, ὢν αὐτοῦ µιµητής, τῇ δὲ οὐσίᾳ ἡ γένεσις, ἣ εἰκὼν αὐτῆς ἐστι καὶ µίµηµα. Εἴπερ δὲ ὁ δηµιουργὸς ὁ 
τῆς γενέσεώς ἐστιν ἀγαθός, ἦ που ἔσται καὶ ὁ τῆς οὐσίας δηµιουργὸς αὐτοάγαθον, σύµφυτον τῇ οὐσίᾳ. Ὁ 
γὰρ δεύτερος διττὸς ὢν αὐτοποιεῖ τήν τε ἰδέαν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τὸν κόσµον, δηµιουργὸς ὤν, ἔπειτα θεωρητικὸς 
ὅλως. Συλλελογισµένων δ’ ἡµῶν ὀνόµατα τεσσάρων πραγµάτων τέσσαρα ἔστω ταῦτα· ὁ µὲν πρῶτος θεὸς 
αὐτοάγαθον· ὁ δὲ τούτου µιµητὴς δηµιουργὸς ἀγαθός· ἡ δ’ οὐσία µία µὲν ἡ τοῦ πρώτου, ἑτέρα δ’ ἡ τοῦ 
δευτέρου· ἧς µίµηµα ὁ καλὸς κόσµος, κεκαλλωπισµένος µετουσίᾳ τοῦ καλοῦ. Eusebius quotes this 
important passage in p.e. 11.22.3-5. For a discussion of the importance of Eusebius’ quotation of this 
fragment, see Chapter 6 of this study. Dillon notices similarities between this fragment and Origen, Princ. 
I.II.13. See Dillon, “Logos and Trinity,” 6-7. 
13 Numenius, Frag. 17.4; cf. Alcinous, Didask. 164.27 Whittaker ed., and Lloyd Gerson, From 
Plato to Platonism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 211 n16. 
14 Aristotle, Metaph. Λ 1074b15-34. Cf. Numenius, Frag. 2.13-16; Gerson, From Plato to 
Platonism, 210. 
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καὶ θειότερος) than the Demiurge.15 Given the Demiurge’s description as an entity that 
contemplates the Good, it is not clear whether the principle of Nous is restricted, in 
Numenius’s scheme, to the First or the Second principle. In fact, Numenius refuses the 
question, depicting both the First and Second as Nous in different states or modes. 
Numenius’s First Principle is not only Aristotle’s Nous but also Plato’s “Good,” 
and is αὐτοάγαθον σύµφυτον τῇ οὐσίᾳ. The second God, on the other hand, “makes the 
Idea of himself” in imitation of the First God.16 The title µιµήτης explains what it means 
for the Demiurge to be an “image” (εἰκὼν) of the First. “The creating God is related 
(Ἀνάλογον) to the Good, of which He is an imitator (µιµητής), as generation is to 
essence, of which [generation] is an image and an imitation (εἰκὼν αὐτῆς ἐστι καὶ 
µίµηµα).”17 If the second principle imitates the first, the second principle cannot be 
identified with the supreme and sole source of divinity, the First god.  
For Numenius, talk of “participation” implies hierarchy. Numenius describes the 
Demiurge’s imitation of Nous in terms of “participation.” In Fragment 19, the Demiurge 
is good not by himself (οὐ παρ᾽ἑαυτοῦ) but “from the first” (παρὰ δὲ τοῦ πρωτοῦ). 
Numenius glosses the Demiurge’s reception of goodness as “by participation in the [First] 
(ὑφ᾽οὗ µετουσίας ἐστὶν οὗτος ἀγαθός).”18 The passage should be considered in full: 
                                               
15 Numenius, Frag. 17.6-8. The Teachings of Silvanus, a text of nebulous provenance and date—
potentially pre-Origenian in Alexandria—casts theological epistemology in terms of the Son’s 
identification as Demiurge and the God the Father’s “image.” See William Schoedel, “ ‘Topological’ 
Theology and Some Monistic Tendencies in Gnosticism,” in Essays on the Nag Hammadi Texts in Honour 
of Alexander Böhlig, ed. by Martin Krause (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1972), 103; Silvanus, 100, 21-27. 
16 Numenius, Frag. 16.9-10. Numenius’ use of αὐτοαγαθόν provides precedent for Origen’s 
αὐτόθεος. For more on this, see below. Des Places (111n3) reports that αὐτοποιεῖ is an apparent hapax 
legomenon, but the idea of self-production has precedence in both Stoic pantheism and Gnosticism. See 
Whittaker, “Self-Generating Principles,” and Chapter 1 of this study. 
17 Numenius, Frag. 16, 6-8. Ἀνάλογον δὲ τούτῳ µὲν ὁ δηµιουργὸς θεός, ὢν αὐτοῦ µιµητής, τῇ δὲ 
οὐσίᾳ ἡ γένεσις, ἣ εἰκὼν αὐτῆς ἐστι καὶ µίµηµα. 
18 Numenius, Frag. 19.9. 
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That which participates in it [presumably, the First Principle], participates in 
nothing but in thought (ἐν δὲ µόνῳ τῷ φρονεῖν);19 That is the only way in which it 
could profit from the Good; there is no other way. And thought coincides only 
with the First. If that by which the other things are colored and made good is 
present only to that, then it would betray foolishness of soul to dispute this any 
further. For if the the Second is good, not from itself but from the First, how then 
would it be possible that he (the First) is not good, if the latter derives his 
goodness from participation in the (other, the First), especially as the Second 
participates in him (the First) specially because he is the Good? So Plato taught 
the sharply observant (auditor) by his statement, “The Good is One” (τὸ ἀγαθὸν 
ὅτι ἐστὶν ἕν).20 
 
The second God’s participation in the First ensures continuity of nature (i.e., that both are 
good), but it also entails subordination. In Numenius’s scheme, participation names the 
process by which the secondary, subordinated entity owes both its existence and the 
quality of its existence to a primary cause. In the next passage, Numenius states that  
Plato represented these things as true differently in different places; for in the 
Timaeus peculiarly he wrote the common inscription on the Creator, saying, “He 
was good.” But in the Republic he called the Good the Idea of Good, meaning 
that the Idea of the Creator was the Good, because to us He is manifested as good 
by participation in the First and only Good. “For as men are said to have been 
fashioned by the idea of man, and oxen by that of an ox, and horses by the idea of 
a horse; so also naturally if the Creator is good by participation in the First Good, 
the first Mind would be an idea, as being absolute good.”21 
 
This statement confirms the statement in Fragment 16 that “the First God is self-
sufficiently good (αὐτοάγαθον), but the Demiurge is good as an imitator (µιµήτης) of the 
                                               
19 Cf. Origen, Princ. 1.1.3, regarding the immaterial nature of participation in the Holy Spirit. 
20 Numenius, Frag. 19 (apud Eusebius, p.e. XI.22.6-8). Μετέχει δὲ αὐτοῦ τὰ µετίσχοντα ἐν ἄλλῳ 
µὲν οὐδενί, ἐν δὲ µόνῳ τῷ φρονεῖν· ταύτῃ ἄρα καὶ τῆς ἀγαθοῦ συµβάσεως ὀνίναιτ’ ἄν, ἄλλως δ’ οὔ. Καὶ 
µὲν δὴ τὸ φρονεῖν, τοῦτο δὴ συντετύχηκε µόνῳ τῷ πρώτῳ. Ὑφ’ οὗ οὖν τὰ ἄλλα ἀποχραίνεται καὶ 
ἀγαθοῦται, ἐὰν τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ µόνον µόνῳ προσῇ, ἀβελτέρας ἂν εἴη ψυχῆς ἔτι ἀµφιλογεῖν. Εἰ γὰρ ἀγαθός 
ἐστιν ὁ δεύτερος οὐ παρ’ ἑαυτοῦ, παρὰ δὲ τοῦ πρώτου, πῶς οἷόν τε ὑφ’ οὗ µετουσίας ἐστὶν οὗτος ἀγαθός, 
µὴ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, ἄλλως τε κἂν τύχῃ αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀγαθοῦ µεταλαχὼν ὁ δεύτερος; οὕτω τοι ὁ Πλάτων ἐκ 
συλλογισµοῦ τῷ ὀξὺ βλέποντι ἀπέδωκε τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὅτι ἐστὶν ἕν. 
21 Numenius, Frag. 20 (apud Eusebius, p.e. XI.22.9-10). Ταῦτα δ’ οὕτως ἔχοντα ἔθηκεν ὁ Πλάτων 
ἄλλῃ καὶ ἄλλῃ χωρίσας· ἰδίᾳ µὲν γὰρ τὸν κυκλικὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ δηµιουργοῦ ἐγράψατο ἐν Τιµαίῳ εἰπών· 
“Ἀγαθὸς ἦν”· ἐν δὲ τῇ Πολιτείᾳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶπεν “ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν,” ὡς δὴ τοῦ δηµιουργοῦ ἰδέαν οὖσαν τὸ 
ἀγαθόν, ὅστις πέφανται ἡµῖν ἀγαθὸς µετουσίᾳ τοῦ πρώτου τε καὶ µόνου. Ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι µὲν 
λέγονται τυπωθέντες ὑπὸ τῆς ἀνθρώπου ἰδέας, βόες δ’ ὑπὸ τῆς βοός, ἵπποι δ’ ὑπὸ τῆς ἵππου ἰδέας, οὕτως 
καὶ εἰκότως ὁ δηµιουργὸς εἴπερ ἐστὶ µετουσίᾳ τοῦ πρώτου ἀγαθοῦ ἀγαθός, ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα ἂν εἴη ὁ πρῶτος 
νοῦς, ὢν αὐτοάγαθον. 
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First.”22 The “First God,” a King “free from labor,” does not create and is the “Father” of 
the Second God, which does create and “rules in that he passes through the heaven” as its 
Creator.23 In a confusing line, Numenius refers to the first principle, Mind, as the 
“Demiurge of Being,” in distinction from the twofold “Demiurge of Becoming.”24 The 
reference to a “Demiurge of Becoming” recalls Timaeus’ statement that the Demiurge 
makes recourse to an eternal paradigm when he makes the Cosmos.25 Numenius explains 
that the “Demiurge of Becoming,” in imitation of the αὐτοαγαθόν Mind, “makes an Idea 
of himself,” which he then uses to create the Cosmos.  
Numenius’s highest principle is highest insofar as it does not owe its existence to 
any other cause. Numenius identifies the source of all existence with this first principle 
alone. An analogy of first principle to being and second principle to creating follows. As 
the Good (τὸ ἀγαθὸν) must be the principle of being (οὐσίας), Numenius explains, so the 
“creating divinity” (δηµιουργὸς θεὸς) is the principle of becoming (γενέσεως ἀρχή).26 
There is no distinction between the being and the goodness of the first principle; they are 
identical. As another fragment has it, “the First God is simple, being in himself (ὁ θεὸς ὁ 
                                               
22 Numenius, Frag. 16.14-15. ὁ µὲν πρῶτος θεὸς αὐτοάγαθον· ὁ δὲ τούτου µιµητὴς δηµιουργὸς 
ἀγαθός· 
23 Numenius, Frag. 12.12-14 (apud Eusebius, p.e. XI.18.6-10). τὸν µὲν πρῶτον θεὸν ἀργὸν εἶναι 
ἔργων συµπάντων καὶ βασιλέα, τὸν δεµιουργικὸν δὲ θεὸν ἡγεµονεῖν δι᾽οὐρανοῦ ἰόντα. 
24 Numenius, Frag. 16.8-12. 
25 Cf. Plato, Tim. 29a: “Now if so be that this Cosmos is beautiful and its Creator good, it is plain 
that he fixed his gaze on the Eternal. . . . and it is clear to all that his gaze was on the Eternal. . . .” (εἰ µὲν 
δὴ καλός ἐστιν ὅδε ὁ κόσµος ὅ τε δηµιουργὸς ἀγαθός, δῆλον ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἀΐδιον ἔβλεπεν.... παντὶ δὴ σαφὲς 
ὅτι πρὸς τὸ ἀΐδιον). Following this, in 29b, Timaeus concludes that the Cosmos is a copy (εἰκόν) of an 
original model (παραδείγµα). 
26 Numenius, Frag. 16. That the Son possesses God’s “demiurgic power” would become a feature 
of Eunomius’ theology, following a line stretching back at least to Numenius. See Michel Barnes, 
“Eunomius of Cyzicus and Gregory of Nyssa: Two Traditions of Transcendent Causality,” Vigiliae 
Christianae 52 (1998): 59-87. 
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µὲν πρῶτος ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὤν ἐστιν ἁπλοῦς).”27 The First God’s “being in himself” makes him 
simple and indivisible (µή . . . διαιρετός).  
 So Numenius develops an intricate but underdetermined constellation of three key 
descriptions of the relationship between the Demiurge and the Mind-and-Good which 
transcends the Demiurge. The Demiurge is an image of the Good insofar as the Demiurge 
is an imitator of the Good; another way of speaking of the Demiurge’s imaged imitation 
is that the Demiurge is a participant in the Good. All three of these modes of speaking 
about the second God’s relationship to the first reinforce a hierarchical dynamic between 
the two. As image, imitator, and participant, the second principle is a derivative and 
subordinate effect of the Good considered as an intellectual cause. It would remain for 
later Platonists, such as Plotinus, to puzzle over the mechanics of the relationship 
between the Good and the Demiurge.28 
 Fragment 16 of Numenius’s On the Good, taken by itself, leaves the impression that 
Numenius has in mind either a Binity (Nous and Demiurge) or a Quaternity (Nous, First 
Being, Demiurge, Second Being), but elsewhere he states clearly that the “First God, who 
exists in himself, is simple,” whereas the “Second and third God are One.”29 The mention 
of a “third god” implies that Numenius in fact teaches a triad, with the third entity being 
the “World-Soul” of Timaeus. To complicate matters, however, some fragments suggest 
that the first two principles are two capacities of the same entity, others that they are 
distinct entities with distinct cosmological functions. In the final analysis, the triad 
                                               
27 Numenius, Frag. 11.11-13. 
28 Plotinus will identify the Good with the One and subordinate the Nous to the One. 
29 Numenius, Frag. 21. Des Places states plainly that in any case Numenius did not teach four 
Gods, as the two Gods and “two beings” of Fragment 16 might suggest. See Des Places, 111 n7. See Peter 
Van Nuffelen, Rethinking the Gods. Philosophical Readings of Religion in the post-hellenistic period 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), which has a chapter on Numenius (and more literature). 
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Proclus ascribed to Numenius of πατήρ, ποιητής, ποίηµα fits: the First God is the Father 
of the Demiurge; the second is the Demiurge and “Maker,” who then produces a third, the 
Cosmos and the “Product.”30 If this arrangement is authentic, Numenius taught a Platonic 
“triad” of God–Demiurge–Cosmos/World-Soul, arranged hierarchically with a grammar 
of participation, of First over Second, and Second over Third. 
 
Clement and Justin Martyr 
 
 
 
 It is not difficult to see why Numenius’ triad would be tempting for appropriation 
by Christians. Origen’s predecessors had already begun puzzling over the issue and 
offered some promising leads. Clement of Alexandria, for example, knew Numenius and 
offered a version of his triad, which he found supported by recourse to Plato’s own 
writings.31 And, though most of the evidence that remains for Numenius derives from 
Eusebius of Caesarea, it is plausible that both Eusebius and Origen took their knowledge 
of Numenius’ texts from Clement himself, who found Numenius’ threefold scheme of 
“First God, Demiurge, and First Product” amenable to his purposes.  
 Clement based his use of Numenius on a scheme of three divine entities in the 
Pseudo-Platonic Second Epistle (312e), which reads: 
Upon the king of all do all things turn; he is the end of all things and the cause of 
all good. Things of the second order turn upon the second principle, and those of 
the third order upon the third.32  
                                               
30 Numenius, Frag. 21. Νουµήνιος µὲν γὰρ τρεῖς ἀνυµνήσας θεοὺς πατέρα µὲν καλεῖ τὸν πρῶτον, 
ποιητὴν δὲ τὸν δεύτερον, ποίηµα δὲ τὸν τρίτον· ὁ γὰρ κόσµος κατ’ αὐτὸν ὁ τρίτος ἐστὶ θεός· ὥστε ὁ κατ’ 
αὐτὸν δηµιουργὸς διττός, ὅ τε πρῶτος θεὸς καὶ ὁ δεύτερος, τὸ δὲ δηµιουργούµενον ὁ τρίτος. 
31 Clement’s remark about Numenius’ peculiar blending of Platonic and Jewish speculation is our 
earliest evidence for dating Numenius’ writings. Though modern scholars doubt the authenticity of the 
Platonic epistle to which Clement appeals, Clement was convinced that Plato wrote this text. 
32 Plato, Ep. 2, 312e. περὶ τὸν πάντων βασιλέα πάντ’ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα πάντα, καὶ ἐκεῖνο 
αἴτιον. ἁπάντων τῶν καλῶν· δεύτερον δὲ πέρι τὰ δεύτερα, καὶ τρίτον πέρι τὰ τρίτα. Plato, Cooper trans., p. 
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Justin Martyr had used this passage to justify his speaking of the Logos as “in second 
place” (ἐν δευτέρᾳ χώρᾳ).33 “[Plato],” Justin suggests,  
said that the Power next to the first God was placed crosswise in the universe. 
And as to his speaking of a third, he did this because he read…“that the Spirit of 
God moved over the waters.” For he gives the second place to the Logos which is 
with God…; and the third place to the Spirit who was said to be borne upon the 
water, saying, “And the third around the third.”34  
 
Clement’s interpretation is similar to Justin’s, and it makes sense as a Christian 
appropriation of Numenian ontology. Clement appeals to Timaeus 41a7, where Timaeus 
describes the generation of multiple “gods.” The “begetter” of the entire universe says to 
all these deities: “O gods, divine works whose maker and father I am, whatever has come 
to be by my hands cannot be undone but by my consent.”35 As Clement reads Plato’s 
triadic scheme, God the Father is “first” and the cause of all good things because it is by 
his will that all things come to be, and without his “consent” none can be undone. The 
Son is the Father’s first product, which in turn enables the Father to produce further 
entities. This first product is the Father’s Wisdom, and by Wisdom the Father produces 
                                                                                                                                            
1638. It is this passage to which Lloyd Gerson turns to argue that Plotinus did not need to base his “system” 
solely on the Parmenides in order to develop a doctrine of three hypostases, for example, at Enn. V.1.8.23-
27. See Lloyd Gerson, “The ‘Neoplatonic’ Interpretation of Plato’s Parmenides,” IJPT, forthcoming, note 
14 (manuscript draft). 
33 Justin, I Apol. XIII, 3; cf. I Apol. LX, 7. See Jean Daniélou, Gospel Message and Hellenistic 
Culture (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1973), 346-47 ad loc.; and Carl Andresen, “Justin und der 
mittlere Platonismus,” Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentlishe Wissenschaft 44 (1952): 190. 
34 Justin, I Apol. LX, 7. For more on this issue in Justin and its relationship to Justin’s alleged 
tendencies toward a binitarian theology, see Anthony Briggman, “Measuring Justin’s Approach to the 
Spirit: Trinitarian Conviction and Binitarian Orientation,” Vigiliae Christianae 63 (2009): 107-37. 
35 Clement, Srom. V.14.102, 5-103, 2; ANF 2:468. ἥ τε ἐν Τιµαίῳ δηµηγορία πατέρα καλεῖ τὸν 
δηµιουργὸν λέγουσα ὧδέ πως· “θεοὶ θεῶν, ὧν ἐγὼ πατὴρ δηµιουργός τε ἔργων.” ὥστε καὶ ἐπὰν εἴπῃ “περὶ 
τὸν πάντων βασιλέα πάντα ἐστὶ κἀκείνου ἕνεκεν τὰ πάντα κἀκεῖνο αἴτιον ἁπάντων τῶν καλῶν, δεύτερον δὲ 
περὶ τὰ δεύτερα καὶ τρίτον περὶ τὰ τρίτα,” οὐκ ἄλλως ἔγωγε ἐξακούω ἢ τὴν ἁγίαν τριάδα µηνύεσθαι· τρίτον 
µὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦµα, τὸν υἱὸν δὲ δεύτερον, δι’ οὗ “πάντα ἐγένετο” κατὰ βούλησιν τοῦ πατρός. 
And the address in the Timaeus calls the creator, Father, speaking thus, “You Gods of gods, of whom I am 
Father and the Creator of your works.” So that when he says, ‘Around the king of all, all things are, and 
because of Him are all things; and he [or that] is the cause of all good things; and around the second are the 
things second in order; and around the third, the third,’ I understand nothing else than the Holy Trinity to be 
meant; for the third is the Holy Spirit, and the Son is the second, by whom all things were made according 
to the will of the Father. 
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the Holy Spirit, another divine product, third in the scheme. The Father is then able, by 
the instruments of Wisdom and the Holy Spirit, to produce further entities.36 
 
Searching for a Hierarchical Triad in Origen’s Commentary on John  
 
 
 
With the triadic schemes of Numenius and Clement in view, we may now turn to 
Origen’s Commentary on John. Several Middle Platonic themes appear in Commentary 
on John 2.12-21. There Origen interprets John 1:1 (“In the beginning was the Word, and 
the Word was with God, and the Word was God”). Origen’s exegesis of this verse is 
pivotal, and yet its full effect on Origen’s thought is not assessed evenly in scholarship. 
Once I have identified the Middle Platonic themes of this crucial portion of the 
Commentary, I will move to other passages in the Commentary that apply a hierarchical 
logic to the Christian triad. 
It will be best to consider Jo. 2.12-21 in three related segments. First (Jo. 2.12-15) 
Origen distinguishes between the Father and the Word along lines drawn from Middle 
Platonism between a highest divinity (here, God the Father) and an intermediary (here, 
The Word). With a move echoing Philo, Origen points out that John 1:1 uses the definite 
article (ὁ) to refer to God, but it does not use the definite article in calling the Word 
“divine” (θεός).37 Then (Jo. 2.16-18) he addresses a monarchian objection to his 
exegetical explanation.38 Finally (Jo. 2.19-21), Origen explains that he does not mean to 
                                               
36 I have used the ambiguous term “produce” because the distinction between “creating,” 
“begetting,” “causing” is not clear at this point. These terms are synonymous as Origen uses them. 
37 Cf., for example, Philo, Somn. 1.229. Gerhard Gruber, Zoē; Wesen, Stufen Und Mitteilung Des 
Wahren Lebens Bei Origenes (Munich: M. Huber, 1962), 114n63 adverts to this text. 
38 This passage will be discussed in the context of Origen’s quarrel with monarchianism, presented 
in Chapter 3. 
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teach a horizontal procession, but a vertical one, whose asymmetry culminates with God 
the Father. The asymmetry reflects the hierarchy endemic to Middle Platonism. 
 
Jo. 2.13-15: A τάξις of Uncreated Cause and Word, Word and Rational Creatures 
 
(12) But since the proposition, “In the beginning was the Word,” has been placed 
first, perhaps it indicates some order (τάξις); in the same manner, next, “And the 
Word was with God,” and third, “And the Word was God.” Perhaps he says, “And 
the Word was with God,” then, “And the Word was God,” that we might 
understand that the Word has become God because he is “with God.” (13) John 
has used the articles in one place and omitted them in another very precisely, and 
not as though he did not understand the precision of the Greek language. In the 
case of the Word, he adds the article “the,” but in the case of the noun “God,” he 
inserts it in one place and omits it in another. (14) For he adds the article when the 
noun “God” stands for the uncreated cause of the universe, but he omits it when 
the Word is referred to as “divine.” (15) For as the God who is over all (ὁ ἐπὶ πᾶσι 
θεὸς) is “the God” and not simply “God,” so the source (πηγή) of reason in each 
rational being is “the Word.” That reason which is in each rational being would 
not properly have the same designation as the first Reason, and be said to be “the 
Word.”39  
 
 According to Origen, John 1:1 “indicates an order (τάξις).” The Son bears an 
identity necessarily disclosed in reference to his “arche,” the Father; it cannot have been 
otherwise. The logical “order” of John 1 fits the “order” of “Father, Son, and Holy Spirit” 
of Matthew 28:19. Appeal to this divine τάξις—both textually and ontologically—was a 
traditional anti-monarchian strategy. Tertullian and Novatian took similar approaches in 
                                               
39 Jo. 2.12-15. (12) Ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ τάχα τάξιν τινὰ δηλοῖ τὸ πρῶτον τετάχθαι τὸ “ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος” . 
. . Jo. 2.11: Καὶ τάχα τοιαύτην τινὰ τάξιν ὁ Ἰωάννης ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἰδὼν οὐ προέταξε τὸ “Θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος” 
τοῦ “Ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν,” ὅσον ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀποφάσεσιν οὐδὲν ἂν κωλυθέντος τοῦ εἱρµοῦ πρὸς τὸ καθ' 
αὑτὸ ἰδεῖν ἑκάστου τῶν ἀξιωµάτων τὴν δύναµιν· ἓν γὰρ ἀξίωµα τὸ «Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος» καὶ δεύτερον τὸ 
“Ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν» καὶ ἑξῆς «καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος.” (13) Πάνυ δὲ παρατετηρηµένως καὶ οὐχ ὡς 
ἑλληνικὴν ἀκριβολογίαν οὐκ ἐπιστάµενος ὁ Ἰωάννης ὅπου µὲν τοῖς ἄρθροις ἐχρήσατο ὅπου δὲ ταῦτα 
ἀπεσιώπησεν, ἐπὶ µὲν τοῦ λόγου προστιθεὶς τὸ “ὁ”, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς θεὸς προσηγορίας ὅπου µὲν τιθεὶς ὅπου δὲ 
αἴρων. (14) Τίθησιν µὲν γὰρ τὸ ἄρθρον, ὅτε ἡ “θεὸς” ὀνοµασία ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀγενήτου τάσσεται τῶν ὅλων 
αἰτίου, σιωπᾷ δὲ αὐτό, ὅτε ὁ λόγος “θεὸς” ὀνοµάζεται. Ὡς δὲ διαφέρει κατὰ τούτους τοὺς τόπους “ὁ θεὸς” 
καὶ “θεός”, οὕτως µήποτε διαφέρῃ “ὁ λόγος” καὶ  “λόγος.” (15) Ὃν τρόπον γὰρ ὁ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεὸς “ὁ θεὸς” 
καὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς “θεός,” οὕτως ἡ πηγὴ τοῦ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν λογικῶν λόγου “ὁ λόγος,” τοῦ ἐν ἑκάστῳ λόγου 
οὐκ ἂν κυρίως ὁµοίως τῷ πρώτῳ ὀνοµασθέντος καὶ λεχθέντος “ὁ λόγος.” Regarding Origen’s use of Stoic 
logic to argue for the presence of a “τάξις” in John, see Ronald Heine, “Stoic Logic as Handmaid to 
Exegesis and Theology in Origen’s Commentary on the Gospel of John,” JTS 44 (1993): 90-117. 
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making a τάξις of the trinity.40 However, Origen’s motivation for “ordering” the trinity 
does not begin and end with anti-monarchian tradition.  
Origen speaks of “the God over all” (ὁ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεὸς), who transmits divinity to a 
second God, the Word. Origen’s title “the God over all” for “the uncreated cause of the 
universe” leads Origen to notice that the Word is described not as “the God” but as 
“divine” (θεὸς). The fact that Origen reserves the title of αὐτόθεος for “the God over all,” 
compared with Numenius, suggests that Origen was adapting Numenius’ scheme for 
positing the highest divinity above lower entities in a primal procession.41 
Christians privileged God’s transcendence, and on this score Origen was no 
exception. Though it would be pushing the evidence too far to equate each instance of an 
Alexandrian’s reverence for a supreme first principle with a reference to the cult of theos 
hypsistos, the Hypsistarian tradition was long established in Alexandria. Origen calls God 
the Father, and God the Father alone, “αὐτόθεος,” the “one true God.” Though he never 
                                               
40 For more on this, see Chapter 3. The ordering of “first, second, third,” and the use of taxis also 
appears in Eusebius, p.e. 7.15.1-10. When Eusebius refers to the Son as “second” and the Spirit as “third,” 
the anti-monarchian tradition of the three as τάξις is as plausible a candidate for motivation as a Middle 
Platonist scheme drawn from Numenius. Then again, both traditions would have been mutually reinforcing 
for a figure as widely educated as Eusebius, who indeed knew both traditions well. 
41 The earliest evidence dates to ca. 200 B.C.E. The epigraphic evidence is collected and 
contextualized by Stephen Mitchell, “The Cult of Theos Hypsistos between Pagans, Jews, and Christians,” 
in Polymnia Athanassiadi and Michael Frede, eds., Pagan Monotheism in Late Antiquity (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1999), 81-148, especially 126-28; Mitchell refers, on p. 146 in the Appendix to his article, 
Item 283, to a II. BCE inscription in Alexandria as follows: [ – θε]ῶι ὑψίστωι | [ – τ]ὸν ἱερὸν | ]περίβολον 
καὶ] τὴν προσ|[ευχὴν καὶ τὰ  συγ]κυροῦντα. There is also reason for seeing beneath Origen’s titles for the 
Father— αὐτόθεος, ὁ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεὸς—to the cult of the “Highest God,” widespread by Origen’s day in 
Alexandria. The cult of the “Highest God” was deeply intertwined with the gradual development of 
monotheism in Judaism and Christianity in the imperial period. Its tendencies, especially when combined 
with Platonic monism, motivated a deep urge to worship a supreme deity. Alexandria lays claim to some of 
the earliest epigraphic evidence for the cult. By the second century C.E., Alexandrian pagans, Jews, and 
Christians shared the view that an ultimate deity transcends all other spiritual powers and principalities. 
Much earlier, Judaism’s monotheistic proclivities had been absorbed into pagan theology with the result 
that any given pantheon of gods could be subordinated to a higher, supreme deity. The name for this deity 
was hypsistos, “highest,” even though, paradoxically, this highest God was also supposed to be above even 
the attribution of names. Though it would be pushing the evidence too far to equate each instance of an 
Alexandrian’s reverence for a supreme first principle with a reference to the cult of theos hypsistos, the 
Hypsistarian tradition was long established in Alexandria. 
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identifies God the Father with “the most high,” he provides no apology for reading Luke 
1:35 as meaning that the Holy Spirit is not to be identified with “the Power of the Most 
High [God].” The Power of the Most High is Christ, who “overshadows” Mary.42 Origen 
lets his reader draw the inference: if Christ is the power of the Most High, then God the 
Father, implicitly, is the Most High God.  
On the other hand, Christ, as the Power and Wisdom of God, is the highest and 
greatest “power” generated by God the Father. He transcends all other powers and 
maintains his own eternal existence distinct from the Father. Origen, in conscious or 
unconscious rivalry of contemporary theological schemes, places God the Father at the 
top of a hierarchy of spiritual entities.  
 
Jo. 2.16-18: The Father’s Primal Image and Perfect Participant 
 
 
 
The next passage offers more overt evidence that Origen’s thought is imbued with 
Numenian dynamics. It also provides important evidence for the way Origen uses those 
Numenian dynamics to oppose monarchian theology. We will return to the matter of 
monarchianism at length in Chapter 3. For now, it is important to notice several features 
of this passage that can be traced to Numenius. Origen’s use of αὐτόθεος for God the 
Father, and the implication that the Son is divine, θεὸς, by participation in αὐτόθεος, 
bears striking resemblance to Numenius arrangement of a first God, αὐτοάγαθος, and the 
second God, the Demiurge, “good” by participation.43 
                                               
42 See Jo. 6.67. 
43 Cf. Numenius, Frags. 16 and 20, ed. Des Places. Origen’s construal here would have a long and 
consequential afterlife. If Photius is to be trusted as evidence for Methodius’ Xeno, then the Son’s 
demiurgic “imitation” (µίµησις) of the Father establishes the Son as one of two “creative powers” (δύο 
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(16) Many people who wish to be pious are troubled because they are afraid that 
they may proclaim two Gods and, for this reason, they fall into false and impious 
beliefs. They either deny that the individuality of the Son is other than that of the 
Father by confessing him to be God whom they refer to as “Son” in name at least, 
or they deny the divinity of the Son and make his individuality and essence as an 
individual to be different from the Father. (17) Their problem can be resolved in 
this way. We must say to them that at one time God, with the article, is God in the 
absolute sense, wherefore also the Savior says in his prayer to the Father, “That 
they may know you the only true God.” On the other hand, everything besides 
God in the absolute sense, which is made God by participation in his divinity, 
would more properly not be said to be “the God,” but “God.” To be sure, his 
“firstborn of every creature,” inasmuch as he was the first to be with God and has 
drawn divinity into himself, is more honored than the other gods beside him (of 
whom God is God as it is said, “The God of gods, the Lord has spoken, and he 
has called the earth”). It was by his ministry that they became gods, for he drew 
from God that they might be deified, sharing ungrudgingly also with them 
according to his goodness. (18) The God, therefore, is the true God. The others 
are gods formed according to him as images of the prototype. But again, the 
archetypal image of the many images is the Word with the God, who was “in the 
beginning.” By being “with the God” he always continues to be “God.” But he 
would not have this if he were not with God, and he would not remain God if he 
did not continue in unceasing contemplation of the depth of the Father.44 
 
                                                                                                                                            
δυνάµεις . . . ποιητικάς) for Methodius. Here is Methodius’ description of the Son’s role in creation (ANF 
trans.): “The other which adorns and embellishes, by imitation (κατὰ µίµησιν) of the former, the things 
which already exist. This is the power of the Son, the almighty and powerful hand of the Father, by which, 
after creating matter not out of things which were already in existence, He adorns it (µετὰ τὸ ποιήσαι τὴν 
ὕλην ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων κατακοσµεῖ)” (Bonwetsch, ed., De creatis 9). Origen’s Demiurgic Logos influenced 
even as critical a figure as Methodius, who in turn mediated Origen’s scheme to Arius. See Lloyd 
Patterson, Methodius of Olympus (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1997), 208-20, 
for a strong case along these lines. See especially Patterson’s notes on Methodius’ expression of “two 
powers” theology on Patterson, 215. See Lloyd Patterson, “Methodius, Origen, and the Arian Dispute,” in 
Studia Patristica 19 (Elmsford, NY: Pergamon Press, 1982), 912-23, in which Patterson provides a case for 
significant parallels between Methodius’ Xeno and Arius’s Letter to Alexander of Alexandria. 
44 Jo. 2.16-18. (16) Καὶ τὸ πολλοὺς φιλοθέους εἶναι εὐχοµένους ταράσσον, εὐλαβουµένους δύο 
ἀναγορεῦσαι θεοὺς καὶ παρὰ τοῦτο περιπίπτοντας ψευδέσι καὶ ἀσεβέσι δόγµασιν, ἤτοι ἀρνουµένους 
ἰδιότητα υἱοῦ ἑτέραν παρὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ὁµολογοῦντας θεὸν εἶναι τὸν µέχρι ὀνόµατος παρ’ αὐτοῖς “υἱὸν” 
προσαγορευόµενον, ἢ ἀρνουµένους τὴν θεότητα τοῦ υἱοῦ τιθέντας δὲ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἰδιότητα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν 
κατὰ περιγραφὴν τυγχάνουσαν ἑτέραν τοῦ πατρός, ἐντεῦθεν λύεσθαι δύναται· (17) Λεκτέον γὰρ αὐτοῖς, ὅτι 
τότε µὲν αὐτόθεος ὁ θεός ἐστι, διόπερ καὶ ὁ σωτήρ φησιν ἐν τῇ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα εὐχῇ· “Ἵνα γινώσκωσι σὲ 
τὸν µόνον ἀληθινὸν θεόν·” πᾶν δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὸ αὐτόθεος µετοχῇ τῆς ἐκείνου θεότητος θεοποιούµενον οὐχ 
“ὁ θεὸς” ἀλλὰ “θεὸς” κυριώτερον ἂν λέγοιτο, οὗ πάντως “ὁ πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως,” ἅτε πρῶτος τῷ 
πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εἶναι σπάσας τῆς θεότητος εἰς ἑαυτόν, ἐστὶ τιµιώτερος, τοῖς λοιποῖς παρ’ αὐτὸν θεοῖς—ὧν ὁ 
θεὸς θεός ἐστι κατὰ τὸ λεγόµενον· “Θεὸς θεῶν κύριος ἐλάλησε, καὶ ἐκάλεσε τὴν γῆν”—διακονήσας τὸ 
γενέσθαι θεοῖς, ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀρυσάµενος εἰς τὸ θεοποιηθῆναι αὐτούς, ἀφθόνως κἀκείνοις κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ 
χρηστότητα µεταδιδούς. (18) Ἀληθινὸς οὖν θεὸς ὁ θεός, οἱ δὲ κατ’ ἐκεῖνον µορφούµενοι θεοὶ ὡς εἰκόνες 
πρωτοτύπου· ἀλλὰ πάλιν τῶν πλειόνων εἰκόνων ἡ ἀρχέτυπος εἰκὼν ὁ πρὸς τὸν θεόν ἐστι λόγος, ὃς “ἐν 
ἀρχῇ” ἦν, τῷ εἶναι “πρὸς τὸν θεὸν” ἀεὶ µένων “θεός,” οὐκ ἂν δ’ αὐτὸ ἐσχηκὼς εἰ µὴ πρὸς θεὸν ἦν, καὶ οὐκ 
ἂν µείνας θεός, εἰ µὴ παρέµενε τῇ ἀδιαλείπτῳ θέᾳ τοῦ πατρικοῦ βάθους. 
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Origen distinguishes the Son from the Father in essence, but maintains that the Word is 
similar to God the Father—divine—through participation.45 The Son, “more honored than 
the other gods beside him” [quoting Psalm 44.1], “receives” from αὐτόθεος, God the 
Father: “It was by his ministry that they became gods, for he drew from God (ὁ θεὸς) that 
they might be deified, sharing (µεταδιδούς) ungrudgingly also with them according to his 
goodness.”46 Notice the Demiurgic position Origen gives the Son. He receives 
(ἀρυσάµενος) divinity from the Father, and the “gods”—presumably the totality of 
rational creatures—participate in the Son, the chief participant, as he shares with 
(µεταδιδούς) them.  
Earlier in the Commentary (Jo. 1.188), Origen described “participants in Christ” 
as “truly [living] because they receive their life from this life.”47 Here he makes God the 
Father superior to the Son in a similar way: “the God (ὁ θεὸς) . . . is very God (αὐτόθεος). 
The others are gods formed according to him as images of a prototype.”48 The Son, in 
turn, is the “archetypal image of the many images” (ἀλλὰ πάλιν τῶν πλειόνων εἰκόνων ἡ 
ἀρχέτυπος εἰκὼν ὁ πρὸς τὸν θεόν ἐστι λόγος) the primal image of God the Father. All 
other divine images take shape in reference to him.49  
Recall that Numenius depicts the second principle or Demiurge under three 
Platonic descriptors: image, imitator, and participant. Origen follows suit and construes 
                                               
45 Stead quotes this passage as similar to Numenius, Frags. 19-20. See Christopher Stead, “Was 
Arius a Neoplatonist?” In Studia Patristica 33 (Leuven: Peeters, 1997), 39–52, at 52. 
46 Jo. 2.17: ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀρυσάµενος εἰς τὸ θεοποιηθῆναι αὐτούς, ἀφθόνως κἀκείνοις κατὰ τὴν 
αὐτοῦ χρηστότητα µεταδιδούς. 
47 Jo. 1.188: ἀφ’ ἧς οἱ µέτοχοι τοῦ Χριστοῦ λαµβάνοντες τὴν ἀληθῶς ζῶσι ζωὴν. 
48 Jo. 2.18. Ἀληθινὸς οὖν θεὸς ὁ θεός, οἱ δὲ κατ’ ἐκεῖνον µορφούµενοι θεοὶ ὡς εἰκόνες 
πρωτοτύπου· 
49 Origen’s “theology of the image” takes especially clear expression in hom. 1. in gen. For more 
on this, see Chapter 7 of this study. 
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the Son as the Father’s image, imitator, and participant.50 A standard Platonist illustration 
of an “image” was the mark left in wax by a seal. The seal itself is the “paradigm,” and 
the mark is the seal’s image. Insofar as the mark resembles the paradigmatic seal, the 
mark is a participant in the seal. Insofar as Ideas are “paradigms,” they are causes of the 
effects that resemble them. Each image participates in its paradigmatic cause. The 
Timaean Demiurge looks to an eternal “paradigm” (exemplar) in creating the cosmos.51 
Platonists were well known for having added this “fifth cause” to Aristotle’s four.52 
Origen portrays the Son as looking to the Father as to a “paradigm” when he says that the 
Son contemplates the “fatherly depths.” Origen’s use of a cognitive model to relate Son 
to Father and Spirit to Son necessitates loss in the process of transmission. Origen states 
that   
no one who participates in justice and the power to judge people will be able to 
receive the impressions (ἐναποµάξασθαι) of justice and of judging so completely 
in his own soul that he falls short of absolute justice and judgment in no way, just 
as a painter will not be able to give a share of all the unique features of what is 
being painted to his painting.53 
 
                                               
50 We will return to the issue of the “Son as Image” in Chapter 4, because a key fragment of On 
First Principles alleges that Origen refers to the Father as “incomparably” divine, using a term that later 
would come to be applied, not to the Father, but to the Son as the Father’s “incomparable” (aparallaktos) 
image. For the development of this aspect of Origen’s thought in later theologies of the Son, see especially 
Mark DelCogliano, “Eusebian Theologies of the Son as Image of God before 341,” Journal of Early 
Christian Studies 14:4 (2006): 459–484; and Matthew Crawford, “The Triumph of Pro-Nicene Theology 
over Anti-Monarchian Exegesis: Cyril of Alexandria and Theodore of Heraclea on John 14.10-11,” Journal 
of Early Christian Studies 21.4 (2013): 537-68. 
51 Seneca, Ep. 65.9: Haec omnia mundus quoque, ut ait plato, habet: facientem: hic deus est. Ex 
quo fit: haec materia est. Formam: haec est habitus et ordo mundi, quem videmus. Exemplar, scilicet ad 
quod deus hanc magnitudinem operis pulcherrimi fecit. Propositum, propter quod fecit; text from Teubner 
(O. Hense, 1938). 
52 Seneca, Ep. 65.7: his quintam plato adicit exemplar, quam ipse idean vocat: hoc est enim, ad 
quod respiciens artifex id, quod destinabat, effecit; Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 138. 
53 Origen, Jo. 2.52. Οὐδεὶς γὰρ τῶν µετεχόντων δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς τοῦ κρίνειν λαὸν δυνάµεως 
οὕτω πάντη ἐναποµάξασθαι ἑαυτοῦ τῇ ψυχῇ δυνήσεται τοὺς τῆς δικαιοσύνης τύπους καὶ τοῦ κρίνειν, ὥστε 
ἐν µηδενὶ ἀποδεῖν τῆς αὐτοδικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς αὐτοκρίσεως, ὡς οὐδὲ ὁ γράφων εἰκόνα οἷός τε ἔσται 
µεταδοῦναι πάντων τῶν τοῦ γραφοµένου ἰδιωµάτων τῇ γραφῇ. Cf. Cels. 6.64 and Ayres ad loc. in 
“Undiminished Giver,” 62, as well as Chapter 4 of this study. 
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The metaphor at work in this case is a Platonic commonplace of model and copy whose 
ultimate origin is Timaeus 28b: Origen’s painter, like the Demiurge there, contemplates 
an object he wishes to reproduce.54 The Son’s contemplation of the Father enables the 
Son to be the Father’s perfect image. 
The Son’s role of “perfect participant” is a hallmark of Origen’s christology. It 
marks the Son as an exemplar for all other creatures. The Holy Spirit is a perfect 
participant in the Logos, and all the saints are participants in the Holy Spirit. The saints 
are “holy” to the degree that they participate in the Holy Spirit. In this way, each member 
in the series represents an imitation of the Father’s perfect image, the Son, who by his 
perfect obedience resembles the Father perfectly. Origen uses the formal relationship that 
obtains between Ideas and participants, in Platonism, to underscore the formal 
resemblance between the Son and all creatures that participate in him.  
The activity of contemplation determines the degree to which each participant 
resembles its object of participation. So, a saint contemplates the Holy Spirit, and to the 
degree that the holy man or woman understands the Holy Spirit’s character, the soul 
becomes holy. The difference between the angels and saints, on the one hand, and the 
Holy Spirit, on the other, is that the Holy Spirit perfectly participates in the Wisdom that 
is the Son. The Son, for his part, is distinguished from the Holy Spirit insofar as the Son 
maintains perfect and eternal contemplation of the Father, so that the Son participates in 
the Father perfectly. The Father is the supreme object of contemplation. 
                                               
54 Cf. Plato, Rep., Book 10, and Soph. 265b. The image may also come from Philebus 39a-c, a 
passage Dillon notes Alcinous, Didask. 4, draws upon in describing sense-perception. However, I have not 
been able to discern in Origen evidence of Alcinous’s distinctive epistemological distinction between logos 
epistemonikos and logos doxastikos. 
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 So Origen views the Son as a prototypical image of God the Father. Application of 
Aristotle’s example of an “image” to Origen’s construal of the Son as image would make 
the Son qua image separated and “invested with its own substance.”56 It would also imply 
that the Son is equivocally, not unequivocally, “divine.” Origen does not invoke 
Aristotle’s example from Categories in Jo. 1.152, but his use of the phrase “invested with 
his own substance” (οὐσιωµένον) would call Aristotle’s illustration to mind. Although the 
Son qua image reproduces the Father’s essential goodness, the Son qua image is a 
substance distinct from the Father. And both the Son and the Father can be called 
“divine,” though the Son is not divine in the same way that the Father is, because the Son 
participates in the Father’s divinity. 
 If we consider the Word as “contemplating” the Father as an appropriation of 
Numenius’ Demiurge, Origen’s theology of the Son comes more clearly into focus. First, 
Origen uses terms for participation to make the Word intrinsically dependent upon God 
the Father as ultimate source (πηγή). The difference between the subject that receives 
impressions—the Word—and that subject’s object of contemplation—the Father—is that 
the subject cannot generate the impressions it receives from itself. “It is not possible that 
one who shares in the Life, and for this reason is called ‘living’, has himself become 
Life.”57 The same holds, Origen says, for Justice and its participants: no participant of 
Justice ever becomes Justice in the “participated” sense. For Origen, as for Numenius, 
what participates can never come to be the originating cause of that in which it shares. 
                                               
56 Jo. 1.152. καὶ κεχωρισµένον καὶ οὐσιωµένον. 
57 Jo. 2.52. This arrangement differs from the self-productive second principle that appears in both 
Numenius’ and Clement’s ontologies. For my explanation as to why Origen avoids applying such terms to 
the Son, see Chapter 3. 
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Origen’s application of participation to the Son ensures that the Son is never equated with 
God the Father at the level of nature. 
To participate is to be perfected, and to be perfected is to gain what one lacks.58 
The Word’s participation in the highest God means, at the very least, that the Word 
acquires divinity from the Father as source. The Word “becomes” divine—even if Origen 
uses the term “becomes” equivocally and non-temporally. 59 Even a careful reader could 
be forgiven for applying to Origen’s Son a concept whose original home is the realm of 
incarnate souls bound to think with and through the senses. He uses the same terms for 
participation to talk about the existence of a natural capacity in a creature—wisdom or 
rationality, for example—whose exercise is predicated upon the created resemblance 
between the creature and the “pattern” according to which the creature is made, i.e., the 
Son. So “each of the wise participates in Christ to the extent that he has the capacity for 
wisdom, insofar as Christ is wisdom, just as each one who possesses power has obtained 
greater power to the extent that he has shared in Christ, insofar as Christ is power.”61 In 
this case, creatures possess a capacity for some activity that Christ simply is as the 
Father’s perfect Image.62 So creatures share in the “substance” of Christ but must come to 
                                               
58 Here Origen agrees with Alcinous’s definition of God as not “qualified (for he is not endowed 
with quality, nor is his peculiar perfection due to qualification,” whereas the Son is “qualified” as “divine” 
so as not to be identified with the self-perfect God the Father. See Alcinous, Didask. 10.4, whose use of the 
term ἀποτετελεσµένον may echo Timaeus 28b1. 
59 Jo. 2.12: “Perhaps [John] says, ‘And the Word was with God,’ then, ‘And the Word was God,’ 
that we might understand that the Word has become God because he is with God (ἵνα δυνηθῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸς 
τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ὁ λόγος νοηθῆναι γινόµενος θεός).” The emphasis is not on a temporal change of going from 
one state to another, but on the ontological priority of the Father to the Son. 
61 Jo. 1.246: Ἕκαστος δὲ τῶν σοφῶν καθ’ ὅσον χωρεῖ σοφίας, τοσοῦτον µετέχει Χριστοῦ, καθ’ ὃ 
σοφία ἐστίν· ὥσπερ ἕκαστος τῶν δύναµιν ἐχόντων κρείττονα ὅσον εἴληχε τῆς δυνάµεως, τοσοῦτον 
Χριστοῦ, καθ’ ὃ δύναµίς ἐστι, κεκοινώνηκεν. Note that the terms for participation (µετέχω, λαµβάνω, and 
κοινωνία) are used synonymously. 
62 A similar case is Jo. 1.269-270, where “all men participate in [Christ] insofar as he is Word.” 
Here the capacity is Logos, and Origen uses Paul’s statement that “the Word is near you, even in your 
mouth, and in your heart,” to support his supposition that even those who have sinned “have already 
partaken of him” because they possess a fundamental capacity for reason. 
 64 
realize Christ’s likeness through their actions—actions, in turn, which are not guaranteed 
always to mirror the archetype. His application of the same metaphor to the Son 
introduces a pronounced ambiguity about what it means for the Son to be God the 
Father’s “image”—even with qualifications like eternal, incomparable, and prototypical. 
Origen speaks repeatedly of God the Father as “first” and the Son as “second” in 
“order” (taxei). He can speak of both the Son and the Holy Spirit as “transcending other 
created beings,” but statements like these do not preclude the possibility that the Son and 
the Holy Spirit themselves are hierarchically arranged with respect to one another, and 
with respect to the Father.63 The Son, he says, is “older than” the Holy Spirit.64 Origen’s 
use of πρεσβυτέρος recalls Numenius’s use of metaphorical age to order divine principles 
in a hierarchy.65 The Holy Spirit, too, receives from and participates in the Son:  
The Holy Spirit seems to have need of the Son ministering to his hypostasis, not 
only for it to be, but also for it to be wise, and rational, and just, and whatever 
other thing we ought to understand it to be by participation in the aspects of Christ 
which we mentioned previously.66 
 
Origen knows the generic use of a grammar of participation, also used by Numenius, to 
place first divine principles in a hierarchy, and he applies the grammar to his own triad: 
the Holy Spirit participates in the Son, and the Son in the Father. This arrangement 
appears in a much later book of the Commentary, where Origen states that “the Father 
                                               
63 e.g., Jo. 13.151. Ἀλλ’ ἡµεῖς πειθόµενοι τῷ σωτῆρι λέγοντι· “Ὁ πατὴρ ὁ πέµψας µε µείζων µού 
ἐστιν” καὶ διὰ τοῦτο µὴ ἐνεγκόντι µηδὲ τὴν “ἀγαθὸς” προσηγορίαν τὴν κυρίαν καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ τελείαν 
παραδέξασθαι αὐτῷ προσφεροµένην, ἀλλὰ ἀναφέροντι αὐτὴν εὐχαρίστως τῷ πατρὶ µετ’ ἐπιτιµήσεως πρὸς 
τὸν βουλόµενον ὑπερδοξάζειν τὸν υἱόν, πάντων µὲν τῶν γενητῶν ὑπερέχειν οὐ συγκρίσει ἀλλ’ 
ὑπερβαλλούσῃ ὑπεροχῇ φαµὲν τὸν σωτῆρα καὶ τὸ πνεῦµα τὸ ἅγιον, ὑπερεχόµενον τοσοῦτον ἢ καὶ πλέον 
ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρός, ὅσῳ ὑπερέχει αὐτὸς καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦµα τῶν λοιπῶν, οὐ τῶν τυχόντων ὄντων. Ὅση γὰρ 
δοξολογία τοῦ ὑπερέχοντος θρόνων, κυριοτήτων, ἀρχῶν, ἐξουσιῶν, καὶ παντὸς ὀνόµατος ὀνοµαζοµένου οὐ 
µόνον ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ µέλλοντι, πρὸς τούτοις καὶ ἁγίων ἀγγέλων καὶ πνευµάτων καὶ 
ψυχῶν δικαίων, τί δεῖ καὶ λέγειν; 
64 Jo. 2.73; Heine, trans., 113; πρεσβυτέρου παρ᾽αὐτὸ τοῦ λόγου τυγχάνοντος. 
65 Cf. Numenius, Frags. 16.3; 17.7; 24.65.  
66 Jo. 2.76. οὗ χρῄζειν ἔοικε τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦµα διακονοῦντος αὐτοῦ τῇ ὑποστάσει, οὐ µόνον εἰς τὸ 
εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ σοφὸν εἶναι καὶ λογικὸν καὶ δίκαιον καὶ πᾶν ὁτιποτοῦν χρὴ αὐτὸ νοεῖν τυγχάνειν κατὰ 
µετοχὴν τῶν προειρηµένωνἡµῖν Χριστοῦ ἐπινοιῶν. 
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exceeds the Savior by as much as, or even more than, the Savior himself and the Holy 
Spirit exceed the rest.”67 A graded grammar of participation thus appears to be a 
relatively stable feature of his trinitarian thought.  
 
Jo. 2.19-21: Non-Reciprocal Dependence, Transmission, and Loss 
 
 
 
(19) Some, however, have probably taken offense at what we said when we 
described the Father as the true God but, in addition to the true God, said many 
gods have come into existence by participation in the God. These people might 
fear that the glory of the one who transcends all creation is put on a level with the 
others who happen to have the title “god.” Because of this we must set forth this 
explanation in addition to the difference which has already been explained in 
relation to which we declared that God the Word is the minister of deity to all the 
other Gods. (20) The reason which is in each rational being has the same position 
in relation to the Word which is in the beginning with God, which is God the 
Word, which God the Word has with god. For as the Father is very God and true 
God in relation to the image and images of the image (wherefore also men are 
said to be “according to the image,” not “images”), so is the very Word in relation 
to the reason in each one. For both hold the place of a source; the Father, that of 
divinity, the Son, that of reason. (21) As, therefore, there are many gods, but for 
us there is “one God, the Father,” and there are many lords, but for us there is 
“one Lord, Jesus Christ,” so there are many words, but we pray that the Word who 
is in the beginning, who is with God, God the Word, may be with us. 
 
Here Origen reiterates his point that he teaches a vertical hierarchy. Some of his readers, 
he says, might be worried that he has brought “the Father as the true God” down by 
speaking of the participation of other entities in the one true God. According to this 
arrangement, the procession from Father to Son and rational entities would be horizontal, 
not vertical. Origen is clear about what he means. Both the Father and the Son “hold the 
                                               
67 Jo. 13.151; Pace Beeley, p. 321n48 ad loc. Beeley asserts that Origen “is merely using two 
senses of greatness at the same time, as several orthodox theologians will also do later.” The problem with 
this interpretation is that the distinction Beeley asserts Origen knows (“two senses of greatness”) is not in 
evidence here or elsewhere. In fact, Origen does not distinguish, for example, between a “grammar of 
participation” as applied to the Trinity and a “grammar of participation” as applied to the order of creatures.  
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place of a source,” but they are not the source of the same quality at the same level. “The 
Father [is source] of divinity, the Son . . . of reason.” 
Scholars often associate two components of Platonist causality with Plotinus and 
later forms of Neoplatonism. These are the principle of non-reciprocal dependence, and 
the principle that a cause is superior to its effect.68 As we have seen, both principles 
precede Plotinus. Consider, first, the doctrine that a cause is greater than its effect. 
Scholars have been tempted to identify this idea with Plotinus and to associate its 
presence elsewhere as a marker of Plotinian influence.69 However, the doctrine is not 
distinctive of Plotinus and can be found in earlier Hellenistic philosophy.  
As we have seen, emanation and causality are linked by the Platonist axiom that 
an Idea is a cause. Origen’s characterization of the Son as “image” represents a Christian 
appropriation of Numenius’s depiction of the Demiurge as an “image.” Origen’s trinity in 
Jo. 1-2 is framed in terms of a causal procession in which each cause produces an effect 
both similar and inferior to its cause. The Father causes the Son to be divine, and the 
divine Son causes all rational entities, beginning with the Holy Spirit, to be what they are.  
Next, consider the principle of non-reciprocal dependence reinforces the 
hierarchical character of Origen’s procession. Origen acknowledges that some “people 
might fear that the glory of the one who transcends all creation (τὴν τοῦ πᾶσαν κτίσιν 
                                               
68 In the case of Plotinus, the first principle is detailed by Dominic O’Meara, “The Hierarchical 
ordering of reality in Plotinus,” in The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, ed. Lloyd Gerson (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 66-81; the second by A.C. Lloyd, “The Principle that the Cause is 
greater than its Effect,” Phronesis 21.2 (1976), 146-156. Lloyd shows that on this point Plotinus was not 
novel, strictly speaking, but made much of a principle already in circulation in earlier philosophical 
tradition. 
69 So Panayiotis Papageorgiou, “Plotinos and Eunomios: A Parallel Theology of the Three 
Hypostases,” The Greek Orthodox Theological Review 37 (1992): 215-231, at 231. But see Chapter 1 and 
A.C. Lloyd, “The Principle That the Cause is Greater than Its Effect,” Phronesis 21.2 (1976): 146-156. 
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ὑπερέχοντος δόξαν) is put on a level with (ἐξισῶσαι) the others who happen to have the 
title ‘god’.”70 In order to protect against such a consequence, Origen posits an analogy. 
The reason which is in each rational being has the same position in relation to the 
Word which is in the beginning with God, which is God the Word, which God the 
Word has with God. For as the Father is self-sufficient deity and true God in 
relation to the image and images of the image (wherefore also men are said to be 
“according to the image,” not “images”), so is the self-sufficient Logos in relation 
to the reason in each one. For both hold the place of a source; the Father, that of 
divinity, the Son, that of reason.71 
 
This is an explicit appropriation of the principle that a cause is superior to its effect. Here 
the Father is superior to the Word in the same way that the Word is superior to all its 
rational effects. Note the analogous application of the title αὐτόλογος to the Son in this 
passage. The title provides the Son a role of “source” (πηγή) comparable to that of God 
the Father. Humans exist “according to the image,” but are not themselves “images” of 
the one Word. As God the Father is to the Word, so the Word is to all “words,” or rational 
creatures.  
Origen’s analogy runs in two directions. It guarantees the logikoi’s dependence 
upon and inferiority to the Image for their rationality. It also suggests that the Son draws 
from and is dependent upon αὐτόθεος, the “only True God.” The Word is “according to 
the Father” but is not himself to be identified as the source of divinity, as αὐτόθεος. As 
the logikoi contemplate the Logos, so the Logos contemplates the “fatherly depths” of 
                                               
70 Jo. 2.19:  Ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ εἰκὸς προσκόψειν τινὰς τοῖς εἰρηµένοις, ἑνὸς µὲν ἀληθινοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ πατρὸς 
ἀπαγγελλοµένου παρὰ δὲ τὸν ἀληθινὸν θεὸν θεῶν πλειόνων τῇ µετοχῇ τοῦ θεοῦ γινοµένων, 
εὐλαβουµένους τὴν τοῦ πᾶσαν κτίσιν ὑπερέχοντος δόξαν ἐξισῶσαι τοῖς λοιποῖς τῆς “θεὸς” προσηγορίας 
τυγχάνουσι, πρὸς τῇ ἀποδεδοµένῃ διαφορᾷ, καθ’ ἣν ἐφάσκοµεν πᾶσι τοῖς λοιποῖς θεοῖς διάκονον εἶναι τῆς 
θεότητος τὸν θεὸν λόγον, καὶ ταύτην παραστατέον. 
71 Jo. 2.20: Ὁ γὰρ ἐν ἑκάστῳ λόγος τῶν λογικῶν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἔχει πρὸς τὸν ἐν ἀρχῇ λόγον 
πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ὄντα λόγον θεόν, ὃν ὁ θεὸς λόγος πρὸς τὸν θεόν· ὡς γὰρ αὐτόθεος καὶ ἀληθινὸς θεὸς ὁ 
πατὴρ πρὸς εἰκόνα καὶ εἰκόνας τῆς εἰκόνος, —διὸ καὶ “κατ’ εἰκόνα” λέγονται εἶναι οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὐκ 
“εἰκόνες”— οὕτως ὁ αὐτόλογος πρὸς τὸν ἐν ἑκάστῳ λόγον. Ἀµφότερα γὰρ πηγῆς ἔχει χώραν, ὁ µὲν πατὴρ 
θεότητος, ὁ δὲ υἱὸς λόγου. 
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αὐτόθεος. As the logikoi participate in the Logos as αὐτόλογος, so the Logos participates 
in αὐτόθεος.  
Origen’s use of participation in Jo. 2.19-21 underwrites a mechanism of 
epistemological access to God the Father provided by knowledge of the Son, the 
“invisible image” according to which the each individual rational Nous is constructed.72 
The Father is participated in by his sole and perfect image, the Son. This “invisible” 
image, in turn, is the source of the Holy Spirit’s existence and character. As the Holy 
Spirit participates in that image, it is enabled to serve as the source of holiness for the 
saints who participate in him.73 Origen’s chain of epistemological access doubles as an 
“imitative chain”; less advanced saints imitate more advanced saints, who in turn work 
toward equality with the angels (Jo. 2.82), the chief of which is the Holy Spirit.74 The 
Holy Spirit perfectly participates in the Son and is infused with the Son’s perfections, 
which communicate the invisible Father as his perfect and invisible “image.”75 The only 
quality in which the Son participates is divinity. So his reception of divinity is the only 
way in which the Son is inferior to the Father as the product of God the Father. Of all 
                                               
72 For an intriguing comparison of Origen to Atticus and Numenius on the question of the Second 
Principle’s knowledge of the First, see Rowan Williams, “The Son’s Knowledge of the Father in Origen,” 
in Origeniana Quarta, ed. Lothar Lies (Vienna: Tyrolia, 1987), 146-53. Williams’ comparison leads him to 
conclude that, “In two respects, Origen clearly ranges himself with Neoplatonism over against some of its 
precursors: he accepts that the logic of placing the First beyond intellect and insisting on its simplicity 
involves the identification of intellect with the Second, and the assimilation of intellect and demiurge; and 
he holds (as far as we can see) that the intelligibilia are within the being of the Second qua wisdom” (149). 
73 Cf. Princ. 1.2.6, where Origen states that the Son “is therefore the image of the invisible God, 
the Father, being the truth, when considered in relation to the Father himself, and the image, when 
considered in relation to us, to whom he reveals the Father; through which image we know the Father, 
whom ‘no one’ else ‘knoweth save the Son and he to whom the Son hath willed to reveal him.’ And he 
reveals the Father by being himself understood.” 
74 Didymus cites Luke 20:36 as evidence for the idea that human beings strive to become like 
angels—a verse Origen employs three times in Princ. to make a similar point. See Princ. I.8.4, II.2.2, and 
especially IV.4.2: “. . . when the saints reach the height of perfection they are said to be made like, or equal 
to, the angels, according to the gospel statement.” 
75 For more on the Holy Spirit’s participation in the Son, see Chapter 4. 
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other qualities or virtues he is a source comparable to αὐτόθεος. So Origen elsewhere 
speaks of the Son as αὐτολόγος, αὐτοσοφία, and αὐτοαλήθεια.76  
According to Origen, the Son receives the quality of divinity from the Father in an 
eternal act of contemplation, and here it is important to note that how Origen elsewhere 
defines participation complicates his application of the metaphor in Jo. 2.19-21. In Jo. 
2.52, for example, Origen describes what it means for any soul to “participate.” In doing 
so, he uses a key term about the psychological aspect of participation in describing 
contemplation: ἐναποµάξασθαι. According to Origen,  
no one who participates in justice and the power to judge people will be able to 
receive the impressions (ἐναποµάξασθαι) of justice and of judging so completely 
in his own soul that he falls short of absolute justice and judgment in no way, just 
as a painter will not be able to give a share of all the unique features of what is 
being painted to his painting.77 
 
This passage occurs in a section of Jo. 2 in which Origen is describing the way rational 
entities participate in justice. Origen does not apply it directly to the Son; he is speaking 
here of the consequences of a rational soul’s participation in the “Idea” of justice. 
Nevertheless, the consequences for speaking of the Son as “participating in” the Father 
hang in the air, because Origen does not distinguish between senses of terms for 
participation when he applies them to the Son. 
Finally, we may consider a pivotal passage that should be read in light of Origen’s 
Numenian debts: 
(75) We are persuaded that there are three hypostases, the Father, the Son, and the 
Holy Spirit, and we believe that only the Father is unbegotten. We admit, as more 
                                               
76 See, for example, Cels. 3.41, a later text that reinforces the model of Jo. 1-2. 
77 Origen, Jo. 2.52. Οὐδεὶς γὰρ τῶν µετεχόντων δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς τοῦ κρίνειν λαὸν δυνάµεως 
οὕτω πάντη ἐναποµάξασθαι ἑαυτοῦ τῇ ψυχῇ δυνήσεται τοὺς τῆς δικαιοσύνης τύπους καὶ τοῦ κρίνειν, ὥστε 
ἐν µηδενὶ ἀποδεῖν τῆς αὐτοδικαιοσύνης καὶ τῆς αὐτοκρίσεως, ὡς οὐδὲ ὁ γράφων εἰκόνα οἷός τε ἔσται 
µεταδοῦναι πάντων τῶν τοῦ γραφοµένου ἰδιωµάτων τῇ γραφῇ. Cf. Cels. 6.64 and Ayres ad loc. in “Holy 
Spirit as ‘Undiminished Giver’,” 62. 
 70 
pious and as true, that the Holy Spirit is the most honored of all things made 
through the Word, and that he is [first] in rank of all the things which have been 
made by the Father through Christ. (76) Perhaps this is the reason the Spirit too is 
not called son of God, since the only begotten alone is by nature a son from the 
beginning. The Holy Spirit seems to have need of the Son ministering to his 
hypostasis, not only for it to exist, but also for it to be wise, and rational, and just, 
and whatever other thing we ought to understand it to be by participation in the 
aspects of Christ which we mentioned previously.78 
 
Origen here famously states clearly that the Holy Spirit is the “first” of “all things made 
through the Word,” and we will return to this passage in Chapter 4, in order to examine 
more carefully its consequences for Origen’s pneumatology. For now it is important to 
note that the τάξις that emerges in Jo. 2.75-76 turns on the principle of non-reciprocal 
dependence: the Son participates in the Father, but the Father does not participate in the 
Son; the Holy Spirit participates in the Son, but the Son does not participate in the Holy 
Spirit. The suspicion that Origen thinks this principle is applicable to the Son and the 
Spirit is confirmed by his use of the same terms in their cases as those he uses to describe 
the hierarchy at the level of rational creatures.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 Origen’s Commentary on John invokes a scheme of procession that resembles 
hierarchical orderings of Gnostic, Christian, and Platonic precedent. Origen’s “triad” is at 
home in this broad tradition. God the Father, αὐτόθεος, produces an image, the Son he 
                                               
78 Jo. 2.75-76; (75.) Ἡµεῖς µέντοι γε τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις πειθόµενοι τυγχάνειν, τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν 
υἱὸν καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦµα, καὶ ἀγέννητον µηδὲν ἕτερον τοῦ πατρὸς εἶναι πιστεύοντες, ὡς εὐσεβέστερον καὶ 
ἀληθὲς προσιέµεθα τὸ πάντων διὰ τοῦ λόγου γενοµένων τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦµα πάντων εἶναι τιµιώτερον, καὶ 
τάξει πρῶτον πάντων τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς διὰ Χριστοῦ γεγενηµένων. (76.) Καὶ τάχα αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ αἰτία τοῦ 
µὴ καὶ αὐτὸ υἱὸν χρηµατίζειν τοῦ θεοῦ, µόνου τοῦ µονογενοῦς φύσει υἱοῦ ἀρχῆθεν τυγχάνοντος, οὗ 
χρῄζειν ἔοικε τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦµα διακονοῦντος αὐτοῦ τῇ ὑποστάσει, οὐ µόνον εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ σοφὸν 
εἶναι καὶ λογικὸν καὶ δίκαιον καὶ πᾶν ὁτιποτοῦν χρὴ αὐτὸ νοεῖν τυγχάνειν κατὰ µετοχὴν τῶν προειρηµένων 
ἡµῖν Χριστοῦ ἐπινοιῶν. 
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generates and the Word he possesses. This image, in turn, is the instrument by which he 
produces multiple rational images. The first of the rational images produced by the Father 
through his Word is the Holy Spirit. The Son’s role as mediator of divinity and agent of 
creation is clear enough. Analogously, the Holy Spirit is the agent neither of creation nor 
of rationality, but the primal source of holiness in the saints.   
The hierarchical model of Jo. remains in spite of Origen’s claims that all three of 
the divine causes are “divine,” because Origen articulated his trinity in a context in which 
divine causes were regularly ordered and ranged in hierarchical terms.  The scholar who 
wishes to read this model out of Origen must furnish statements that explicitly mitigate 
the plain consequences of Origen’s grammar of participation.  
The net effect of the foregoing argument, then, is to shift the burden of proof to 
scholars who would read a hierarchical taxis out of Origen. Not only does Origen not 
distance his own presentation of the three first divine principles from precedents that 
ordered them hierarchically, but he overtly adopts the terminology and conceptual 
tendencies shared by all of those precedents to order the three in a series of graded 
entities. It is my contention that he would have been surprised by anyone who did not 
think a “hierarchical triad” was the obvious, traditional Christian arrangement. Origen 
remains committed to this model of the trinity for at least the early period of his 
theological career. In Chapter 4, I will argue that the net effect of Origen’s hierarchy—a 
“low” pneumatology—remains visible for the length of Origen’s career. But first, we turn 
to the polemical reasons that led Origen to adopt a grammar of participation that 
distinguished the triad in a graded hierarchy: monarchian theology. 
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Chapter 3 
“That They May Know You, the Only True God”:  
Participation’s Anti-Monarchian Function 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 With Origen’s appropriation of Numenius in view, we may now consider Origen’s 
theology within a frame of theological polemics. This chapter uncovers the way Origen 
put his appropriation of Numenius to the service of an anti-monarchian agenda. Origen 
admitted that God the Father alone is the primary principle of a triadic hierarchy. The 
Son’s participation in the monarchy of the Father forms the basis of a strategy for 
distinguishing the Son from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from the Son, and for 
explaining the continuity of divinity that courses down through the hierarchical triad to 
the rest of the rational creation. 
Origen uses participation to resist monarchian theology with three related tactics. 
First, he consistently avoids “self-production” terminology in referring to the second 
person. Second, he emphasizes the Son’s eternal and non-temporal reception from the 
Father. Third, he explains that the Son possesses divinity “essentially,” as a distinct entity 
subordinated to the Father. These three stratagems are developed on the basis of an appeal 
to a logic of procession of entities that participate in one another hierarchically. With 
these arguments in mind, we will review two “bogeymen” that often plague modern 
attempts to understand Origen’s “triadology”: the shift of “containment” language from a 
physical to an epistemological sense, and the doctrine of eternal generation of the Son. 
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When contextualized as anti-monarchian, these elements of Origen’s theology, so often 
puzzled over, take on a new light. 
Previous scholarly treatments recognize the breadth of Origen’s use of 
participation language, but none has contextualized this language within a polemical 
setting. A growing body of scholarship has reinforced various links between Origen’s 
exegesis, his theology, and his polemic against Roman monarchianism.1 On the other 
hand, Origen’s readers have neglected to account for his engagements with 
monarchianism or have overused later doctrinal categories to judge Origen’s thought. 
Some have judged the results of Origen’s use of a participation logic to be a 
“subordinationist” trinitarian theology.2 However, such critics tend to operate with too 
little self-critical awareness about the rhetorical use of “subordinationism” as a heuristic 
category: it belies doctrinal standards foreign to Origen’s context and so remains 
anachronistic if not used with qualification. On the other hand are Origen’s latter-day 
defenders, some of whom either downplay3 or ignore altogether4 the significance of the 
                                               
1 A.H.B. Logan, “Origen and the Development of Trinitarian Theology,” in Origeniana quarta 
(1987), 424-429; Ronald Heine, “The Christology of Callistus,” Journal of Theological Studies 49.1 
(1998): 56-91; Ibid., Origen: Scholarship in the Service of the Church (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011); and Mark DelCogliano, “The Interpretation of John 10:30 in the Third Century: Antimonarchian 
Polemics and the Rise of Grammatical Reading Techniques,” Journal of Theological Interpretation 6.1 
(2012): 117-138, with attendant bibliography on monarchianism. For the outworking of Origen’s anti-
monarchianism in later thought, see especially Andrew Radde-Gallwitz, “The Holy Spirit as Agent, not 
Activity: Origen’s Argument with Modalism and its Afterlife in Didymus, Eunomius, and Gregory of 
Nazianzus,” Vigiliae Christianae 64 (2010): 1-22; and Matthew Crawford, “The Triumph of Pro-Nicene 
Theology over Anti-Monarchian Exegesis: Cyril of Alexandria and Theodore of Heraclea on John 14.10-
11,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 21.4 (2013): 537-68. 
2 A good example of a view like this is J. Nigel Rowe, Origen’s Doctrine of Subordination: A 
Study in Origen’s Christology (New York: Peter Lang, 1987), 3-33. 
3 See, for example, Henri Crouzel, Origen, 181-204, and Ibid., “Les personnes de la Trinité sont-
elles de puissance inégale selon Origène, Peri Archon I, 3, 5-8?” Gregorianum 57 (1976): 109-125; 
Christopher Beeley, Unity of Christ (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 22-31. Both Crouzel and 
Beeley resist the consequences of participation for Origen’s theology of the trinity. Crouzel does so with an 
explicit allergy to the anachronism of charges of “subordinationism.” 
4 See Sarah Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self: An Essay ‘On the Trinity’ (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 126-32, especially 130-32; Ilaria Ramelli, “Origen’s Anti-
Subordinationism and Its Heritage in the Nicene and Cappadocian Line” Vigiliae Christianae 65 (2011): 
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metaphysics of participation in Origen’s thought to such a degree that Origen cannot have 
meant what he said. My account charts a middle course between ignoring the 
consequences of “participation” for Origen’s Trinitarian theology, on the one hand, and 
overreaching with anachronistic judgment, on the other.   
 
Roman Monarchian Theology and Origen’s Commentary on John 1–2 
 
 
 
Before addressing Origen’s Commentary on John, it is important to acknowledge 
two stages of development in monarchian theology up to this point. At the early stage, 
Noetus had held to the paradoxical idea that God the Father “suffered” in the Son. Later 
versions of monarchian theology used Stoic mixture theory to construct a more nuanced 
view. Callistus of Rome, for example, taught not that God the Father suffered, but that 
God the Son was the divine nature—God the Father—mixed with human nature. This is 
what Callistus must have meant when he referred to a “total blending” (συµπάσχειν) of 
the Father with the Son, invoking a Stoic theory of mixture in which each element does 
not lose its individual qualities. The two can be extracted whole and intact after the 
mixture, even though they are more closely mixed than a jar of oil and water shaken 
vigorously.6  
                                                                                                                                            
21–49. Coakley ascribes to Origen the kind of “hyper-pneumatology” he explicitly rejects in On First 
Principles, but she does so on grounds that his rejection is an exoteric doctrine, as opposed to the esoteric 
doctrine she finds in On Prayer. Notwithstanding the fact that a claim that an author has offered an 
“esoteric” doctrine is as difficult to disprove as it is to prove, Coakley does not explain the instances of 
hierarchical trinitarianism that do appear in On Prayer. I find her reading of On Prayer unconvincing 
because, in fact, the spiritual “eroticism” she finds there is not in real conflict with a “low” pneumatology I 
identify in Chapter 4. Ramelli reacts vehemently to any allegation of “subordinationism” against Origen, to 
the point that her treatments appear completely unaware of Origen’s use of “participation” as even 
potentially problematic. 
6 The Stoics had in mind the sui generis total blending of body and soul. 
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Callistus, Heine argues, applied this Stoic theory of total blending to the 
incarnation.7 On this view, the Father, or divine Pneuma, is totally blended with the flesh, 
or Son, which, at the death of the Son, is again separated. The Father, on this account, 
need not be said to have “died.” Callistus’ opponents did not need to exaggerate much to 
make the claim that the theory involves the Father in some kind of “suffering.” On the 
other hand, Callistus’ construal might have been misread by opponents like Hippolytus. 
The term at the heart of the theory, συµπάσχειν, means “to suffer with,” or “to blend 
totally,” depending on one’s philosophical awareness. Hippolytus and others could seize 
upon the similarity of the philosophical term in order to conflate Callistus’ theory with 
older patripassian theories of Noetus and his followers.8  
Though it is unclear whether Origen opposed Callistus himself, the 
monarchianism he opposed was more advanced than that of Noetus. His opponents did 
not teach that the Father suffered and died. They were intent on teaching that, because 
there are not two ultimate principles, the Father and the Son are one substance (ousia). 
Origen famously opposed this construal by arguing in favor of the Son’s eternal 
existence, distinct from the Father. In what follows, I will draw our attention to the anti-
monarchian motivation for several key components of Origen’s theological exegesis in 
the Commentary on John. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
7 See Heine, “Callistus”: 76. 
8 For more on this, see Heine, “Callistus”: 74-77. 
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God the Father, αὐτόθεος, and the Question of “Self-Production” 
 
 
 
As we have seen, in the Commentary on John, Origen refers to the Son as θεὸς, 
but not ὁ θεὸς, and applies the title αὐτόθεος exclusively to God the Father.9 Origen’s 
anti-monarchian agenda helps to explain his reservation of a particular title for God the 
Father alone. Then, too, it helps to clarify the theological consequences that follow from 
that reservation. Origen’s use of αὐτόθεος is a neologism.10 It invites comparison with a 
family of titles for “self-produced” ascribed to the highest deity by a range of Hellenistic 
sources— e.g., αὐτογένεθλος, αὐτόγονος, αὐτόφυτος, αὐτογενής, αὐτογέν<ν>ητος.11 In 
spite of the similarity between αὐτόθεος and those titles, Origen generally avoids 
application of terms indicating “self-production” to the Father or the Son. Instead, the 
Father is αὐτόθεος, and the Son is αὐτολόγος and αὐτοσοφία. We should pause to 
                                               
9 Jo. 2.17. 
10 The results of a TLG search suggest that Origen was first to use the word αὐτόθεος. On the other 
hand, compounds formed with “auto” are attested as apax legmomena in other figures, such as Numenius, 
who appears to have been the only figure to use the term αὐτοποεῖ (see Des Places, 111n3). Clement (Strom 
8.9) and Origen (Princ. 3.1.4.7) both know the term αὐτοτελής αἰτία which M. Frede (“The Original Notion 
of a Cause,” 138) explains as representing the Stoic “perfect cause” (cf. Cicero, De Fato 41; see also 
Alcinous, Didask. 10.3 and Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 283, which uses the term in combination with 
two other similar –teles titles for God—aeiteles and panteles). Whether Origen coined the term αὐτόθεος to 
read that causality onto God the Father is an interesting question. The only place in the Didymean corpus 
where αὐτοτελής appears is Trin. 7.8.13, line 10. Jerome translates some term repeatedly in DSS with 
causa, often referring to the Holy Spirit as “cause,” though not the causa perfecta of Cicero (see e.g., DSS 
46, 49, 71, 84, 202, 206, 238). Dillon’s commentary on Alcinous suggests some ways in which Middle 
Platonism is a more appropriate background for Origen’s αὐτόθεος as the first in a series of sources. 
11 On αὐτογένεθλος, αὐτόγονος, αὐτόφυτος, αὐτογενής, αὐτογέν<ν>ητος, see Lampe, A Patristic 
Greek Lexicon, s.vv. For a wide-ranging account of divine “self-production” up to and including Proclus, 
see John Whittaker, “A Hellenistic Context for John 10, 29,” Vigiliae Christianae 24 (1970): 241–60; John 
Whittaker, “The Historical Background of Proclus’ Doctrine of the ΑΥΘΥΠΟΣΤΑΤΑ,” in De Jamblique a 
Proclus, ed. Heinrich Dörrie (Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 1975), 193–230; John Whittaker, “Self-Generating 
Principles in Second-Century Gnostic Systems,” in The Rediscovery of Gnosticism, ed. Bentley Layton, 
vol. 1 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1980), 176–89. Unfortunately, Whittaker nowhere discusses Origen’s use of 
αὐτόθεος. For more on this term in Origen, see Balas, 269-70. Norman Russell errs in presuming that 
Origen ascribes all “auto” titles only to the Father: cf. Cels. 3.41, where the Son is described as follows: ὁ 
αὐτολόγος ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ αὐτοσοφία καὶ ἡ αὐτοαλήθεια. Origen only never refers to the Son as αὐτόθεος. Cf. 
Norman Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), 150n61. 
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consider Origen’s studied avoidance of terms for self-production.12 In order to understand 
Origen’s avoidance, it will help to attend to the intellectual culture that preceded him.  
The esteem afforded the Father by allowing him alone the title αὐτόθεος is similar 
to the kind of supremecy the cult of Theos Hypsistos reserved for one transcendent 
deity,13 and one alone. Though Origen’s αὐτόθεος does not replicate the terminology of 
the cult of the Highest God, Origen’s reasons for avoiding that terminology are possibly 
more complex than one might expect: Origen’s avoidance of such terms may have more 
to do with their having been co-opted by Roman monarchians than with their association 
with pagan religion.14 In order to underscore his own theology’s similarity to such 
religious proclivities, yet keep his theology distant from the “self-generative” God of the 
monarchians, Origen coined a new term for the “highest God”: αὐτόθεος. 
 
Self-Production of the Second Principle 
 
 
 
 A theme apparent in triadic Gnosticism which returns in third-century Christianity 
is the self-production of the scheme’s second principle. Gnostic theologies knew a wide 
range of terms for divine self-production.15 One of the earliest and most striking 
examples of the second principle’s self-generation appears in another citation by 
Hippolytus. It regards the sect of the Peratae. Hippolytus reports that they knew of a first 
                                               
12 See Clement, Protr. 7.74.5; C. Mondésert, Clément d'Alexandrie. Le protreptique, 2nd edn. 
Sources chrétiennes 2 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1949). 
13 A famous fragmentary inscription related to the cult of theos hypsistos in Asia Minor begins by 
calling the highest God self-generate (αὐτοφυής). See Stephen Mitchell, “The Cult of Theos Hypsistos 
between Pagans, Jews, and Christians,” in Polymnia Athanassiadi and Michael Frede, eds., Pagan 
Monotheism in Late Antiquity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 81-148, at 86. 
14 On which, see Chapter 4. 
15 Whittaker, “Self-Generating Principles in Second-Century Gnostic Systems,” in The 
Rediscovery of Gnosticism, ed. Bentley Layton, vol. 1 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1980), 176–89. 
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God, unoriginate (ἀγέννητον), a second deity, self-produced (αὐτογενές), and a third god, 
begotten (γεννητόν).17 The procession moves from a principle unproduced through a 
principle that self-generates to a principle produced by another. The Naasenes, too, know 
of an autogenetic figure.19 Gnostics had a number of resources at their disposal for the 
development of the idea that the second principle produces itself. John Whittaker would 
draw our attention to terminology and concepts endemic to Stoic pantheism (the cosmos 
spontaneously produces itself); Neopythagoreanism (the series of numbers is self-
generated); and tragic literature (images of divine self-renewal). Whittaker finds the most 
likely inspiration in oracular literature, which provided a common basis for Gnostics, 
orthodox Christians, and pagan Platonists alike.21  
Self-production was also a theological metaphor favored by pantheistic Stoics, 
like Seneca, who could speak of God as the one who produces himself.33 By Clement’s 
day, as Whittaker puts it, “one looked . . . beyond the universe and even beyond the 
demiurgic Nous in quest of the ultimate.”36 The self-productive God had been 
subordinated to a higher, unoriginated and transcendent deity. Clement quotes the 
“Thracian Orpheus,” who writes of the Demiurge that “he is one, self-generating 
(αὐτογενής); and from Him alone all things proceed, and in them He Himself exerts his 
activity: no mortal beholds him, but he beholds all.”38 Elsewhere Clement quotes the 
classical Perithous (of either Euripides or Critias) and glosses its use of a divine epithet, 
                                               
17 Hippolytus, Haer. 5.12; see Whittaker, “Self-Generating Principles,” 184-5, ad loc. καὶ ἔστι τὸ 
µὲν πρῶτον ἀγέννητον, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν τέλειον· τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἀγαθὸν αὐτογενές· τὸ δὲ τρίτον 
γεννητόν. 
19 According to Hippolytus, Ref. V.10. 
21 Whittaker, “Self-Generating Principles,” 187-90. 
33 Apud Lactantius, Inst. I.7, Seneca, fr. 15 Haase: Deus ipse se fecit. 
36 Whittaker, “Self-Generating Principles,” 182. 
38 Coxe trans., ANF 2, p. 193, slightly modified; εἷς ἔστ’, αὐτογενής, ἑνὸς ἔκγονα πάντα 
τέτυκται· ἐν δ’ αὐτοῖς αὐτὸς περινίσσεται, οὐδέ τις αὐτὸν εἰσορᾷ θνητῶν, αὐτὸς δέ γε πάντας ὁρᾶται. 
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τὸν αὐτοφυῆ, as a way of speaking about the “Demiurgic Nous” (ἐνταῦθα γὰρ µὲν 
αὐτοφυῆ τὸν δηµιουργὸν νοῦν εἴρηκεν).39 For Clement, as with Hippolytus’s Peratae, the 
second principle is self-productive and subordinated to a higher first principle.41 Clement 
posits a transcendent Father in order to preempt Stoic pantheism, but he does not deny 
that the second principle self-generates insofar as the Logos became flesh. So Clement 
seems to teach that the incarnation of the Logos was the second principle’s “self-
generation.”42  
A tradition like the one known to Clement remained in Alexandria for a long time. 
The Chaldean Oracles could speak of God as αὐτογένεθλος.43 The De trinitate associated 
with Didymus quotes a related fragment of the Perithous, which glosses αὐτογένεθλος 
with the following definition of self-generation: “creating itself, ever new, not created 
(Τίκτων αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν, ἀεὶ νέος, οὐ ποιητός).”45 Turning to school Platonism, Numenius 
reports that the second principle “makes an Idea of himself.”46 Plotinus avoids stating 
explicitly that the second principle, Nous, self-generates. He avoids such language 
probably because he was nervous about his position’s being confused or elided with 
popular Gnosticism. According to Plotinus, the Nous in no way originates from the One 
                                               
39 Clement, Strom. 5.14.114.3; and Whittaker, “Self-Generating Principles,” 182 ad loc. 
41 A key biblical text in Jo. 2.12-20 is John 17:3 (“that they may see you, the one true God”). John 
17:3 does not play a role in the monarchian thought opposed by Tertullian (Against Praxeas) or Hippolytus 
(Against Noetus/Against Heresies). Whether the monarchians faced by Origen employed the verse or not, 
Origen invokes John 17:3 as a tactic in anti-monarchian polemics. 
42 Clement, Strom. 5.3.16.5; and see Whittaker, “The Historical Background of Proclus’ Doctrine 
of the ΑΥΘΥΠΟΣΤΑΤΑ,” in De Jamblique a Proclus, ed. Heinrich Dörrie (Genève: Vandoeuvres, 1974), 
224.  
43 Chald. Or. 39; Ruth Majercik, ed. and trans., The Chaldean Oracles: Text, Translation, and 
Commentary (New York: Brill, 1989), 62-63. The term αὐτογένεθλος reappears in (Pseudo-)Didymus, 
Trin. 3 (PG 39 788.9) and Gregory of Nyssa, Eun. 3.8.29.9. 
45 Trin. 3.2.1 (PG 39.788); c. 390? CE. 
46 Frag. 16, ed. Des Places; ὁ γὰρ δεύτερος διττὸς ὢν αὐτοποιεῖ τήν ἰδέαν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τὸν κόσµον. 
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as an act on the part of the One, even if the One does generate the Nous.47 Porphyry was 
less allergic to borrowing from the Gnostics than was Plotinus. A trajectory of the second 
principle’s self-generation runs from Porphyry (Hist. Phil. Fr. 18) to Marius Victorinus 
(Adv. Arium 3.17.15; 4.13.5). 
In Christian circles, a period of stigmatization ensued in the third century 
because the second principle’s “self-production” had been a preferred idiom of earlier 
monarchians.48 As John Whittaker notices, Hippolytus accuses Noetus of predicating his 
patripassianist identification of the Father and Son on the notion of divine self-
generation.49 Subsequent abstention from the metaphor of self-production for the second 
person thus appears as a reaction to this monarchian tradition. This reaction helps to 
explain Origen’s reservation of the title αὐτόθεος for God the Father alone, in 
Commentary on John and On First Principles.  
Had Origen employed the terms of “self-production” in the case of the Son, he 
would have had good precedent for doing so, but he did not. Thus, Origen avoids the 
terminology of “self-production” in the face of a tradition that had grown comfortable 
with it. His avoidance was probably not due to Gnosticism’s use of the terms; Clement’s 
use of the language testifies to an environment in which Gnostics were not radically 
against the trend on this score, but were reflecting a doctrinal commonplace. However, 
                                               
47 Pépin, 305, reads Enn .V, 2.11.1.7-8 this way. The question of the One’s “self-production,” or 
“self-reflexivity,” as Lloyd Gerson terms it, is another matter. I am persuaded by Gerson’s point that, for 
Plotinus, “self-reflexivity does not compromise simplicity,” and that Plotinus’s reflections on the One are 
in keeping with Aristotle’s similar comfort in speaking of “thought thinking itself” without worrying that 
such speaking would problematize the first principle’s simplicity. In any event, Plotinus appears more 
comfortable than his followers—especially Proclus—would have been, to speak of the One’s self-
causation, for example, in the pivotal Ennead VI.8. See especially Enn. VI.8.13.57, 14.41, 16.15, 16.17, 
and Lloyd Gerson, “The ‘Neoplatonic’ Interpretation of Plato’s Parmenides,” IJPT, forthcoming. 
48 Here the studies of Whittaker are crucial. See Whittaker, “Self-Generating Principles,” 178-180; 
and Whittaker, “Historical Background,” especially 210-214. 
49 See Hippolytus, Ref. IX.10 (9.5 in ANF’s numbering). 
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Gnostics like Hippolytus’s Peratae were not the only potential cause for a stigmatization 
of self-production talk in the third century. The point I want to emphasize here is that 
language of “self-production” formed the basis of a concept useful to monarchians.50 The 
Father and Son, according to some versions of monarchian theology, comprise one entity 
that self-generates, now as Father, now as Son. Hippolytus’ report of Noetus’ doctrine is a 
case in point:  
Now, that Noetus affirms the Son and Father are the same, no one is ignorant. But 
he makes his statement thus: “When indeed, then, the Father had not been born, 
He yet was justly styled ‘Father’; and when it pleased Him to undergo generation, 
having been begotten, He Himself became His own Son, not another’s.” For in 
this manner he thinks to establish the sovereignty of God, alleging that Father and 
Son, so called, are one and the same (substance), not one individual produced 
from a different one, but Himself from Himself; and that He is styled by name 
Father and Son, according to vicissitude of times.51 
 
Noetus is supposed to have been concerned that there should not be any kind of “other” 
production within divine nature. “The Son” was generated “from himself,” not “from 
                                               
50 See Whittaker, “Historical Background,” 209-214. Whittaker presses his argument a step too 
far. He concludes that, because after the monarchian crisis orthodox Christians tended to avoid talk of 
divine “self-production,” “Christians neglected an important department of theology, and by abandoning 
the concept of self-generation deprived their theology of a suggestive means of expressing the aseity of the 
supreme divinity” (Whittaker, 214). Whittaker has not made the case that Christians failed to express such 
a feature of the divine nature. It is this feature, I suggest, that Origen maintained by coining the term 
autotheos (Whittaker does not include Origen in his discussion). Notably, the evidence for earlier use of 
terms related to “self-production” is retained by Clement, falls away with Origen, and returns positively, 
apparently, only with Cyril of Alexandria. It is also worth noting that the De trinitate associated with 
Didymus retains precisely the sort of application of “self-generation” to the divine nature Whittaker claims 
is lacking in orthodox Christian circles (see footnote 20 above). 
51 ANF trans. p. 128, Ref. IX.10, 10-11. Ὅτι δὲ καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν υἱὸν εἶναι λέγει καὶ πατέρα, οὐδεὶς 
ἀγνοεῖ· λέγει γὰρ οὕτως· ὅτε µὲν οὖν µὴ γεγένητο ὁ πατήρ, δικαίως πατὴρ προσηγόρευτο· ὅτε δὲ ηὐδόκησε 
γένεσιν ἐκ παρθένου ὑποµεῖναι, γεννηθεὶς ὁ πατὴρ υἱὸς ἐγένετο αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ, οὐχ ἑτέρου. οὕτως γοῦν 
δοκεῖ µοναρχίαν συνιστᾶν, ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φάσκων ὑπάρχειν πατέρα καὶ υἱόν, γινόµενον οὐχ ἕτερον ἐξ 
ἑτέρου, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ· ὀνόµατι µὲν πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν καλούµενον κατὰ χρόνων τροπήν, ἕνα δὲ ὄντα 
(M. Marcovich, ed., Hippolytus. Refutatio omnium haeresium, PTS 25 [Berlin: De Gruyter, 1986], 348). 
Similar but not identical phrasing reappears in Hippolytus’ Contra Noetum. Early in the account (CN 
3.2.3), Hippolytus uses intensive and reflexive pronouns to underscore that Noetus identifies the Father 
with Christ as a single agent: Αὐτός ἐστι Χριστὸς ὁ Πατήρ, αὐτὸς Υἱός, αὐτὸς ἐγεννήθη, αὐτὸς ἔπαθεν, 
αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἤγειρεν.  At CN 7.4, Noetus’ followers are supposed to confess that the Son is himself the 
Father (ὁµολογοῦντος αὐτοῦ ἑαυτὸν Πατέρα). 
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another” (αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ, οὐχ ἑτέρου).52 Hippolytus elaborates the compressed quotation: 
the divine manifestation of “the Son” is self from self, not other from other (γινόµενον 
οὐχ ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ). Noetus taught divine self-production as a 
way of protecting the divine µοναρχία.  
Echoes of Noetus appear in Origen’s synopsis of the monarchian tradition in the 
Commentary on John. As Origen says, some “deny that the individual existence of the 
Son is other than that of the Father” (ἰδιότητα υἱοῦ ἑτέραν παρὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς).53 The 
monarchian tradition from Noetus forward would have read language of one divine 
hypostasis proceeding from another as indicating “another from another” (ἕτερον ἐξ 
ἑτέρου). This sort of differentiation could only entail ditheism, on their account.  
Origen uses a grammar of participation to distinguish Son from Father and order 
the divine first principles in the face of monarchian theology. Given the use Noetus 
makes of “self-production,” John Whittaker explains the charge later leveled at 
“Sabellians” that they taught a divine “Father-Son” (ὑιοπάτορα) by reading it as an 
ascription of “self-production” to the Father-Son deity.54 So Clement’s use of “self-
production” to describe the incarnation would have looked dangerously outdated to 
Origen. It would have appeared to fit all too neatly with monarchian theologies.  
Yet Origen retains a monarchian’s preference for one primary divine principle. He 
allows that the Father alone is the supreme source of all, and in this way provides a 
concession to monarchian concerns. He does not, however, deny the Son’s eternal divine 
                                               
52 Eusebius will revive the language of “another from another” in his quarrel with Marcellus (e.g., 
e. th. 3.5). See Chapters 5-6. 
53 Jo. 2.16. 
54 The charge resurfaces in Arius’ concerns about Alexander of Alexandria’s theology. See, for 
example, his letter to Alexander; Urk. 6: “. . . nor as Sabellius claimed, dividing a Monad into a Son-Father 
(ὑιοπάτορα).” 
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existence, as a monarchian would have. He refuses the monarchian consequence that the 
sole divine principle acts under different forms; instead, there are second and third 
hypostases arranged in a hierarchy. Origen’s ordered use of “auto”-titles to refer to the 
Father, the transcendent source, and the Son, the secondary source, directly follows from 
and reinforces his opposition to monarchian theologies of the Son. 
 
The Perfect Participant: Anti-Monarchian Grammar of Participation 
 
 
 
I now return to passages from the Commentary on John discussed in Chapter 2. 
We saw there that Origen drew on Numenius to discover a Platonic hierarchy in the 
Gospel of John. I now want to draw attention to evidence in these passages that Origen 
employed that hierarchy as an anti-monarchian strategy. 
  
 
The Son’s Participation in the Father 
 
 
 
Origen’s thought is squarely situated in an Alexandrian tradition that had absorbed 
middle Platonist tradition. In the Commentary on John, “participation” names likenesses 
between creatures and their divine sources. By invoking a Platonic grammar of 
participation, Origen invokes a scheme common to earlier forms of Platonism in which 
an ultimate source produces entities that resemble one another in a chain or procession. 
The chain includes both the Holy Spirit’s need for a source in the Son, and the Son’s need 
for a source in the Father.  
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However, Origen’s use of participation is no mere aping of Platonist ontology. It 
provides a way of speaking about the Son’s distinction from the Father, and the Holy 
Spirit’s distinction from the Son, which prevents the distinctions between the three from 
collapsing. This grammar ensures both that the relationship between each of the three 
“hypostases” is incorporeal and that each of the “three” is a real existent produced by an 
incorporeal cause. The continuity thus provided is one of conceptual similarity: the Son is 
the primal image of the Father; and the Holy Spirit is the primal participant in the 
Father’s image. However, because each of the three is a “real existent,” none of the three 
can be collapsed into another. All three exist eternally. In this way, the grammar of 
participation grounds Origen’s invalidation of monarchian theology. 
Ronald Heine’s arguments that Origen encountered monarchianism at Rome are 
convincing. Taking Eusebius’s evidence seriously, Heine supposes that Origen was in 
Rome “when the controversy between Zephyrinus, Callistus and Hippolytus must have 
been raging.”56 He argues that Callistus, with his knowledge of Stoic mixture theory, had 
advanced the monarchian tradition beyond that of the patripassianist theory of Noetus and 
his followers. Because Origen does not mention patripassianism, but because he does 
appear sensitive to monarchian theological concerns, he probably does not have the 
earlier doctrine of Noetus in view. The monarchian doctrine Origen encountered in Rome 
was more sophisticated than that of Noetus, if it was not that of Callistus himself.57  
                                               
56 Heine, 57. Heine’s judgment is based in part on Eusebius h.e. 6.14.10, which reports that Origen 
“visited Rome, ‘desiring,’ as he himself somewhere says, ‘to see the most ancient church of Rome,” while 
Zephyrinus was Rome’s bishop. Eusebius’s data implies a period of roughly 199-216 for the dates of 
Origen’s visit, but it is plausible to suppose, as Heine does, that the visit occurred at a time when Origen 
could have encountered the debate he appears to know in his early writings. 
57 For more on Roman monarchian theology, see H. Hagemann, Die Römische Kirche (Freiburg, 
Herder, 1864), 300-28. I agree with Heine’s worry that Hagemann presses the evidence too far in 
attempting to identify Origen’s opponent with Callistus himself. Whether Origen encountered Callistus 
himself is probably indeterminable. 
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Origen opposes doctrines dear to monarchians in several places in the 
Commentary on John.58 To take just one example, Origen has in view monarchianism 
when he reports that some use Psalm 44:2 (Ἐξηρεύξατο ἡ καρδία µου λόγον ἀγαθόν) to 
portray the Son as  
an expression of the Father occurring in syllables. And in accordance with this 
view, if we inquire of them carefully, they do not give him hypostasis, nor do they 
make his ousia clear. I do not mean that it is this or that, but in what manner [he 
has] ousia.59  
 
The last phrase indicates that Origen’s quarrel with monarchians turns not on the question 
of what, precisely, the second person is (οὐδέπω φαµὲν τοιάνδε ἢ τοιάνδε). It rather turns 
on precisely how the second person is (ὅπως ποτὲ οὐσίαν). Against those who would 
disperse the Word’s subsistence into the ethereality of syllables, Origen insists that the 
Word is distinct from the Father, “separated and substantiated” (καὶ κεχωρισµένον καὶ 
οὐσιωµένον).60  
                                               
58 Origen’s quarrel with the Gnostic Heracleon in the Commentary is amply documented. 
Naturally, Origen’s disagreements with Heracleon tend toward questions about what the “creation” of the 
cosmos mentioned by Scripture entails, e.g., were the “aeons” created by God the Father? See, for example, 
Jo. 2.100-104, for Origen’s anti-Heraclean exegesis on this point. For clear anti-monarchian statements in 
Jo., see 1.243-44, 1.266, 2.12-18, and 13.151-152. An anti-monarchian polemic appears in other texts from 
both early and late periods of Origen’s career (early: Princ. I [pre-230s]; Dialogue with Herclides 4 [circa 
230]; and late: Contra Celsum 8.12 [late 240s]). 
59 Jo. 1.151: καὶ µάλιστα ἐπεὶ συνεχῶς χρῶνται τῷ· “Ἐξηρεύξατο ἡ καρδία µου λόγον ἀγαθόν,” 
οἰόµενοι προφορὰν πατρικὴν οἱονεὶ ἐν συλλαβαῖς κειµένην εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο 
ὑπόστασιν αὐτῷ, εἰ ἀκριβῶς αὐτῶν πυνθανοίµεθα, οὐ διδόασιν οὐδὲ οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ σαφηνίζουσιν, οὐδέπω 
φαµὲν τοιάνδε ἢ τοιάνδε, ἀλλ’ ὅπως ποτὲ οὐσίαν. See Heine, “Christology of Callistus”, 65. Heine can also 
point to Origen’s attack on monarchian exegeis of Ps 44:2 at Jo. 2.280-287, so the anti-monarchian concern 
appears to span at least the time-frame of both of the first books of Origen’s Commentary. Eusebius repeats 
this charge against Marcellus and includes the interpretation of it as the Stoic distinction between the logos 
endiathetos / logos prophorikos at e. th. II.15.4. 
60 Jo. 1.152: Λόγον γὰρ ἀπαγγελλόµενον υἱὸν εἶναι νοῆσαι καὶ τῷ τυχόντι ἐστὶν ἀµήχανον. Καὶ 
λόγον τοιοῦτον καθ’ αὑτὸν ζῶντα καὶ ἤτοι οὐ κεχωρισµένον τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο τῷ µὴ ὑφεστάναι 
οὐδὲ υἱὸν τυγχάνοντα ἢ καὶ κεχωρισµένον καὶ οὐσιωµένον ἀπαγγελλέτωσαν ἡµῖν θεὸν λόγον. Heine (73ff.) 
compares Origen’s exegesis of Ps 44:2 at Jo. 1.151 with Tertullian’s Against Praxeas in order to confirm 
Origen’s anti-monarchian polemic. At first glance it is not clear whether Origen here endorses the latter 
proposition as his own construal of things, or whether he might be forcing a ridiculous conclusion on his 
opponents. It could be that he is forcing a Gnosticizing interpretation of the distinction between Father and 
Son, in materialistic terms, on his monarchian opponents. However, Origen elsewhere deploys substantial 
language to refer to the distinction between Father and Son, with which pattern the usage here accords. See, 
for example, Jo. 2.62, and the discussion of that text in the following Chapter. 
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At Jo. 2.16, Origen notes two monarchian positions:  
Many people who wish to be pious are troubled because they are afraid that they 
may proclaim two Gods and, for this reason, they fall into false and impious 
beliefs. They either deny that the individuality of the Son is other than that of the 
Father by confessing him to be God whom they refer to as “Son” in name at least, 
or they deny the divinity of the Son and make his individuality and essence as an 
individual to be different from the Father.61 
 
This passage is well known.62 Though Origen does not name his opponents, their 
positions owe to a monarchian concern. They are “troubled because they are afraid that 
they may proclaim two Gods,” or, in other words, two supreme first principles. Some, 
Origen says, “confess him to be God whom they refer to as ‘Son’ in name at least,” in 
order to “deny that the distinctiveness of the Son is other than that of the Father.”63 This 
is the first result of a monarchian concern. On the other hand, a monarchian might “deny 
                                               
61 Jo. 2.16; Heine trans., 98, slightly modified. Καὶ τὸ πολλοὺς φιλοθέους εἶναι εὐχοµένους 
ταράσσον, εὐλαβουµένους δύο ἀναγορεῦσαι θεοὺς καὶ παρὰ τοῦτο περιεὐλαβουµένους δύο ἀναγορεῦσαι 
θεοὺς καὶ παρὰ τοῦτο περιπίπτοντας ψευδέσι καὶ ἀσεβέσι δόγµασιν, ἤτοι ἀρνουµένους ἰδιότητα υἱοῦ 
ἑτέραν παρὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ὁµολογοῦντας θεὸν εἶναι τὸν µέχρι ὀνόµατος παρ’ αὐτοῖς “υἱὸν” 
προσαγορευόµενον, ἢ ἀρνουµένους τὴν θεότητα τοῦ υἱοῦ τιθέντας δὲ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἰδιότητα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν 
κατὰ περιγραφὴν τυγχάνουσαν ἑτέραν τοῦ πατρός, ἐντεῦθεν λύεσθαι δύναται· 
62 Its sense and significance for Origen’s thought are disputed. Previous generations of scholarship 
were more willing to acknowledge the ambiguities in Origen’s thought than have been more recent 
scholars. Christopher Beeley, for example, provides a quietly sterilized account of Origen in Chapter 1 of 
The Unity of Christ (see especially p. 25ff). The sterilization owes in part to Beeley’s overlooking of 
participation’s consequences. He can acknowledge that the late Origen of Contra Celsum wrote that the 
Father “‘gave a share of himself and his greatness’ to the Son” (Beeley, Unity of Christ, 23, quoting Cels. 
6.69). But he skirts the consequences of a statement like this. He later asserts, “Nor does the language of 
participation . . . signal any lessening of divinity in the Son merely because Origen also uses it to refer to 
the relationship between the saints and God” (Ibid., 26). He next cites two texts (Frag.Ps. 134.19-20 and 
Schol.Apoc. 20) to support this claim. These texts are spurious, in part because they fly in the face of so 
much of Origen’s undisputed corpus’s position regarding participation and the Son. Beeley’s appeal to 
them is circular. Even if one were to admit them as evidence of Origen’s thought, it is difficult to explain 
them except as traces of a shift. In that case they would stand at direct odds with the quotation Beeley 
himself provides from Cels. 6.69, late in Origen’s career. In no case are they straightforwardly compatible 
with Jo. quoted elsewhere by Beeley. He resorts to the position that the Father’s being “greater than” the 
Son “refer[s] . . . to the Father’s unique role and character within the Trinity” (Ibid., 26). Yet again a 
question is begged: what does it mean for the Father to have “a unique role and character within the 
Trinity” when that role entails being the only fully divine cause? It is not far-fetched to suppose that the 
consequence of that “role and character” excludes the possibility of the Son’s “equal divinity,” since 
Origen adheres to the principle that a cause is greater than its effect. Ontological disparity between the 
Father and Son is an ineluctable consequence of Origen’s logic. Beeley does not account for this line of 
thinking because he deems it unworthy of an accounting; he dismisses it as obviously misguided. 
63 ἰδιότητα υἱοῦ ἑτέραν παρὰ τὴν τοῦ πατροῦ, ὁµολογοῦντας θεὸν εἶναι τὸν µέχρι ὀνόµατος 
παρ᾽αὐτοῖς υἱὸν προσαγορευόµενον. 
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the divinity of the Son and make his distinctiveness and essence as an individual to be 
different from the Father.”64 This second position resulting from monarchianism might 
lead to a theology according to which the Son’s divinity is a temporary matter that takes 
place only at some stage during the life of Jesus.65 
Eusebius’s evidence that Origen encountered a monarchian by the name of 
Beryllus is important, because Beryllus’s terminology appears in Origen’s reference to 
unnamed individuals who deny that the Son possesses “his own distinct existence” (τὴν 
ἰδιότητα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν κατὰ περιγραφὴν).66 Beryllus had denied precisely this. There is 
no reason to doubt Eusebius’s report that documents were still in circulation in the early 
fourth century testifying to exchanges between Origen and Beryllus, whom Origen 
purportedly won over with personal discussion.67 Here is what Eusebius says of Beryllus’ 
doctrine: 
He dared to assert that our Saviour and Lord did not pre-exist in a distinct form of 
being of his own before his abode among men, and that he does not possess a 
divinity of his own, but only that of the Father dwelling in him.68 
 
According to this report, Beryllus claimed that Christ did not “pre-exist” (προϋφεστάναι) 
in a distinct form of being (κατ’ ἰδίαν οὐσίας περιγραφὴν). Beryllus taught a version of 
                                               
64 ἢ ἀρνουµένους τὴν θεότητα τοῦ υἱοῦ τιθέντας δὲ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἰδιότητα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν κατὰ 
περιγραφὴν τυγχάνουσαν ἑτέραν τοῦ πατρός. Heine notes that these two options might be referred to as 
modalist and dynamic forms of monarchianism, respectively. The modalist is the version of monarchianism 
with which Origen takes issue. Dynamic monarchianism, on the other hand, leads to a form of adoptionism, 
whereby it is the Son’s human nature, and not his divinity, that is permanently secured. See Heine, “Stoic 
Logic as Handmaid,” 98-99. To Heine’s careful and, I think, correct analysis of this passage, I only add that 
it is not implausible that Origen’s opponents have tried implicitly to lump his own position in with the 
adoptionist camp. 
65 Modern historians of dogma would call this theology “adoptionist,” though I refrain from the 
term because it is not used by Origen or his opponents. 
66 Jo. 2.16. 
67 Given the exchange between Origen and Heraclides, discovered in stenographic form on 
papyrus, we need not doubt the authenticity of an account like the one Eusebius provides. Origen was no 
stranger to disputation and might easily have gone to persuade Beryllus of his error. 
68 Eusebius, e.h. 6.33.1. Greek: τὸν σωτῆρα καὶ κύριον ἡµῶν λέγειν τολµῶν µὴ προϋφεστάναι 
κατ’ ἰδίαν οὐσίας περιγραφὴν πρὸ τῆς εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἐπιδηµίας µηδὲ µὴν θεότητα ἰδίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλ’ 
ἐµπολιτευοµένην αὐτῷ µόνην τὴν πατρικήν. 
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monarchian theology according to which the Father was the “divinity” that indwelled 
Jesus during the incarnation. Christ, according to Beryllus, did not have “his own 
divinity” (θεότητα ἰδίαν ἔχειν). In this regard he is an example of a monarchian use of a 
Christology of mixture: the Father is the divinity that dwells in Christ.69 If that is so, then 
Christ does not have a pre-temporal existence: the man Jesus is indwelled by God the 
Father, and the man Jesus’ divinity results from that indwelling. Origen opposes 
Beryllus’s doctrine by arguing in favor of the Son’s distinct eternal existence prior to the 
incarnation. Beryllus, for his part, objected to Origen’s doctrine on the grounds that it 
seemed to teach the existence of two separate and independent existents and, thus, two 
supreme first principles. If it was not Beryllus himself who motivated Origen’s worries in 
the Commentary on John, it must have been someone who shared his position. 
Psalm 44:2 (LXX) states that “my heart erupts with a good Word” (ἐξηρεύξατο ἡ 
καρδία µου λόγον ἀγαθόν). Psalm 44:2 was a key monarchian prooftext because it could 
be read as an instance of the Word’s “proceeding forth” from the mouth of God the 
Father, only to dissipate into the air. Psalm 44:2 provided a basis for monarchianism 
especially if the “Word” were characterized according to the Stoic psychological 
distinction between inner reason (λόγος ἐνδιάθετος) and outward expression (λόγος 
προφορικός). Monarchians had good precedent for associating Psalm 44:2 with the λόγος 
προφορικός. Theophilus of Antioch had used the Stoic idea to illustrate two moments or 
aspects of the second Person—the Word as imminent in the Father’s mind and the Word 
                                               
69 For more on this, see Heine, “Christology of Callistus,” 74-78. For more evidence that early 
Christians were sensitive to various ways in which Stoic mixture theory could be deployed in christology, 
see Anthony Briggman, “Irenaeus’ Christology of Mixture,” Journal of Theological Studies 64.2 (2013): 
516-555. 
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revealed to humankind.70 From a Stoic standpoint, the λόγος προφορικός could only be 
conceived in terms of speech, as opposed to a transcendent, enduring procession.71 
Monarchians would then use Psalm 44:2 to construe God’s λόγος ἀγαθόν as a “mere 
utterance” of God, “an expression of the Father occurring in syllables” that comes to be 
and passes away.72  
Origen knows the Stoic distinction between inner speech and outward expression, 
but he avoids any mention of it in the Commentary on John. The avoidance is not 
accidental.73 In order to undermine a monarchian interpretation of Psalm 44:2, Origen 
tacitly repeals Theophilus’s association of the Stoic λόγος ἐνδιάθετος–λόγος προφορικός 
distinction with Psalm 44:2. Having avoided the question of a two-stage Logos theory, he 
uses a participatory grammar to articulate the Son’s continuity with and distinction from 
the Father. Participation provides a way of achieving distinction between the Father and 
the Son without sacrificing the continuity suggested by the Father’s incorporeal and 
eternal generation of the Son.  
God, with the article, is αὐτόθεος, wherefore the Savior says in his prayer to the 
Father, “that they might know You, the Only True God. On the other hand, 
                                               
70 Theophilus, Ad Autolycum 2.10 and 2.22. 
71 Heine, 66. 
72 Jo. 1.151; cf. Jo. 1.280-287 and discussion ad loc by Heine, “Christology of Callistus”: 66. 
Origen’s alternative psychological distinction between “voice” and “reason” (Jo. I, 32) explains the need 
for voice, and so for teaching, among human beings. It does not broach the question of the relationship 
between human psychology and the divine nature, or the relationship between Christ as God’s eternal 
Logos and the Holy Spirit as John the Baptist. Joseph Lienhard (“Origen’s Speculation on John the Baptist 
or Was John the Baptist the Holy Spirit?” in Origeniana Quinta, ed. R.J. Daly [Leuven: Peeters, 1992], 
449-453) notes that at this stage in his career Origen speculated that John the Baptist is the Holy Spirit. In 
the case of Jo. 1.32, Origen uses the relationshiop of John the Baptist to Christ as a model for thinking 
through the complex interrelationship between speech and its intelligibility. 
73 At least he is aware of it in the later text of Contra Celsum 6.65. See D.G. Robertson, “Origen 
on Inner and Outer Logos,” Studia Patristica XLVI (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 201-205. 
Origen’s avoidance of the distinction is not due, as Roberstson supposes, to worries that the distinction 
represented a position not “close enough to the psychological doctrines of the Scriptures.” 
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everything except αὐτόθεος, which is made God by participation in his divinity, 
would more properly not be said to be ‘the God’ but ‘divine’.”74  
 
Recall that this statement’s context is the elaboration of John 1’s identification of the 
Logos as “with God,” πρὸς τὸν θεόν. There can be little doubt that Origen means to 
include the Son in the group designated by the phrase “based the supreme God” (τὸ παρὰ 
τὸ αὐτόθεος), because in his next breath he invokes the scene of the “Savior’s prayer to 
the Father” (John 17:3), “that they might know You the One True God.” The Son prays to 
αὐτόθεος just as the rest of the rational creation does. 
Origen states that the Son, like all other creatures, is “made God by participation 
in [the Father’s] divinity” (µετοχῇ τῆς ἐκείνου θεότητος θεοποιούµενον). Yet he is 
satisfied that he has successfully avoided both horns of the dilemma posed by Origen’s 
opponents. Neither has he denied the priority of the “One True God,” nor, by making the 
Son’s existence distinct from the Father, has he alienated the Son from the Father, since 
the Son is God “by nature,” and not by adoption like the rest of the created, spiritual 
cosmos. 
 
The Son’s Possession of Divinity οὐσιωδῶς 
 
 
 
Origen has monarchian theology as a target in mind when he describes the Son as 
possessing divinity “essentially” (οὐσιωδῶς). In the passage quoted above, when Origen 
describes how the Son has existence, he describes that existence as “separated and 
substantiated” (καὶ κεχωρισµένον καὶ οὐσιωµένον). In a number of other places he adopts 
                                               
74 Jo. 2.17; αὐτόθεος ὁ θεός ἐστι, διόπερ καὶ ὁ σωτήρ φησιν ἐν τῇ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα εὐχῇ· “Ἵνα 
γινώσκωσι σὲ τὸν µόνον ἀληθινὸν θεόν”· πᾶν δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὸ αὐτόθεος µετοχῇ τῆς ἐκείνου θεότητος 
θεοποιούµενον οὐχ “ὁ θεὸς” ἀλλὰ “θεὸς” κυριώτερον ἂν λέγοιτο. 
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Aristotelian terminology to underscore the Son’s eternal existence, distinct from the 
Father.75 Origen’s preference for using the phrase καθ' αὑτὸν as an anti-monarchian term 
is apparent at Jo. 2.69, where he writes:  
But consider if it is possible for us to learn two things in that ‘in the beginning’ is 
mentioned twice. One is that “in the beginning was the Word,” as if he were by 
himself (καθ' αὑτὸν), and not with anyone at all; the other being that “in the 
beginning” he “was with God.” I think that it is not false to say of him that “he 
was in the beginning and “in the beginning” he was “with God,” neither being 
only “with God” since “he was” also “in the beginning,” nor being only “in the 
beginning,” and not being “with God,” since “the same was in the beginning with 
God.”76 
 
The “two things” the phrase “in the beginning” signifies are the Word’s eternal distinction 
from the Father and the Word’s eternal presence “in” the “beginning,” which Origen had 
already glossed as Wisdom.77 When Origen explains his first interpretation of John’s 
statement that the Word was “in the beginning,” he interprets it to mean that the Word 
was “by himself, and not with anyone at all” (ὡς εἰ καθ' αὑτὸν ἦν καὶ µὴ πάντως πρός 
τινα). By saying this, Origen abstracts the Word’s existence from God the Father’s, in 
theory, in order to underscore the Word’s distinction from God the Father. In order to do 
this he uses the Aristotelian phrase καθ' αὑτὸν to describe the Word. For Origen, then, 
describing the Word as καθ' αὑτὸν opposes a monarchian identification of the Word with 
the essence of Father. Clement of Alexandria had distinguished between the Father and 
                                               
75 The likelihood of Origen’s deep acquaintance with Peripatetic philosophy only increases if his 
teacher, Ammonius, was not the enigmatic Ammonius Saccas, the teacher of Plotinus, but a different 
Ammonius—a Peripatetic. For a compelling argument along those lines, see Mark Edwards, “Ammonius, 
Teacher of Origen” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 44.2 (1993): 169-181. In any case, Origen’s having 
learned at the feet of a Platonist like Ammonius Saccas would not preclude his familiarity with 
Peripateticizing usage of terms as general as “essence.” 
76 Jo. 2.69, Heine trans. Ὅρα δὲ εἰ κατὰ τὸ δισσὸν ὀνοµάζεσθαι τὸ “ἐν ἀρχῇ” δυνατὸν ἡµᾶς 
µανθάνειν πράγµατα δύο· ἓν µὲν ὅτι “ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος,” ὡς εἰ καθ' αὑτὸν ἦν καὶ µὴ πάντως πρός τινα· 
ἕτερον δὲ ὅτι “ἐν ἀρχῇ” “πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἦν.” Καὶ οἶµαι, ὅτι οὐ ψεῦδος εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι “ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν” 
καὶ “ἐν ἀρχῇ” “πρὸς τὸν θεὸν,” οὔτε “πρὸς τὸν θεὸν” µόνον τυγχάνων, ἐπεὶ καὶ “ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν,” οὔτε “ἐν 
ἀρχῇ” µόνον ὢν καὶ οὐχὶ “πρὸς τὸν θεὸν” ὢν, ἐπεὶ “Οὗτος ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν θεόν.” 
77 Jo. 1.109-124. 
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the Son by using the phrase “by circumscription and not in essence.” However, Beryllus 
had insisted that the Word could not be distinguished from the Father “according to his 
own individuality of essence” (κατὰ περιγραφὴν καὶ οὐ κατ᾽οὐσίαν).78 Origen uses the 
phrase καθ' αὑτὸν to oppose Beryllus’s denial of the Son’s “own distinct existence” 
(κατ᾽ἰδίαν οὐσίας περιγραφὴν).79 
Elsewhere Origen applies οὐσιωδῶς to the Son’s existence to achieve the same 
effect.80 The term οὐσιωδῶς was part of an Aristotelian distinction between something 
that is what it is “by definition”— καθ' αὑτὸν/οὐσιωδῶς—and something that possesses a 
quality as a nonessential attribute, or accident (συµβεβηκός). Simplicius reports that 
Xenocrates and Andronicus reduced Aristotle’s ten categories to two: that which is “by 
itself” (καθ’ αὑτὸ) as opposed to that which is “relative” (τὸ πρός τι). Others made, he 
says, a similar divide between substance (οὐσίαν) and accident (συµβεβηκὸς).81 If 
                                               
78 See Clement of Alexandria, exc. Thdot. 19.1 (GCS 17, 112). Matthew Crawford drew my 
attention to this passage in “Triumph”: 552. 
79 See Eusebius, h.e. 6.331 (GCS 6.2, 588), and Crawford, “Triumph”: 552-3. 
80 Origen, Cels. 6.44 applies Aristotle’s distinction between the possession of a quality 
“essentially” as opposed to its possession “by accident” (e.g., Met.5.30.4 and 10.1.1)—in other words, 
participation “essentially” as opposed to “accidentally” pace Stead 52 who argues that Christian writers 
don’t know this distinction developed by Porphyry and Alexander of Aphrodisias in met. 91.10; Porph. 
Isag. 176; 21.15; 22.9-10. In Jo. 2.124, Origen applies the same Aristotelian distinction to the difference 
between God and the rational creation. In Jo. 6.188 he states that the Son has an essential existence. In exp. 
in Prov. 8.22 he states that the Son as Wisdom exists essentially, and dial. 5 refers to the Son’s essential 
possession of divinity. See also or. 27.12 (GCS 3:371), where Origen states that “the Son of God subsists 
essentially” (ούσιωδῶς ὑφεστῶτος τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ). See Crawford, “Triumph”: 554, for discussion of 
these passages in the context of a trajectory running from Theodore of Heraclea to Cyril of Alexandria. 
81 “The followers of Xenocrates and of Andronicus seem to include everything in [the opposition] 
‘by itself’ and ‘relative’, so that, according to them, so large a multitude of genera is superfluous. Others 
make the division into ‘substance’ and ‘accident’; these people too seem somehow to be saying the same 
thing as those just mentioned, who say that accidents are ‘relative’ as [being] always ‘of’ other things (τὰ 
συµβεβηκότα πρός τι λέγουσιν, ὡς ἄλλων ἀεὶ ὄντων), and that substance is by itself (τὴν οὐσίαν καθ' 
αὑτό)” (Simplicius in Cat. 63.21-29; Sorabji, trans., 63). Simplicius goes on to complain that both groups 
fail to include the universal and the particular in their two categories, and so fail to account for Aristotle’s 
scheme. ἄλλοι δὲ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον αἰτιῶνται τὴν περιττότητα. οἱ γὰρ περὶ Ξενοκράτη καὶ Ἀνδρόνικον 
πάντα τῷ καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ τῷ πρός τι περιλαµβάνειν δοκοῦσιν, ὥστε περιττὸν εἶναι κατ' αὐτοὺς τὸ τοσοῦτον 
τῶν γενῶν πλῆθος. ἄλλοι δὲ εἰς οὐσίαν καὶ συµβεβηκὸς διατέµνουσιν· καὶ οὗτοι δὲ ταὐτόν πως δοκοῦσι 
τοῖς προτέροις λέγειν τὰ συµβεβηκότα πρός τι λέγουσιν, ὡς ἄλλων ἀεὶ ὄντων, καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καθ' αὑτό. 
ῥητέον οὖν κοινῇ πρὸς ἀµφοτέρους, ὅτι τὴν εἰς ἐλάχιστα τοµὴν τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ζηλώσαντες ἀτελῶς 
αὐτῆς ἥψαντο, τὸ καθόλου καὶ τὸ µερικὸν παραλείποντες. καὶ µέντοι τὰ συµβεβηκότα πολλὰ ὄντα γένη 
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Simplicius’ account of the earlier tradition is reliable, the adverbial use of οὐσία 
(οὐσιωδῶς) could easily have stood for something that exists “according to itself” or “by 
itself.”  Alexander of Aphrodisias confirms just that sort of application of an adverbial 
form of οὐσία. He glosses καθ' αὑτὸ with οὐσιωδῶς.82  
In each of several cases, Origen uses the term οὐσιωδῶς to establish the Son’s 
having “his own” divine existence. In the Dialogue with Heraclides, he refers to the 
Son’s possession of divinity “essentially” (οὐσιωδῶς).83 In Dial. 5, Origen responds to 
the objection that he had “professed before the church [his] belief that at the resurrection 
the body which rose had been a corpse.” Origen is opposing the Son’s possession of 
divinity “essentially” to the Son’s possession of a body. In passing he confirms that he 
has “attributed deity to Jesus Christ essentially (οὐσιωδῶς).”  
The appearance of οὐσιωδῶς in the context of Origen’s opposition of Christ’s 
possession of “divinity” to his possession of a human body, subject to decay, might lead 
readers to suppose that Origen thinks the Son is divine in the same way that the Father is, 
which is to say, divine without participation in divinity. In fact, in a number of places 
Origen can be found referring to the Son as divine οὐσιωδῶς and opposing such reference 
to creaturely possession of divinity as an “accident,” as something participated because 
received. It is tempting to read into this opposition the idea that the Son (and the Spirit) 
                                                                                                                                            
ἀποστενοῦσιν εἰς ἓν τῶν συµβεβηκότων τὸ πρός τι (Simplicii in Aristotelis categorias commentarium, Ed. 
K. Kalbfleisch [Berlin: Reimer, 1907] Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 8, p. 63, lines 21-29). 
82 See Alexander of Aphrodisias, in metaph. 471.21: ὥστε ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν εἰρηµένων φανερόν 
ἐστιν ὅτι <τὸ τί ἦν εἶναί ἐστιν ὅσων ὁ λόγος ὁρισµός ἐστι,> τουτέστιν ἐκ τῶν ὄντων ἐπ' ἐκείνων µόνων τὸ 
τί ἦν εἶναι λέγεται κυρίως τῶν οὐσιῶν, ὧν ὁ λόγος ὁρισµὸς ἤτοι ἀνάπτυξις καὶ ἀπαρίθµησίς ἐστι τῶν καθ' 
αὑτὸ καὶ οὐσιωδῶς ὑπαρχόντων αὐταῖς. Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria, 
Ed. Hayduck, M (Berlin: Reimer, 1891). Philo (De decalogo 29-31) and Clement (Strom. 8.6) know 
Aristotle’s ten categories well enough, but Philo does not apply a scholastic reduction of the ten to two 
general categories of substance and accident. Clement’s understanding in Strom. 8.6 is comparable to 
Philo’s. 
83 dial. 5. οὐσιωδῶς οὕτω προσφέρων Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ τὴν θεότητα. 
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are set to the same side of a line between divinity and creaturehood as God the Father. On 
this reading, because the three are divine οὐσιωδῶς, they do not participate, but are 
divine in and through themselves.  
Indeed, Origen does elevate the Son and the Spirit. They are “higher” or “greater” 
than all other spiritual creatures. However, such elevation does not mean that the Father 
is not “higher” than the Son, and the Son “higher” than the Spirit, however “essentially” 
(οὐσιωδῶς) each of the three is divine. Origen makes this point explicit elsewhere in the 
Commentary.84 There is little doubt that Origen thinks all three of the hypostases are 
incorporeal and in this way divine. However, to state that the three existences are 
incorporeal and divine begs the question of what it means to call them “divine” or how 
each of the three is “divine.” For Origen, it is not contradictory to state both that each of 
the three is incorporeally and essentially (οὐσιωδῶς) divine and that the Father, Son, and 
Spirit stand in hierarchical relation one to another. These are not incompatible ideas for 
him.  
More often than not Origen’s emphasis in making such statements is that the Son 
has a divine existence—a “divinity”— distinct from that of God the Father. This is how 
Origen counteracts the statement of someone like Noetus, who had denied the possibility 
of the Son’s existing as “other from other” (ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου). The Son is distinct from 
the Father as a separate existent, Origen argues, but he is not completely “other from 
other” (ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου).85 The Son’s participation in the Father guarantees this last fact. 
                                               
84 Jo. 13.151. 
85 Christ is the Son of God “by nature,” a phrase fraught with ambiguity. Origen insists on a unity 
of two entities, essentially distinct. He does not elaborate in the Commentary on John about the kind of 
unity the Son possesses with the Father, or about how the Son possesses that unity. It is only in On First 
Principles and Against Celsus that we find the well known analogy of the Son’s “volitional” unity with the 
Father. On all of this, see the next chapter. 
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Though the Son’s procession from the Father, his generation, is eternal, the Son 
nevertheless finds his source in the primary God, the Father. Because the Son eternally 
participates in the Father, the Father-Son relationship is asymmetrical. If there is tension 
in this formulation, it is the result of Origen’s efforts to satisfy the sympathies of his 
opponents, who wished to insist that one entity “self-generates” as the Father and then 
“self-generates” as the Son.86 Instead, Origen opts for a hierarchy in which a primary 
entity generates a secondary entity that receives divinity from it. 
The difference between the statements Origen makes about the three’s being 
divine essentially (οὐσιωδῶς) and their ordering in a hierarchy has to do with whether 
one is talking specifically about the qualities of which each entity is the source, or 
whether one is referring more broadly to the possession of divinity. When an object’s 
character καθ’ αὑτὸ is opposed to the qualities it possesses as “accidental,” the qualities 
an object possesses καθ’ αὑτὸ cannot be taken away from the object except on pain of 
that object ceasing to be what it is. If we gloss Origen’s grammar of participation in Jo. 
2.12-20 with these terms, God the Father exists καθ’ αὑτὸ. The Son derives his existence 
and divinity from the Father and so does not exist καθ’ αὑτὸ. There remains an eternal 
relationship of derivation running from the Son to the Father. On the other hand, looking 
down the hierarchy, the Son is wise, rational, and just “essentially” (καθ’ αὑτὸ), serving 
as the source for the Holy Spirit’s possession of all such qualities. Similarly, the Holy 
Spirit is holy “essentially” (καθ’ αὑτὸ) and serves as the source of sanctity for all the 
angelic host. So the graded series Origen articulates in Jo. 2.12-20 is a sequence of the 
reception of qualities that are “essentially” (καθ’ αὑτὸ), not accidental, to each of the 
trinitarian persons in order. The Son receives from the Father what the Father is 
                                               
86 See the next section of this chapter for more on “self-production.” 
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“essentially” (καθ’ αὑτὸ), namely, divine existence. The Holy Spirit, in turn, receives 
from the Son what the Son is “essentially” (καθ’ αὑτὸ). All other rational creatures 
receive all of these qualities from God the Trinity.  
 
Old Themes in a New Key: Containment and Eternal Generation 
 
 
 
In scholarship on Origen’s doctrine of the trinity, two issues appear frequently, but 
only infrequently do the scholars discussing them agree with precision about the nature 
and consequences of their presence in Origen’s thought. These topics are the question of 
the Son’s knowledge of the Father and the doctrine of the Son’s eternal generation. Both 
of them can be explained by recourse to Origen’s campaign against monarchianism. 
Against monarchian theology, Origen’s grammar of participation guaranteed both that the 
Son was distinct from and subordinate to the Father in a series of entities. To grasp 
Origen’s anti-monarchian theology is to acknowledge his debt to a Platonizing grammar 
of participation that established a hierarchical arrangement of Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit. The issue is not that Origen could not have arranged things otherwise, but that the 
conceptual grammar he chose to employ carries with it consequences he did not disclaim.  
 
The Son: From Physical Containment to Epistemological Comprehension 
 
 
 
A key feature of Origen’s anti-monarchian strategy also supported by his appeal to 
the Son’s participation in the Father is his understanding that the Father “comprehends” 
the Son as a distinct entity, but that the Son does not “comprehend” the Father in the 
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same way.87 Recall Beryllus’ phrase that Christ did not pre-exist the incarnation as an 
“individual circumscribed existent” (κατ’ ἰδίαν οὐσίας περιγραφὴν).88 Origen, on the 
other hand, affirms that this is precisely the way Christ existed before the incarnation. In 
Jo. 2.16, he states one horn of the dilemma his opponents face: “by denying the divinity 
of the Son they make his own distinct existence as an individual different from the 
Father” (ἀρνουµένους τὴν θεότητα τοῦ υἱοῦ τιθέντας δὲ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἰδιότητα καὶ τὴν 
οὐσίαν κατὰ περιγραφὴν τυγχάνουσαν ἑτέραν τοῦ πατρός, ἐντεῦθεν λύεσθαι δύναται). 
The key phrase is τὴν ἰδιότητα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν κατὰ περιγραφὴν, and its presence in 
Origen’s Commentary corroborates Eusebius’ report of Beryllus’ denial.  
The end of Commentary on John Book 1 contains this pregnant passage: 
In addition, to signify that the Word has his own individuality (ἰδίαν περιγραφὴν), 
that is to say, lives according to himself, we must speak also of powers, not only 
of power. “For thus says the Lord of the powers” is a phrase which occurs in 
many places, certain divine spiritual beings being named powers. The highest and 
best of these powers was Christ who is called not only the “wisdom of God,” but 
also the “power.” [292] As, therefore, here are many powers of God, each of 
which has its own individuality (ἑκάστη κατὰ περιγραφήν), which the Savior 
excels, so also the Christ, on the basis of our previous investigation, will be 
understood to be the “Word”—although the reason which is in us has no 
individuality apart from us (ὁ παρ’ ἡµῖν οὐκ ἔστι κατὰ περιγραφὴν ἐκτὸς ἡµῶν)—
possessing substance (τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχων) “in the beginning,” that is in 
wisdom.89 
 
                                               
87 On this point, see Rowan Williams, “The Son’s Knowledge of the Father in Origen,” in 
Origeniana Quarta, ed. Lothar Lies (Vienna: Tyrolia, 1987), 146-53; and Crawford, “The Triumph of Pro-
Nicene Theology.” 
88 See Alistair H. B. Logan, “Origen and the Development of Trinitarian Theology,” in Origeniana 
Quarta, ed. L. Lies, Innsbrucker Theologische Studien, 19 (Innsbruck: Tyrolia 1987), 424-9. 
89 Origen, Jo. 1.291-92. (291) Καὶ ἔτι εἰς τὸ παραδέξασθαι τὸν λόγον ἰδίαν περιγραφὴν ἔχοντα, 
οἷον τυγχάνοντα ζῆν καθ’ ἑαυτόν, λεκτέον καὶ περὶ δυνάµεων, οὐ µόνον δυνάµεως· “Τάδε γὰρ λέγει κύριος 
τῶν δυνάµεων” πολλαχοῦ κεῖται, λογικῶν τινων θείων ζῴων δυνάµεων ὀνοµαζοµένων, ὧν ἡ ἀνωτέρω καὶ 
κρείττων Χριστὸς ἦν, οὐ µόνον σοφία θεοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ δύναµις προσαγορευόµενος. (292) Ὥσπερ οὖν 
δυνάµεις θεοῦ πλείονές εἰσιν, ὧν ἑκάστη κατὰ περιγραφήν, ὧν διαφέρει ὁ σωτήρ, οὕτως καὶ λόγος—εἰ καὶ 
ὁ παρ’ ἡµῖν οὐκ ἔστι κατὰ περιγραφὴν ἐκτὸς ἡµῶν—νοηθήσεται ὁ Χριστὸς διὰ τὰ προεξητασµένα, ἐν 
ἀρχῇ, τῇ σοφίᾳ, τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχων. 
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Here we see that Origen is willing to entertain the same constellation of spiritual entities 
between the “highest God” and the rest of the cosmos in which we live, but in a way 
comparable to God the Father, he places the Son at the top of a hierarchy of those powers. 
The Holy Spirit, we learn elsewhere, is the chief of all the powers that participate in the 
Son. 
Elsewhere, in Jo. 2.75, Origen describes the Trinity as three “hypostases.” The 
term hypostasis did not come directly into Origen’s hands from Platonism, but had 
already been absorbed by Valentinian Gnosticism. Monarchians like Beryllus had denied 
the definition of a “hypostasis” as an “individual circumscribed existent” to describe the 
Son, perhaps as part of an anti-gnostic polemic. Origen took the alternative approach of 
adopting “hypostatic” language in spite of its Gnostic heritage in order to oppose the 
monarchian position.  
It is important to attend to the significance of the final term in the phrase Beryllus 
denies: περιγραφὴν. Origen pairs his language of the Son’s participation in the Father, 
and the Holy Spirit’s participation in the Son, with the language of “enclosing.” More 
widely he uses the term περιγραφή and cognates to express this idea. Here, too, Origen 
has transformed the tradition that preceded him in response to the challenge of 
monarchian theology. 
The tradition prior to Origen had associated divine nature with “that which 
encloses but is not enclosed.” What is finite had for a long time been equated with what is 
comprehensible in Greek philosophy.90 If boundlessness is distinctive of divine nature, 
                                               
90 William Schoedel traces parallels between the axioms containing not contained/ enclosing not 
enclosed and the use of similar doctrines in Eleatic, post-Parmenidean philosophy, as well as these 
doctrines’ absorption into early Christian theology, both “orthodox” and “gnostic.” He highlights a 
monistic shift in some of Irenaeus’ opponents, which is more developed in the Alexandrian, and potentially 
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divinity is unknowable. Irenaeus had reversed the earlier Greek tradition’s conception of 
divine nature as finite and so knowable.91 His version of this axiom was borrowed from 
Philo, who probably inherited it from an early middle Platonist tradition also accessed by 
Alkinous.  
 In order to understand how Origen contributed to the transformation of this set of 
concepts, it is important to notice that Gnosticism in Alexandria had already shifted away 
from a radically dualist cosmology. The shift probably was precipitated by Irenaeus’s 
argumentation. Schoedel isolates a development in Gnosticism from dualism toward 
monism, and the cause for the development, he argues, was Irenaeus’ rhetorical 
influence.92 Gnostics had previously held to a “topological” theology according to which 
divinity is “locatable.” Irenaeus forced some of his interlocutors to shift toward a 
cosmology whose basis is monistic, the central axiom of which is that it is God’s nature 
to enclose but not be enclosed. Schoedel’s evidence of the purported shift is that 
Teachings of Silvanus, a Gnostic text probably of Alexandrian provenance, reveals that its 
author had made space for monistic theology. With Silvanus, the strict Gnostic 
cosmological dualism of earlier forms of Gnosticism has given way to the conviction that 
divine nature “contains and is not contained.” 
                                                                                                                                            
proto-“orthodox” Teachings of Silvanus. See William Schoedel, “ ‘Topological’ Theology and Some 
Monistic Tendencies in Gnosticism,” in Essays on the Nag Hammadi Texts in Honour of Alexander Böhlig, 
ed. Martin Krause (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1972), 99-102; and William Schoedel, “Enclosing, Not Enclosed: 
The Early Christian Doctrine of God,” in Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual 
Tradition: In Honorem Robert M. Grant, ed. by William Schoedel and Robert Louis Wilken (Paris: 
Éditions Beauchesne, 1979), 75–86. 
 Cf. Origen, princ. Frag 24 (GCS 22:164) and Crawford, “Triumph,” 550, ad loc. 
91 The trajectory culminates in the early Christian era with Gregory of Nyssa’s well known 
doctrine of epektisis and the doctrine of divine infinity. 
92 For the text of Teachings of Silvanus, I have used James Robinson et al., The Nag Hammadi 
Library in English (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1988). Christian texts from the apostolic period invoke 
the enclosing/not enclosed doctrine as a way of defining divine nature. 1 Clem 28:4 reads a version of Ps. 
138:7-10 (LXX) this way: ποῖ οὖν τις ἀπέλθῃ ἢ ποῦ ἀποδράσῃ ἀπὸ τοῦ τὰ πάντα ἐµπεριέχοντος. 
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 The nature and the location of the Demiurge is a pivotal aspect of theologies in 
this vein. Is the Demiurge “contained in space” as the fashioner of matter? Or is it that the 
Demiurge “contains but is not contained”? Middle Platonists were comfortable locating 
the Demiurge on the side of all the things “contained”—but that results from Platonist 
characterization of divine nature not as infinite but as finite, and because finite, 
intelligible. The Demiurge’s identification with the “known God,” as opposed to the 
transcendent, unknowable Father, correlates with the Demiurge’s being “enclosed,” for 
example, in Silvanus, but also in Clement of Alexandria and Numenius.93 The pressure 
placed on Christology by the location of the Demiurge in space is evident in Silvanus’ 
paradoxical characterization of Christ, who is “restrained; still he is unrestrained 
according to his nature.”94 Similar christological paradoxes can be found earlier and 
elsewhere.95 The point is that the question of whether the Son is, like the Father, 
“uncontained” remains relatively underdetermined in Silvanus. The text does not even 
open the question of locating the Holy Spirit in space. 
 The relevance of Silvanus’ Christology and its relationship to containment 
language for Origen’s Christology is as follows. If Silvanus is indeed the product of 
earlier Alexandrian theology, then its shift away from the strict dualism of more radical 
Gnostic theology indicates that already in Alexandria, Gnosticism was not antithetical to 
monism. If this is so, it suggests that Origen cannot be made out to repeal Gnosticism by 
subordinating the Son to the Father, as if doing so were simply a matter of inverting the 
Gnostic tendency to denigrate the Demiurge of Genesis by calling the Son the 
                                               
93 See Teachings of Silvans 100, 13-16; Schoedel, “ ‘Topological’ Theology,” ad loc., 89-90. 
94 Teachings of Silvanus 101, 33-102, 7. 
95 Schoedel references Ignatius Eph. 7.2, for example. 
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“Demiurge” and making the Father superior to him.96 Origen does subordinate the Son to 
the Father, but for different reasons and with Gnostic precedent. Silvanus (116, 7-9) 
identifies Christ as the Demiurge and clears him of the charge of ignorance.97 It is 
improbable that Origen’s elevation of the Father over the Son responded to Gnostic 
anxieties about the ignorance of the Demiurge. If anything, Origen’s insistence that the 
Son knows the Father through contemplation, even if he does not comprehend the Father, 
as well as the Son’s identification as the Father’s “Wisdom,” were themselves Gnostic 
commonplaces by the third century. Gnostic theologies had developed a more complex 
stance on the issue of dualism than that of “Sethian” texts like the Apocryphon of John. 
 If Origen repeals Theophilus’ association of Psalm 44:3 with the procession of the 
Son from the Father, then he appears to reinstate simultaneously Theophilus’ hierarchical 
trinity. The hierarchy in Theophilus is represented by a series of enclosed entities. The 
illustration is that of the Father holding a pomegranate in his hand. The figure is 
somewhat literally the Father; his hand, metaphorically, is the Son, which holds a piece of 
round fruit. The fruit, enclosed by the Son, is comprised of both a rind and pulp. The pulp 
is the cosmos, and the rind is the Spirit, the boundary between the Son and the cosmos.98 
Whereas Irenaeus would elevate the Holy Spirit to a status of being God’s other “hand,” 
                                               
96 As Beeley argues in Unity of Christ, 26n48. Beeley asserts that Origen uses “two senses of 
greatness” when in fact Origen does not distinguish between senses of “greatness.” The omission is crucial: 
without a distinction between the kind of hierarchy applied to the “order” of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, 
and the hierarchy applied to other rational entities, Origen produces the very ambiguity that would render 
his theology of the trinity problematic in the decades subsequent to Nicaea. Beeley denies that Origen’s 
theology generates this ambiguity, even if as a byproduct of his commitment to Hellenistic philosophical 
principles such as the doctrine that a cause is superior to its effect. 
97 See Schoedel, 89-90 for discussion. 
98 See Schoedel, “ ‘Topological’ Theology,” 97-98; and Theophilus Ad Aut. 1.5. 
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Origen returns to the one-handed model according to which the Holy Spirit is 
subordinated to the Son.99 
Origen knows terms of “enclosure” and applies them to the Son. However, he 
does so with a key difference from his predecessors who had used such terminology. He 
transfers the operative language of “containment” to the realm of epistemology.100 Jerome 
translates Origen’s usage of the term in a metaphorical, and not literal/material sense, 
meant to imply an epistemological consequence, not a physical one (so the Father 
“comprehends” the Son, but the Son does not “comprehend” the Father). Origen himself 
did not speak of the Son’s being “enclosed” in anything but a non-material sense. 
Whether Origen was the first to use “enclosed” without its literal meaning, or whether 
gnosticism in Alexandria had already developed a sense of speaking of “being enclosed” 
without material form, is uncertain. It is clear, however, that Origen shifts the tradition of 
speaking about the Father’s “comprehension” of the Son from physical to 
epistemological soil. Origen reinforces the hierarchical scheme when he transfers the 
containing/not contained trope to the realm of epistemology. When this shift is combined 
with Origen’s hierarchical model of the trinity, the Son cannot be said to comprehend the 
Father. This means that the Son is placed in a position of eternal contemplation of the 
Father, though the Son never attains the level of knowledge of the Father that the Father 
has of himself or other entities.  
                                               
99 For more on the nature and significance of Irenaeus’s “two-hands” model of pneumatology, see 
Anthony Briggman, Irenaeus. 
100 I have been helped on this subject by Matthew Crawford’s treatment of Origen, en passent, in 
“The Triumph of Pro-Nicene Theology.” 
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Origen can be found denying the Son’s physical circumscription.101 Though his 
denials of the Son’s physical circumscription are not widespread, it is clear enough that 
Origen associated both the Son and the Holy Spirit with the incorporeal nature of 
divinity, such that it could be the nature of neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit to be 
“contained in space.” However, Origen does imply two important applications of the 
containing–not contained scheme, however epistemologically construed. First, the Father 
is, ultimately, not comprehended. Not even the Son finally comprehends the depths of the 
Father. That Origen thinks this explains his insistence on the eternal contemplation of the 
Father by the Son. If Gregory of Nyssa is appropriately characterized as teaching that the 
soul moves indefinitely toward God but never finally attains identity with God, Origen 
construed something like the idea and characterized the Son as the paradigmatic soul-in-
progress. For Origen, the chosen idiom is eternal contemplation, and there remains an 
ultimate distinction between the Father and the Son in this sense alone: the Son eternally 
contemplates the un-contain-able depths of the Father. 
In short, monarchianism forced the issue regarding the trinitarian use of 
containment language. It drove Origen to innovate in its application to the Son by using 
“containment” non-physically. One option taken previously to Origen was not available 
to him in the face of monarchian theology. That option would have been to deny that the 
Son is circumscribed, as Clement had done, and so to identify the Son with the divine 
nature.102 However, had Origen simply denied circumscription to the Son, his monarchian 
opponents would have been able to elide his position with theirs. He needed a way to 
                                               
101 Crawford, “Triumph”: 552, n50, cites Origen, Cels. 4.5 (“Even supposing that we do say that 
[the power and divinity of God] leaves one place and fills another, we would not mean this in a spatial 
sense”) as evidence that there is little reason to doubt the Latin of Princ. 4.4.1, where Origen denies that the 
Son “is contained in some place” (in loco aliquo contineri). 
102 See Shoedel, “ ‘Topological’ Theology,” 101; and Clement, Strom. 7.5.5. 
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maintain his opposition to the likes of Beryllus without denying the Son’s divinity. The 
language of circumscription provided him this, provided he used it in a non-physical 
sense. The language of “comprehension,” in turn, could be used without physical 
connotation, in order to provide Origen with a conceptual apparatus for durable 
distinction of the three without material division. Origen’s intra-trinitarian model of 
participation afforded just such a conceptual apparatus. 
The question of the Son’s knowledge of the Father, which would appear later with 
such force and centrality in the wake of Nicaea, was a side-effect of Origen’s 
decentralizing of the physical containment metaphor dear to the monarchian position. It 
was not the primary focus of his thought. By making of containment not a physical but an 
epistemological matter, Origen could avoid the implication that the Son was indistinct 
from the Father, without having to make the Son a corporeally enclosed entity. 
 
“Eternal Generation” 
 
 
 
Finally, consider the doctrine of eternal generation, associated at least since the 
work of G. Prestige with Origen’s genius, and often attributed to him as a lasting 
hallmark of his proto-orthodoxy. Contrary to what many scholars have presumed about 
Origen’s doctrine of the Son’s eternal generation from the Father, the doctrine was not an 
incipient instance of Nicaea’s homoousion. It travelled with different presuppositions and 
intentions. As Maurice Wiles argued in an important but not always noticed article from 
1961, Origen’s doctrine of eternal generation was at once a real innovation and an 
obstacle for later theology. For, on one hand, it stipulated that the Son was eternally 
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present to the Father, but, on the other hand, it entailed that the rest of the “rational 
creation” was eternally existent as well as the Father and the Son.103 
The passages in the Apology ascribing to Origen a doctrine of eternal generation 
are important.104 However, they do not rule out the possibility of hierarchical ordering. 
Nor need Origen’s doctrine of eternal generation be considered anything but an artifact of 
his anti-monarchian polemic combined with Platonizing proclivities. Recall that it was 
the Roman school of monarchians who characterized the Logos as coming to be and 
passing away like a series of syllables. Marcellus’ alleged doctrine that the Kingdom of 
the Son would “come to an end,” famously opposed by the Constantinopolitan Creed, 
was the end of such a long-standing monarchian tendency to grant the Logos only 
temporary status as a divine agent.  
That Origen’s doctrine of eternal generation was formed to oppose 
monarchianism becomes more apparent the closer we look at his argumentation. First, 
take this dense quotation from Pamphilus’ Apology for Origen, purported to come from 
On First Principles 1.1.5-6: 
God, therefore, must not be thought of as some kind of body or as existing in a 
body, but he is an intellectual nature, simple, admitting within himself no addition 
of any kind, so that one should not believe that he has anything greater and lesser 
in himself, but that he is in all parts a µονάς and, so to speak, a ἑνάς. He is both 
the mind and the source form which the beginning of all intellectual nature, or of 
mind, exists. But mind, in order to move or operate, does not need a physical 
location, nor measurable size, nor bodily shape or color, nor does it require any 
other of those things at all that are proper to a body or to matter.105 
 
                                               
103 Maurice Wiles, “Eternal Generation,” Journal of Theological Studies (1961): 284-291. Beeley, 
The Unity of Christ, for example, does not mention Wiles’s perspective, and his reading of Origen does not 
account for the evidence Wiles presents. Though Ayres, The Legacy of Nicaea, does not cite the argument, 
his portrayal of Origen is not discordant with that of Wiles. 
104 See Pamphilus, Apol., 47-64 in Scheck trans., FOTC 120. 
105 Scheck trans., 62-63. 
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Here Origen provides a description of the divine “monad” as incorporeal. Origen does not 
here invoke a divine nature which both Father and Son possess in the same way or to an 
equal degree. Pamphilus unapologetically includes it as a passage about Origen’s 
“conception of God the Father.”106  
 Next, in Apology 48, Pamphilus quotes probably from Origen’s lost Commentary 
on Genesis. “If God always is perfect,” Origen reasons, “he does not lack the power by 
which he is Father, and if it is good that he is the Father of such a Son, why would he 
deprive himself of this good and not become the Father immediately, if one can say it this 
way, from when he is able to be Father?”107 Notice that the logic directly confronts one 
who would make the Son’s begetting temporally bound. That temptation was 
characteristic of the monarchianism Origen opposed in his Commentary on John. In the 
next passage quoted by Pamphilus, Origen elaborates on the argument for the Father’s 
eternal generation of the Son by comparing the Father and Son to a light and its radiance. 
The familiar comparison comes from pairing Wisdom 7:26 with Hebrews 1:3.108 Origen 
explicitly addresses a monarchian concern when he acknowledges that, if he had 
proclaimed the Son “unborn,” “we would appear to be implying two principles of light.” 
Instead, Origen says, there is one ἀρχή of radiance, one “origin and source,” God the 
Father. So Origen concedes to the monarchian position at least the formal requirement of 
a single divine source or ἀρχή. On the other hand, Origen denies the monarchian idea that 
the Son does not exist eternally. The Father, never without his Wisdom, is a light that 
eternally emits its radiance. Those insistent on granting a “beginning” to the Son, in Apol. 
                                               
106 Scheck trans., Pamphilus, Apol. 43: “So then, we have clarified Origen’s conception of God the 
Father (de deo Patre) by means of the written texts that we have set forth above.” 
107 Scheck, trans., 66. 
108 Appeal to Hebrews 1:3 as a christological passage was long-standing; cf. 1 Clem. 36:2. 
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54 and 56, could plausibly have been monarchians. Origen’s opposition to them plays on 
the multiple sense of ἀρχή, noted extensively in the first book of the Commentary on 
John.109 The term ἀρχή could mean “beginning,” “principle,” or “source,” and so Origen 
implies, to argue that the Son “has a beginning” does little to advance the monarchian 
axiom of one divine ἀρχή —if the Son has an ἀρχή other than the ἀρχή that is the Father, 
there are two first ἀρχαί. If the Father is the Son’s ἀρχή, or source, there is one ἀρχή, and 
the Son exists eternally as a distinct divine entity. According to Origen, so does the rest of 
the “rational creation.” 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
The topic of Origen’s “subordination” of the Son to the Father has received 
scholarly attention that is relatively wide, but not necessarily always deep. It is not often 
recognized that, in fact, Origen’s hierarchical ordering of the Son and the Holy Spirit is 
part of a strategy of developing eternal distinctions within divine nature in the face of a 
monarchian position that would have reduced the identities of the Son and the Holy Spirit 
to that of God the Father. The dynamic of a triadic hierarchy is intrinsic to Origen’s anti-
monarchian position. To read Origen’s hierarchy as innocent or “pre-Nicene,” and 
thereby implicitly to exculpate Origen from the ontological consequences that follow 
from Origen’s triadic hierarchy in his Christology is tempting, but it misleads.110  
While it is not the burden of historical scholarship to hold Origen to post-Nicene 
standards, to imply that his triadic scheme is “proto-Nicene” misreads Origen’s doctrine 
                                               
109 See Jo. 1.90-124. 
110 In this way, Henri Crouzel misleads. See Crouzel, Origen, 181-204. 
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on its own terms. To deprive Origen of triadic hierarchy altogether, on the other hand, 
dissembles in still a different way. Depriving Origen of triadic hierarchy also deprives 
Origen’s trinitarian model of its rhetorical and polemical force. It takes away whatever 
contemporary orthodoxy Origen’s that model possessed. 
It was a triadic hierarchy, grounded in a grammar of intra-trinitarian participation 
and procession, that allowed Origen to articulate eternal distinction within God, and 
thereby to resist monarchian theology. Were it not for his use of a Platonic grammar of 
participation to order the trinity within itself, Origen’s opponents could have elided his 
position with theirs. Rhetorically, Origen for his part could appeal to a broad consensus 
that, in fact, there were multiple divine principles in a graded series, and that this did not 
preclude the Father’s “monarchy,” his sole property of unique and primal source. Origen 
conceded this much to his opponents, even if it meant subordinating Son to Father, and 
Spirit to Son. He ensured, however, that the “subordination” of the Son to the Father was 
not conducted along the lines of a God-world distinction, since he replaced the 
corporeality of the containment metaphor with a grammar of epistemological 
comprehension. The Son’s eternal generation ensured the Son’s eternal presence, along 
with the rest of the “spiritual creation,” in light of God the Father’s. The Father would 
never be without his eternal, “hypostatic,” Wisdom. The scholar who, from a post-Nicene 
perspective, attempts to “cure” Origen of the “disease” of a triadic hierarchy removes not 
only the cancer allegedly diagnosed, but also the very heart and soul of Origen’s 
contemporary and constructive orthodoxy. Origen may have been either anti-monarchian 
or proto-Nicene, but he cannot have been both in any straightforward reading of his 
Commentary on John. 
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In the next chapter, with Origen’s grammar of participation and the trinitarian 
model it generates in view, comparison of Jo. with On First Principles (Princ.) enables 
an assessment of some of the evidence of a hierarchical trinity controversially alleged of 
Origen by his critics. The model that emerges in Jo. surfaces in some of these fragments; 
it can also be seen if we peer behind Rufinus’s version of the text. In the final analysis of 
both Jo. and Princ., Origen’s anti-monarchian grammar of participation impacts his 
portrayal of the Son to a limited degree. I will argue that it weakens his theology of the 
Holy Spirit. 
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Chapter 4 
Origen’s Low Pneumatology 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 It is the burden of this final chapter on Origen to demonstrate that Origen’s 
grammar of participation generates a low pneumatology. By “low” I mean that Origen’s 
theology produces unresolved ambiguity about the Holy Spirit’s ontological status and 
fails to give the Holy Spirit the same kind of causal agency as that given to God the 
Father.1 First I compare relevant passages from the first two books of the Commentary on 
John with several disputed passages in On First Principles, both those in Rufinus’s 
tendentious translation and those of the Greek fragments alleged by Origen’s critics. I 
show that the same tiered arrangement appears in On First Principles for the same 
polemical purposes: to oppose monarchian theology. I also argue that Origen never 
deviated from this basic orientation. I then argue that Rufinus’s translation obscures 
                                               
1 As will become clear in this chapter, it is tempting to suggest that using the word “trinitarian” to 
describe Origen’s theology misleads. Against calling Origen “binitarian,” on the other hand, is Christoph 
Markschies, “Der Heilige Geist im Johanneskommentar des Origenes. Einige vorlaüfige Bemerkungen,” in 
Origenes und sein Erbe (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2007), 107-126, (apparently) on the grounds that Origen calls 
the Spirit a third hypostasis (Jo. 2.75). Although Origen does call the Spirit “third,” in terms of the Spirit’s 
power the Spirit is first of another series: the series of celestial rational creatures, the logikoi, the prime of 
which is the Spirit. Ziebritzki explores the potential correlation between developments of “three hypostases 
doctrine” in Platonism and Christianity. For Ziebritzki, Origen is the first fully “Trinitarian” theologian in 
the true sense, because he teaches “three hypostases.” He sees pneumatology as a key point of contact 
between Christianity and Platonism’s doctrine of the “world soul.” He depends, however, on showing that 
pneumatology was persistently “low” until Origen. Among other objections one might raise is that 
Ziebritzki has slighted Irenaeus. His treatment depends on H.-J. Jaschke, but Anthony Briggman has 
offered a strong case in favor of viewing Irenaeus as having held a “high” pneumatology. See Hans-Jochen 
Jaschke, Der Heilige Geist Im Bekenntnis Der Kirche: Eine Studie Zur Pneumatologie Des Irenäus von 
Lyon Im Ausgang Vom Altchristlichen Glaubensbekenntnis (Münster: Aschendorff, 1976); Anthony 
Briggman, Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit (Oxford; New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2012). 
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Origen’s thought in at least one instance, and I clarify the appearance in Origen’s writings 
of a term which might justifiably be used to question my argument: οὐσιωδῶς. 
 
Rufinus and the Trinity of On First Principles 
 
 
 
 Before turning to a comparison between the Commentary on John and On First 
Principles, a word about Rufinus’s translation is in order. The dynamics of participation 
that emerge with relative clarity in the Commentary on John are muted in Rufinus’ Latin 
translation of On First Principles.2 The crucial first two books of On First Principles, in 
which Origen discusses the Father, Christ, and the Holy Spirit, are not extant in Greek 
apart from fragments alleged by sources whose hostility might have muddled Origen’s 
original formulations. Before we come to the text of On First Principles itself, a brief 
word regarding Rufinus’ translations is in order. 
 It is not sound to suspect Rufinus without reason. However, he acknowledges that 
he has represented Origen, not reproduced him. He would follow Jerome’s method for 
translating Origen’s homilies. Jerome had “so smoothed over and emended these 
[potentially offensive statements] in his translation, that a Latin reader would find in them 
nothing out of harmony with our faith (a fide nostra discrepet).”3 Rufinus admits that he 
has tampered with the original formulation. He has not “reproduce[d] such passages from 
                                               
2 For the text, I have used Herwig Görgemanns and Heinrich Karpp, eds., Origenes Vier Bücher 
von den Prinzipien (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976). 
3 Princ. Praef. 1.2; Butterworth trans., lxiii. . . . ita elimavit omnia interpretando atque purgavit, ut 
nihil in illis quod a fide nostra discrepet latinus lector inveniat. This statement is important, 
methodologically, for its absence in the scholarship of Ilaria Ramelli, who culls Origen’s homilies, extant 
only in Latin translation, precisely for the sorts of doctrinal fixes Rufinus claims Jerome introduced. 
Ramelli acknowledges neither this allegation nor its potential consequences, if true, for her portrait of 
Origen as a “proto-Cappadocian.” See Illaria Ramelli, “Origen’s Anti-Subordinationism and Its Heritage in 
the Nicene and Cappadocian Line,” Vigiliae Christianae 65 (2011): 21-49. 
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the books of Origen as are found to be inconsistent with and contrary to his true 
teaching.”4 Rufinus emphasizes Origen’s “true” teaching, what Origen must really have 
meant when he said certain things now “offensive” to Latin doctrinal sensitivities. 
Rufinus has omitted material offensive to the Latin regula and expanded Origen’s 
obscure statements with explanations.5 Rufinus states plainly what Origen’s “true 
teaching” regarded:  
. . . wherever . . . I have found in his books anything contrary to the reverent 
statements made by him about the Trinity in other places, I have either omitted it 
as a corrupt and interpolated passage, or reproduced it in a form that agrees with 
the doctrine which I have often found him affirming elsewhere.6  
 
The “Origen” subject to revision by Rufinus’s On First Principles is not first of all the 
Origen of the “Origenist controversies” over the soul’s pre-existence and fall or the status 
of the material body.7 Rufinus sterilized an Origen of Trinitarian speculation.8  
Rufinus claims he conducted his sterilization, however, without recourse to 
foreign wells. He is supposed to have only given “back to [Origen] his own statements 
                                               
4 Ibid., . . . observantes scilicet ne ea, quae in libris Origenis a se ipso discrepantia inveniuntur 
atque contraria, proferamus. 
5 We do not have to guess at the contents of Rufinus’ understanding of the Christian regula, since 
we possess his Commentary on the Creed. See ACW 20, J.N.D. Kelly, trans. From this we can observe 
Rufinus’s own trinitarian beliefs. Rufinus’s creed was not the Nicene Creed, however much he may have 
interpreted his local creed in conformity with his understanding of Nicaea. For more on this issue, see 
below. 
6 Praef. 1.3. Sicubi ergo nos in libris eius aliquid contra id invenimus, quod ab ipso in ceteris locis 
pie de drinitate fuerat definitum, velut adulteratum hoc et alienum aut praetermisimus aut secundum eam 
regulam protulimus, quam ab ipso frequenter invenimus adfirmatum. 
7 For which see Elizabeth Clark, The Origenist Controversy (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1992), 159-93, a still matchless accounting of the turbulent years in the late fourth and early fifth 
centuries that occasioned Rufinus’s defensive translations of Origen. 
8 Ronald Heine notes, in his introduction to Rufinus’s translations of Origen’s homilies on Genesis 
and Exodus that Rufinus “suppresses contradictory elements in Origen. By contradictions he means 
primarily contradictions regarding the doctrine of the Trinity. Since Rufinus thought that Origen’s genuine 
thought was in agreement with the orthodox faith this means, in effect, that he suppresses those elements in 
Origen which are not in harmony with the orthodox faith on the Trinity.” See Ronald Heine, trans., Origen. 
Homilies on Genesis and Exodus, FOTC 71 (Washington, D.C.: CUA Press, 1982), 35. 
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found in other places.”9 Which, precisely, were the trinitarian views offensive to the late-
fourth-century regula? Where, exactly, did Origen save himself from those views? 
Rufinus gives no citations, but his statements suggest that a shift later in Origen’s life 
regarding the Trinity is at least possible. Later in this chapter, I will confirm that Origen 
never altered his logic of participation in support of a graded model of the trinity, and the 
confirmation suggests that Rufinus must either have been talking about a different aspect 
of Origen’s thought, or perhaps had access to something that was not original to Origen.  
 Now is not the time to conduct a systematic review of the reliability of Rufinus’s 
translations of On First Principles.10 We have to admit that Origen’s original Greek may 
lie beyond the grasp of historical reconstruction. Yet, a strong candidate for at least some 
of the “offensive” trinitarian material reshuffled by Rufinus is apparent. Given 
intervening developments between Origen’s early career and Rufinus’ emendations of On 
First Principles, Origen’s hierarchical trinity in Jo. 1-2 would have appeared problematic 
to someone like Rufinus. If that hierarchical version were to have appeared in the original 
Greek Rufinus translated, he would have singled it out as a prime candidate for the kind 
of revision he owns up to having conducted. Had Rufinus encountered Didymus’ On the 
Holy Spirit, translated earlier by Jerome, his sensitivity would have been heightened all 
the more. He might have found Didymus’s scholastic theology a useful tool for clarifying 
some of Origen’s the statements in On First Principles that would have embarrassed pro-
Nicene readers.  
                                               
9 Praef. 1.3. Nihil tamen nostrum diximus, sed licet in aliis locis dicta, sua tamen sibi reddidimus. 
Note the final word in this sentence could well be a play on “Didymus,” if we suppose Rufinus to have 
used Didymus in his “handing back to Origen” what Origen said elsewhere. 
10 On Rufinus’s methods as a translator of Origen generally, see Heine, FOTC 71, 30-39. 
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 I offer the following reading of On First Principles without denying that a range 
of statements regarding the divinity of the Son and Holy Spirit can be found throughout 
the Latin version, and without denying, a priori, the validity of such statements for a 
reconstruction of Origen’s model of the Trinity. But the presence of Origen’s anti-
monarchian grammar of participation must be kept in mind as subject to Rufinus’s 
corrections, and just so, as a probable strand of the elusive original text of On First 
Principles. To demonstrate the veracity of Jerome’s claim that Rufinus borrowed from 
Didymus in his “correction” of Origen is not the burden of this chapter. That Rufinus did 
so becomes an enticing possibility worth entertaining once the features of Didymus’s pro-
Nicene theology are brought into focus by the chapters that conclude this study.12 In the 
comparisons to follow, Rufinus’s intervention will never be far from mind. Though I will 
not undertake an exhaustive analysis of passages where Rufinus’s influence is plausible, I 
will argue that Rufinus has brought his own thought to bear in one important case, 
regarding the unity of the Father and Son, in On First Principles 1.2.6. But before we 
come to these matters, it is appropriate to get in view a doctrinal comparison of Origen’s 
thought in the Commentary and On First Principles.  
                                               
12 In the following discussion, I will note points where I think Rufinus may have repaired elements 
in Origen’s thought, and why I think that. We can dispense at the outset with a few apparent discrepancies 
between the trinity of Jo. 1-2 and Rufinus’ Origen in Princ. Rufinus’ translation of Princ. 1.4.2 to the effect 
that the Triad is “the fount of all holiness” may not be as helpful to saving Origen from himself as one 
might first suppose. Origen elsewhere uses τριάδος to refer to the Trinity, but the term is rare in his 
undisputed writings. In Jo. 6.166, Origen says that the τριάδος is “venerable” (προσκυνητός). The 
Philocalia records a single instance of the term, which reproduces the Commentary on Matthew’s 
attribution of the adjective ἀρχικός to the trinity (Commentary on Matthew 15.31). So the “triad” is the 
“primal triad” or “causal triad.” This usage bears out the arrangement in Jo. 1-2 of a graded series of 
causes. Rufinus’s Latin in Princ. 1.4.2 only describes holiness as transmitted by all three persons; holiness 
is the “lowest common denominator” in Origen’s causal scheme from Jo. 1-2.  Recall that the Holy Spirit, 
third in rank, is the self-productive source of holiness for creation—but not of existence (the Father) or 
rationality (the Son) (Princ. 1.3.5). Origen affirms the immutability of the Holy Spirit in Princ. 1.3.4. The 
affirmation is not necessarily Rufinus’s channeling of Didymus. Origen states that the Holy Spirit possesses 
holiness not through knowledge gained by the Father’s revelation of the Son, like we possess holiness, but 
through himself. This presumes only what we already know about the Holy Spirit from Jo. 2: the Holy 
Spirit is the cause of holiness, and, in this regard at least, is immutable. 
 115 
Commentary on John and On First Principles: Hierarchy and Low Pneumatology 
 
 
 
 I now want to describe the continuity that holds between key passages in the 
Commentary on John and some of the fragments alleged of Origen’s original version of 
On First Principles. The goal is to observe a line of continuity from the Commentary to 
On First Principles, and to attend to evidence that confirms Origen never departed from 
the approach of the Commentary.  
 
Binitarian Tendencies in the Commentary on John 
 
 
 
 I argued in Chapter 2 that Origen drew on Middle Platonism to develop a triadic 
hierarchy in the Commentary on John’s first two books. I want here to draw attention to 
the effects of that dynamic on Origen’s pneumatology. Origen’s use of the term τάξις 
appears clearly in Jo. 2.73-77, and here it produces a low pneumatology.13 In the 
Commentary on John, Origen never names the Holy Spirit as “third” in order, though he 
does imply that the Holy Spirit is “third.” The omission is remarkable in light of earlier 
Christian readings of Platonic triadology (e.g., Justin and Clement). Jo. 2.73-77 is 
especially important, since it includes the only place in Origen’s Greek works where he 
implies that the Holy Spirit is third in the primal series, by stating that he believes in 
“three hypostases.”14 
However, Origen does not say that the Holy Spirit is third in the series of first 
principles. Instead of an explicit statement to that effect, we find something rather 
different in the immediate context. Only two paragraphs earlier, Origen states that the 
                                               
13 The significance of τάξις is pronounced at Princ., 1.3.4-8. 
14 Jo. 2.75. 
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Holy Spirit is “the most honored of all things made through the Word, and . . . he is [first] 
in rank (τάξει) of the ‘all things’ which have been made by the Father through Christ.”15 
The Spirit is “one of the ‘all things’ considered to be inferior (ὑποδεέστερον) to the one 
through whom he was made” [i.e., the Son].16 Here Origen comes as close as he ever 
does to an explicit statement of the Holy Spirit’s subordination to the Son.17 The Holy 
Spirit is the principle (ἀρχή) of an alternate order (τάξις)—the τάξις of created rational 
entities, or angels.  
 Origen’s commitment to a “triad” of three hypostases recedes under the weight of 
binitarian tendencies, especially if we entertain the possibility that his pneumatology is 
angelomorphic. Such a possibility can be seen just between the lines of Jo. 2.82:  
if [someone] takes offense when we say that the Savior was made less than the 
Holy Spirit when he became man, we must approach him from what is said in the 
Epistle to the Hebrews, when Paul also declared that Jesus was made less than 
angels because he suffered death” (quoting Hebrews 2:9).18  
 
                                               
15 Jo. 2.73. On this passage and its background, see especially A.H.B. Logan, “Origen and the 
Development of Trinitarian Theology,” in Origeniana quarta: die Referate des 4. Internationalen 
Origeneskongresses (Innsbruck, 2.-6. September 1985, ed. L. Lies (Vienna: Tyrolia, 1987), 424-429. 
16 Jo. 2.86 ἕν τῶν πάντων τυγχάνων ὑποδεέστερον τοῦ δι᾽οὗ ἐγένετο νοούµενον. Origen lets on 
that some biblical texts draw him to an “opposite view,” but it is unclear what the texts are, or what “the 
opposite view” is. In On First Principles, Origen feels the need either to oppose a form of “hyper-
pneumatology,” or to protect his own word from being (mis)read to imply a “hyper-pneumatological” 
scheme. It is likely that he has the same view in mind here, though he is less forceful in his rejection here 
than he is in On First Principles. Additionally, in fragment 39 ep. ad Mennam, Origen states that the Father 
“contains all things, and the Son is one of the ‘all things,’ and so he also contains the Son” (ὁ δὲ πατὴρ 
ἐµπεριέχει τὰ πάντα, τῶν δὲ πάντων ἐστὶν ὁ υἱός, δἠλον ὅτι καὶ τὸν υἱόν). This fragment presents an 
inclusion of the Son in John 1:3, though when Origen comments on that verse in Jo. 2.86 he does not 
mention the Son.  Matthew Crawford notes (551 n46) that Jerome’s presentation of a Latin translation of 
this Greek helps to corroborate Justinian’s allegation. But Justinian’s and Jerome’s allegation fits with the 
statement made in Jo. 1.291-292 to the effect that the Son is “circumscribed”. In his Contra Marcellum 
I.4.41, Eusebius of Nicomedia will insist that the Son’s being the Father’s “image” means that “there are 
two ousiai and two pragmata and two dunameis,” echoing Origen’s anti-monarchian point at Jo.291-292. 
See Gwynn, The Eusebians, 216-217. 
17 His term is ὑποδεέστερον. 
18 Jo. 2.82. Εἰ δὲ ἐν τούτῳ προσκόπτει τις τῷ λέγειν ἠλαττῶσθαι παρὰ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦµα τὸν 
σωτῆρα ἐνανθρωπήσαντα, προσακτέον αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἑβραίους λεγοµένων ἐπιστολῇ, καὶ 
ἀγγέλων ἐλάττονα διὰ τὸ πάθηµα τοῦ θανάτου ἀποφηναµένου τοῦ Παύλου γεγονέναι τὸν Ἰησοῦν· φησὶ 
γάρ· “Τὸν δὲ βραχύ τι παρ’ ἀγγέλους ἠλαττωµένον βλέποµεν Ἰησοῦν διὰ τὸ πάθηµα τοῦ θανάτου δόξῃ καὶ 
τιµῇ ἐστεφανωµένον.” 
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The logic of Origen’s reasoning here is that the incarnate Logos (i.e., Jesus) was “less 
than the angels,” and that this explains the way in which we can say that the second 
person is less than the third. The logic turns on the premise that, if the incarnate Logos 
were lower than the angels, he would also be lower than their principle, the Holy Spirit. 
This statement, taken by itself, does not identify the Holy Spirit as the chief of the angelic 
host. However, when coupled with Origen’s identification of the Holy Spirit with the one 
who is “first in rank” of the “all things” produced by the Father through the Word, the 
lines between “Holy Spirit” and “Archangel” begin to blur. 
Origen goes on to explain why the Holy Spirit is not to be identified with the Son. 
Just as the Son is not to be identified with the Father because the Son, as the Father’s 
invisible image, participates in the Father’s divinity, so too the Holy Spirit receives 
certain qualities from the Son.19 The Father uses the Son to cause the Holy Spirit to exist. 
The Son provides the Holy Spirit with a determinate character. In order for the Holy 
Spirit’s “hypostasis” not to be indeterminate, it is filled with all the attributes of Christ 
that Christ is “naturally”—wisdom, rationality, justice, and so on. Origen invokes 1 
Corinthians 12:4-6 to provide the Holy Spirit a role analogous to that of the Father and 
Son: he, too, provides the “material of the gifts” administered to the saint that participates 
in him. As the Father is the source of the Son’s divinity, the Son as Logos is the self-
sufficient source for all creation of its rationality.20   
Origen now extends the analogy to the Holy Spirit, which, as the “material” of the 
Son, is the self-productive source of holiness for creation.21 The Holy Spirit’s “material” 
                                               
19 Jo. 2.76, already quoted, speaks of the Holy Spirit’s reception of qualities from the Son. 
20 Jo. 2.19-20. 
21 Jo. 2.77: Οἶµαι δὲ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦµα τήν, ἵν' οὕτως εἴπω, ὕλην τῶν ἀπὸ θεοῦ χαρισµάτων 
παρέχειν τοῖς δι' αὐτὸ καὶ τὴν µετοχὴν αὐτοῦ χρηµατίζουσιν ἁγίοις, τῆς εἰρηµένης ὕλης τῶν χαρισµάτων 
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is set in motion (ἐνεργουµένης) by the Father, made righteous (διακονουµένης) by the 
Son, and given existence (ὑφεστώσης) by the Holy Spirit. Origen’s causal ordering of the 
trinity reappears. The Father is the self-sufficient source of divinity and causes the Son’s 
divine existence; the Son is the self-sufficient source of rationality and causes the Holy 
Spirit’s rational existence; and the Holy Spirit is the self-sufficient source of holiness and 
causes the existence of all holy creatures.  
Origen elsewhere uses τάξις to indicate the angelic order attained by way of 
participation in a scale of ranking.22 He does not distinguish his use of τάξις to refer to 
the angelic hierarchy from his use of that term in the context of trinitarian speculation. In 
fact, Origen’s failure to distinguish between the angelic “order” and the trinitarian 
“order” does not appear to be an oversight; the lack of a distinction between the angelic 
and trinitarian hierarchies appears to be intentional. If Origen thought the Holy Spirit was 
an angel, the continuity between the angelic and trinitarian “orders” is a logical 
consequence Origen embraced. With this dynamic more clearly in view, we may turn to 
several passages in On First Principles for comparison. 
 In Princ. 1.3.3, Origen appears to deny the Holy Spirit’s being “made or produced”:  
                                                                                                                                            
ἐνεργουµένης µὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, διακονουµένης δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ὑφεστώσης δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦµα.  
The characterization of the Spirit as the “spiritual material” (materia spiritualis) of the Son is mentioned by 
Aloys Grillmeier in his concise account of Origen’s christology (see Grillmeier, Christ in Christian 
Tradition, 138-48). He does not name the passage in Origen he has in mind when he writes that “[the 
pneuma] provides a new substratum, which makes it possible to receive ‘the wisdom of Christ’. The Spirit 
appears as ‘materia spiritualis’ which is informed by the ‘Logos-wisdom’. . . . The Holy Spirit is neither 
unbegotten like the Father, nor begotten as is the Son, nor is it created like other creatures. It issues from 
the Father and becomes a subsisting hypostasis by means of the Logos. Thus it belongs on the side of God, 
but is in third place after the Father and the Son” (140). Grillmeier is probably thinking of Princ. 1.3.8 
(“[rational creatures obtain] . . . their holiness from the Holy Spirit and they become capable of receiving 
Christ afresh in his character of the righteousness of God”) when he speaks of the Spirit as a “new 
substratum” that makes possible a fresh receiving of the Word as wisdom. 
22 Princ. 1.6.2-3; Clement’s “gnostic” was a spiritual guru always pure and ready to pray in the 
ranks of angels already in this world (Strom. 7.12; ANF, 545: “So is [the Gnostic] always pure for prayer. 
He also prays in the society of angels, as being already of angelic rank, and he is never out of their holy 
keeping; and though he pray alone, he has the choir of the saints standing with him”). Cf. also Origen, Cels. 
4.29. 
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It is proved by many declarations throughout the whole of scripture that all things 
were created by God (a deo universa creata sint) and that there is no substance 
which has not received its existence from him (nec sit ulla substantia quae non ab 
eo hoc ipsum ut esset acceperit); which refutes and dismisses the doctrines falsely 
taught by some, that there is a matter which is co-eternal with God, or that there 
are unbegotten souls, in whom they would have it that God implanted not so 
much the principle of existence as the quality and rank of their life. Moreover in 
that little book composed by Hermas, called “The Shepherd, or the Angel of 
Repentance”, it is thus written: “First of all, believe that God is one, who created 
and set in order all things; who, when nothing existed before, caused all things to 
be; who contains all things, but himself is contained by none.” Similar statements 
are also made in the book of Enoch. But up to the present we have been able to 
find no passage in the holy scriptures which would warrant us in saying that the 
Holy Spirit was a being made or created (factura esse vel vreatura diceretur), not 
even in that manner in which we have shown above that Solomon speaks of 
wisdom, nor in the manner in which the expressions we have dealth with, such as 
life, or word, or other titles of the Son of God, are to be understood. The “Spirit of 
God,” therefore, who “moved upon the waters,” as it is written, in the beginning 
of the creation of the world, I reckon to be none other than the Holy Spirit, so far 
as I can understand; which indeed I have demonstrated in my exposition of these 
passages, not, however, according to their literal but according to their spiritual 
meaning.23 
 
Note that the passage begins with a clear statement by Origen that “all things (universa) 
have been produced (creata sint) by God.” Rufinus’s use of the Latin universa probably 
translates πάντα, the same word used in John 1:3. However, according to Rufinus, Origen 
here makes it clear that Scripture never speaks of the Holy Spirit as one of the “all 
things” produced by God. So Rufinus’s Latin implies that Origen either has not read John 
1:3, or does not want to admit it as evidence in pneumatology. 
 About halfway through the section italicized in the quotation above, the passage is 
interrupted, in Butterworth’s translation, by the presentation of Koetschau’s Fragment 7, 
taken from Justinian’s Letter to Mennas, which alleges that Origen said: “Following the 
same reasoning we believe that everything whatever except the Father and God of the 
universe is created (ὅτι µὲν οὖν πᾶν ὅ τι ποτὲ παρὰ τὸν πατέρα καὶ θεὸν τῶν ὅλων 
                                               
23 Princ. 1.3.3; Butterworth trans., modified, 31. 
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γενητόν ἐστιν, ἐκ τῆς ἀκολουθίας πειθόµεθα).”24 Even if this fragment paraphrases and 
does not quote Origen, it represents Origen’s doctrine in the Commentary on John. 
Origen’s statement in Rufinus’s version of On First Principles 1.3.3, to the effect that he 
knows of no Scripture in which the Holy Spirit is “a being made or created,” runs afoul of 
what Origen makes plain in the Commentary on John:  
But if it is true that “all things were made through him,” we must investigate if the 
Holy Spirit, too, was made through him. I think that one who declares that he was 
made and who advances the statement, “All things were made through him,” must 
accept tha tthe Holy Spirit too was made through the Word, since the Word is 
older than he (Οἶµαι γὰρ ὅτι τῷ µὲν φάσκοντι γενητὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ προιεµένῳ 
τὸ πάντα δι᾽αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο· ἀναγκαῖον παραδέξασθαι, ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦµα διὰ 
τοῦ λόγου ἐγένετο, πρεσβυτέρου παρ᾽αὐτὸ τοῦ λόγου τυγχάνοντος).25 But it 
follows that one who does not wish the Holy Spirit to have been made through the 
Christ, if he judges the things in this Gospel to be true, says he is “unbegotten.”26 
 
Origen acknowledges not only that John 1:3 might be read to imply that the Holy Spirit is 
one of the “all things” made by the Father through the Word, and he concludes that the 
best interpretation of this passage is that the Holy Spirit is, in fact, among the “all things” 
of John 1:3.27  
 So, did Origen say in On First Principles that “we have been able to find no 
passage . . . which would warrant us in saying that the Holy Spirit was a being made or 
created”? Two options present themselves, the suggestion that Origen was lying 
notwithstanding. First, Origen could have written his statement in On First Principles 
prior to having come to write his Commentary on John, or at least its first two books. 
                                               
24 Fragment 7, Just. Ep. ad Menam. 
25 Note that here Origen calls the Son “older than” the Holy Spirit, perhaps echoing Numenius’s 
use of the word πρεσβύτερος to arrange first principles, as he does, for example, in Fragments 16, 17, and 
24, ed. Des Places. Blanc (SC 120, 253n2) notes that the term is not necessarily “chronological,” which is 
true so far as it goes, and notes several instances of this term in Origen’s Commentary (e.g., Jo. 1.236; 2.36; 
2.181; 2.185; 10.179), but she does not connect it to Numenius’s precedent. 
26 Jo. 2.73. 
27 The other two options, he goes on to make clear, are to identify the Holy Spirit as the 
“unbegotton,” or to teach “that the Holy Spirit has no distinctive essence different from the Father and the 
Son” (Jo. 2.74). 
 121 
Indeed, the phrase “up to the present” suggests an ongoing search, as though Origen were 
reporting on his work-in-progress. However, if that is so, then the Commentary represents 
a shift in thinking and should be privileged as representing Origen’s more developed 
pneumatology—since he has finally decided that, in fact, John 1:3 indicates that the Holy 
Spirit is produced by the Father through the Son. On the other hand, if the Commentary 
and On First Principles were written more or less contemporaneously, then Origen’s 
original statement in On First Principles is obscured by Rufinus’s sympathetic 
intervention. In either case, the statement in On First Principles regarding the Holy 
Spirit’s being “produced” should not be used as evidence of Origen’s mature 
pneumatology—or, for that fact, even of his pneumatology in his “early” period. At the 
very most, it represents an experimental position that was soon abandoned. 
 
Son as Image and Hierarchical Triad 
 
 
 
I now want to pivot from Origen’s low pneumatology to his descriptions of the 
Son as the Father’s “invisible image” in On First Principles. Origen’s construal of the 
Son as the Father’s image is a theology of procession. It describes, in an accessible way, 
what it means for the Father to “beget” the Son. It also makes space for the grammar of 
participation articulated in the Commentary on John. In the first book of On First 
Principles, Origen repeatedly characterizes the Son as God the Father’s “image.”28 We 
may set aside Origen’s statements, in Princ. 1.1.8, to the effect that the Son does not see 
the Father. A number of Origen’s readers took these statements to mean that Origen 
                                               
28 See especially Princ. 1.1.8; 1.2.6; 1.2.8; 1.2.13. 
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thought the Son incapable of seeing the Father.29 Origen’s statement concerns the nature 
of both the Father and the Son. It is inappropriate to speak of vision in the case of either, 
he says, since both the Father and the Son are intellectual entities. Neither of them sees or 
is seen with the physical senses. So the Son “cannot” see the Father because the Father is 
not the kind of entity that can be seen in any event. The “cannot” in that sentence does 
not restrict the Son’s nature, but expresses the incorporeality of both Father and Son. 
Princ. 1.2.6 confirms that this reading of 1.1.8 is not a Rufinian gloss. Origen 
writes: 
But in regard to the Son of God, of whom we are now speaking, the image may be 
compared to our second illustration; for this reason, that he is the invisible image 
of the invisible God, just as according to the scripture narrative we say that the 
image of Adam was his son Seth. It is written thus: “And Adam begat Seth after 
his own image and after his own kind.” This image preserves the unity of nature 
and substance common to a Father and a Son.30 
 
Origen describes the Son as an invisible image, and he refers to his distinction between 
two ways of thinking about an “image.” One way is to consider an image as an artificial 
production; the other is to think of it as a natural production. The first, a physical 
representation like a painting or carved statue, is better suited to illustrate the way human 
beings resemble God, Origen says. With this “image painted or carved on some material” 
Origen has in mind the interpretation of the “image” of Genesis 1. The second kind of 
“image”—a natural production—on the other hand, is more appropriate to the kind of 
continuity between Father and Son. Insofar as the Son is God the Father’s “invisible 
                                               
29 See Butterworth, p. 13, for references to Jerome, Epiphanius, and Justinian. 
30 Princ. 1.2.6. 
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image,” the Son “preserves the unity of nature and substance common to a father and a 
son.”31   
 The Latin’s report here of “natura ac substantia” reflects Rufinus’ intervention. 
The Greek equivalent—φύσις καὶ οὐσία—never appears in Origen’s extant Greek 
writings. The phrase “nature and substance” does feature, however, in Rufinus’s 
discussion of the unity that obtains between God the Father and the Son. In the course of 
Rufinus’s discussion it becomes clear that he treats “nature” and “substance” as 
synonymous, and that whatever unity the persons of the trinity have, they have it at the 
level of “nature or (vel) substance.” In his Commentary on the Creed, he states: “‘God,’ 
so far as human intelligence can conceive, is the designation of the absolutely supreme 
nature or substance.”32 Having defined God as a “substance without beginning or end, 
simple, uncompounded, invisible, incorporeal, ineffable, incomprehensible: a substance 
(substantiam) in which there is nothing accidental, nothing creaturely (in qua nihil 
adjunctum, nihil creatum sit),” Rufinus scolds his reader not to delve too deeply into the 
question of the Son’s generation from the Father lest he “plunge too inquisitively into the 
                                               
31 Princ. 1.2.6. Quae imago etiam naturae ac substantiae patris et filii continet unitatem; 
Butterworth trans., 19. Depending on how one takes this line, we might have a statement at odds with 
Origen’s statements in Jo. 1.152 that the Son is substantially distinct from the Father, kai kexorismenon kai 
ousiomenon. In Prin. 1.2.6, we are supposed to think of the Son’s being an image as the basis for continuity 
between the “nature and substance” of the Father and Son. A few lines down in 1.2.6, Origen expresses this 
unity as existing only at the level of shared volition between the Father and the Son: the Son’s “birth from 
the Father is as it were an act of his will proceeding from the mind. And on this account my own opinion is 
that an act of the Father’s will ought to be sufficient to ensure the existence of what he wills.” In Jo. 1.152, 
Origen makes it plain that the Son is a substance separated from the Father. In Jo. 2.75 he calls the Father, 
Son, and Holy Spirit distinct hypostases. With Rufinus’s Latin we have a slight correction. Origen 
excoriates those who would construe the Son’s generation from the Father in corporeal terms. He has in 
mind certain Gnostics. Whatever “separation” Origen implies between the Father and the Son, it is not a 
material division. Instead, he explains that the Son is distinct from the Father as an act of will proceeding 
from the mind is distinct from mind. Origen avoids the monarchian alternative, which is to identify the Son 
as a Word proceeding from the mind, since a Word’s subsistence is too impermanent. Origen feels pressed 
to avoid any connotation of corporeality as he describes the Son’s substantial distinction from the Father, 
and so he opts here for the metaphor of an act of will that proceeds from the mind. 
32 Rufinus, Comm. in Sym. Apost. 4; PL 21, 341. Deus, secundum quod opinari potest humana 
mens, naturae ipsius vel substantiae quae est super omnia appellatio est; Kelly trans., 33. 
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depths of the mystery.”33 Following this warning, Rufinus provides examples of such 
oversights, and in the process he implies what the unity of the Father and Son is like: 
“First of all explain, if you can, how the mind within you generates its word, and what the 
spirit of memory in your mind is. Explain how these, for all their diversity in reality and 
operation (quomodo haec cum diversa sint rebus et actibus), form a unity in substance or 
nature (unum tamen sint vel substantia vel natura), or how, while proceeding from the 
mind, they are never separated (separentur) from it.”34 The doctrine of “common 
operation” is traceable to Origen himself.35 The clear use of “nature” and “substance” as 
synonyms, however, is not.36 In On First Principles 1.2.6, Rufinus is thus more likely 
than Origen to have said that the Son’s being the Father’s “image” preserves the unity of 
“nature and substance” of the Father and the Son.  
An original and its copy, or an archetype and its image, have the “same nature,” 
according to Aristotle, even if they are not the same “substance.”37 In this sense, the 
                                               
33 PL 21, 341; Kelly trans., 34. 
34 PL 21, 342; Kelly trans., 34. 
35 See Princ. 1.2.12 and the discussion of this passage below, in Chapter 6. 
36 Cf. Mark Edwards, “Did Origen Apply the Word Homoousios to the Son?” Journal of 
Theological Studies 49.2 (1998): 658-670. Edwards argues, against an earlier article on the same subject by 
Hanson (see below), that Pamphilus’s report that Origen used the term homoousios was not inaccurate. 
However, he concludes that Origen’s “use was too tentative to anticipate the later orthodoxy, yet 
venturesome enough to be thought heretical before the Nicene Council” (Edwards, 670). Even if Edwards 
has made a strong case for Origen’s use of the word homoousios, it is a use whose qualification takes back 
the proto-Nicene sense some of Origen’s modern readers have implied by pointing out that he applied it to 
the Son. If Origen did use the word, he glosses it to mean “of the same nature as the Father” (in Edwards’ 
retrograde Greek: ταὐτον κατ᾽οὐσίαν τῷ πατρὶ; cf. Edwards, 665), which suggests the possibility that 
Origen’s use of the word conceded terminologically a point to the monarchians which he then immediately 
revoked conceptually: a distinction between the Father and the Son’s hypostases. Regarding Princ. 1.2.6., 
Edwards acknowledges that “the word substantiae may be epexegetic here,” though he makes no mention 
of the potential confirmation one might glean from Rufinus’s usage in his Commentary on the Creed. See 
Edwards, 662. I am inclined to agree with Hanson’s statement that “[t]here can be little doubt that Origen 
believed that the Son was of the same nature as the Father, but this would not have prevented him from 
saying that the Son’s ousia is distinct from that of the Father.” See Richard P. C. Hanson, “Did Origen 
Apply the Word Homoousios to the Son,” in Epektasis: Melanges Patristiques offerts au Cardinal 
Daniélou, ed. J. Fontaine and C. Kannengiesser (Paris, 1972), 293-303, at 293-4. 
37 Beeley makes the following statement regarding Origen’s use of the metaphor of “image” to 
describe the Son: “Christ is the image of God the Father more in the way that a human child is the image of 
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model of an original and its image is an example of equivocation.38 A man and an 
artificial representation of him in the form of a statue are both the “same nature,” but on 
is not “man” in the same way as the other. Origen reads the Father-Son model in terms of 
an original-image relationship which implies equivocation. It is hard to believe he would 
have said “and substance,” given the purchase that term had for monarchian theology. For 
Origen himself, the participatory model of model and copy, in which the copy is 
ontologically “less than” that from which it receives, governs his use of terms for the 
Father and the Son’s having the “same nature.”  
 The Father and the Son, then, are two distinct incorporeal entities united in some 
way, and one of the chief means of unity is the model of original and image. It is this 
model which Jerome claimed led Origen to say disastrous things about the Son in relation 
to the Father. We do not have to credit Jerome’s allegation that these statements led 
Origen to describe the Son as “a very small brightness,” in order to understand why 
Koetschau is justified in crediting this Greek fragment alleged by Justinian: statements in 
                                                                                                                                            
its parent than in theh sense of a painted or carved image: he is a distinctly existing being just like his 
parent, not a mere artifact made by a superior being. . . . The difference between the two types of imaging 
is that the Father and the Son are of the same nature, just as a human parent and child are both human 
beings; whereas an artist and an artifact are not of theh same nature” (Beeley, Unity of Christ, 29-30). In a 
footnote to this statement, Beeley appeals to Princ. 1.2.6 and admits that the phrase naturae ac substantiae 
unitatem could be an insertion on the part of Rufinus. Yet he insists that the phrase “expresses Origen’s 
meaning faithfully enough, if it is not overinterpreted to indicate Athanasian consubstantiality. Origen 
expresses the common divinity and sameness of nature (if not sameness of ousia) shared by the Father and 
Son in several other passages” (Beeley, Ibid., 322n57). He cites Hanson’s article on the question, “Did 
Origen Apply the Word Homoousios?” So it appears that Beeley thinks that Origen’s use of the “Son as 
Image” metaphor precludes the possibility of hierarchy. In fact, Origen’s use of the image metaphor is a 
direct result of his appropriation of Numenius, who speaks of the second principle or Demiurge as an 
“imitator” and “image” of the first, and for this reason subordinates the second principle to the first. To say 
that the Father and the Son “share the same nature” does not preclude the possibility that the Father is the 
“original” and the Son a subordinated participant in the Father as source. For this reason, I am not 
convinced that Origen’s statement in Princ. 1.2.6 save Origen from a hierarchical arrangement of Father 
over Son, as Beeley here implies. 
38 Aristotle, Cat. 1. 
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very similar terms appear in Origen’s Commentary on John.39 In 1.2.6, Origen states that 
the Son, as incorporeal Wisdom, is  
. . . the image of the invisible God, the Father, being the truth, when considered in 
relation to the Father himself, and the image, when considered in relation to us, to 
whom he reveals the Father; through which image we know the Father, whom “no 
one” else “knoweth save the Son and he to whom the Son hath willed to reveal 
him.” And he reveals the Father by being himself understood; for whoever has 
understood him understands as a consequence the Father also, according to his 
own saying, “He that hath seen me, hath seen the Father also.”40  
 
Notice that Rufinus’s translation here states an analogy: the Son is truth in relation to the 
Father and image in relation to humanity. It makes little sense, on Origen’s own terms, to 
consider the Son as truth in relation to God the Father. As Butterworth notes, the 
incongruity between what Rufinus claims Origen says, and what Origen implies, belies 
Rufinus’s attempt to cloak Origen’s controversial arrangement of the Son as image in 
relation to the Father and truth in relation to humanity. That arrangement, as we have 
seen, is expressed with clarity in Commentary on John 2.12-21, especially at 2.18 and 
2.20: 
(2.18) The God, therefore, is the true God. The others are gods formed according 
to him as images of the prototype. But again, the archetypal image of the many 
images is the Word with the God, who was “in the beginning.” By being “with the 
God” he always continues to be “divine.” . . . (2.20) The reason which is in each 
rational being has the same position in relation to the Word which is in the 
beginning with God, which is God the Word, which God the Word has with God. 
For as the Father is the one true God in relation to the image and images of the 
image (wherefore also men are said to be “according to the image,” not “image”), 
so is the very Word in relation to the reason in each one. For both hold the place 
of a source; the Father, that of divinity, the Son, that of reason.41  
 
                                               
39 See Jerome, Ep. ad Avitum 2. 
40 Imago ergo est invisibilis dei patris salvator noster, quantum ad ipsum quidem paterem veritas, 
quantum autem ad nos, quibus revelat patrem, imago est, per quam cognoscimus patrem, quem nemo alius 
novit nisi filius et cui voluerit filius revealre. Revelat autem per hoc, quod ipse intelligitur. A quo enim ipse 
fuerit intelletus, consequenter intellegitur et pater, secundum hoc quod ipse dixit: Qui me vidit, vidit et 
patrem; Butterworth trans., 19-20. 
41 Jo. 2.18, 20; Heine trans., 99-100. 
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Here Origen states clearly the analogy between Father and Son, Word and rational 
creatures, which Rufinus’s translation has obscured in On First Principles. The similarity 
between Origen’s analogy here and that implied by a similar original statement in Princ. 
1.2.6 is part of the reason Koetschau included for reference a Greek fragment from 
Justinian’s Epistle to Mennas. Fragment 4 of On First Principles, according to 
Koetschau’s numbering, reads as follows: 
We, therefore, having been made according to the image, have the Son, the 
original, as the truth of the noble qualities that are within us. And what we are to 
the Son, such is the Son to the Father, who is the truth.42  
 
It is not difficult to understand why Koetschau included this fragment, and there is little 
reason to doubt its authenticity. 
 Not much further along in Rufinus’s version of the text (1.2.8), Origen restates the 
Son’s identity as the Father’s image and pairs it with increased ability to receive the Son, 
God’s “word” and “wisdom.”  
I do not think it superfluous, therefore, to turn our attention to this point, namely, 
how there can be said to exist, besides the actual substance or subsistence of God 
(whatever that substance or subsistence means), something else which is an image 
of his substance. See, then, whether the Son of God, who is called God’s word 
and wisdom, and who alone knows the Father and reveals him to whom he will, to 
those, namely, who become capable of receiving his word and wisdom, may not 
perhaps be said to express the image of God’s substance or subsistence for this 
reason, that he makes God understood and known; that is, when wisdom outlines 
first in herself the things which she wishes to reveal to others, by means of which 
they are to know and understand God, then she herself may be called the “express 
image of God’s substance.”43 
                                               
42 Koetschau, ed., Fragment 4; Γενόµενοι τοίνυν ἡµεῖς κατ᾽εἰκόνα, τὸν υἱὸν προωτότυπον ὡς 
ἀλήθειαν ἔχοµεν τῶν ἐν ἡµῖν καλῶν τύπων· αὐτὸς δὲ ὅπερ ἡµεῖς ἐσµὲν πρὸς αὐτόν, τοιοῦτος ἐστι πρὸς τὸν 
πατέρα ἀλήθειαν τυγχάνοντα; Butterworth trans., 20. 
43 Princ. 1.2.8: non mihi videtur otiose esse intellectus advertere, quomodo alia praeter ipsam dei 
substantiam vel subsistentiam, quaecumque illa substantia vel subsistentia dicitur, figura substantiae eius 
esse dicatur. Et vide ne forte, quoniam filius dei, qui et verbum eius et sapientia dicitur et qui solus novit 
patrem, et revelat quibus vult, id est qui capaces verbi ipsius et sapientiae fiunt, secundum hoc ipsum, quod 
intellegi atque agnosci facit deum, figuram substantiae vel subsistentiae eius dicatur exprimere: id est cum 
in semet ipsa primum describit sapientia ea, quae revelare vult ceteris, ex quibus ab illis agnoscitur et 
intellegitur dues, et haec dicatur figura expressa substantiae dei; Butterworth trans., 21. 
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The Son is the image of God the Father’s substance. He is called the “image” because he 
makes God the Father understood and known.  
 The Son is in position to make the Father known because the Son knows the Father 
perfectly. Contemplation of an object results in conformity to that object’s aspects. If one 
contemplates goodness, one becomes good. Because the Son perfectly contemplates the 
Father, he is in a position perfectly to reproduce the Father’s nature and so to be the 
Father’s perfect image. Because the Son is the Father’s image, he provides reliable 
epistemological access to the Father.44 
 Origen elaborates on the Son-as-Image model by invoking the example of an 
enormous statue at Princ. 1.2.8: 
Let us suppose . . . that there existed a statue of so great a size as to fill the whole 
world, but which on account of its immensity was imperceptible to anyone, and 
that another statue was made similar to it in every detail, in shape of limbs and 
outline of features, in form and material, but not in its immense size, so that those 
who were unable to perceive and behold the immense one could yet be confident 
that they had seen it when they saw the small one, because this preserved every 
line of limbs and features and the very form and material with an absolutely 
indistinguishible similarity. It is by some such likeness as this that the Son, in 
emptying himself of his quality with the Father, and showing to us a way by 
which we may know him, becomes an “express image” of God’s substance; so 
that, through this fact of his becoming to us the brightness, we who were not able 
to look at the glory of pure light while it remained in the greatness of his godhead, 
may find a way of beholding the divine light through looking at the brightness.45  
 
                                               
44 Origen makes this point without recourse to calling the Son ἀπαραλλάκτος because, for him, 
that term would signify that the Son and the Father are not two distinct entities, but are really one—a 
consequence that would lead ineluctably to the monarchian position. On this term and its later history, see 
especially DelCogliano, “Theologies of the Son as Image,” 
45 Butterworth trans., 22. Verbi causa, si facta esset aliqua status talis, quae magnitudine sui 
universum orbem terrae teneret et pro sui immensitate considerari a nullo posset, fieret autem alia statua 
membrorum habitu ac vultus liniamentis, specie ac materia per omnia similis absque magnitudinis 
immensitate, pro eo ut qui illam immensam considerare atque intueri non possent, hanc videntes, illam se 
vidisse confiderent, pro eo quod omnia vel membrorum vel vultus liniamenta vel ipsam speciem 
materiamque similitudine prorsus indiscreta servaret: tali quadam similitudine “exinaniens” se filius de 
aequalitate patris et viam nobis cognitionis eius ostendens, “figura expressa substantiae eius” efficitur; uti 
qui in magnitudine deitatis suae positam gloriam merae lucis non poteramus aspicere, per hoc quod nobis 
“splendor” efficitur, intuendae lucis divinae viam per splendoris capiamus aspectum. 
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Here is a way to see the “sun” without approaching it directly.46 Origen provides 
Colossians 1:15 with an explicitly epistemological valence and associates the Son’s being 
as image with his function as the revealer of an otherwise incomprehensible nature—that 
of God the Father, whose light is too much for the capacity of our mind’s eye. 
 The continuity that obtains between the smaller figure (Christ) and the larger, 
incomprehensible statue (God the Father) is not due to the fact that both are made of the 
same “material.” Rather, the continuity derives from the fact that both statues share the 
same form or bear the same appearance—analogically speaking. Origen is careful to 
point out that, once we have grasped the conceptual point, we have to abandon the 
corporeal grounds upon which we came to that point: the Son is not a physical statue of a 
physical Father. But the one who has understood the character conveyed by Christ will 
have understood what can be grasped of God the Father. This is the point of Origen’s 
illustration of the two statues. The analogy turns on epistemological access to God the 
Father provided in Christ. Such access is guaranteed by the fact that the “image” 
faithfully represents the essential attributes or defining characteristics of the original, 
inaccessible image.  
 
 
 
                                               
46 Origen implies that God the Father is the Sun of Republic 509b. The Son is a more gentle, 
approachable light. Origen characterizes the Son as the “mediator” that helps the soul out of the Cave and 
into the light of the Sun in Plato’s Allegory of the Cave (Republic VII, 514a-521a): “. . . we arrive at the 
meaning of [the Son’s] being the brightness; for it is through its brightness that the nature of the light itself 
is known and experienced. This brightness falls softly and gently on the tender and weak eyes of mortal 
man and little by little trains and accustoms them, as it were, to bear the light in its clearness; and when it 
has removed from them all that darkens and obstructs their vision . . . it renders them capable of enduring 
the glory of the light, becoming in this respect even a kind of mediator between men and the light” (Princ. 
I.II.7; Butterworth trans., 21). 
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The Son as Image and Graded Ordering: Princ. 1.2.13 and 1.3.5 
 
 
 
We have seen in that Commentary the edges of an anti-monarchian polemic and 
Origen’s development of a graded scheme of participation against the monarchian 
position. The same polemical edges of Origen’s participatory grammar appear in the same 
terms, I will now show, in the trinitarian theology articulated in Princ. 1.2.13 and 1.3.5.47 
Koetschau includes a fragment from Justinian that he thinks belongs at 1.2.13. The 
fragment reads: 
in the case of the Savior it would be right to say that he is an image of God’s 
goodness, but not goodness itself (εἰκὼν ἀγαθότητος τοῦ θεοῦ ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ 
αὐτοαγαθόν). And perhaps also the Son, while being good, is yet not good purely 
and simply (ὁ υἱὸς ἀγαθὸς ἀλλ᾽οὐχ ὡς ἁπλῶς). And just as he is the image of the 
invisible God, and in virtue of this is himself God, and yet is not he of whom 
Christ himself says, ‘that they may know thee, the only true God’; so he is the 
image of the goodness (εἰκὼν τῆς ἀγαθότητος), and yet not, as the Father is, 
incomparably good.48  
 
This passage fits with Origen’s strategy in Jo. 2, with a slight difference.49 In Jo. 2.12-20, 
Origen refers to God the Father exclusively with the title αὐτόθεος, not the title 
αὐτοαγαθόν. And here he uses αὐτοαγαθόν in a comparable way. God the Father alone is 
αὐτοαγαθόν; the Son is ἀγαθὸς ἀλλ᾽οὐχ ὡς ἁπλῶς. The point is the same: the Son is an 
                                               
47 As Ronald Heine notes, “there is no section on the Trinity in the On First Principles” (Origen, 
136). Instead, scholars who would reconstruct Origen’s “trinitarian theology” in Princ. must piece together 
a synthetic account on the basis of Origen’s relatively scattered remarks on God the Father, Christ, and the 
Holy Spirit. I am focusing here on passages in which Origen’s use of participation bears directly on his 
conception of the trinity. The most important sections are Princ. 1.Pref.4, 1.1.3-6, 1.2.1-13, 1.3.2-8. 
48 οὕτω τοίνυν ἡγοῦµαι καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ σωτῆρος καλῶς ἂν λεχθήσεσθαι ὅτι εἰκὼν ἀγαθότητος τοῦ 
θεοῦ ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ αὐτοαγαθόν. Καὶ τάχα καὶ ὁ υἱὸς ἀγαθὸς ἀλλ᾽οὐχ ὡς ἁπλῶς. Καὶ ὥσπερ εἰκών ἐστι 
τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ  ἀοράτου καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο θεός, ἀλλ᾽οὐ περὶ οὗ λέγει αὐτὸς ὁ Χριστὸς ἵνα γινώσκωσί σε τὸν 
µόνον ἀληθινὸν θεόν, οὕτως εἰκὼν τῆς ἀγαθότητος ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ὡς ὁ πατὴρ ἀπαραλλάκτως ἀγαθός; 
Butterworth trans., 27, slightly modified. Cf. Asterius, frag. 63, Vinzent p. 122 for an appropriation of 
Origen’s participatory grammar. 
49 That is so unless we are here dealing with a quotation from a later portion of Jo. (!). That 
possibility is, however, improbable since Origen did not probably get to John 17:3 in nearly two decades of 
work on the commentary. See John McGuckin, “Structural Design and Apologetic Intent in Origen’s 
Commentary on John,” in Origeniana Sexta, 441-457, and Heine, Origen, 83-103. 
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entity which participates in its cause, the Father, which in turn is superior to its effect, the 
Son. The author introduces a distinction between God the Father as “Goodness itself” or 
Good simply, and the Son, who, though “God,” is not to be identified with the God. The 
dynamic of participation ensures the distinction, and the author is able to recover John 
17:3 from the monarchian purpose of insisting that there are not two Gods (the Father and 
Jesus Christ) but only one true God. It also produces the corollary notion that the Son is 
“less than” the Father because the Son participates in the Father. 
 The fragment “at” 1.2.13 fits into Origen’s anti-monarchian strategy. Origen 
admits the principle of “one True God” without sacrificing the divinity of the second 
person. He may therefore speak of “two Gods” without speaking of two first principles. 
He has a first principle participated by a second. The price he has to pay, however, is that 
the goodness of the second person (and the third) is derived from the first. Rufinus has 
Origen concluding this section of Princ. with the following proposal:  
we ought not to imagine that there is some kind of blasphemy, as it were, in the 
saying that ‘none is good save one, God the Father’, as if these words were to be 
taken as a denial that either Christ or the Holy Spirit is good; but, as we said 
before, the original goodness must be believed to reside in God the Father, and 
from him both the Son and Holy Spirit undoubtedly draw into themselves the 
nature of that goodness existing in the fount from which the one is born and the 
other proceeds.50 
 
Origen appeasl to Mark 10:18 to justify his distinction between the Father as “the Good” 
and the Son as a participant in “the Good”: Jesus says that “none is good but God” 
(οὐδεὶς ἀγαθὸς εἰ µὴ ὁ θεός). Though the Greek for this passage is lost, it is probable that 
Origen was making the point that in this passage Jesus refers to “the God” and 
                                               
50 Princ. 1.2.13. Propter quod non debet velut blasphemiae aliquod genus putari in eo quod 
dictum est quia nemo bonus nisi unus dues pater, ut propterea putetur vel Christus vel spiritus sanctus 
negari quod bonus sit; sed, ut superius diximus, principalis bonitas in deo patre sentienda est, ex quo vel 
filius natus vel spiritus sanctus procedens sine dubio bonitatis eius naturam in se refert, quae est in eo 
fonte, de quo vel natus est filius vel procedit spiritus sanctus; Butterworth trans., 27-28. 
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identifying “goodness” with “the God,” the Father. God the Father thus is the “one true” 
source of goodness for the Son and the Holy Spirit. This statement remains in Rufinus’s 
Latin and confirms Origen’s commitment an ordering of derivation. In spite of the fact 
that Origen teaches that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit possess goodness not, as with 
other entities, as some attribute that can be lost, the Son and the Holy Spirit receive their 
goodness from God the Father. And so the incorporeal subordination of the Son and the 
Holy Spirit to the Father remains in Origen’s trinitarian model in On First Principles. 
 Origen cites John 17:3 as he argues for a clear expression of the Son’s 
participation in the Father. Recall that in Jo. 2.17, when Origen replies to an (imagined or 
real) interlocutor who has posed the dilemma, John 17:3 provides Origen’s justification 
as to why the God is the one true God and the Savior is divine, but not the God. The same 
deployment of the same verse occurs here. Origen introduces the logic of participation 
with John 17:3 in order to dissolve the monarchian picture of one god who acts in 
different ways. Instead, according to Origen, one true God is simply, and it is in this God 
that all other “gods”—including the Son and the Holy Spirit—participate. Origen trades 
the picture of One True God acting in diverse ways for the distinct existences 
(hypostases) of the Son and Holy Spirit afforded by a participatory hierarchy of 
incorporeal entities. Given the fragment’s concordance with Origen’s polemical strategy 
in Jo., I am inclined to conclude that it is anti-monarchian and close to a statement 
original to Origen. Koetschau was correct to include it as a representation of Origen’s 
early model of the Trinity. 
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A Hierarchy of Causes  
 
 
 
 Another fragment, placed by Koetschau in Princ. 1.3.5, provides another pivotal 
passage for grasping the significance of participation for Origen’s trinitarian scheme. It is 
one of the most fulsome statements Origen makes about the functions proper to each 
trinitarian person, and it is frequently referred to in scholarship.51 Here is the central 
passage: 
The God and Father, who holds the universe together, is superior to every being 
that exists, for he imparts to each one from his own existence that which each one 
is; the Son, being less than the Father, is superior to rational creatures alone (for 
he is second to the Father); the Holy Spirit is still less, and reaches the saints 
alone. So that in this way the power of the Father is greater than that of the Son 
and of the Holy Spirit, and that of the Son is more than that of the Holy Spirit, and 
in turn the power of the Holy Spirit exceeds that of every other holy being.52 
                                               
51 See especially Henri Crouzel, “Les personnes de la Trinité sont-elles de puissance inégale selon 
Origène, Peri Archon I, 3, 5-8?” Gregorianum 57 (1976): 109-125; Ziebritzki also reviews these issues at 
some length. See Ziebritzki, 203-24. Crouzel argues that Origen did not teach that the three are arranged in 
a hierarchy of power, even if they are arranged in a hierarchy of “appropriation.” This is supposed to save 
Origen from a hierarchy of the trinity considered in and of itself: “Le subordinationisme d’Origène, malgré 
un tout petit hombre de texts difficiles parce qu’insuffisamment clairs, est essentiellement basé, comme 
celui de plusieurs anténicéens et à la différence de celui des Ariens, sur une hiérarchie venant de l’origine et 
de l’ ‘économie’ rédemptrice” (114). I sympathize with Crouzel’s attempt to save Origen from 
anachronistic judgments, but I am not convinced that the “hierarchy” applies only to the “redemptive 
economy,” in part because I am not convinced that Origen distinguishes consistently between an 
“immanent” and an “economic” trinity, and Crouzel’s reading of Origen requires that distinction of him. 
52 Butterworth, trans., 33-34, slightly modified; Koetschau, ed., Fragment 9. ὁ µὲν θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ 
συνέχων τὰ πάντα φθάνει εἰς ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων, µεταδιδοὺς ἑκάστῳ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰδίου τὸ εἶναι, ὅπερ ἐστίν, 
ἐλαττόνως δὲ παρὰ τὸν πατέρα ὁ υἱὸς φθάνων ἐπὶ µόνα τὰ λογικά (δεύτερος γάρ ἐστι τοῦ πατρός), ἔτι δὲ 
ἡττόνως τὸ πνεῦµα τὸ ἅγιον ἐπὶ µόνους τοὺς ἁγίους διϊκνούµενον· ὥστε κατὰ τοῦτο µείζων ἡ δύναµις τοῦ 
πατρὸς παρὰ τὸν υἱὸν καὶ τὸ πνεῦµα τὸ ἅγιον, πλείων δὲ ἡ τοῦ υἱοῦ παρὰ τὸ πνεῦµα τὸ ἅγιον, καὶ πάλιν 
διαφέρουσα µᾶλλον τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύµατος ἡ δύναµις παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα ἅγια. Primarily on the basis of this 
passage in On First Principles, Salvatore R.C. Lilla comes close indeed to suggesting that Plotinus and 
Origen are twin versions of a contemporary shift in thinking toward triadic hierarchies. He states generally 
that “Origen’s theology is deeply influenced both by Middle Platonism and by the hierarchical structure of 
the system of early Neoplatonism, reflected in the teaching of Ammonius and Plotinus.” See Salvator R.C. 
Lilla, “The Neoplatonic Hypostases and the Christian Trinity,” in Studies in Plato and the Platonic 
Tradition: Essays Presented to John Whittaker, ed. Mark Joyal (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1997), 127-190, 
at 128. We do not possess Ammonius’s writings, so it is hard to know how Lilla can claim to have access to 
Ammonius’s doctrine. We do have the work of Numenius, who influenced Plotinus, but it is unclear 
whether that is what Lilla means by “early Neoplatonism.” Origen died in 254 CE, a year after Plotinus is 
thought to have begun writing, in 253 CE. The date of 253 as the beginning of Plotinus’s literary career is 
based on Porphyry's most probably reliable claim that Plotinus had been writing since the first year of 
Gallienus, in Vit. Plot., 4. 
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The “power” of each member of the triad is “greater” than that which follows it. Note 
that Origen characterizes the Son as “second” to the Father, and implies, but does not 
state explicitly, that the Holy Spirit is “third.” It is debatable whether this parenthetical 
remark is original to the fragment. A key difference suggests that the Holy Spirit’s 
inclusion as “third” represents a Justinian gloss. Nevertheless, it does bear out Origen’s 
grammar of participation in Jo. Note, too, that Origen’s conclusion at the end of this 
fragment—“the power of the Holy Spirit exceeds that of every other holy being”—fits 
with his statement in Jo. 2.75 that the Holy Spirit is “first” in the “order” (τάξις) of 
created entities. Origen does not invoke the term τάξις here, but he is nevertheless 
describing an “ordering” of the Trinity.53 The Father, the Son, and Holy Spirit operate in 
increasingly specific spheres of ontological consequence: the Father causes existence, the 
Son causes rationality, and the Holy Spirit causes holiness. This arrangement indicates 
that all things which exist are created by the Father and participate in the Father insofar as 
they exist; that all things that exist as rational are caused by the Son and participate in the 
Logos’ rationality; and that all rational entities which are or are becoming holy participate 
in the Holy Spirit’s holiness. Creatures participate in the Father, the Son and the Holy 
Spirit as sources that impart proper characteristics as distinct causes.54 This is the same 
                                               
53 See Michel Barnes’ comparison of Origen’s taxis to Tertullian’s gradus in the contest against 
monarchianism in Barnes, “The Beginning and End of Early Christian Pneumatology,” Augustinian Studies 
39:2 (2008): 169-86, especially 184-86. As Koetschau notes by way of justification for his inclusion of this 
fragment, Origen elsewhere confirms the arrangement outlined here: see Cels. VI.29 and especially 
VIII.15, where Origen, invoking John 14:28, states that “It is obvious that we, who maintain that even the 
sensible world is made by the Creator of all things, hold that the Son is not mighter than the Father, but 
subordinate” (Chadwick, trans.). Origen’s statements in Jo. 2 to similar effect tell against using the 
apologetic context of Cels. to mitigate the consequences of his riposte to Celsus regarding his trinitarian 
doctrine. 
54 Henri Crouzel argues at length that Origen’s “subordinationism” is merely apparent, and that 
Origen’s trinitarian thought is problem-free in its essentials (see Henri Crouzel, Origen, A.S. Worrall trans., 
[San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1989] “Trinity and Incarnation,” 181-204, especially at 188). He 
apologizes for On First Principles 1.3.4-8 (191) by arguing that in suggesting that Origen taught a 
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graded causal hierarchy of Jo. 2, with one difference. Here, the Holy Spirit appears to be 
ranked “third,” whereas in Jo. 2.75-76, the Holy Spirit is ranked not third but first of the 
creatures. The discrepency is, however, not reason to doubt the authenticity of this 
fragment, since Origen does not say explicitly that the Holy Spirit is “third,” but that the 
Holy Spirit’s power is greater than that of all those entities it produces. The implication 
that the Holy Spirit is “third” in rank is an implication which Justinian deduced from 
Origen, but which Origen did not originally state so clearly. On the other hand, there are 
statements by Origen himself of a Holy “triad.” 
 Unfortunately, the evidence is such that not even a scholar as well-informed as 
John Dillon can pinpoint Origen’s source in Platonic school tradition for the doctrine that 
the first three hypostases extend their activities in concentric circles. Dillon concludes 
that there is no evidence for the doctrine traceable to Eudorus of Alexandria to the effect 
that “God is the creator even of matter, while the power of the Demiurge extends to all 
                                                                                                                                            
hierarchy of power in the Trinity, “Jerome, followed by Justinian, projected conclusions onto [this passage] 
which were personal to them and which Origen did not draw.” However, if the fragments represent 
paraphrastic interpolation and not quotations of Origen, it is not difficult to see how Jerome and Justinian 
could have come to their conclusions, given Origen’s remarks in Jo. 2.12-18, a text Crouzel admits poses 
difficulties (Crouzel, 181). Though we should not hold Origen to anachronistic standards, it is going too far 
to suggest that his trinitarian scheme was free of hierarchical consequences. Though Crouzel is not wrong 
to stress the fact that Origen’s trinitarian theology is expressed in pre-Nicene terms, his insinuation that the 
discerning reader had no reason to take issue with its terms of expression is an overstatement. In so 
overstating his case, Crouzel obscures the anti-monarchian context of Origen’s trinitarian scheme, 
inadvertently robbing it of its genius and originality. Had Origen not developed the participatory grammar 
he did, his monarchian opponents might have carried the day. Another problematic text for a reading like 
Crouzel’s is the arrangment in On Prayer 15.4. There Origen paraphrases Jesus’s statement that “no one is 
good but God the Father alone” by offering a liturgical argument. He says that Jesus means by this 
statement that we should pray to the Father through the Son and the Holy Spirit. In Origen’s paraphrase, 
the Son means: “You should pray only to the Father, to whom I [i.e., the Son] pray myself. . . . For you 
must not pray to the High Priest appointed on your behalf by the Father or to the Advocate who is charged 
by the Father with praying for you. Rather you must pray through the High Priest and the Advocate. . . . It 
is not reasonable for those who are deemed worthy of one and the same Father to pray to a brother. You 
must pray only to the Father with me and through me.” See Rowan Greer, trans., Origen (New Jersey, 
Paulist Press, 1979), 114. 
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that which is endowed with Form . . . ; the Soul would then extend to all that had all.”55 
Nevertheless, he remains “convinced . . . that Origen’s theory and Proclus’ theory are 
applications of the same doctrine, and that this doctrine was not invented by Origen.”56 
Elsewhere, Dillon mentions the Pseudo-Platonic Second Epistle as an influence on 
Numenius, and we have already seen that this passage was exploited by early Christians 
such as Justin and Clement. Dillon sees Origen as having drawn indirectly from this 
Platonic tradition of three successive entities.57 The Pseudo-Platonic Second Epistle 
(312e) speaks of three successive political entities ruling over three respective groups: “It 
is in relation to the king of all and on his account that everything exists. . . . In relation to 
a second, the second class of things exists, and in relation to a third, the third class.”58 
The relatively open-ended nature of this formula provides a pregnant precedent for later 
Platonist speculation to fill out the scheme. Though it does not specify the nature of the 
“classes” that belong to each successive entity, it provides the sort of precedent that 
confirms that Origen’s doctrine was most probably not his own creation, but an 
adaptation of a Platonic doctrine as Dillon suggests. In arranging his trinity as a taxis, 
Origen followed Clement’s precedent. Clement had used the Second Epistle to support 
his adherence to just the sort of threefold taxis as the one Origen describes.59 
                                               
55 John Dillon, “Origen’s Doctrine of the Trinity and Some Later Neoplatonic Theories,” in 
Neoplatonism and Christian Thought, ed. D.J. O’Meara (Albany, NY: International Society for 
Neoplatonic Studies/State University of New York Press, 1981), 19-23, at 22. 
56 Ibid., 23. 
57 John Dillon, “Logos and Trinity: Patterns of Platonist Influence on Early Christianity,” in John 
Dillon, The Great Tradition: Further Studies in the Development of Platonism and Early Christianity 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), 6. 
58 περὶ τὸν πάντων βασιλέα πάντ’ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα πάντα, καὶ ἐκεῖνο αἴτιον 
ἁπάντων τῶν καλῶν· δεύτερον δὲ πέρι τὰ δεύτερα, καὶ τρίτον πέρι τὰ τρίτα. Burnet, ed.; Glenn Morrow, 
trans., Plato: Complete Works, ed. John Cooper (Indianapolis: Hacket, 1997), 1638. Cf. Plotinus VI.7.42.3-
10; D. O’Meara, “The hierarchical ordering of reality,” 80n21; and Lloyd Gerson discusses this passage in 
later interpretation of the Parmenides. See Lloyd Gerson, “The ‘Neoplatonic’ Interpretation of Plato’s 
Parmenides,” The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition (forthcoming). 
59 See above, Ch. 1. 
 137 
The Question of Contradictory Hierarchies 
 
 
 
Another question arises. Some scholars have seen in On First principles 1.3.4-8 
two contradictory “hierarchies” of the Trinity.60 Origen seems to teach that the Trinity 
could be arranged according to the breadth of entities that derive from each trinitarian 
person in a doctrine of “appropriations” (so, Father: all existents; Son: all rational 
existents; and Holy Spirit: all holy, rational existents), or that it could be arranged 
according to the quality of the entities so appropriated, with the result that the trinity is 
inverted in terms of importance. This “inverted” trinity would result from the fact that the 
Holy Spirit, as the sole means of access to the Son and the Father, is of chief importance. 
So Origen teaches a trinity with the Holy Spirit at the “top.”  
However, Origen explicitly denies the view that the Holy Spirit should be 
considered greater than the Son. Balas’s interpretation of this text operates on the 
assumption that Origen anticipates a misunderstanding of his own teaching, but that is not 
so. Instead, he is rejecting an actual Jewish-Christian theology of the Holy Spirit that 
placed the Holy Spirit “over” the Son.61  We need not worry, then, that Origen here 
espouses two conflicting models. He espouses only one: an ordered chain of causes from 
Father down to Holy Spirit. That the Holy Spirit is the primary means of access to the 
Son and the Father is only a logical consequence that follows from one’s perspective. For 
any sanctified rational entity, the Holy Spirit is the point of entry to the higher principles 
                                               
60 Crouzel claims that Origen was afraid that the section on the Trinity in Princ. I.III.5-I.IV.2 
“would comprise an inverse hierarchy based on the nobility of the respective functions” (Crouzel, 191). 
Balàs likewise infers from Origen’s entertainment of hyperpneumatology that it was a perceived 
consequence of his own doctrine (Balàs, 264). 
61 Barnes, “The Beginning and End of Early Christian Pneumatology”: 180-84. 
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in the hierarchy. Balas implies that this move restricts Logos to the saints alone. However, 
Origen states explicitly that Logos is not limited to the saints.  
If we take into account that Origen does not see tension between limiting the Holy 
Spirit to the “saints” and universal access to the Logos, Balas’s appeal to a distinction 
between a distinction between the “supernatural” and “natural” orders in Origen 
evaporates. Origen thinks that God the Father is accessible to all rational entities through 
the Logos, but that only certain entities are provided the help of the Holy Spirit. The Holy 
Spirit is a particular and, perhaps, the prefered means of access to the Logos, but it is not 
the only means of access to the Logos. Origen can speak of pagan wisdom without 
worrying too much about whether tha pagans have any access to the Logos. Indeed, they 
do.62 Origen is an unreconstructed rationalist who has not entertained the sorts of 
problems an Augustine would face regarding the fallibility of reason. To read him as 
having a distinction between the “supernatural” and “natural” orders is to offer an 
anachronistic, if ingenious, reconstruction of Origen’s position. 
 
The Omnipresence of the Logos 
 
 
 
 In On First Principles, Book IV, Origen recapitulates his doctrine and takes up 
problems not yet resolved.63 Origen writes, in Rufinus’s version: “It is now time for us, 
after having dealt to the best of our ability with the matters previously discussed, to 
summarise the particular points, with the object of gathering together what we have said 
in scattered references, and first of all to repeat our teaching concerning the Father, the 
                                               
62 See, for example, Jo. 2.30. 
63 Princ. 4.4.1-2.  
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Son, and the Holy Spirit.”64 After some discussion of the Son’s eternal, immaterial 
generation and the Word’s omnipresence to the saints, Origen pivots with this transitional 
sentence: “Having therefore briefly repeated these points concerning the doctrine of the 
Trinity. . . .”65 The promised statement regarding the Holy Spirit never appears. 
Indeed, Origen has a fine opportunity to name the Holy Spirit when he describes 
the means by which Christ is omnipresent to creatures in the process of sanctification. In 
Princ. 4.4.2, Origen anticipates an objection that the Word’s indwelling of Peter or John 
would circumscribe the Word in place: 
But if anyone should maintain that through those who receive a share of God’s 
Word, or of his Wisdom or truth or life, the Word himself and the wisdom appear 
to exist in a place, we must answer him by saying that undoubtedly Christ, in his 
character of Word and Wisdom and all the rest, was in Paul, according to Paul’s 
own statement. . . . Since then he was in Paul, who will doubt that he was 
similarly in Peter and in John and in every one of the saints, and not only in those 
on earth, but also those in heaven? For it is absurd to say that Christ was in Peter 
and Paul, but that he was not in Michael the archangel and in Gabriel.66 
 
Origen concludes that the divinity of the Son cannot be thought of as “contained in any 
place” (divinitas filii dei non in loco aliquo concludebatur), and that “in virtue of the 
majesty of its incorporeal nature, [the divinity of the Son of God] is confined to no place, 
in no place, on the other hand, can we think of it as being absent.”67 The Son is present to 
all individuals, but not to all to the same degree. Origen says nothing here about the 
agency of the Holy Spirit in rendering the Son present to such individuals. Indeed, one 
wonders whether the Holy Spirit himself, as an angel, is not subject to the Son’s presence 
                                               
64 Princ. 4.4.1. 
65 Princ. 4.4.3. 
66 Princ. 4.4.2; Butterworth trans., 316. Didymus worries in similar fashion, but his worry 
concerns the Holy Spirit’s ability to be omnipresent, not Christ’s (see Spir. 21-23). Origen solves the 
problem by making Christ’s divinity the omnipresence required of God for sanctification (Spir. IV.4.4). 
Here is a trace, at least, of Origen’s pneumatology: the divine agency we might expect to find attributed to 
the Spirit is instead ascribed to the divinity of the Son. The sole mention of the Holy Spirit, late in the 
chapter, does not save Origen even if it is not the result of Rufinus’s tampering. 
67 Butterworth trans., 316. 
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in a way similar to all the other angels and rational creatures since, as Origen says, “he 
needs him to minister to his hypostasis.”68 Origen is not inclined to provide the Spirit 
with such agency primarily because the Spirit is itself in need of such agency. As Origen 
says in Jo. 2.76, “the Spirit stands in need of the Son ministering to his hypostasis.” 
Christ himself was in Peter and Paul. But how did Christ come to be in Peter and Paul? 
Origen does not say what someone like Didymus might, namely, that Christ’s presence is 
rendered possible by the Holy Spirit, who “creates Christ’s body” in Mary’s womb. 
Origen’s failure to ascribe agency to the Holy Spirit in this instance confirms that his 
hierarchical trinity has generated a pneumatology sufficiently “low” that it invites an 
exclusion of the Holy Spirit from God’s dealings with creation.  Though Origen’s 
silence should not be held against him, the chance to provide the Holy Spirit with agency 
in the process of transformation is worth noting, if for no other reason than the exegetical 
absence Origen left behind. In the final analysis, the closest analog for Origen’s Christian 
trinity is the doctrine ascribed to Numenius by Proclus, in his Commentary on Timaeus. 
Numenius teaches three “gods”: a first, the Father, a second, the maker, and a third, the 
thing made. This “third God,” Proclus explains, is also the Cosmos. Origen’s trinity is the 
Father, whose Son is the principle of creation and an agent of creation, but nevertheless a 
second derivative figure who “participates” in the Father.69 There is no easy identification 
of the Holy Spirit with the Cosmos in Origen. However, Origen does teach an elaborate 
cosmos of rational creatures, and the chief of these appears to be the Holy Spirit. So even 
if the Holy Spirit is not reducible to the spiritual Cosmos or Platonic World-Soul, the 
Holy Spirit is to be identified as its most important leader and representative before the 
                                               
68 Jo. 2.76. 
69 Cf. Numenius fr. 20, ed Des Places. 
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Father and the Son. The Spirit is the one who worships God the Father most perfectly 
through the Logos. The Holy Spirit takes on the appearance of the most holy Archangel 
of all. 
 
The Question of Development 
 
 
 
So far, I have limited my discussion of Origen’s theology to his early period as 
represented by texts drawn from the Commentary on John’s first two books and what can 
be discerned of the first two books of On First Principles. I have not opened the question 
whether Origen may or may not have developed his thought on this issue in later works. 
The little evidence one can summon as evidence of a shift comes from spurious 
fragments on the Apocalypse and the Psalms; such material is just as likely an 
interpolation influenced by later orthodoxy as a late shift in Origen’s thought.70 Not only 
does the later Against Celsus not distance itself from earlier views that “subordinate” the 
Holy Spirit, but it provides a more extreme version of the same view.  Two passages, one 
from Against Celsus and one from the Commentary, suffice to show that the same basic 
model remained for the course of Origen’s career. In Against Celsus 8.15, Origen 
reproduce the trinitarian hierarchy alleged of Origen by Jerome and Justinian:  
It is obvious that we, who maintain that even the sensible world is made by the 
Creator of all things, hold that the Son is not mightier than the Father, but 
                                               
70 Cf. Williams, Arius, 142-3 and Beeley, Unity of Christ, 26. Beeley sterilizes this issue in 
Origen’s thought, depends upon Williams’ precedent for the use of these two fragments from the catenae 
(C. Beeley, The Unity of Christ, (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2012), 26). However, Beeley 
does not follow Williams in treating these fragments as only potentially reliable.  Instead,  Beeley insists 
that, on the basis of these two remarks, he is justified in drawing the following interpretive conclusion: “nor 
does the language of participation . . . signal any lessening of divinity in the Son merely because Origen 
also uses it to refer to the relationship between the saints and God.”  Had Origen himself offered such a 
disclaimer, Beeley’s interpretation might convince, but—apart from these spurious remarks—Origen 
cannot be found making such an explicit clarification in his undisputed writings. 
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subordinate. And we say this because we believe him who said, “The Father who 
sent me is greater than I” (Jn. 14:28).71 
 
The reference to the Son’s being “less than” the Father is clear enough here. Again, in 
Against Celsus 5.39, Origen confirms that the Son is the perfect “participant” in the 
Father. He is worried that his opponents will construe his belief in a “second god” as 
implying polytheism: 
Therefore, though we may call him a second God, it should be understood by this 
that we do not mean anything except the virtue which includes all virtues, and the 
Logos which includes every logos whatsoever of the beings which have been 
made according to Nature, both those which are primary and those that exist for 
the benefit of the whole. We say that this Logos dwelt in the soul of Jesus and was 
united with it in a closer union than that of any other soul, because he alone has 
been able perfectly to receive the highest participation in him who is the very 
Logos and the very Wisdom, and the very Righteousness.72  
 
Note that the soul of Jesus is the perfect participant in the αὐτολόγος. The scheme retains 
the hierarchy Origen finds in the opening lines of the Gospel of John. The Father alone is 
αὐτόθεος, and the second person alone is αὐτολόγος and αὐτοσοφία. Another example 
occurs in a later section from the Commentary on John.73 Origen interprets John 14:28 
(“The Father who sent me is greater than I”) as indicating that  
the Father exceeds the Savior as much (or even more) as the Savior himself and 
the Holy Spirit exceed the rest.  And by ‘the rest’ I do not mean ordinary beings, 
for how great is the praise ascribed to him who transcends thrones, dominions, 
principalities, powers, and every name that is named not only in this world but 
also in that which is to come?.... But although the Savior transcends in his 
                                               
71 Cels. 8.15. 
72 Cels. 5.39. About this passage Normal Russell writes: “If the Son is Logos, the Father is 
αὐτολόγος; if the Son is Wisdom, the Father is αὐτοσοφία.” Russell cites Cels. 5.39, but here Origen does 
not call the Father αὐτολόγος: he calls the second person the αὐτολόγος. Focusing on the sentence, “he 
alone has been able perfectly to receive the highest participation in him who is the αὐτολόγος,” Russell 
reads the subject of the verb to be the Logos, not the “soul of Jesus.” But to call the Father αὐτολόγος runs 
afoul of what Origen is careful to do in the Commentary on John 2.12-18—a text which Russell also cites 
here. There Origen constructs a clear seres of principles that cause respective qualities: the Father creates 
all things and imparts divinity, from which arises the Logos, who in turn causes all rational qualities, from 
which arises the Holy Spirit, who in turn causes all holiness. The Origen of the Commentary would not 
apply the term αὐτολόγος to the Father except as a byproduct of the fact that the Father is perfectly what all 
of his products are. But the second person is αὐτολόγος. 
73 Jo. 13.151-152. 
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essence, rank, power, divinity (for the Word is living), and wisdom, beings that 
are so great and of such antiquity, nevertheless, he is not comparable with the 
Father in any way. For he is an image of the goodness and brightness, not of God, 
but of God’s glory and of his eternal light; and he is a vapor, not of the Father, but 
of his power; and he is a pure emanation of God’s almighty glory, and an 
unspotted mirror of his activity.74 
 
Origen emphasizes the “distance” between the Father who transcends the Son and the 
Son who transcends all those beings that participate in the Son. Origen’s use of 
participation earlier in Jo. tells against the possibility of explaining away Origen’s 
emphasis on the Son’s inferiority to the Father in this passage. The Holy Spirit appears 
again as the highest angel, the archangel of all archangels, thrones, powers, and so on, in 
a grand angelic hierarchy. The Son, from whom the Holy Spirit receives all that he is, 
transcends him, and he, in turn, is transcended by God the Father to an unfathomable 
degree. 
 There are more examples that Origen continues to hold to a grammar of intra-
trinitarian participation in later works. These suffice to demonstrate that he does not 
abandon the basic principles at work in his earlier anti-monarchian model of the trinity. 
 
Excursus: Reading οὐσιωδῶς/substantialiter in On First Principles 
 
 
 
Now we come to Origen’s use of a vague but important philosophical term: 
οὐσιωδῶς. The anti-monarchian valence of this term has been demonstrated in the 
previous chapter. In Princ. 1.5.3, Origen opposes the way that goodness resides in all 
created powers and how it resides in the Trinity. In the powers, goodness is not 
substantial: non substantiale sit in ipsis bonum. He then states that “essential goodness is 
                                               
74 Jo. 13.151-153; Heine, trans., 100. Origen’s invocation of John 14:28 is in keeping with his use 
of the verse in Cels. VIII.15. 
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found, as we have plainly shown, solely in Christ and the Holy Spirit, and of course the 
Father also.”75 The Trinity does not possess goodness accidentally. 
In discussing the departure of rational entities from an original contemplation of 
goodness (Princ. 1.6.2), Origen distinguishes between “all those beings who started from 
one beginning but were drawn in various directions by their own individual impulses and 
were distributed throughout the different ranks of existence in accordance with their 
merit,” on the one hand, and “God and his Christ . . . [and] the Holy Spirit,” in whom 
goodness resides “essentially” (substantialiter).  
. . . all those beings who started from one beginning but were drawn in various 
directions by their own individual impulses and were distributed throughout the 
different ranks of existence in accordance with their merit; for in them goodness 
does not reside essentially, as it does in God and his Christ and in the Holy Spirit. 
For only in this Trinity, which is the source of all things, does goodness reside 
essentially. Others possess it as an accident, liable to be lost, and only then do 
they live in blessedness, when they participate in holiness and wisdom and in the 
divine nature itself.76 
 
Among those who fell, Origen explains, goodness is possessed accidentally (accidentem . 
. . ac decidentem habent). “For only in this Trinity, which is the source of all things, does 
goodness reside essentially.” All “others” possess goodness “as an accident, liable to be 
lost, and they only live in blessedness when they participate in holiness and wisdom and 
in the divine nature itself.”77   
The Greek for these passages is lost. We should notice that Origen uses the 
adverbial phrase “essentially” or “substantially” in two distinct senses. He uses the term 
                                               
75 Butterworth trans., 47; GCS : quod utique in solo Christo et in spiritu sancto evidenter 
ostendimus, sine dubio utique et in patre. Non enim trinitatis natura habere aliqueid conpositionis ostensa 
est, ut haec ei consequenter videantur accidere. 
76 Butterworth trans., 53; GCS page 80. …qui ab illo uno intio pro suis unusquisque motibus varie 
acti per diversos ordines pro merito dispensati sunt; non enim in his bonitas substantialiter inerat, sicut in 
deo et Christo eius et in spiritu sancto. In hac enim sola trinitate, quae est auctor omnium, bonitas 
substantialiter inest; ceteri vero accidentem eam ac decidentem habent, et tunc sunt in beatitudine, cum de 
sanctitate et sapientia ac de ipsa deitate participant. 
77 Butterworth trans., 53, modified. 
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not only to name the mode of possession of some attribute, but also to speak of the 
distinction of one entity from another. Origen uses “essentially” in the first sense—the 
distinction of possession of some attribute naturally or intrinsically—to distinguish the 
Trinity from all other entities. On the other hand, Origen uses “essentially” to distinguish 
entities one from another, such as the Son from the Father.  
Before we can adjudicate this Princ. 1.6.2, it is important to settle what Origen 
means when he uses the term “essentially” in application to the trinity. Origen applies the 
term “essentially” (οὐσιωδῶς) to the Son’s existence in four places.78 Of these, Origen’s 
remark in his Dialogue with Heraclides is most pertinent. He there refers to the Son’s 
possession of divinity “essentially.”79 In Dial. 5, Origen responds to the objection that he 
had “professed before the church [his] belief that at the resurrection the body which rose 
had been a corpse.” Origen is opposing the Son’s possession of divinity “essentially” to 
the Son’s possession of a body. In passing he confirms that he has “attributed deity to 
Jesus Christ essentially (οὐσιωδῶς).” What does this statement mean? 
 Origen’s use of οὐσιωδῶς in Dial. 5 derives from the Peripatetic tradition and is 
directly related to his anti-monarchian agenda.80 The term is well known as part of an 
Aristotelian distinction between something that is what it is “by definition” and 
                                               
78 In Cels. 6.44 Origen applies Aristotle’s distinction between the possession of a quality 
“essentially” as opposed to its possession “by accident” (e.g., Met.5.30.4 and 10.1.1)—in other words, 
participation “essentially” as opposed to “accidentally” pacé Stead, 52, who argues that Christian writers 
did not know this distinction developed by Porphyry and Alexander of Aphrodisias in met. 91.10; Porph. 
Isag. 176; 21.15; 22.9-10. See Jo. 2.124, where Origen applies the Aristotelian distinction to the difference 
between God and the rational creation; Jo. 6.188 states that the Son has an essential existence); exp. in 
Prov. 8.22 states that the Son as Wisdom exists essentially, and dial. 5 refers to the Son’s essential 
possession of divinity. See Crawford, 554, for discussion of these passages in the context of a trajectory 
running from Theodore of Heraclea to Cyril of Alexandria. 
79 dial. 5. οὐσιωδῶς οὕτω προσφέρων Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ τὴν θεότητα. 
80 The likelihood only increases if his teacher, Ammonius, was not the enigmatic Ammonius 
Saccas, the teacher of Plotinus, but a different Ammonius—a Peripatetic. For a compelling argument along 
those lines, see Mark Edwards, “Ammonius, Teacher of Origen” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 44.2 
(1993), 169-181. In any case, Origen’s having learned at the feet of a Platonist like Ammonius Saccas 
would not preclude his knowledge of Peripateticizing usage of terms as general as “essence.” 
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something that possesses a quality as a nonessential attribute, or accident. Simplicius 
reports that Xenocrates and Andronicus reduced Aristotle’s ten categories to two: that 
which is “by itself” (καθ' αὑτὸ) as opposed to that which is “relative” (τὸ πρός τι). Others 
made, he says, a similar divide between substance (οὐσίαν) and accident (συµβεβηκὸς).81 
If Simplicius’s account of the earlier tradition is reliable, the adverbial use of οὐσία 
(οὐσιωδῶς) could easily have stood for something that exists “according to itself” or “by 
itself.” Alexander of Aphrodisias confirms just that sort of application of an adverbial 
form of οὐσία. He glosses καθ' αὑτὸ with οὐσιωδῶς.82  
When an object’s character καθ' αὑτὸ is opposed to the qualities it possesses as 
“accidental,” the qualities an object possesses καθ' αὑτὸ cannot be taken away from the 
object except on pain of that object ceasing to be what it is. If we gloss Origen’s grammar 
of participation in Jo. 2.12-20 with these terms, God the Father is divine καθ' αὑτὸ. The 
Son derives his divinity from the Father and so is not divine καθ' αὑτὸ. The Son is wise, 
rational, and just καθ' αὑτὸ, and the Holy Spirit is holy καθ' αὑτὸ. So the graded series 
                                               
81 “The followers of Xenocrates and of Andronicus seem to include everything in [the opposition] 
‘by itself’ and ‘relative’, so that, according to them, so large a multitude of genera is superfluous. Others 
make the division into ‘substance’ and ‘accident’; these people too seem somehow to be saying the same 
thing as those just mentioned, who say that accidents are ‘relative’ as [being] always ‘of’ other things (τὰ 
συµβεβηκότα πρός τι λέγουσιν, ὡς ἄλλων ἀεὶ ὄντων), and that substance is by itself (τὴν οὐσίαν καθ' 
αὑτό)” (Simplicius in Cat. 63.21-29; Sorabji, trans., 63). Simplicius goes on to complain that both groups 
fail to include the universal and the particular in their two categories, and so fail to account for Aristotle’s 
scheme. ἄλλοι δὲ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον αἰτιῶνται τὴν περιττότητα. οἱ γὰρ περὶ Ξενοκράτη καὶ Ἀνδρόνικον 
πάντα τῷ καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ τῷ πρός τι περιλαµβάνειν δοκοῦσιν, ὥστε περιττὸν εἶναι κατ' αὐτοὺς τὸ τοσοῦτον 
τῶν γενῶν πλῆθος. ἄλλοι δὲ εἰς οὐσίαν καὶ συµβεβηκὸς διατέµνουσιν· καὶ οὗτοι δὲ ταὐτόν πως δοκοῦσι 
τοῖς προτέροις λέγειν τὰ συµβεβηκότα πρός τι λέγουσιν, ὡς ἄλλων ἀεὶ ὄντων, καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καθ' αὑτό. 
ῥητέον οὖν κοινῇ πρὸς ἀµφοτέρους, ὅτι τὴν εἰς ἐλάχιστα τοµὴν τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ζηλώσαντες ἀτελῶς 
αὐτῆς ἥψαντο, τὸ καθόλου καὶ τὸ µερικὸν παραλείποντες. καὶ µέντοι τὰ συµβεβηκότα πολλὰ ὄντα γένη 
ἀποστενοῦσιν εἰς ἓν τῶν συµβεβηκότων τὸ πρός τι (Simplicii in Aristotelis categorias commentarium, Ed. 
K. Kalbfleisch [Berlin: Reimer, 1907] Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 8, p. 63, lines 21-29). 
82 Alexander of Aphrodisias, in metaph. 471.21: ὥστε ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν εἰρηµένων φανερόν ἐστιν 
ὅτι τὸ τί ἦν εἶναί ἐστιν ὅσων ὁ λόγος ὁρισµός ἐστι, τουτέστιν ἐκ τῶν ὄντων ἐπ' ἐκείνων µόνων τὸ τί ἦν 
εἶναι λέγεται κυρίως τῶν οὐσιῶν, ὧν ὁ λόγος ὁρισµὸς ἤτοι ἀνάπτυξις καὶ ἀπαρίθµησίς ἐστι τῶν καθ' αὑτὸ 
καὶ οὐσιωδῶς ὑπαρχόντων αὐταῖς. Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis metaphysica commentaria, Ed. 
Hayduck, M (Berlin: Reimer, 1891). Philo (De decalogo 29-31) and Clement (Strom. 8.6) know Aristotle’s 
ten categories well enough, but he does not apply a scholastic reduction of the ten to two general categories 
of substance and accident. Clement’s understanding in Strom. 8.6 is comparable to that of Philo’s. 
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Origen articulates in Jo. 2.12-20 is a sequence of the reception of qualities that are καθ' 
αὑτὸ to each of the trinitarian persons in order. The Son receives from the Father what the 
Father has καθ' αὑτὸ, namely, divinity. The Holy Spirit, in turn, receives from the Son 
what the Son is καθ' αὑτὸ. All other rational creatures receive all of these qualities from 
God the Trinity.  
Recall that in Dial. 5, Origen states that the Son is divine “essentially.” If Origen 
is here drawing on the sense of οὐσιωδῶς that means a subject possesses its attributes 
from itself and not by derivation, his application of οὐσιωδῶς to the Son’s possession of 
divinity would contradict his statements in Jo. to the effect that the Son possesses divinity 
“by participation” in God the Father. On the other hand, such a statement would 
undermine the participatory scheme Origen had constructed to maintain an eternal 
distinction between the Father and Son in the face of monarchianism. How, then, should 
we read Origen’s statement in Dial. 5 that the Son is divine οὐσιωδῶς? Does his 
statement represent a shift in thinking that in Jo. 2? 
The first question to ask is whether Origen’s thought is “anti-monarchian” in the 
Dialogue with Heraclides. Origen’s anti-monarchian christology argues that there are two 
divine entities distinct one from the other, and that the second entity participates in the 
first. This model is still apparent in the exchange between in Origen and Heraclides at 
Dial. 124. To speak of an object καθ’ αὑτὸ is ambiguous in one very important way. Such 
reference may either indicate only that what we are talking about is its own entity, as 
distinct from other entities, or that the qualities it possesses belong to it intrinsically. 
Describing an object καθ’ αὑτὸ may also serve to indicate both facts at the same time. 
When Origen invokes the “substance” side of the Aristotelian pair of substance-accidence 
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with the term οὐσιωδῶς and says that the Son possesses divinity “essentially”, it could be 
that he is only recalling his attempt to underscore the Son’s own “existence” or “essence” 
or “power.” If that were so, he would be referring to his position, against the 
monarchians, that the Son is a divine entity distinct from the Father, not to be confused 
with the Father. The Son has his divinity “by himself” as a distinct divine entity. So the 
Son is divine “essentially” (οὐσιωδῶς). 
Jo. 2.69 bears out the alternative sense of οὐσιωδῶς as an anti-monarchian term.83 
Origen applies a version of the Aristoliean distinction to the Word. There he states that 
the Word exists both essentially (καθ’ αὑτὸν) as something distinct from God the Father 
and relative to (πρὸς) God the Father as something derivative from the Father. We are left 
to infer what Origen has already told us earlier in the Commentary—that the Word as Son 
is dependent upon God the Father for his divinity insofar as he participates in God the 
Father. So far, so good. The appropriation of the substance-accidence distinction shows 
that Origen could use Aristotle’s term for existence “by itself” to emphasize the Son as a 
distinct entity in his anti-monarchian mood. The Son is not divine “by himself” like the 
Father is. In fact, in Jo. 2.69, Origen uses the Aristotelian distinction to render the Son 
both distinct from and dependent upon the Father, just as his grammar of participation in 
Jo. 2.12-20 states explicitly. Origen knows a sense of “essentially” that signifies the 
existence of a distinct entity. At Jo. 1.152 Origen pairs οὐσιωµένον with κεχωρισµένον to 
argue for the Son’s distinct existence (ὑπόστασις). There is no reason to read Origen’s use 
                                               
83 Jo. 2.69, Heine trans. Ὅρα δὲ εἰ κατὰ τὸ δισσὸν ὀνοµάζεσθαι τὸ «ἐν ἀρχῇ» δυνατὸν ἡµᾶς 
µανθάνειν πράγµατα δύο· ἓν µὲν ὅτι «ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος», ὡς εἰ καθ' αὑτὸν ἦν καὶ µὴ πάντως πρός τινα· 
ἕτερον δὲ ὅτι “ἐν ἀρχῇ” “πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἦν.” Καὶ οἶµαι, ὅτι οὐ ψεῦδος εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι “ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν” 
καὶ “ἐν ἀρχῇ” “πρὸς τὸν θεὸν,” οὔτε “πρὸς τὸν θεὸν” µόνον τυγχάνων, ἐπεὶ καὶ “ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν,” οὔτε “ἐν 
ἀρχῇ” µόνον ὢν καὶ οὐχὶ “πρὸς τὸν θεὸν” ὢν, ἐπεὶ “Οὗτος ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν θεόν.” 
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of οὐσιωδῶς in Dial. 5 as departing from its use to distinguish the Son from the Father. 
Dial. 5, then, does not represent a significant shift in Origen’s christology. 
Now recall Rufinus’s presentation of Origen in On First Principles 1.6.2. There 
Origen appears to apply just the sort of Aristotelian use of οὐσιωδῶς that might save his 
model of the trinity from the consequences of his grammar of participation in Jo. 1-2. 
And though we cannot find Origen employing that distinction in application to the Son in 
his indisputable corpus, we do find Didymus applying this distinction in precisely this 
way in a number of places.84  
According to Didymus, goodness “exists essentially (οὐσιωδῶς) in God, in the 
Trinity. And it is by participation in the Trinity that human beings have the good and the 
just and virtue.”85 Didymus has to clarify a point about psychology that leads him to 
distinguish between the way human souls possess the good and the way the Son does. In 
passing he uses Aristotle’s distinction between a quality possessed intrinsically and one 
possessed accidentally. 
Not all things said indicate the underlying substances, but there are times when 
they indicate things attributed to them. The knowledge of God is attributed to a 
man. The man is not for this reason called “Knowledge,” but “knowing.” The 
attribute is not said univocally with regard to the thing to which it is attributed. 
But the Savior is called both “wise” and “Wisdom,” both “Knowledge” and 
“having knowledge,” both “Justice” and “just.” And I do not here mean as 
attribute and substance, but through the comparison of both of the terms the same 
thing is indicated. For if I say that the Savior is Justice, I mean not that he 
possesses it, nor that he has a just disposition (?), and if I say that he is just—“do 
not deny the Just”—I do not mean that he is such, but that he is Justice itself. It is 
                                               
84 I exclude for the time being analysis of the relatively high frequency of the term οὐσιωδῶς in 
De trinitate, whose Didymean authorship remains questionable. Though De trin. is influenced by Didymus 
if not original to him, it is not guaranteed to have been a text that could have influenced Rufinus. 
85 τινὲς δὲ πάλιν ἢ κατὰ ἄγνοιαν ἢ σοφιστικώτερον λέγουσιν ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ὅτι καὶ 
αὐτὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἔχει τὸ εἶναι. ψεῦδος δέ ἐστιν τοῦτο· ὑπάρχει γὰρ τῷ θεῷ οὐσιωδῶς, τῇ τριάδι. µετουσίᾳ δὲ 
τῆς τριάδος ἔχουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὴν ἀρετήν. κἂν αὐτοὶ οὖν ἀπόσχωνται, 
ἔστιν. ἐν τῷ θεῷ, ἀφ' ἧς ἔχουσιν αὐτοὶ τὸ σπουδαῖοι εἶναι, ὑπάρχει; Didymos der Blinde. 
Psalmenkommentar, pt. 2, ed. M. Gronewald, ed., PTA 4 (Bonn: Habelt, 1968), Codex page 77, lines 21-
25. 
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in this way that we speak of justice as an attribute in the case of God. I do not 
mean that God is just by participation in Justice, but that God establishes justice.86 
 
In Princ. 1.6.2, Rufinus translates Origen as saying that goodness does not reside in 
creatures “essentially in the way it does in God and his Christ and in the Holy Spirit.”87 In 
On the Holy Spirit 13, Didymus uses the same Latin term (substantialiter) to argue 
against characterizing the Holy Spirit as an angel. 
Moreover, that which is essentially good cannot be capable of participating in an 
external goodness, since it is what bestows goodness on other things. Therefore, it 
is clear that the Holy Spirit is distinct from not only corporeal but also incorporeal 
creatures because other substances receive this substance for their sanctification. 
Indeed, it is not only incapable of participation in a foreign sanctification, but, 
above all, it is the Bestower and Creator of sanctification.88 
 
In the case of Princ. 1.6.2, then, Rufinus appears to have emended an original, more 
nebulous statement to the effect that “goodness resides essentially in the source of all 
things.” Didymus’s influence on Rufinus in this conceptual matter would help to explain 
otherwise strange divergences between the trinity of two works written about the same 
period of time with similar polemical aims.89 
                                               
86 οὐ πάντα οὖν τὰ λεγόµενα τὰς ὑποκειµένας οὐσίας δηλοῖ, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ τὰ συµβεβηκότα 
αὐταῖς σηµαίνει. συµβέβηκεν δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ γιγνώσκειν θεόν. διὸ γνῶσις οὐ λέγεταί ποτε ὁ ἄνθρωπος, 
ἀλλὰ γιγνώσκων. οὐχ ὁµωνυµεῖ ὧδε τὸ συµβεβηκὸς τῷ ὑποκειµένῳ. ὁ δὲ σωτὴρ λέγεται καὶ σοφὸς καὶ 
σοφία, καὶ γνῶσις καὶ γνῶσιν ἔχων, καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ δίκαιος, καὶ οὐ λέγω ὧδε συµβεβηκὸς καὶ 
ὑποκείµενον, ἀλλ' ἐκ παραλλήλου διὰ δύο ὀνοµάτων τὸ αὐτὸ σηµαίνεται· ἐὰν γὰρ λέγω ὅτι ὁ σωτὴρ 
δικαιοσύνη ἐστίν, οὐχ ἕξιν αὐτὸν λέγω, οὐ διάθεσιν, καὶ ἐὰν λέγω αὐτὸν δίκαιον – ”ὑµεῖς δὲ τὸν δίκαιον 
ἠρνήσασθε” – , οὐ τὸν ποιὸν λέγω, ἀλλὰ τὴν δικαιοσύνην. δίκαιον οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ καθόλου 
λέγοµεν. οὐ λέγω τὸν θεὸν δίκαιον εἶναι τῷ µετέχειν δικαιοσύνης, ἀλλὰ τῷ χορηγεῖν δικαιοσύνην; 
Didymos der Blinde. Psalmenkommentar, pt. 1, ed. Doutreleau, L., Gesché, A., Gronewald, M. Bonn: 
Habelt, 1969; Papyrologische Texte und Abhandlungen 7, pp. 202-217. Codex page 53, lines 8-16. 
87 non enim in his bonitas substantialiter inerat, sicut in deo et Christo eius et in spiritu sancto. 
GCS, 80. 
88 DelCogliano, et al. trans., 147. Quod autem substantialiter bonum est non potest extraneae 
capax esse bonitatis, cum ipsum tribuat ceteris bonitatem. Igitur manifestrum est non a corporalibus solum, 
sed et ab incorporalibus creaturis extraneum esse Spiritum Sanctum, quia ceterae substantiae hanc 
substantiam sanctificationis accipiunt; iste uero non tantum non est capax sanctificationius alienae, sed 
insuper attributor est et creator. 
89 Ronald Heine discusses the authenticity of Fragment 2 in the scholia collected by Preuschen and 
spurioiusly attributed to Origen (see Preuschen, ed., 485.24-486.26). Heine argues that “one would hardly 
want to say that this fragment is Origen. Perhaps one might say it is Origenist.” I would go further and 
suggest we may safely infer that it is indeed Origenist, and that it is Didymean. See Ronald E. Heine, “Can 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
Given the reading presented in the first part of this dissertation, Origen used the 
conceptual tools at his disposal, drawn from Platonism, to oppose a live threat to 
doctrinal “orthodoxy” in his own day: monarchianism. Origen’s modern defenders may 
wish to downplay the consequences of the metaphysics of participation in Origen’s more 
extreme statements in his early thought, but the cost will be an account of Origen’s 
contemporary “orthodoxy” in the face of monarchian theology. In that case, the gain of a 
“proto-Nicene” Origen yields the loss of an Origen who contributed to the live debate of 
his own era. 
My focus on the dynamics of participation in Origen’s trinity should not be 
mistaken for an attempt to hold him accountable according to anachronistic standards. I 
hoped to limn the provocative nature of a dynamic deeply and intentionally ingrained in 
Origen’s thinking about God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. During his early period 
                                                                                                                                            
the Catena Fragments of Origen’s Commentary on John Be Trusted?” Vigiliae Christianae 40 (1986), 118-
134, esp. 127-128. Consider Didymus’s similar remarks about the Son in his Lectures on the Psalms, in L. 
Doutreleau, A. Gesché, M. Gronewald, eds., Didymos der Blinde, Psalmenkommentar, Pt. 1, Patristische 
Texte und Abhandlungen 7 (Bonn, Habelt, 1969), Codex 2, Lines 2–13: ὁ σωτὴρ καὶ κύριος ἡµῶν θεὸς ἅµα 
καὶ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν· θεὸς µὲν ἀεί, οὐκ ἀεὶ δὲ ἄνθρωπος· πρὸ γὰρ τῆς κτίσεως θεὸς ἦν, ἄνθρωπος δὲ οὐχί. 
ἔµελλεν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὑφίστασθαι σωτηρίας ἕνεκα.  καὶ τὸ µὲν ἄνθρωπος γενέσθαι διά τι ἔχει, τὸ δὲ θεὸς 
εἶναι οὐ διά τι, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ὕπαρξιν καὶ τὴν τοῦ γεννήµατος οὐσίαν· οὕτω γὰρ ἤκουσα τοῦ· “ζῶ 
διὰ τὸν πατέρα” µου. οὐ τοῦτο λέγει, ὅτι ὁ πατὴρ ζωοποιεῖ µε, ὡς βούλονται οἱ Εὐνοµιανοί, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο 
λέγει, ὡς εἰ λέγοι τις· “διὰ τοῦτο λογικός εἰµι, ὅτι λογικὸν ἔχω πατέρα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο θνητός εἰµι, ὅτι 
θνητὸν ἔχω πατέρα”. καὶ ἀληθές γε· τὸ ”ὅτι” ἐστὶν ἀποδεικτικὴ αἰτία. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ζῇ διὰ τὸν πατέρα, ἐστὶν 
λεγόµενος ζωὴ οὐ παρονοµαζόµενος ἀπὸ ζωῆς, ἀλλ' ὡς πηγὴ ζωῆς καὶ ὡς µεταδιδοὺς παντί· λέγοµεν γὰρ 
τὸν ζῶντα ζωὴν ἔχειν, λέγοµεν δὲ καὶ τὴν ζωὴν τὴν οὐ παρονοµαζοµένην ἀπὸ ζωῆς· οὐ γὰρ µετέχει ζωή, 
ἀλλὰ αὐτή ἐστιν ἡ ζωή. οὕτως οὖν ζῇ διὰ τὸν πατέρα. My translation of the first half of this quotation is as 
follows: “Our Savior and Lord is simultaneously God and human; he is always God, but not always human.  
For before the creation he was God, but he was not yet human. But he was about to take this (humanity) on 
for our salvation. And the human part he was able to become ‘on account of something,’ but to be the 
divine part was not ‘on account of anything,’ but through his own existence and essence of being begotten.  
For it is in this way that you should hear the verse, ‘I live through my Father.’ He does not say that the 
Father ‘gives me life,’ as the Eunomians wished, but he says this, as if someone might say, ‘I am rational 
because I have a rational Father, and I am mortal because I have a mortal father.’ And true indeed: the 
‘because’ is a demonstrative cause.” 
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Origen’s grammar of participation served a twofold purpose: it was polemically useful 
and intellectually attractive. And yet, the ingenuity of Origen’s early trinitarian model 
contained the seeds of its undoing. Origen’s rendering of the Son and Holy Spirit as 
participants left the Son and the Holy Spirit divine agents which not only act but also 
participate. For this reason, Origen’s use of participation generates an important 
ambiguity at the heart of his trinitarian model.  
Origen does not distinguish between the kind of participation enacted by the Son 
or the Holy Spirit and that which other creatures, such as angels, must enact in order to be 
transformed into “gods.” His imprecision in this regard generates questions for discerning 
readers: if the Son is supposed to save us as only God can, and if, due to his participation 
in God the Father he lacks what we lack, namely, an internally self-generating source of 
divinity, how can he save us? If the trinity consists of the Holy Spirit, who participates in 
the Son, who in turn participates in the Father, who alone is the supreme self-productive 
source of divinity, how, in Origen’s terms, is the trinity not a graded series of causes? If 
the trinity is a graded series of causes, what are the consequences of such a doctrine of 
God for the emerging sense in Christian tradition that Christ—and later, the Holy Spirit—
is fully God? 
With Origen’s grammar of participation and the theological ambiguities it 
generates now in view, we may turn to the second part of this study, which focuses on 
Didymus the Blind’s reconstruction of Origen’s theology in light of a new, “pro-Nicene” 
perspective in Alexandria. 
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Chapter 5 
“I Will Pour Out My Spirit” 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 The next two chapters describe the ways that Didymus’s theology in On the Holy 
Spirit should be considered “pro-Nicene.” In order to show that Didymus teaches a “pro-
Nicene” theology, it is important first to define the term “pro-Nicene.” I adopt the 
definition proposed by Lewis Ayres. Ayres provides the following criteria for a broad set 
of “pro-Nicene” theologies: (1) “a clear version of the person and nature distinction . . .”; 
(2) “clear expression that the eternal generation of the Son occurs within the unitary and 
incomprehensible divine being;” (3) “clear expression of the doctrine that the persons 
work inseparably.”1 So defined, the term “pro-Nicene” describes Didymus’s theology 
because On the Holy Spirit offers an early version of these pro-Nicene instincts. 
Didymus’s axiom that all three of the trinitarian persons do not participate is a strong 
ground for a doctrine of the “eternal generation” of the Son and a doctrine that the 
persons work inseparably. In Chapter 6, we will see that Didymus argues for a distinction 
between the one power and nature of the Trinity, on the one hand, and the activities of the 
three that may be distinguished, on the other. In the second part of this study, then, I aim 
to show that Didymus crafts an early version of what would become hallmark features of 
later, pro-Nicene theologies.  
 I begin this chapter by pointing out the continuity between Origen and Didymus 
on the nature of participation. Then I present a brief history of the exegesis of John 16:14. 
                                               
1 Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 236. 
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The impact of this verse on pneumatology is tied to its use of a key term in Platonist 
philosophy: λαµβάνω. After placing this verse into its context as an anti-monarchian 
prooftext for distinguishing the Holy Spirit from the Son, I show how Didymus’s 
interpretation of this verse is a prime example of his “pro-Nicene” exegesis. In a way 
analogous to the generation of the Son’s taking place in the incomprehensible mystery of 
the Trinity, Didymus argues that we should interpret the Holy Spirit’s “reception” from 
the Son in light of the Spirit’s identity as a divine agent and source. Didymus bases this 
reading on the axiom that the Holy Spirit does not participate in any higher source, but is 
participated in by creatures. Based on his reading of John 16:14 and his argument that the 
Holy Spirit is a divine source that does not participate, Didymus opposed Eunomius’s 
claim that the Holy Spirit is “filled.” He does so by carefully attending to Scripture’s 
usage of terms for “pouring out” and “being filled”— terms dear, as we shall see, also to 
Plotinus.  
 
Beyond Origen and Monarchianism:  
Participation, Circumscription, and Omnipresence 
 
 
 
In scholarship, Jerome’s name is often associated with exaggeration—especially 
in scholarship concerning Origen or Origenism. However, Jerome did not exaggerate 
when he characterized Didymus as not given to rhetorical polish.2 Didymus’ On the Holy 
Spirit exudes no obvious structure. It barely evinces order at all, apart from abrupt 
divisions of a meandering exegetical discussion; it reads like a concatenation of 
                                               
2 Didymus, Spir., pref. See L. Doutreleau, ed., Didyme l’Aveugle Traité du Saint-Esprit (SC, 386) 
(Paris, Éditions du Cerf, 1992). 
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polemical exegesis strung together from notes.3 Probably the style results from the fact 
that Didymus presented his arguments to students in an exploratory lecture, proceeding 
wherever his mind took him.4 The argumentation is compressed, and repetition abounds. 
Themes, not textual sequence, must guide our consideration of On the Holy Spirit. We 
begin with the theme of the Holy Spirit’s “participation” in the Son and the question of 
whether the Holy Spirit is “circumscribed.” 
 Origen’s characterization of the Holy Spirit as both participated in “intellectually” 
and “circumscribed” could have been viewed as problematic. To be “circumscribed” 
could have implied spatial location—the very consequence Origen’s definition of 
participation sought to exclude. Origen’s use of terms for “circumscription” for the Son 
and Holy Spirit was developed in the face of monarchian theology, which reduced the 
activity of all three persons to the nature and activity of a single entity. In using terms for 
“circumscription” to refer to the Holy Spirit, the options could be limited to Origen’s low 
pneumatology and monarchian theology. 
 Didymus moves beyond these options. He appropriates Origen’s doctrine of 
intellectual participation in the Holy Spirit to come to the non-Origenian conclusion that 
the Holy Spirit is “uncircumscribed.” Didymus’s identificaiton of the Holy Spirit with the 
divine nature allows him to explain the Holy Spirit’s activity as “teacher,” in terms 
similar to both the Father and the Son, as an unparticipating source. Whearas for Origen 
the Holy Spirit had been a teacher who had “received” from the Son, it is clear from 
Didymus’s treatment that the Holy Spirit is an untutored teacher. 
                                               
3 For what little structure there is, the arrangement provided by the English translation of 
DelCogliano, Radde-Gallwitz, and Ayres, based on Doutreleau’s edition, has undoubtedly colored my 
understanding of the text. 
4 For more on the scholastic context of Didymus’s extant writings, see Richard Layton, Didymus 
the Blind and His Circle (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 13-35. 
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Origen: The Holy Spirit as Participated and Circumscribed 
 
 
 
 Origen uses the Platonic distinction between the incorporeal and the corporeal in a 
decisive way for his pneumatology. Recall that participation occurs without need for 
bodies; it is an intellectual causal mechanism.5 Origen worries that some might try to 
construe the fact that the Holy Spirit “dwells in” the saints alone as a kind of materialistic 
participation. If that were so, then the Spirit would be localized, found in some places but 
not in others.6 Prior Christians had associated the Holy Spirit’s activity with the Holy 
Spirit’s presence—and “presence” was not rendered in Platonic terms. Instead, the Holy 
Spirit could be present in a place—or not. As opposed to this, in the same way that an 
Idea causes beauty to exist in a sensible particular item that is beautiful, Origen says that 
the Holy Spirit causes holiness to be in the saint’s soul.  
 Origen points out that this view was accounted for and dismissed by Jesus himself 
in John 4:24:  
It was this belief of the woman, who thought that God would be worshipped 
rightly or wrongly by Jews in Jerusalem or by Samaritans in Mount Gerizim 
because of some special privilege attaching to the material places, that the Savior 
contradicts by saying that the man who desires to seek for God must abandon all 
idea of material places.7  
 
Origen next quotes Jesus’ statement that “the true worshippers shall worship the Father 
neither in Jerusalem nor in this mountain. God is spirit, and they that worship him must 
worship in spirit and in truth” (John 4:21, 23, 24).8 This he rejected by making recourse 
                                               
5 See above, Chapter 1. 
6 Origen states the limitation of the Holy Spirit’s presence to the “saints alone” later, in Princ. 
1.3.7: “the working of the power of God the Father and god the Son is spread indiscriminately over all 
created beings, but a share in the Holy Spirit is possessed, we find, by the saints alone (spiritus vero sancti 
participationem a sanctis tantummodo haberi).” 
7 See Origen, Princ. 1.1.4; Butterworth trans. 9. 
8 Ibid. 
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to Plato’s implication, in the Parmenides, that no such definition of participation is 
acceptable: 
Further, although many saints partake of (participant) the Holy Spirit, he is not on 
that account to be regarded as a kind of body, which is divided into material parts 
(partes corporales) and distributed to each of the saints; but rather as a 
sanctifying power (virtus . . . sanctificans), a share of which is said to be 
possessed (cuius participium habere) by all who have shown themselves worthy 
of being sanctified through his grace.9  
 
Following this statement, Origen clarifies his point with an illustration: 
There are many who share in the teaching and art of medicine; yet are we to 
suppose that all who share in medicine have some material substance called 
“medicine” placed before them from which they take away little particles and so 
obtain a share of it? Must we not rather understand that all who with ready and 
prepared minds gain a comprehension of the art and its teaching may be said to 
share in (participare) medicine? These illustrations from medicine must not be 
supposed to apply in every detail when compared with the Holy Spirit; they 
establish this point only, that a thing in which many have a share is not necessarily 
to be regarded as a body. The Holy Spirit is far different from the system or 
science of medicine, for the Holy Spirit is an intellectual existence (subsistentia 
est intellectualis), with a subsistence and being of its own (proprie substistit et 
extat), whereas medicine is nothing of the sort.10 
 
Origen applies a logic of participation to the relationship between the Holy Spirit and his 
“participants,” the Saints. The logic applies in the same way that a reader of Parmenides 
131a-c would have been tempted to construe the relationship between Ideas and sensible 
particulars. No material relationship is necessary to provide sensible particulars with 
access to the Ideas. In the same way, according to Origen, the relationship provided by 
                                               
9 Origen, Princ. 1.1.3. Sed et cum de spiritu sancto multi sancti participant, non utique corpus 
aliquod intellegi potest spiritus sanctus, quod divisum in partes corporals percipiat unusquisque 
sanctorum; sed virtus profecto sanctificans est, cuius participium habere dicuntur omnes, qui per eius 
gratiam sanctificari meruerint. 
10 Origen, Princ. 1.1.3. Multi sunt qui disciplinae sive artis medicinae participant, et numquid 
putandum est omnes eos, qui medicinae participant, corporis alicuius, quod medicina dicitur, in medio 
positi sibi auferre particulas et ita eius participium sumere? an potius intellegendum est quod quicumque 
promptis paratisque mentibus intellectum artis ipsius disciplinaeque percipiunt, hi medicinae participare 
dicantur? Sed haec non omnimodis similia exempla putanda sunt de medicina sancto spiritui comparata; 
sed ad hoc tantummodo conprobandum, quia non continuo corpus putandum est id, cuius participatio 
habetur a plurimis. Spiritus enim sanctus longe differt a medicinae ratione vel disciplina pro eo quod 
sanctus spiritus subsistentia est intellectualis et proprie subsistit et extat; nihil autem tale est medicina. 
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participation is intellectual, and the Holy Spirit’s existence as a cause is intellectual. So 
the Saints do not “share in” the Holy Spirit as a material entity. 
 The immateriality of the Holy Spirit suggests that the Holy Spirit is not bound by 
place. However, Origen did not foreclose the possibility that the Holy Spirit might be 
“circumscribed,” if the questions of circumscription and corporeality were distinguished. 
In fact, Origen’s doctrine of three distinct “hypostases” seemed to teach the Holy Spirit’s 
“circumscription.”11 In turn, the Holy Spirit’s “circumscription” could be used to return to 
the Holy Spirit a “localized” status. Origen’s anti-monarchian construal of the Holy Spirit 
as “circumscribed” thus left open the possibility of reading “circumscription” as location, 
and location in spatial terms. 
 
Didymus: The Holy Spirit is Participated because it is Uncircumscribed 
 
 
 
 In Spir. 21-23, Didymus argues that the Holy Spirit is “uncircumcribed by neither 
place nor substance. Invisible creatures, such as angels, he says, “are not circumscribed 
by place and limits (non circumscribantur loco et finibus inuisibiles creaturae),” but they 
are “limited by the distinctive feature of their substance” (tamen proprietate substantiae 
finiuntur). Didymus distinguishes between invisible creatures who are “circumscribed” 
not spatially but “by the distinctive feature of substance.” The Holy Spirit, on the other 
hand, “even though he is in many, does not have a circumscribed substance” (cum in 
pluribus sit, non habet substantiam circumscriptam).12 The Holy Spirit, in other words, 
                                               
11 See Jo. 2.75. 
12 Didymus is not facing the question of whether the Holy Spirit is localized, but what had become 
the more basic question: is the Holy Spirit an angel? However, he is dealing with an older tradition of 
“indwelling,” according to which the Spirit of God indwells places—and persons. 
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may have distinctive features, but those features do not “circumscribe” the Holy Spirit in 
place. 
Animating Jerome’s Latin translation of Didymus’s subsistens is likely a form of 
the verb ὑφίστηµι. Didymus is here probably referring to a teaching like Origen’s (e.g., 
Jo. 2.77), that the Holy Spirit’s hypostasis comprises the “goods given by the Lord.” 
Origen says that “the material of the gifts is made active/set in motion/operated by God, 
administered by Christ, and subsists in accordance with the Holy Spirit” (τῆς εἰρηµένης 
ὕλης τῶν χαρισµάτων ἐνεργουµένης µὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, διακονουµένης δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ 
Χριστοῦ, ὑφεστώσης δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦµα).13 Origen only uses the noun hypostasis 
in one place, two paragraphs prior to this sentence, at Commentary on John 2.75.14 Here 
he states that the “material of the gifts” is given hypostasis “according to” the Holy Spirit. 
If the term hypostasis means “material,” then it suggests that the Holy Spirit’s 
“hypostasis” is the material of the gifts conferred by Christ, because the phrase could 
mean that the Holy Spirit comprises the “gifts” as a single entity: the Holy Spirit 
“instantiates” the “matter” of the gifts. However we interpret the phrase ὑφεστώσης δὲ 
κατὰ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦµα, Origen’s formulation does not include the Holy Spirit as an agent 
that operates or makes active the gifts in the soul.  
Didymus agrees with Origen’s statement in the Commentary on John by saying 
that the Holy Spirit “exists in those goods which are conferred by the Lord” (ipse 
subsistens in his bonis quae a Domino largiuntur). However, Didymus uses the Origenian 
axiom that spiritual gifts “exist in accordance with the Holy Spirit” to reason in a 
                                               
13 Origen, Jo. 2.77 
14 The Latin given to him by Rufinus at Princ. 1.1.3 (see above: quod sanctus spiritus subsistentia 
est intellectualis et proprie subsistit et extat; nihil autem tale est medicina) would suggest that he used the 
term to describe the Holy Spirit in On First Principles. There is little reason to doubt Rufinus’s translation 
on this point, since “hypostasis” does not mean much more than “distinct existence” for Origen. 
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direction different from Origen. For the Holy Spirit’s “hypostasis” or subsistence, as 
Jerome’s Latin would have us say, does not merely represent the virtuous creatures who 
share in a more transcendent source of good gifts, as Didymus’s opponents have argued. 
“On the contrary, this substance (substatia = ὑπόστασις?) we are now discussing 
produces wisdom and sanctification. . . . The Holy Spirit . . . is the immutable sanctifier, 
the bestower of divine knowledge and all goods (scientiae diuinae et uniuersorum 
attributor bonorum).” Didymus qualifies Origen’s description of the Holy Spirit’s 
“hypostasis”: if it is true that the Holy Spirit is the aggregation of divine gifts, that 
aggretation is an agent and source of those gifts. The Holy Spirit is an agent and source 
transcended by no other, and is united with the Father and the Son. In order for Didymus 
to make his case along these lines, he will have to show that, in fact, Scripture depicts the 
Holy Spirit as the “produce[r] of wisdom and sanctification.” 
Didymus agrees with Origen that the Holy Spirit is a “third hypostasis” in which 
the saints participate immaterially. To this account he adds that the Holy Spirit is a divine 
agent in the same way that the Father and the Son are. In order to see how this is the case, 
we must first turn to a biblical passage which emphasizes the Holy Spirit’s “reception” 
from the Son and the Father: John 16:14. 
 
John 16:14: the Spirit’s Reception from the Son and Low Pneumatology 
 
 
 
John 16:14 occurs as one of a series of statements Jesus makes about himself, the 
Holy Spirit, and the relationship the Spirit has to both the Son and the Father. 
When the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you in all truth; for he will not speak 
on his own, but will speak whatever he hears, and he will declare to you the things 
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that are to come. He will glorify me, because he will take what is mine and 
declare it to you. All that the Father has is mine. For this reason I said that he will 
take what is mine and declare it to you.15 
 
The Holy Spirit mediates for us what the Father says to the Son. Because he plays the 
role of mediating what Jesus hears and says, “he will glorify [the Son] because he will 
take what is mine and declare it to you” (ἐκεῖνος ἐµὲ δοξάσει, ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐµοῦ λήµψεται 
καὶ ἀναγγελεῖ ὑµῖν). Jesus concludes with a statement that authorizes the Holy Spirit’s 
reception from the Son, since “all that the Father has is [the Son’s] (ὅσα ἔχει ὁ πατὴρ ἐµά 
ἐστιν).” Furthermore, the Holy Spirit’s angelic office is explicit: three times in this 
passage the Holy Spirit performs the function of a messenger, an ἄγγελος: ἀναγγελεῖ 
ὑµῖν.16 
John 16:14 could serve as the basis of an angelomorphic pneumatology that is 
“low” in the sense that it ranks the Holy Spirit as third in a vertical, hierarchical series. 
The ranking of “third” might be sufficiently “low” that the Spirit crosses over from 
classification with the Father and Son to classification with the angelic host. John 16:14 
uses two terms that would tempt ancient readers to characterize the Holy Spirit as an 
angel inferior to the Son. First, the Holy Spirit is said to receive from the Son and, as a 
result of that reception, to glorify the Son. This characterization implies that the Holy 
Spirit is more liturgical participant than object of glorification. Second, the Holy Spirit 
receives and hands on the sacred speech given from the Father to the Son. Each of these 
                                               
15 Jn. 16:13-15. ὅταν δὲ ἔλθῃ ἐκεῖνος, τὸ πνεῦµα τῆς ἀληθείας, ὁδηγήσει ὑµᾶς ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ 
πάσῃ· οὐ γὰρ λαλήσει ἀφ᾽ἑαυτοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ὅσα ἀκούσει λαλήσει καὶ τὰ ἐρχόµενα ἀναγγελεῖ ὑµῖν. ἐκεῖνος ἐµὲ 
δοξάσει, ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐµοῦ λήµψεται καὶ ἀναγγελεῖ ὑµῖν. Πάντα ὅσα ἔχει ὁ πατὴρ ἐµά ἐστιν· διὰ τοῦτο εἶπον 
ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐµοῦ λαµβάνει καὶ ἀναγγελεῖ ὑµῖν. 
16 Though Jesus’s statement that the Holy Spirit “will announce to you” is not a statement that “the 
Holy Spirit is an angel,” the function of delivering a revelation is associated with angelic figures, especially 
in apocalyptic literature.  So, for example, in Revelation 2-3, the seven churches are each assigned their 
own angels, or messengers, who carry John’s apocalypse to them. In Revelation 17:7-18, an angel explains 
to John his foregoing vision (John 17:1-6). We will return to this point momentarily. 
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characterizations of the Holy Spirit takes on a particular valence when contextualized 
within two broad influential streams of literature: apocalyptic and Middle Platonic. I take 
up the thread in apocalyptic literature first by turning to the angelomorphic pneumatology 
of the Ascension of Isaiah. 
The pneumatology of the Ascension is important not only because it represents a 
kind of angelomorphism that tempted early Christians, but also because it exhibits a 
tendency that would be exploited by anti-monarchian readings of John 16:14: a vertical 
ordering of the trinity. The Ascension’s ordering is “apocalyptic” in the sense that a series 
of figures passes a secret revelation down a chain. Isaiah receives the secret message 
from an angelic guide, third in a series.17 The angelus interpres, or “interpreting angel,” is 
a familiar trope in ancient Jewish and early Christian literature, and the Ascension 
exploits the hermeneutic function of the angel with an important twist: the angelic 
interpreter is no ordinary angel. The angel sent to Isaiah “was not of this firmament, nor 
was he from the angels of glory of this world, but he came from the seventh heaven.”18 
Isaiah emphasizes the distinction of this “glorious angel” from the rest of the angelic 
host: “His glory was not like the glory of the angels which I always used to see, but he 
had great glory, and an office, such that I cannot describe the glory of this angel” (7:2). 
Upon asking the guide to disclose his identity, Isaiah is refused (7:1-6). The angel tells 
                                               
17 For the critical text of the Ascension, see Paolo Bettiolo and Enrico Norelli, eds. Ascensio 
Isaiae, CCSA 7 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1995). For translation, see James Charlesworth, The Old Testament 
Pseudepigrapha (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1983). The date and provenance of the Ascension is 
nebulous. The portion of the text containing the narrative of Isaiah’s ascension may date as late as the 
fourth century CE, and perhaps as early as the first or second century. See Robert Hall, “The Ascension of 
Isaiah: Community Situation, Date, and Place in Early Christianity,” Journal of Biblical Literature 109.2 
(Summer 1990): 289–306. Hall argues that the final form of the text was achieved by the mid-second 
century. I refer to the Ascension not to imply its later influence, but to provide evidence of angelomorphism 
prior to anti-monarchian readings of John 16:14, and to show why those anti-monarchian readings could 
plausibly have been taken to imply angelomorphism. 
18 Asc. Is. 6:11-13. 
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him he may not learn who he is until he has “taken [him] up through (all) the stages and 
have shown [him] the vision on account of which [the angel] was sent.” Only then, he 
says, “you will understand who I am; but my name you will not know, for you have to 
return into this body” (7:4-5).  
 At this point the speaker reports his feeling overjoyed at his guide’s warmth 
toward his desire to proceed. The guide senses this feeling and asks, rhetorically,  
Do you rejoice because I have spoken kindly to you? . . . You will see one greater 
than me, how he will speak kindly and gently with you; and the Father of the one 
who is greater you will also see, because for this purpose I was sent from the 
seventh heaven, that I might make all this clear to you (ut notificem tibi omnia 
hec).19  
 
The speaker’s statement “that I might make all this clear to you” resembles the Holy 
Spirit’s angelic office in John 16:13-15. In his report is a hierarchy of intensifying 
kindness: God the Father is the one “greater than” (maiorem) the one promised to “speak 
kindly and gently” (humiliorem et sapientiorem) to the prophet. That figure, in turn, is 
Christ. This leaves one plausible interpretation of the angelic guide leading the prophet 
back to the seventh heaven. He is the Holy Spirit. 
 When the angelic guide whose description is beyond compare finally leads Isaiah 
up through the seven heavens, the guide’s identity becomes clearer. In the seventh 
heaven, Isaiah is advised to worship an archangel (9:33-36), one who “has spoken in 
you,” and is informed that this is the Angel of the Holy Spirit. That the Angel of the Holy 
                                               
19 Asc. Is. 7:7-8. I quote from the Latin version of the text; the Old Slavonic version notices the 
parallel to John 16:14 and makes it more obvious; the translator of the Old Slavonic text, Alda Giambelluca 
Kossova, renders it as “in order to teach you everything” (“per annunciare a te tutto questo”); in his 
synopsis, Enrico Norelli renders the Slavonic in Latin as “ut nuntiem tibi haec omnia” (see Asc. Is. CCSA 
7: 292 and 388, respectively). Perhaps the author has in mind both John 16:14 and John 14:26. John 14:26 
states that the Holy Spirit, or Paraclete “will teach you all things” (ὑµᾶς διδάξει πάντα). John 14:26: ὁ δὲ 
παράκλητος, τὸ πνεῦµα τὸ ἅγιον, ὃ πέµψει ὁ πατὴρ ἐν τῷ ὀνόµατί µου, ἐκεὶνος ὑµᾶς διδάξει πάντα καὶ 
ὑποµνήσει ὑµᾶς πάντα ἃ εἶπον ὑµῖν ἐγώ. 
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Spirit was the prophet’s guide all along is never made explicit but hangs in the air as the 
most reasonable conclusion.  
 The Ascension of Isaiah was not an isolated instance of speculation about the 
Holy Spirit’s angelic status. Earlier Jewish angelologies lent such speculation credibility. 
The angelology of Melchizedek was promising in this regard. In the Dead Sea Scrolls, 
Melchizedek in an exalted angelic figure who receives the names el and elohim. In a 
striking rewriting of Isaiah 61:2, one of the scrolls (11Q Melch.) refers to the jubilee year 
not as “the year of Yahweh’s favor,” but as “the year of Melchizedek’s favor.”20 In 2 
Enoch 71-72, Melchizedek receives the genealogy Genesis claimed he lacked.21 Hebrews 
depicts Melchizedek as the archetypal owner of the spiritual authority God the Father 
gave to the Son. Because Jesus’s priesthood is timeless—“according to the order of 
Melchizedek”—the author of Hebrews argues that “Jesus has became the guarantee of a 
better covenant.”22 The Nag Hammadi corpus also includes speculation about 
Melchizedek’s divinity into its cosmogony by describing Melchizedek as a heavenly 
archetype of the transcendent Sethian “race.”23  
Speculation about Melchizedek’s angelic status became pneumatological in the 
third and fourth centuries. In a letter addressed to Evangelus, Jerome mentions an 
unattributed treatise that deals with the question of Melchizedek’s angelic nature in 
                                               
20 See Michael Wise, M. Abegg, Jr., and E. Cook, trans., The Dead Sea Scrolls: a New Translation 
(San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1996), 455-57. 
21 Genesis 14:17-20 mentions Melchizedek as blessing Abraham, and the author of Hebrews 6-7 
deduces from Scripture’s silence regarding his origin that he was “without father, without mother, without 
generation” (Heb. 7:3). 
22 Heb. 7:15-22. 
23 See especially Nag Hammadi Codex IX, “Melchizedek.” The text is so fragmentary that it is 
difficult to render a clear picture of what role Melchizedek was thought to have played in the gnostic 
cosmogony of aeons. He is referred to as “holy” and a “high priest” (4, 14). In 6, 16-18, he is “[from] [the] 
race (γένος) of the High-priest (ἀρχιερεύς) [which is] above [thousands of thousands] and [myriads] of 
myriads of the aeons (αἰών)” (Birger A. Pearson, ed., Nag Hammadi Codices IX and X (Leiden: Brill, 
1981). For more on this enigmatic text, see “Introduction to Codex IX” in Pearson, ibid., 19-40. 
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considerable detail.24 Its author claimed not only that Melchizedek was an angel, but also 
that he was the Holy Spirit. Jerome initially suspected Origen and Didymus of the heresy, 
but he was not able to find them guilty of identifying Melchizedek with the Angel of the 
Holy Spirit. Instead, Origen and Didymus agreed that Melchizedek was “one of the 
highest powers” (supernis uirtutibus est locatus).25  
Jerome’s picture fits with what we find in Origen’s extant Homilies on Genesis. It 
would not have made sense for Origen to associate Melchizedek with the Holy Spirit 
because he associated him with Christ.26 God the Father rewards the Son with eternal 
priesthood, and Christ is a “priest forever according to the order of Melchizedek.” 
Interpreting a key phrase in Hebrews 6:17, Origen explains that the Son’s eternal priestly 
status discloses God’s “immutable will.”27 Didymus, for his part, is careful to note that 
                                               
24 The editors of the “Nicene Fathers” translation date Jerome’s Letter 73, Ad Evangelum, to the 
year 398. The date appears arbitrary, though it was written after Jerome turned against Didymus and other 
“Origenists.” 
25 “So immediately I discovered at the beginning of Origen’s homilies on the beginning of Genesis 
a writing about Melchizedek. There Origen, in a long and winding speech, was distracted from his main 
topic to the point that he called [Melchizedek] an angel, and with nearly the same arguments as your writer 
on the Holy Spirit, he was located among the highest powers. I then turned to Didymus, Origen’s follower, 
and I saw a man at the feet of his master holding the same opinion.” Jerome, Ep. 73.2. Statimque in fronte 
geneseos primam omeliarum origenis repperi scriptam de melchisedech, in qua multiplici sermone 
disputans illuc deuolutus est, ut eum angelum diceret, isdem que paene argumentis, quibus scriptor tuus de 
spiritu sancto, ille de supernis uirtutibus est locutus. Transiui ad didymium, sectatorem eius, et uidi 
hominem pedibus in magistri isse sententiam. For the critical edition of the text see Isidorus Hilberg, ed., 
Sancti Eusebii Hieronymi Epistulae Pars II: Epistulae LXXI–CXX, CSEL 55 (Verlag der Österreichischen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften: Vienna, 1996) 13–23, here quoted from p. 14. We may dismiss as rhetorical 
flourish Jerome’s insinuation that he turned to the very first page of a codex of Origen’s sermons to find the 
stray detail he managed to unearth. 
26 It would take us too far afield to open the question of whether Origen identified the Holy Spirit 
with John the Baptist at the time of his delivering his Homilies on Genesis. See Joseph Lienhard, “Origen’s 
Speculation on John the Baptist or Was John the Baptist the Holy Spirit?” in Robert J. Daly, ed., 
Origeniana Quinta (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1992) 449-453. 
27 Origen, HomGen 9.1. Hebrews 6:17 states: “...when God desired to show even more clearly to 
the heirs of the promise the unchangeable character of his purpose (τὸ ἀµετάθετον τῆς βοθλῆς αὐτοῦ), he 
guaranteed it by an oath.” Didymus would agree with Origen’s interpretation of Hebrews. In the 
Commentary on Zechariah (e.g., I, 183), Didymus states that the reason those who are thirsty can drink and 
be filled by the Son is that the Son is immutable: “Anyone coming to him drinks, you see, for the reason 
that his position is immovable.” It is the Son’s constancy that enables him to be a divine source. 
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Hebrews 7:3 states that Melchizedek resembles (ἀφωµοιωµένος) the Son of God, and not 
vice versa.28 
Jerome’s anonymous treatise accords with Epiphanius’s description of some 
“Melchizedekians” who regarded Melchizedek “as a sort of great power” 
(µεγάλην τινὰ δύναµιν).29 They, too, identified him with the Holy Spirit. In turn, 
others call themselves Melchizedekians; they may be an offshoot of the group 
who are known as Theodotians. They honor the Melchizedek who is mentioned in 
the scriptures and regard him as a sort of great power. He is on high in places 
which cannot be named, and in < fact > is not just a power; indeed, they claim in 
their error that he is greater than Christ. Based, if you please, on the literal 
wording of, “Thou art a priest forever after the order of Melchizedek,” they 
believe that Christ has merely come and been given the order of Melchizedek. 
Christ is thus younger than Melchizedek, they say. For if his place were not 
somehow second in line he would have no need of Melchizedek’s rank. Of 
Melchizedek himself they say that he <has come into being> “without father, 
without mother, without lineage”—as they would like to show from St. Paul’s 
Epistle to the Hebrews. They also fabricate spurious books for their own 
deception.30 
 
In order to understand the exegesis of Hebrews to which Epiphanius takes exception, the 
Spirit’s “reception” (λαµβάνω) from the Son in John 16:14 is important.  
The term λαµβάνω is freighted with ontological significance in Platonic tradition.  
It travels with a group of terms related to “participation” in post-Platonic philosophy. In 
                                               
28 Didymus the Blind, ComZech. 2, 69-71: “...since [Melchizedek] is God’s servant not in shadow 
but in truth and in spirit, he will be at the right hand of the one seated and reigning on his throne. Being at 
his right, resembling God the Son and remaining a priest forever, he has a counsel of peace in respect of the 
one whom he resembles, the Son of God also being likewise at peace with the King of Salem—“peace,” 
that is—and the king of righteousness, namely, Melchizedek” (Hill trans., FOTC 111:129). Didymus also 
mentions Melchizedek at Zech. 1, 183; 1, 239; and 1, 244. None of these additional references depart from 
reading Melchizedek as only an angelic power. 
29 Epiphanius, Panarion II, GCS edition of the text edited by Karl Holl, 1912 (TLG) 324.1.3-4. 
30 Μελχισεδεκιανοὺς πάλιν ἕτεροι ἑαυτοὺς καλοῦσιν, ἀποσπασθέντες τάχα ἀπὸ τῶν Θεοδοτιανῶν 
καλουµένων. οὗτοι τὸν Μελχισεδὲκ τὸν ἐν ταῖς γραφαῖς λεγόµενον δοξάζουσι, µεγάλην τινὰ δύναµιν 
ἡγούµενοι. εἶναι δὲ αὐτὸν ἄνω ἐν ἀκατονοµάστοις τόποις καὶ ἀληθῶς εἶναι τοῦτον οὐ µόνον δύναµίν τινα, 
ἀλλὰ καὶ µειζότερον τοῦ Χριστοῦ τῇ ἑαυτῶν πλάνῃ φάσκουσι. Χριστὸν δὲ ἡγοῦνται ἁπλῶς ἐληλυθότα καὶ 
καταξιωθέντα τῆς ἐκείνου τάξεως, δῆθεν ἐκ τοῦ ῥητοῦ τοῦ εἰρηµένου “σὺ εἶ ἱερεὺς εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα κατὰ τὴν 
τάξιν Μελχισεδέκ”· ὡς εἶναι αὐτόν, φησίν, ὑποδεέστερον τοῦ Μελχισεδέκ. εἰ µὴ γὰρ ἦν ἐν δευτέρᾳ τινὶ 
εἰσαγωγῇ κείµενος, οὐκ ἂν τῆς ἐκείνου τάξεως ἐπεδέετο. περὶ αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ Μελχισεδέκ φασιν ὅτι 
“ἀµήτωρ, ἀπάτωρ, ἀγενεαλόγητος” ἐγένετο, ἐκ τῆς πρὸς Ἑβραίους τοῦ ἁγίου Παύλου ἐπιστολῆς παριστᾶν 
βουλόµενοι. πλάττουσι δὲ ἑαυτοῖς καὶ βίβλους ἐπιπλάστους, ἑαυτοὺς ἀπατῶντες. GCS 31; Holl, ed. (1922) 
324, 1.1-5. It is tempting to infer from Epiphanius’s mention of “spurious books” that he has encountered 
the anonymous treatise that fell into the possession of Jerome’s correspondent, Evangelus. At Epiphanius, 
Panarion II.5,2-5; Frank Williams, trans. 82. 
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the Timaeus, Plato had described matter as the “receptacle” which, in a process “difficult 
to describe,” receives form. The Demiurge gives matter form on the basis of a 
resemblance to an original paradigm.31 In describing the process of “stamping” matter 
with forms, Timaeus says, “the figures that enter and depart are copies of those that are 
always existent, being stamped from them in a fashion marvelous and hard to describe.”32  
Timaeus describes what would come to be known as “prime matter” “as a Kind invisible 
and unshaped, all-receptive (πανδεχές), and in some most perplexing and most baffling 
way partaking of the intelligible (µεταλαµβάνον δὲ ἀπορώτατά πῃ τοῦ νοητοῦ).” Nothing 
in the perceptible world is cut off from sharing in intelligible reality. In appropriation of 
Timaeus, terms for “reception” stand for the link between “this world” and the “higher” 
world of the forms. The link between the two worlds occurs not at the level of the 
receptacle and its elements but at the level of the Demiurge who looks to an eternal 
archetype of Being in order to fashion the cosmos that comes to be.33  
Readings of the Timaeus could diverge on matters of detail, but the link between 
Being and Becoming established by the Demiurge was a feature common to many 
Platonic theologies. Numenius provides a characteristic application of terms of reception 
and participation in this context. He posits a primal distinction between the Demiurge, 
which he equates with Mind (Nous), and which constructs the Cosmos, on one hand, and 
the eternal Being to which the Mind looks, on the other hand. The distinction is couched 
in terms of participation and reception.   
If it be granted that Existence, and the Idea, is intelligible, and that Mind is older 
than this, as its cause, then it must be concluded that this Mind alone is the Good. 
For if the Creating Divinity is the principle of Becoming, then surely but the 
                                               
31 Plato, Tim. 48e-51d. 
32 Plato, Tim. 50c. 
33 Plato, Tim. 29a-d. 
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Good be the principle of Being. Inasmuch as the Creating Divinity is analogous to 
him, being his imitator, then must Becoming (be analogous) to Being, because it 
is its image and imitation.34 
 
The myth of the Demiurge grounds a series of two entities that receive and pass on 
characteristics in an imitative chain. The Demiurge reproduces what he sees, imitating the 
Good by looking to the Good—the eternal model—and copying it out in his creative acts. 
The continuity between the Good and the “world of becoming” is guaranteed by the 
Creator’s faithful reception of the good and his passing it along in creation. An 
ontological hierarchy in turn makes this reception possible. Only if the Demiurge receives 
from the Good can he pass the good along, and his reception implies his inferiority to the 
original he receives. So, Numenius says, “Mind alone is the Good,” the “Good-in-itself,” 
and is “older than” every Idea it causes—including the “Creating Divinity.” In this way, 
the Good is superior to the Demiurge.  
Returning to Epiphanius’s “Melchizedekians,” Hebrews states that Christ is a 
“priest κατὰ τὴν τάξιν Melchizedek.” If interpreted in Platonic terms, the Spirit’s 
reception from the Son in John 16:14 implies that the Spirit receives from the Son in a 
series of caused entities. The tendency to use the language of “order” to arrange Christ 
with respect to “Melchizedek” can be explained as a Platonic reading of John 16:14’s use 
of the verb λαµβάνω to name the relationship between the Son and the Spirit. The phrase 
κατὰ τὴν τάξιν (“according to the order of Melchizedek”) could mean that Melchizedek 
represents a special order of priesthood. On the other hand, if read on Platonic ground, 
κατὰ τὴν τάξιν means that Christ is a priest after the order of Melchizedek. This second 
                                               
34Des Places, ed. frag. 16. Εἰ δ’ ἔστι µὲν νοητὸν ἡ οὐσία καὶ ἡ ἰδέα, ταύτης δ’ ὡµολογήθη 
πρεσβύτερον καὶ αἴτιον εἶναι ὁ νοῦς, αὐτὸς οὗτος µόνος εὕρηται ὢν τὸ ἀγαθόν. Καὶ γὰρ εἰ ὁ µὲν 
δηµιουργὸς θεός ἐστι γενέσεως, ἀρκεῖ τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὐσίας εἶναι ἀρχή. Ἀνάλογον δὲ τούτῳ µὲν ὁ δηµιουργὸς 
θεός, ὢν αὐτοῦ µιµητής, τῇ δὲ οὐσίᾳ ἡ γένεσις, ἣ εἰκὼν αὐτῆς ἐστι καὶ µίµηµα. Eusebius quotes this 
passage in the Preparation for the Gospel XI, 22,3-5. 
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reading means that Melchizedek was an eternal priest before Christ received his position 
as an eternal priest from God the Father. Earlier Christian tradition had used the term 
τάξις to arrange the Trinitarian persons in a series.35  
The Refutatio omnium haeresium attributed by some to Hippolytus appears to 
have been an earlier source for Epiphanius. In the mid-third century, its author could 
write that Theodotus the banker “attempted to establish that Melchizedek constitutes a 
kind of greatest power, and that this one is greater than Christ. And they allege that Christ 
happens to be according to the likeness (of this Melchizedek).”36 Note the Timaean 
terminology: Christ comes to be according to the image of Melchizedek. (Ps.?-
)Hippolytus’s “Theodotians” had read Hebrews 7:17 in terms of the Demiurge’s looking 
to an image. God the Father, the Demiurge, created Christ by looking to the paradigm, 
Melchizedek. Epiphanius accuses the Alexandrian Hieracas of having taken the further 
step of identifying Melchizedek with the Holy Spirit.37 If the Holy Spirit is Melchizedek, 
                                               
35 See Michel Barnes, “The Beginning and End of Early Christian Pneumatology,” Augustinian 
Studies 39:2 (2008): 169-186, at 184-86, for a discussion of “ordering” the Trinity as a distinctive anti-
monarchian tactic. 
36 Hippolytus, Ref. VII.36.2-5: . . . καὶ αὐτὸς Θεόδοτος καλούµενος, τραπεζίτης τὴν τέχνην, λέγειν 
δύναµίν τινα τὸν Μελχισεδὲκ εἶναι µε(γ)ίστην, καὶ τοῦτον εἶναι µείζονα τοὺ Χριστοῦ, οὗ κατ᾽εἰκόνα 
φάσκουσι τὸν Χριστὸν τυγχάνειν. (Ps.-)Hippolytus’s descriptor for Melchizedek, δύναµίν τινα . . . 
µε(γ)ίστην, is comparable to Epiphanius’s µεγάλην τινὰ δύναµιν. For Greek text, see Miroslav Marcovich, 
ed., Hippolytus, Refutatio omnium haeresium, Patristische Texte und Studien, Bd. 25 (New York: W. De 
Gruyter, 1986). 
37 Epiphanius, Panarion II.5, 2-5; Frank Williams, trans. (modified), 82. καὶ ὁ µὲν Ἱερακᾶς ὁ 
Αἰγύπτιος αἱρεσιάρχης νοµίζει τοῦτον τὸν Μελχισεδὲκ εἶναι τὸ πνεῦµα τὸ ἅγιον διὰ τό “ἀφοµοιούµενος, 
φησί, τῷ υἱῷ τοῦ θεοῦ µένει ἱερεὺς εἰς τὸ διηνεκές”· ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς λέξεως ἧς εἶπεν ὁ ἅγιος ἀπόστολος “τὸ 
δὲ πνεῦµα ὑπερεντυγχάνει ὑπὲρ ἡµῶν στεναγµοῖς ἀλαλήτοις”. ὁ δὲ ἐπιστάµενος τὸ φρόνηµα τοῦ πνεύµατος 
οἶδεν ὅτι ὑπὲρ ἐκλεκτῶν ἐντυγχάνει τῷ θεῷ. ἐξέπεσε δὲ καὶ οὗτος παντελῶς τοῦ προκειµένου. οὐ γὰρ 
σάρκα ἐνεδύσατο τὸ πνεῦµά ποτε· σάρκα δὲ µὴ ἐνδυσάµενον οὐκ εἶχεν εἶναι βασιλεὺς τῆς Σαλὴµ καὶ 
ἱερεὺς τόπου τινός. καιρῷ δὲ ὅτε περὶ τούτου τοῦ Ἱερακᾶ καὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ αἱρέσεως τὴν ἀνατροπὴν 
ποιήσοµαι, τότε ἐν πλάτει περὶ τούτων διηγήσοµαι, τῆς δὲ ἀκολουθίας τὰ νῦν ἐπιλήψοµαι. “The Egyptian 
heresiarch Hieracas believes that this Melchizedek is the Holy Spirit because of ‘made like unto the Son of 
God he remains a priest continually,’ as though this is to be interpreted by the holy apostle’s statement that 
‘the Spirit makes intercession for us with groanings that cannot be uttered.’ Anyone who understands the 
mind of the Spirit knows that he intercedes with God for the elect. But Hieracas too has gone entirely off 
the track. The Spirit never assumed flesh. And not having assumed flesh, he could not be king of Salem and 
priest of anywhere.” 
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who in turn is prior to Christ in a series, Epiphanius knows a latter-day instance of the 
“hyper-pneumatology” Origen faced in On First Principles.38 To invoke John 16:14’s 
statement that the Spirit receives from the Son would oppose the hyper-pneumatology 
based on Hebrews 7:17. 
 To judge from the range of evidence from (Ps.-?)Hippolytus, Eusebius, Jerome, 
and Epiphanius, Melchizedek’s identification with the Holy Spirit occurred as early as 
Origen’s day and outlasted Didymus’s lifetime. Frequently enough, the question was not 
necessarily whether the Holy Spirit was an angelic creature, but with which angelic 
creature the Spirit should be identified. Given the persistence of such angelomorphic 
tendencies well into the fourth century, it is easier to understand why Jesus’s statement in 
John 16:14 about the Holy Spirit might be rendered not simply as, “He will proclaim to 
you,” but as, “He will be an ‘angel’ to you.”39 John 16:14’s use of λαµβάνω to name the 
relationship between the Son and the Holy Spirit would only reinforce the suspicion that 
the Holy Spirit receives from the Son as an inferior entity. Several anti-monarchian 
readers of John 16:14 would read the verse just this way.  
 
Tertullian, Origen, Novatian, and Eusebius on John 16:14 
 
 
 
 Following Tertullian’s reading of John 16:14, low pneumatological tendencies 
established themselves in anti-monarchian readings of this verse from Origen to 
                                               
38 Barnes, “Beginning and End”: 182. 
39 Rowan Williams was not the first to suggest that the Son and the Spirit had long been 
characterized as “angelic liturgists” in Alexandria—perhaps in Origen’s case—but his treatment remains a 
characteristically rich and suggestive argument along those lines. See Rowan Williams, “Angels 
Unawares : Heavenly Liturgy and Earthly Theology in Alexandria,” in Studia Patristica Vol 30 (Leuven: 
Peeters, 1997), 350-63. 
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Eusebius. That tradition took extreme form in Eunomius’s contention that the Holy Spirit 
is a creature “filled” by the Son, “third in both nature and order” (τρίτον καὶ φύσει καὶ 
τάξει).40 We will now survey anti-monarchian readings of John 16:14 from Tertullian to 
Eusebius. With the exception of Tertullian, each of these figures uses the logic of 
reception in John 16:14 to order the Son and the Spirit as superior to inferior. Each is 
willing to pay the price of distinguishing the three from one another with a grammar of 
intra-trinitarian participation: a low pneumatology. 
John 16:14 could be used to show that the Trinitarian persons are distinct figures 
with distinct activities. On the other hand, Jesus’s statement in John 10:30 that “I and the 
Father are one” was a staple of monarchian exegesis.41 Tertullian appeals to John 16:14 as 
part of a larger attempt to distinguish the three trinitarian personae. He invokes John 
16:14 to recover John 10:30 from monarchian exegesis. According to his reading, Jesus’s 
statement that the Spirit “receives from what is mine,” taken with the implication that the 
Son, too, receives from what belongs to the Father, means that the three are distinct, not 
identical.  
He is called “another Comforter,” indeed; but in what way He is another we have 
already shown.42 “He shall receive of mine,” says Christ, just as Christ Himself 
received of the Father’s. Thus the connection (connexus) of the Father in the Son, 
and of the Son in the Paraclete, yields three gathering together (tres . . . 
cohaerentes), who are yet distinct One from another (alterum ex altero). These 
                                               
40 Eunomius, Apol. 25.22. 
41 For John 10:30’s role in monarchian exegesis, see Mark DelCogliano, “The Interpretation of 
John 10:30 in the Third Century: Anti-monarchian Polemics and the Rise of Grammatical Reading 
Techniques,” Journal of Theological Interpretation 6.1 (2012):117–38. 
42 In Adv. Prax. 13, Tertullian invokes the illustration of the sun and its ray, which he says are “as 
much two things and two species of one undivided substance, as God and His Word, as the Father and the 
Son.” It is not clear whether he means to apply the same metaphor to the kind of unity the Holy Spirit 
shares with the Son and the Father. 
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three are one essence, not one person, as it is said, “I and my Father are One,” in 
respect of unity of substance, not singularity of number.43  
 
So Tertullian rules out “numerical singularity” of the Godhead to oppose monarchianism. 
He presupposes that the Spirit’s reception of what belongs to Christ entails the numerical 
distinction of Son from Spirit. The three are united in terms of undivided divine 
“substance”—though Tertullian stops short of explaining how a unity of substance is not 
a numerical unity. John 16:14 is useful to him as a means of articulating the distinction 
between the Son and the Holy Spirit, because in this passage the Spirit receives from the 
Son. Reception implies distinction in number, as one receives from another. 
Origen, too, uses John 16:14 to oppose monarchianism, and in a similar way. He 
goes beyond Tertullian by tying John 16:14 to an “ordering” of the three persons in a 
hierarchical scheme. The ordering in turn provides a precedent of ambiguous 
consequence. Origen does not refer to John 16:14, as one might expect him to, in a key 
passage, in Commentary on John 2.76, in which he writes that the Holy Spirit “seems to 
have need of the Son ministering to his hypostasis, not only for it to exist, but also for it 
to be wise, and rational, and just, and whatever other thing we ought to understand it to 
be by participation in the aspects of Christ which we mentioned previously.”44 John 16:14 
would have provided a suitable warrant for Origen’s suspicion, but he does not invoke the 
passage here.  
He does invoke John 16:14 twice elsewhere, once early and once late in his 
Commentary on John.45 In Jo. 20.263, Origen says, 
                                               
43 Tertullian, Adv. Prax., 25: Ita connexus patris in filio et filii in paracleto tres efficit cohaerentes, 
alterum ex altero. Qui tres unum sunt, non unus, quomodo dictum est: ego et pater unum sumus, ad 
substantiae unitatem, non ad numeri singularitatem (CCSL 2: 1159-1205). 
44 Origen, Jo. 2.76. 
45 Origen, Jo. 2.127; 20.263. 
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whenever . . . the Holy Spirit or an angelic spirit speaks, it does not speak from its 
own resources, but from the Word of truth and of wisdom. This is made clear also 
in the Gospel according to John where he teaches about the Paraclete and says, 
“He will receive from me, and will announce to you.”46   
 
Origen includes the Holy Spirit with other angelic spirits in classifying it as speaking “not 
. . . from its own resources (ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων), but from the Word of truth and of wisdom.” 
The context indicates that Origen is more concerned to authenticate the Spirit by 
distinguishing “true” from “false” spirits, as much as he would distinguish the Spirit from 
the Son. So his reading of John 16:14 in this case is as likely to be anti-Gnostic as anti-
monarchian. In any event, Origen’s deployment of the verse here includes no protection 
against ontological subordination of the Spirit to the Son; indeed, it turns upon just such 
an arrangement. 
Origen’s other reference to the verse in the Commentary on John (2.127) is more 
telling. He uses John 16:14 to clarify what it means for the Son to “minister to [the Holy 
Spirit’s] hypostasis.” The Son teaches the Holy Spirit to be what it is: 
For that the Holy Spirit also is instructed by [Christ] is clear from what is said 
about the comforter and the Holy Spirit: “Because he will receive from me and 
will announce it to you.” Now we must inquire very carefully if the Spirit, by 
being instructed, contains all things which the Son, who is from the beginning, 
knows by contemplating the Father.47 
 
Origen’s compressed speculation suggests that the Son knows certain things directly—
“by contemplation of the Father”—which the Holy Spirit knows indirectly. The fact that 
the Holy Spirit receives knowledge from the Son reinforces the Spirit’s inferiority to the 
Son. The inferiority does not, however, undermine the Spirit’s authority. Origen is careful 
to point out that the Holy Spirit “comprehends all things,” even if at second remove. The 
                                               
46 Origen, Jo. 2.263; Heine trans., 260 (modified). 
47 Origen, Jo. 2.127. Ὅτι µὲν γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸ αὐτῷ µαθητεύεται, σαφὲς ἐκ τοῦ λεγοµένου περὶ 
παρακλήτου καὶ ἁγίου πνεύµατος· “Ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐµοπυ λήψεται, καὶ ἀναγγελεῖ ὑµῖν.” Εἰ δὲ µαθητευόµενον 
πάντα χωρεῖ, ἃ ἐνατενίζων τῷ πατρὶ ἀρχόµενος ὁ υἱὸς γινώσκει, ἐπιµελέστερον ζητητέον. 
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Holy Spirit receives from the Son, and the reception corroborates Origen’s interpretation 
that the Holy Spirit is “instructed” by Christ.  
Origen was not alone in taking anti-monarchian exegesis of John 16:14 one step 
further than Tertullian had by applying a Platonizing hierarchy to the relationship 
between the Son and Holy Spirit. Novatian, too, uses the verse to subordinate the Spirit to 
the Son. He draws a twofold characterization of the Son and Spirit in Trin. 16.2-3. On one 
hand, he says, this verse demonstrates that the Son is indeed the source of the Holy 
Spirit’s information, and on this point his reading of the verse mirrors Origen’s. He reads 
John 16:14 as authorizing the Holy Spirit because the Son is superior to the Holy Spirit. 
This also entails that the Holy Spirit is “less than” (minor) the Son.  
The premise that motivates Origen’s logic also drives Novatian’s: reception 
implies ontological hierarchy.48 Novatian concludes from John 16:14 that Christ is 
“greater than the Paraclete.” “If [the Paraclete] received from Christ the things which He 
will make known, then surely Christ is greater than the Paraclete, since the Paraclete 
would not receive from Christ unless He were less than Christ,” Novatian explains.49  
Novatian uses John 16:14’s logic of reception to justify an ontological hierarchy of Son 
over the Holy Spirit, and that logic draws on a Platonizing reading of the key verb 
λαµβάνω. The presence of the verb ἀναγγελεῖ is not acknowledged, but the Holy Spirit’s 
status as an angel is left open as a possibility, if not a direct consequence, of the resulting 
ontological hierarchy. 
                                               
48 Whether Novatian is opposing the same “hyper-pneumatology” faced by Origen is an open 
question. But in any case John 16:14 is associated with the Holy Spirit’s distinction from and subordination 
to the Son and the Father in anti-monarchian polemic. 
49 Novatian, Trin. 16.3: Sed si a christo accepit quae nuntiet, maior ergo iam paracleto christus 
est, quoniam nec paracletus a christo acciperet, nisi minor christo esset (CCSL 4: 40). FOTC, DeSimone 
trans., 62. 
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The anti-monarchian tradition of John 16:14 finds its most extensive deployment 
in Eusebius’s polemical use of it against Marcellus. Eusebius glosses John 16:14 with the 
logic of participation Origen had developed in his Commentary on John. Eusebius makes 
a series of references to John 16:14 as part of an argument with Marcellus in his 
Ecclesiastical Theology 3.4-5.50 He provides an extensive quotation of Marcellus’s 
Against Asterius, whom he says states: 
. . . if the Word were to appear to have come from the Father Himself and has 
come to us and “The Holy Spirit” (as even Asterius confessed) “proceeds from the 
Father,” and again the Savior says concerning the Spirit that “He will not speak on 
His own authority (ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ), but whatever He hears He will speak, and He will 
declare to you the things that are to come. He will glorify me, for He will take 
what is mine and declare it to you,” doesn’t the monad in this ineffable statement 
appear clearly and obviously to broaden into a Trinity without in any way 
suffering division?51 
 
According to Marcellus, Jesus’s statements in John 16:13-15 entail that the trinity 
proceeds from a Monad to a Dyad and, finally, a Triad. In no case, Marcellus insists, is 
the substance or reality divided materially. The procession remains immaterial, such that 
the three are names, but they are not the names of separated entities.  
Our concern lies less with reconstructing Marcellus’s theology and more with 
recognizing the traditional force of Eusebius’s reading of John 16:14. In 
opposition to Marcellus, he writes: 
The only-begotten Son of God teaches that He Himself has come forth from the 
Father because He was always with Him, and likewise of the Holy Spirit, who 
exists as another besides the Son. The Savior Himself shows this clearly when He 
says, “He will take what is mine and declare it to you.” For this would be 
                                               
50 In what follows I have benefited from the use of an unpublished translation of De ecclesiastica 
theologica by Kelley Spoerl. I am grateful to Prof. Spoerl for allowing me to consult her translation ahead 
of its publication. 
51 Eusebius, e.th. 3.4.2-3; Spoerl trans. εἰ τοίνυν ὁ λόγος φαίνοιτο ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πατρὸς 
ἐξελθὼν  καὶ πρὸς ἡµᾶς ἐληλυθώς, τὸ δὲ πνεῦµα τὸ ἅγιον, ὡς καὶ Ἀστέριος ὡµολόγησεν, παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς 
ἐκπορεύεται, αὖθίς τε ὁ σωτήρ φησιν περὶ τοῦ πνεύµατος ὅτι “οὐκ ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ λαλήσει, ἀλλ’ὅσα ἀκούσει 
λαλήσει, καὶ τὰ ἐρχόµενα ἀναγγελεῖ ὑµῖν. ἐκεῖνός µε δοξάσει, ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐµοῦ λήψεται καὶ ἀναγγελεῖ 
ὑµῖν”, οὐ σαφῶς καὶ φανερῶς ἐνταῦθα ἀπορρήτῳ δὲ λόγῳ ἡ µονὰς φαίνεται, πλατυνοµένη µὲν εἰς τριάδα, 
διαιρεῖσθαι δὲ µηδαµῶς ὑποµένουσα; 
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unmistakable proof that the Son and the Holy Spirit are not one and the same. For 
that which takes from another is thought to be other than the one who gives.52 
 
Eusebius contends that John 16:14 proves that the Holy Spirit is “a different entity from 
the Son” (ἕτερον ὑπάρχον παρὰ τὸν υἱόν).53 According to him, the “Son” and “Holy 
Spirit” are not different names for a single reality if in fact the Holy Spirit “receives 
from” the Son, as John 16:14 states. Eusebius’s reading of the verse presupposes its anti-
monarchian utility for distinguishing the giver (Son) from the receiver (Spirit)—as with 
Tertullian, Origen, and Novatian.  
After introducing his reading of John 16:14 in Ecclesiastical Theology 3.4, 
Eusebius elaborates on his point in the following section, 3.5. His elaboration plays on 
the various ways the Son speaks of the reception of the Holy Spirit. He cites, first, John 
14:15-17, which closes with the Son’s statement that the world cannot “receive” the 
“Spirit of truth.” This is supposed to entail, according to Eusebius, that “the Spirit is 
another counselor and other than Himself.” Jesus’s breath prepared the disciples to 
receive the Holy Spirit. The logic of reception guarantees that the Son and the Spirit are 
distinct entities: 
For the one who gives and that which is given could not have been the same, but 
the one who provides [the Spirit] was the Savior and that which is given was the 
Holy Spirit, and those received the Spirit were the apostles, while the breath 
purified the apostles, as I said, or also effected the bestowal of the Holy Spirit, for 
it is possible to interpret this event in either of these ways.54 
 
                                               
52 Eusebius, e.th. 3.4.9; Spoerl trans.: ὁ δὲ µονογενὴς υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐξεληλυθέναι 
ἑαυτὸν διδάσκει διὰ τὸ συνεῖναι αὐτῷ πάντοτε, καὶ τὸ ἅγιον δὲ πνεῦµα ὁµοίως ἕτερον ὑπάρχον παρὰ τὸν 
υἱόν. ὃ δὴ σαφῶς αὐτὸς ὁ σωτὴρ παρίστησιν λέγων “ἐκ τοῦ ἐµοῦ λήψεται καὶ ἀναγγελεῖ ὑµῖν.” ἄντικρυς 
γὰρ παραστατικὸν ἂν εἴη τοῦτο τοῦ µὴ εἶναι ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν τὸν υἱὸν καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦµα· τὸ γὰρ παρ’ 
ἑτέρου λαµβάνον τι ἕτερον παρὰ τὸν διδόντα νοεῖται. 
53 Eusebius, e.th. 3.4.9. 
54 Eusebius, e.th. 3.5.2-3; Spoerl trans. τὸ δὲ διδόναι αὐτὸν τὸ πνεῦµα πάλιν ἕτερον αὐτὸν παρίστη 
τοῦ διδοµένου· οὐκ ἂν γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς ἦν ὁ διδοὺς καὶ τὸ διδόµενον, ἀλλ’ ὁ µὲν παρέχων ἦν ὁ σωτήρ, τὸ δὲ 
διδόµενον τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦµα, οἱ δὲ λαµβάνοντες οἱ ἀπόστολοι, τὸ δ’ ἐµφύσηµα καθαρτικὸν ὡς ἔφην τῶν 
ἀποστόλων ἢ καὶ ἐνεργητικὸν τῆς µεταδόσεως τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύµατος, ἑκατέρως γὰρ νοεῖν δυνατόν. 
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Eusebius is satisfied that he has shown that “the Holy Spirit is another existing alongside 
[the Son].” He ratifies this statement by reference to a litany of other passages.55 Upon 
returning to the question of Jesus’s “breath” and comes to a more precise statement about 
the Holy Spirit’s transcendence over all other spiritual powers:  
For when “He breathed upon” [them], then, He also gave to them a share in the 
grace of the Holy Spirit, such as could effect the forgiveness of sins. For “there 
are varieties of gifts,” of which a part were given to [the disciples] when [the 
Savior] lived with them, and after these He filled them with an [even] greater and 
more perfect power. He spoke to [the apostles] about this in the Acts of the 
Apostles: “but you shall receive power when the Holy Spirit has come upon you.”  
 
A little further on, Eusebius concludes that  
the Savior Himself taught that the Holy Spirit exists as another besides Himself, 
outstanding in honor and glory and privileges, greater and higher than any [other] 
intellectual and rational substance (for which reason He has been taken up into the 
Holy and thrice-blessed Trinity). Yet He is surely subordinate to [the Son]. Indeed 
[the Son] showed this when He said, “For He will not speak on His own authority, 
but whatever He hears He will speak”—obviously, from my treasure. For in Him 
are “hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.” Therefore, He Himself, 
seeing as He is the only-begotten Son, receives from the Father and listens to 
Him, while the Holy Spirit supplies what He receives [from the Son]. Hence He 
says, “He will take what is mine and declare it to you.”56  
 
Following this clear subordination of the Holy Spirit to the Son and the Father, Eusebius 
acknowledges both that the Father and Son, too, are spiritual. He then walks a fine line 
between overt angelomorphic pneumatology and his own position.  
. . . given that the Holy Spirit is another alongside the Father and the Son, 
showing his individuality (idioma), the Savior has called Him Counselor, 
distinguishing Him from the common run of angels through the title “Counselor.” 
For the angelic powers also are spirits. For it has been said, “He who makes His 
                                               
55 John 14:23, John 14:25-26, John 16:7, John 5:19, John 20:17. 
56 Eusebius, e.th. 3.5.17-19; Spoerl trans. αὐτὸς ὁ σωτὴρ τὸ πνεῦµα τὸ ἅγιον ἕτερον ὑπάρχειν παρ’ 
ἑαυτὸν ἐδίδαξεν, τιµῇ µὲν καὶ δόξῃ καὶ πρεσβείοις ὑπερέχον καὶ κρεῖττον καὶ ἀνώτερον πάσης τῆς νοερᾶς 
καὶ ογικῆς τυγχάνον οὐσίας (διὸ καὶ συµπαρείληπται τῇ ἁγίᾳ καὶ τρισµακαρίᾳ τριάδι), ὑποβεβηκός γε µὴν 
[εἶναι] αὑτοῦ. ὃ δὴ παρίστη εἰπὼν “οὐ γὰρ ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ λαλήσει, ἀλλ’ ὅσα ἀκούσει λαλήσει”· παρὰ τίνος δὲ 
ἀκούσει, διασαφεῖ λέγων «ἐκ τοῦ ἐµοῦ λήψεται καὶ ἀναγγελεῖ ὑµῖν”, ἐκ τοῦ ἐµοῦ δηλαδὴ θησαυροῦ· ἐν 
αὐτῷ γάρ “εἰσιν πάντες οἱ θησαυροὶ τῆς σοφίας καὶ γνώσεως ἀπόκρυφοι.” αὐτὸς µὲν οὖν ἅτε υἱὸς 
µονογενὴς παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς λαµβάνει καὶ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκούει, τὸ δὲ πνεῦµα τὸ ἅγιον παρ’ αὐτοῦ 
χορηγεῖται· διό φησιν “ἐκ τοῦ ἐµοῦ λήψεται καὶ ἀναγγελεῖ ὑµῖν.” 
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angels spirits.”57 But none of these can be equal to the Spirit-Counselor. For this 
reason, only this [Spirit] has been taken up into the holy and thrice-blessed 
Trinity.58 
 
Eusebius feels pressed to explain the presence of the Holy Spirit in the baptismal formula 
of Matthew 28:19. This is the second time he has said that the Holy Spirit “has been 
taken up into the . . . Trinity.” A few lines later, he confirms that, indeed, the Father 
makes all things through the Son—“both visible and invisible and surely also…the very 
existence of the Spirit-Counselor.”59 Eusebius does not state explicitly that the Holy 
Spirit is an angelic being, but he leaves open the possibility that the Holy Spirit is a 
created spiritual being “taken up” into the Trinity on account of its holiness.  
 
Eunomius: “The Holy Spirit is Filled with Sanctification and Instruction” 
 
 
 
It ought now to be clear that by the time Eunomius came to write his Apology, the 
fact that the Holy Spirit is said to “receive from” the Son in John 16:14, paired with an 
anti-monarchian tradition of reading John 16:14, would entail a logic according to which 
the Holy Spirit is inferior to the Son because he “receives from” the Son. The Spirit’s 
inferiority could reasonably entail an angelomorphic pneumatology, especially if it were 
combined with subtle attention to Origen’s Commentary on John. Such a low 
pneumatology would have considerable authority. 
                                               
57 Quoting Heb. 1:7. 
58 Eusebius, e.th. 3.5.21; Spoerl trans. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύµατος ἑτέρου ὄντος παρὰ τὸν 
πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱόν, τὸ ἰδίωµα παριστὰς ὁ σωτὴρ κέκληκεν αὐτὸ παράκλητον, τὸ κοινὸν τῆς ὁµωνυµίας 
ἀφορίζων διὰ τῆς τοῦ παρακλήτου προσηγορίας, ἐπεὶ καὶ αἱ ἀγγελικαὶ δυνάµεις εἶεν ἂν πνεύµατα· “ὁ” γὰρ 
“ποιῶν τοὺς ἀγγέλους αὑτοῦ πνεύµατα” εἴρηται. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν τούτων ἐξισοῦσθαι δύναται τῷ παρακλήτῳ 
πνεύµατι. διὸ τῇ ἁγίᾳ καὶ τρισµακαρίᾳ τριάδι…. The “individuality” (idioma) of the Spirit’s hypostasis 
derives from Origen’s Commentary on John, and it is later emphasized by Eunomius in Apol. 25.17. 
Eunomius describes the Spirit as “having his own existence” (ἰδίαν ἔχον ὑπόστασιν). 
59 Eusebius cites John 1:3 to support this contention. 
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Eunomius wrote his first Apology in 360, and Basil did not respond to it for at 
least three and perhaps as many as five years.60 Didymus was one of the first to respond. 
Lewis Ayres has suggested that Didymus’s reading of John 16:14 responds to Eunomius’s 
argument, based on Eunomius’s combination of John 16:14 with John 5:19, that the Holy 
Spirit worships the Son.61 We can say more, however. For it is not only to Eunomius’s 
exegesis of John 5:19 that Didymus responds in On the Holy Spirit. He responds to a 
basic logic dependent upon anti-monarchian exegesis of John 16:14.  
Consider the context of Eunomius’s compressed pneumatology. Eunomius took 
cues from both Origen’s Commentary on John 2 and intervening developments in 
Platonism since Origen’s death—possibly the Platonism of Plotinus. The suspicion that, 
in his Apology, Eunomius was drawing on Neoplatonic thought, is not new. That 
Eunomius was a “Neoplatonist” means different things to different readers, so it is 
important to specify Eunomius’s sources and state clearly the consequences of his 
Neoplatonic borrowings. That Eunomius had absorbed important points of Neoplatonic 
doctrine is at least plausible.62 However, no one has yet pointed to Eunomius’s Apology 
25 for a point of contact between Eunomius’s theology and Neoplatonic philosophy. Yet 
here is a straightforward correspondence.  
                                               
60 On dating the Apology, see Richard Vaggione. Eunomius: The Extant Works (New York : 
Oxford University Press, 1987), 5-9. For dating On the Holy Spirit, see DelCogliano, Radde-Gallwitz, and 
Ayres, Works on the Spirit, Introduction; and Mark DelCogliano, “Basil of Caesarea, Didymus the Blind, 
and the Anti-Pneumatomachian Exegesis of Amos 4:13 and John 1:3,” Journal of Theological Studies 61 
(2010), 644–58. 
61 See Lewis Ayres, “The Holy Spirit as the ‘Undiminished Giver’: Didymus the Blind’s De 
Spiritu Sancto and the Development of Nicene Pneumatology,” in The Holy Spirit in the Fathers of the 
Church: The Proceedings of the Seventh International Patristic Conference, Maynooth, 2008, 57–72 
(Portland: Four Courts, 2010), 66-67. Ayres points out that Eunomius bases his position on John 5:19; 
Eunomius’s appeal to John 16:14 is more oblique. As DelCogliano, Radde-Gallwitz, and Ayres state, 
Eunomius was the first anti-Nicene theologian to pair John 16:14 with John 5:19 (see Works on the Spirit, 
40). Eusebius (e.th. 3.3-5) paired these texts in a relevant context, so probably Eunomius was drawing on 
Eusebius. 
62 See Raoul Mortley, From Word to Silence II: The way of negation, Christian and Greek (Bonn: 
Hannstein, 1986), 128-159. 
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In Apology 25, Eunomius argues that the “natures” of the three follow their 
“order.” He claims that when Scripture says we worship “in the Spirit,” it means that the 
Spirit cannot be the object of worship. The point reinforces an anti-monarchian reading of 
John 16:14 even if it does not invoke the text directly. Instead of being identical with the 
Only-Begotten, or another “offspring” of the Father, the Holy Spirit “is third both in 
nature and in order since he was brought into existence at the command of the Father by 
the action of the Son.”63 Eunomius appeals to the precedent of Origen’s Commentary on 
John 2’s exegesis of John 1:3.64 Origen had said that “the Holy Spirit is the most honored 
(τιµιώτερον) of all things made through the Word.” Similarly, Eunomius concludes that 
the Holy Spirit 
is honoured in third place as the first and greatest work of all, the only such ‘thing 
made’ of the Only-begotten, lacking indeed godhead and the power of creation, 
but filled with (πεπληρωµένον) sanctification and instruction.65 
 
Elsewhere Eunomius invokes a distinction between the one who worships and who is 
worshipped (ὅ τε προσκυνούµενος τοῦ προσκυνοῦντος) as an interpretation of Jesus’s 
statement, in John 16:14, that the Holy Spirit “will glorify me.”66 The logic implied by 
John 16:14 also appears in Eunomius’s pneumatology under the rubric of the Holy 
Spirit’s “being filled.”67 This characteristic of the Holy Spirit takes precedence for 
Eunomius, presumably because it is logically primary. It is one of two distinctive features 
of the single chapter Eunomius devotes to the Holy Spirit in his first Apology. The other 
                                               
63 Eunomius, Apol. 25.22-24: ἀλλὰ τρίτον καὶ φύσει καὶ τάξει, προστάγµατι τοῦ πατρός, ἐνεργείᾳ 
δὲ τοῦ υἱοῦ γενόµενον, τρίτῃ χώρᾳ τιµώµενον ὡς πρῶτον καὶ µεῖζον πάντων καὶ µόνον τοιοῦτον τοῦ 
µονογενοῦς ποίηµα…. 
64 See Origen, Jo. 2.73-75, here at 2.75: “τὸ πάντων διὰ τοῦ λόγου γενοµένων τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦµα 
πάντων εἶναι τιµιώτερον καὶ τάξει πρῶτον πάντων τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς διά Χριστοῦ γεγενηµένων. 
65 Eunomius, Apol. 25. 
66 Eunomius, Apol. 20.21. 
67 Eunomius, Apol. 25. 
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distinctive argument is one he shares with Didymus. It is the anti-monarchian argument 
that the Holy Spirit is a divine agent, not merely an activity of God.68 
 Eunomius’s statement that the Holy Spirit’s being “filled with sanctification and 
instruction” (ἁγιαστικῆς δὲ καὶ διδασκαλικῆς πεπληρωµένον) deserves attention. Origen 
had suggested that “the Holy Spirit has need of the Son ministering to his hypostasis.”69 
And if the Holy Spirit’s role is to sanctify, then the Spirit must have received the power to 
sanctify from the Son, just as the Son received his various titles from the Father. 
Eunomius’s assertion makes sense as the formulation of a logical consequence of 
Origen’s theology in the Commentary on John 2. It also fits with broader anti-monarchian 
reading of John 16:14. 
It was not only Origen’s precedent that gave weight to Eunomius’s pneumatology. 
The Platonic tradition had continued to develop along lines concordant with Origen’s 
hierarchical ordering of first principles. Origen himself had initiated a coupling of 
Hebrews 1:3 with Wisdom 7:25-26 to describe the Son, as the Father’s Wisdom, an 
“ἀπόρροια of the pure glory of the Almighty.” Origen uses ἀπόρροια to distinguish the 
Son’s divine origin: he radiates as an ἀπόρροια not from the Father himself, but from his 
glory, as Hebrews 1:3 states.70 Origen’s statement, however, begs an important question: 
what does it mean to call the Son an “emanation” (ἀπόρροια) of the Father’s glory? 
                                               
68 The subtle point that the Holy Spirit is “filled” does not reappear, however, in the summary 
confessional statement appended in the manuscript tradition to the Apology. For more on this issue, see 
Andrew Radde-Gallwitz, “The Holy Spirit as Agent, Not Activity: Origen’s Argument with Modalism and 
Its Afterlife in Didymus, Eunomius, and Gregory of Nazianzus,” Vigiliae Christianae 65, no. 3 (2011), 
227–48. 
69 Origen, Jo. 2.76: . . . ἔοικε τὸ ἄγιον πνεῦµα διακονοῦντος αὐτοῦ τῇ ὑποστάσει, οὐ µόνον εἰς τὸ 
εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ σοφὸν εἶναι καὶ λογικὸν καὶ δίκαιον καὶ πᾶν ὁτιποτοῦν χρὴ αὐτὸ νοεῖν τυγχάνειν κατὰ 
µετοχὴν τῶν προειρηµένων ἡµῖν Χριστοῦ ἐπινοιῶν. 
70 See Origen, Jo. 13.25; cf. Princ. 1.2.10. 
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The term ἀπόρροια is frequent in neither Scripture nor the Platonic tradition. 
Plotinus does not use the term ἀπόρροια. Numenius never uses it, nor does Alcinous in 
his Didaskalikon. But Plotinus and other Platonists speak generically of incorporeal 
emanation or procession. Plotinus does speak—if only once—of an overflowing 
(ὑπερερρύη) of the One. His reticence belies that the Platonic tradition was familiar with 
metaphors of “outpouring” for the primal procession, even if Plotinus himself remained 
squeamish about using physical metaphors to describe the One.71 
In Plotinus’s scheme of emanation, the One “spills over” and produces the One 
existent, which in turn generates the primal triad Being-Life-Mind. Plotinus describes the 
first being to proceed from the One as “filled” by the One when it “halts” and turns to 
“look toward” the One.72 
This, we may say, is the first act of generation: the One, perfect because it seeks 
nothing, has nothing, and needs nothing, overflows (ὑπερερρύη), as it were, and 
its superabundance makes something other than itself. This, when it has come into 
being, turns back upon the One and is filled (ἐπληρώθη), and becomes Intellect by 
looking towards it. Its halt and turning towards the one constitutes being, its gaze 
upon the One, Intellect. Since it halts and turns towards the One that it may see, it 
becomes at once Intellect and being. Resembling the One thus, Intellect produces 
in the same way, pouring forth (προχέας) a multiple power—this is a likeness of 
it—just as that which was before it poured it forth (προέχεε). This activity 
springing from the substance of Intellect is Soul, which comes to be this while 
Intellect abides unchanged: for Intellect too comes into being while that which is 
before it abides unchanged. But Soul does not abide unchanged when it produces: 
it is moved and so brings forth an image. It looks to its source and is filled 
(πληροῦται), and going forth to another opposed movement generates its own 
image, which is sensation and the principle of growth in plants.73 
                                               
71 John Whittaker, “Proclus, Procoius, Psellus, and the Scholia on Gregory Nazianzen,” Vigiliae 
Christianae 29 (1975): 309-313, at 1. See Plotinus, Enn. 5.2.11. Though Plotinus only uses the term 
ὑπερερρύη here, the usage caught the eye of many commentators and enjoyed widespread later influence in 
the Platonic tradition. Gregory Nazianzen appears to have known this particular line in the Enneads, if not 
others. Cf. Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. 29.2. 
72 Plotinus, Enn. V.2.1. 
73 Plotinus, Enn. V.2.1.7-22; Armstrong trans., 59-61. καὶ πρώτη οἷον γέννησις αὕτη· ὂν γὰρ 
τέλειον τῷ µηδὲν ζητεῖν µηδὲ ἔχειν µηδὲ δεῖσθαι οἷον ὑπερερρύη καὶ τὸ ὑπερπλῆρες αὐτοῦ πεποίηκεν 
ἄλλο· τὸ δὲ γενόµενον εἰς αὐτὸ ἐπεστράφη καὶ ἐπληρώθη καὶ ἐγένετο πρὸς αὐτὸ βλέπον καὶ νοῦς οὗτος. 
Καὶ ἡ µὲν πρὸς ἐκεῖνο στάσις αὐτοῦ τὸ ὂν ἐποίησεν, ἡ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ θέα τὸν νοῦν. Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἔστη πρὸς 
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Plotinus here delineates a process of emanation from the One to Nous to Soul. He uses 
several forms of the verb πληρόω to describe the procession. 
Eunomius argues that the Holy Spirit is “filled” (πληροῦται), and his argument 
invites comparison with Plotinian emanation.74 It is difficult to know whether Eunomius 
used Plotinus’s Ennead V.2 directly in order to argue that the Holy Spirit is “filled.” His 
statement is far too compressed to command certainty, even if the logic fits. Whatever his 
source in the Platonic tradition, Eunomius did not simply reproduce a Platonic scheme in 
Christian guise. He was adapting a traditional feature of Platonist metaphysics—
ontological hierarchy—for an end to which that feature had been put in anti-monarchian 
Christian polemic for generations. Anti-monarchians since Origen had tended to use a 
generically Platonic grammar of participation to distinguish between the three and to 
range them hierarchically in “vertical” order. Had Eunomius turned to Origen’s statement 
in the Commentary on John that the Holy Spirit “has need of the Son ministering to his 
hypostasis,” it would have been difficult for him not to see Plotinus’s language of one 
existent’s being “filled” by its superior. The fit between Origen’s pneumatology and 
Plotinian ontology in hindsight was sensible enough, and Eunomius drew the sensible 
                                                                                                                                            
αὐτό, ἵνα ἴδῃ, ὁµοῦ νοῦς γίγνεται καὶ ὄν. Οὗτος οὖν ὢν οἷον ἐκεῖνος τὰ ὅµοια ποιεῖ δύναµιν προχέας 
πολλήν—εἶδος δὲ καὶ τοῦτο αὐτοῦ—ὥσπερ αὖ τὸ αὐτοῦ πρότερον προέχεε· καὶ αὕτη ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας 
ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς τοῦτο µένοντος ἐκείνου γενοµένη· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς µένοντος τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο. Ἡ δὲ 
οὐ µένουσα ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ κινηθεῖσα ἐγέννα εἴδωλον. Ἐκεῖ µὲν οὖν βλέπουσα, ὅθεν ἐγένετο, πληροῦται, 
προελθοῦσα δὲ εἰς κίνησιν ἄλλην καὶ ἐναντίαν  γεννᾷ εἴδωλον αὐτῆς αἴσθησιν καὶ φύσιν τὴν ἐν τοῖς 
φυτοῖς. 
74 John Rist demonstrated that even Enn. V.1’s most striking metaphysical aspects redound to 
earlier tendencies in Middle Platonism, available to Clement and Origen (and others) without access to 
Plotinus’s Enneads, and Rist’s argument remains unchallenged. See John Rist, “Basil’s ‘Neoplatonism’: Its 
Background and Nature,” in Basil of Caesarea: Christian, Humanist, Ascetic. A Sixteen-Hundredth 
Anniversary Symposium, ed. Paul J. Fedwick (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1981), 
137-220. Rist cautions that traces of Plotinus’s distinctive influence are not to be found prior to the late 
fourth century among Christians. As I argued in Chapter 1 of this study, third- and fourth-century 
Christians need not have encountered Plotinus to adumbrate a Christian God as a series of three principles, 
or hypostases, arranged in an emanative scheme. Parallels with Gnosticism notwithstanding, Christians 
might have taken cues from Numenius, if they saw fit. 
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conclusion. The Holy Spirit is a celestial creature “filled” by the Father with the Son’s 
virtues.75  
 
Didymus Against Eunomius: “I Will Pour Out my Spirit” 
 
 
 
In On the Holy Spirit, Didymus offered one of the first straightforward denials 
that the Holy Spirit is “an invisible creature.”76 But whose proposition did he deny? The 
account to follow is not the first to suggest that Didymus recognized and resisted an 
earlier, stronger tradition in Alexandria that involved the Holy Spirit as the leader of the 
angelic host in a heavenly liturgy.77 I argue, however, that Didymus was not only 
responding to angelomorphic pneumatology generally or generically. He was responding 
to a specific instance of it: the explicitly low pneumatology of Eunomius’s Apology 25.78  
Didymus makes extensive use of participation terminology.79 A thoroughgoing 
distinction between God, as substantially good, and creatures, as good-by-reception or 
participation, is fundamental to Didymus’s strategy in On the Holy Spirit.80 Didymus sets 
                                               
75 Other instances of John 16:14’s reception are worthy of attention but occur too late to have been 
relevant to the dispute between Didymus and Eunomius. One is especially ironic. Epiphanius uses the verse 
to castigate Paul of Samosata’s latter-day defenders. The irony is that Epiphanius has taken up a position on 
this verse that stands in line with Eunomius, who in turn derived it from Origen, whom Epiphanius would 
not have relished having inspired his own view on the trinity. See Epiphanius, Panarion II, 65.6.8. 
76 Didymus, Spir. 62. 
77 See Alasdair Heron, “The Holy Spirit in Origen and Didymus the Blind: A Shift in Perspective 
from the Third to the Fourth Century,” in Kerygma Und Logos, ed. by Adolf Martin Ritter (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979) 298–310. 
78 My account here broadens the basis for the perspective taken by the text’s recent translators. See 
DelCogliano, Radde-Gallwitz, and Ayres, 40-42.  
79 In the following discussion, for numeration of the text of Didymus’ On the Holy Spirit, I refer to 
L. Doutreleau, S.J., ed., Didyme l’Aveugle Traité du Saint-Esprit (SC, 386) (Paris, Éditions du Cerf, 1992). 
80 The wide-ranging deployment of this concept and its attendant terminology by Didymus in On 
the Holy Spirit provided some of Mingarelli’s most compelling evidence in his case for Didymus’ 
authorship of On the Trinity, a text that also shows a widespread polemical use of the concept. See L. 
Doutreleau, Le De Trinitate est-il l’Oeuvre de Didyme l’Aveugle? in Recherches de Science Religieuse 45 
(1967), 514-57, at 529: “. . . these nearly identical formulations regarding the participated Spirit are found 
nowhere else.  Neither Athanasius, nor Pseudo-Athanasius, nor Basil, nor Epiphanius, nor even those who 
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himself the task of answering this key question: is the Holy Spirit holy in and of himself, 
or is the Holy Spirit holy “through participation in another’s sanctity”?81 Didymus is at 
pains to differentiate the Holy Spirit from the angels, and his definition of participation 
depends on a distinction between angels, which are mutable, and the divine nature, which 
is not. Didymus’s linking of the ability to be participated with immutability forms the 
basis of his argument that the Holy Spirit is not an angel. An angel, by definition, can 
change. “The Divine Utterances demonstrate that the angels changed and fell.”82 Most 
angels preserved in blessedness, but “those who were similar in nature to them that 
changed,” so the difference between an angel that falls and one that does not is a 
difference in degree, not kind. It is the nature of an angel to have the capability of “falling 
away.” Angels are capable of conversion, whereas divine nature is not. 
Motivating Didymus’s insistence on the mutability of angels is Origen’s doctrine 
of the pre-existence of rational entities that fell away from their Creator. Origen 
distinguishes between God in which goodness resides naturally, or essentially, and the 
good angels, in which goodness resides as a separable accident.83 In Rufinus’s translation 
of On First Principles, Origen says everything created by God is mutable intrinsically. 
He explains that because  
rational beings . . . were made when before they did not exist, by this very fact 
that they did not exist and then began to exist they are of necessity subject to 
change and alteration. For whatever may have been the goodness that existed in 
their being, it existed in them not by nature but as a result of their Creator’s 
beneficence.”84  
                                                                                                                                            
came after him, Jerome and Ambrose, imagined this precision, which permits the explication of certain 
exceptions in using πνεῦµα without the article by protecting its divine sense.” 
81 Didymus, Spir. 19. 
82 Didymus, Spir. 58: Nam et angelorum conversiones et ruinas divina eloquia demonstrant. 
83 See, for example, Princ. 1.5.3. 
84 Origen, Princ. 2.9.2: Butterworth trans., 130; rationabiles istae naturae…factae sunt cum ante 
non essent, hoc ipso, quia non erant et esse coeperunt, necessario convertibiles et mutabiles substiterunt, 
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Rational entities are created, so they are mutable. Because created rational entities 
possess goodness as a separable attribute, they can lose goodness. Origen opposes the 
fact that rational entities participate in goodness with God’s possession of goodness 
without the possibility of loss.85  
 Returning to Didymus, some were deducing from the Holy Spirit’s low 
ontological status that the Holy Spirit is a created rational entity like the good angels. 
Like those good angels, the Holy Spirit would remain a creature that receives goodness. 
Nevertheless, there would remain the logical possibility that the Holy Spirit could cease 
to possess goodness because the Spirit receives it. The difference between the Angel of 
the Holy Spirit and the rest of the angelic host would be a difference in degree, not kind. 
That the Holy Spirit could change would be a logical consequence of its angelic nature 
and so, theoretically at least, it could fall.  
However, Didymus identifies the Holy Spirit with the divine and immutable 
source of all mutable goods. He makes the identification by defining participation in 
terms of causality, as follows: 
Now because he is good, God is the source and principle of all goods. Therefore 
he makes good those to whom he imparts himself; he is not made good by 
another, but is good. Hence it is possible to participate in him but not for him to 
participate.86 
 
                                                                                                                                            
quoniam quaecumque illa inerat substantiae earum virtus, non naturaliter inerat sed beneficio conditoris 
effecta; GCS p. 165. 
85 Didymus, Spir. 56; note the similarity between Rufinus’s translation of Origen and Jerome’s 
translation of Didymus. Rufinus’s Origen describes the angels as convertibiles, and Jerome’s Didymus 
states that the Holy Spirit is inconvertibile. That Didymus has swayed Rufinus’s translation of Origen is a 
tantalizing prospect. 
86 Didymus, Spir. 17: Deus vero cum bonus sit, fons et principium omnium bonorum est. Facit 
igitur bonos eos quibus se impertit, bonus ipse non factus ab alio, sed subsistens: ideo capabilis, non 
capax. 
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Didymus moves immediately from this definition of God’s goodness as uncaused to an 
application of it to the Son’s divinity. Because Scripture speaks of the Son as God’s 
“wisdom,”  
[the Father’s] only-begotten Son is Wisdom [1 Cor 1.24] and sanctification; he 
does not become wise but makes wise, and he is not sanctified but sanctifies. For 
this reason too it is possible to participate in him but not for him to participate.87 
 
The strategy is to associate the Son with a title (here, “Wisdom”) that suggests the Son is 
a “source” on the same level with God the Father. The Father does not participate in some 
higher goodness; the Son does not participate in some higher “wisdom.” Neither, then, 
can be said to participate. The Son is a source in the same way the Father is. So, too, 
Didymus argues, is the Holy Spirit. If the Holy Spirit is also an immutable, eternal 
substance, then the Holy Spirit cannot be identified with created substances such as 
angels.88 
 Didymus’s argument that the Holy Spirit must be characterized as immutable and 
“participated but not participating” is exegetical. Its contours fit with a polemic against 
Eunomius’s pneumatology in Apology 25. Didymus offers a distinctive case for the Holy 
Spirit’s identity as immutable divine source by showing that Scripture reserves language 
of “pouring forth” (e.g., Romans 5:5, Joel 2:28) for the divine nature alone, as opposed to 
angelic creatures. God sends, and does not “pour forth,” angels, he argues.89  A being that 
is “poured forth” is a being that is “participated in by others.”90 Didymus’s exegesis is 
                                               
87 Didymus, Spir. 17: Unigenitus quoque Filius eius, sapientia et sanctificatio, non fit sapiens, sed 
sapientes facit, et non sanctificatur, sed sanctificat. Unde et ipse capabilis est, et non capax. 
88 Didymus, Spir. 55; DelCogliano, Radde-Gallwitz, Ayres 13. Capabilem substantiam uocat, 
quae capiatur a plurimis et eis sui consortium tribuat; capacem uero eam quae communicatione 
substantiae alterius impleatur, et capiens aliud, ipsa non capiatur ab alio. 
89 Didymus, Spir. 49-50. 
90 Didymus, Spir. 50. Cf. Didymus, Spir. 34: “Therefore, whoever fills all creatures, at least those 
which are able to participate in power and wisdom, is not one of those whom he himself fills. It must be 
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motivated by an alternative reading of Scripture according to which the Holy Spirit is 
itself “filled” by the higher power of Christ. That view belongs to Eunomius. 
In Spir. 31-33, Didymus groups a number of biblical texts that speak of “filling.” 
In order, they are: Luke 1:15 (implebitur), Luke 1:41 (repleta), Luke 1:67 (repletus), Acts 
2:4 (repleti sunt), Acts 4:31 (repleti sunt), Ephesians 5:18 (implemini), Acts 6:3 (plenos), 
and Acts 7:55 (plenus). Of these texts, we are left to guess what Didymus’s Greek might 
have been, but the uniformity in Jerome’s translation is striking: whatever Jerome’s 
biblical text might have been, Didymus had amassed a group of texts that all refer to a 
similar set of terms. If the modern critical text is close to the text Didymus had before 
him, then Didymus was not concerned with a set of terms, but with a single term. In the 
critical edition of these texts, the following forms appear: Luke 1:15 (πλησθήσεται), Luke 
1:41 (ἐπλήσθη), Luke 1:67 (ἐπλήσθη), Acts 2:4 (ἐπλήσθησαν), Acts 4:31 (ἐπλήσθησαν), 
Ephesians 5:18 (πληροῦσθε), Acts 6:3 (πλήρεις), and Acts 7:55 (πλήρης). Didymus is 
making a point about a single term’s Scriptural use. The point hinges on the sense one 
gives to the Greek verb πληρόω and its derivative forms.91 
Usage of the term πληρόω is not widespread in Platonic discourse. Plotinus’s use 
of it in Ennead V.2, alongside his more idiosyncratic vocabulary, is distinctive. So when 
Didymus uses the term to describe the Holy Spirit as an agent, not an object, of its 
activity, the evidence should point us in the direction of Plotinus, not simply the broader 
Platonic tradition. Yet, this fact does not resolve the question of whether Didymus knew 
Plotinus. It only suggests that Plotinus’s terminology motivated Eunomius’s 
                                                                                                                                            
concluded from this that his nature is different from that of all creatures.” This is a form of an argument 
that, whatever else might be said of the Holy Spirit, it differs substantially from creatures. 
91 Athanasius does not apply the terms for “filling” to the Holy Spirit, reserving instead the 
metaphor for “fountain” and “river” to the Father and Son, respectively. Cf. Athanasius, Serap. 1.19.2.4. 
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pneumatology. Recall that the term πληρόω (the root of Plotinus’s ἐπληρώθη) appears 
both in Plotinus and in Eunomius’s statement that the Holy Spirit is filled with the power 
of sanctification and instruction.92 It is also behind Jerome’s Latin translation of Didymus 
when he writes, for example, that “the presence of an angel or some other lofty nature 
that was made fills (non implet) neither the mind nor the understanding since it too is 
filled up (completur) from elsewhere,” or that the Holy Spirit “is not one of those whom 
he himself fills (non est ex his quae ipse complet).”93 
Didymus seizes upon the language of “pouring forth” to argue that any entity that 
is “poured forth is participated in by others.” Because the Holy Spirit is an agent of 
“filling,” the Holy Spirit is to be distinguished from all those entities “whom he himself 
fills.” The language of “pouring forth,” recall, had been reserved by Plotinus for the One 
alone. Only the One “overflows” in Plotinus’ scheme. Porphyry speaks of one substance’s 
“completion” or “filling” (συµπλήροσις) of another substance—both “becoming one with 
the other substance” and not ceasing to be what it is. Behind Porphyry’s logic is a version 
of the doctrine of the “undiminished giver” according to which that “source” imparts its 
qualities without change or loss. By pointing out that Scripture speaks of the Holy Spirit 
as “poured forth,” Didymus can show that Scripture links the Holy Spirit to the 
productive nature of God just as it does the Son. Here it is useful to turn briefly to 
Eusebius of Caesarea.  
Eusebius provides an important link between the Platonist tradition of emanation 
and the debate between Eunomius and Didymus. In an important passage of Proof of the 
Gospel (IV.3), Eusebius covers exegetical ground dear to the legacy of Origen by 
                                               
92 Vaggione trans., 69. Rist (“Basil’s Neoplatonism”) does not notice the reference. 
93 Didymus, Spir. 34. 
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providing his interpretation of Wisdom of Solomon 7:25 and Hebrews 1:3.94 characterizes 
the Son’s begetting from the Father as a “pouring forth,” likening the arrangement to the 
relationship between fragrance and substance. He writes: 
For [the Son] is a breath of the power of God, and a pure effluence of the glory of 
the Creator. For a fragrant breath is poured forth from any sweet-scented 
substance, say from myrrh or any of the flowers and odorous plants that spring 
form the earth, beyond the original substance into the surrounding atmosphere, 
and fills the air far and wide as it is shed forth, without any deprivation, or 
lessening, or scission, or division of the said substance. For it still remains in its 
own place, and preserves its own identity, and though begetting this fragrant force 
it is no worse than it was before, while the sweet odour that is begotten, 
possessing its own character, imitates in the highest degree possible the nature of 
that which produced it by its own [fragrance].95 
 
Eusebius appeals to the doctrine of undiminished giving to argue that the Son’s 
generation from the Father does not deprive the Father in any way.96 He implies that this 
appeal demonstrates that the Son is a “perfect image” of the Father—an image that does 
not alter and so is not inferior to the original Good, God the Father. 
 In context, Eusebius’ logic contradicts itself. He insists that the Son is so perfectly 
similar to the Father by “imitation” that the Son can in no way be said to be “inferior” to 
the Father. Yet he also upholds an eternal distinction between the Father and the Son 
(probably against Marcellus) which implies inferiority insofar as the Son is the unique 
“effect” of a primal cause (the Father). The Son is the “Only-Begotten.” The eternal 
distinction between Father and Son risks becoming a hierarchy of causes insofar as 
Eusebius allows that the second entity “came into being.” Eusebius allows as much even 
if he tries to avoid stating that it is the case without appeal to analogy. “The Father 
                                               
94 For an argument that the constellation of 1 Cor. 1:24, Heb. 1:3, and Wisd. 7:25 is a marker of 
Origen’s influence, see Barnes, The Power of God, 111-112. 
95 Eusebius, d.e., 148d. 
96 Lewis Ayres (“Undiminished Giver,” 63n16) does not cite this passage, but does provide 
Eusebius, p.e. 7.15, as an example of Eusebius’ appropriation of the doctrine of undiminished giving. 
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precedes the Son, and has preceded him in existence, inasmuch as he alone is 
unbegotten,” whereas the Son is “brought into being from all time, nay rather before all 
times, by the Father’s transcendent and inconceivable Will and Power.”97 
 Gregory of Nyssa, in Contra Eunomium III, 6, would exploit the contradiction of 
Eusebius’ scheme by distinguishing, famously, between four senses of “generation” and 
arguing against Eunomius’ reduction of all kinds of generation to a single kind.98 In doing 
so, Gregory involved Eusebius’ Proof of the Gospel in his debate with Eunomius and 
implied that to follow Eunomius was to engage in a reductive appropriation of Eusebius. 
Didymus’ response to Eunomius in On the Holy Spirit shows that the question of 
Eusebius’ legacy was already at stake in 360. For Didymus’ exegetical appeals turn on the 
acknowledgment that identifying a divine person with “pouring out” entails the divine 
identity of that divine person—an insight gleamed from one side of Eusebius’ self-
contradictory exegesis of Hebrews 1:3 and Wisdom 7:25. 
Didymus re-aligns Scripture’s “pouring out” language with the Holy Spirit but 
does not deny its applicability to the Son. He argues explicitly that Scripture reserves a 
special manner of speaking for the Holy Spirit: the Holy Spirit, as opposed to angelic 
entities, is “poured out.” Compared to Athanasius, Basil, and Gregory Nazianzen, only 
Didymus makes much of the fact that Scripture never speaks of God “pouring out” angels 
and reserves such terminology for the Holy Spirit. Didymus argues that if the Holy Spirit 
is nowhere said to be “filled,” and if Scripture additionally speaks of the Holy Spirit as 
“poured out,” the the Holy Spirit cannot be identified with angelic entities, which are 
“sent” but not “poured out.” Positively, the Holy Spirit must be identified with divine 
                                               
97 Eusebius, d.e., 147d and 149b, respectively. 
98 See Michel Barnes, “Contra Eunomium III 6,” in Gregory of Nyssa Contra Eunomium III, ed. 
Johan Leemans and Matthieu Cassin (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 369-82, at 371-78. 
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nature in the same way that the Father and the Son are. If the Holy Spirit is so identified, 
passages like John 16:14, which speak of the Holy Spirit’s “reception” from the Son can 
be read in light of the Holy Spirit’s incorporeal nature: the Spirit receives in the same way 
that the Son gives—immutably and incorporeally.99 
That the Holy Spirit does participate in the Son was an axiom that marked a 
venerable anti-monarchian theological position stretching back at least to Didymus’s own 
intellectual master, Origen. Eunomius could legitimate his pneumatology by direct 
recourse to that tradition’s authority in Eusebius. In opposing Eunomius, Didymus was 
guarding his intellectual master’s legacy against some of its most extreme consequences. 
Only a figure well versed in both Origen’s theology and theological tradition could attain 
such a subtle position.  
 
The Holy Spirit as Untutored Teacher 
 
 
 
 As we have seen, Eunomius argues that the Holy Spirit is “filled with holiness and 
instruction” (ἁγιαστικῆς δὲ καὶ διδασκαλικῆς πεπληρωµένον).100 Didymus responds 
directly to this claim by arguing that the Holy Spirit is not “filled with instruction” but 
receives Wisdom from Christ without having learned.101 Didymus points out that John 
14:26 states that the Holy Spirit is not only the content of instruction; he is the agent of 
instruction. Didymus paraphrases: “The Holy Spirit himself, who has been sent by the 
Father and comes in the name of the Son, will teach all things (docebit omnia = διδάξει 
                                               
99 Cf. Didymus, Spir. 163. 
100 Eunomius, Apol. 25.26. 
101 Didymus, Spir. 140-43. 
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πάντα) to those who are perfect in the faith of Christ.”102 On the basis of this passage, 
Didymus adds a clarifying remark. The Holy Spirit, he says,  
will not teach as an instructor or teacher of a discipline which has been learned 
from another. For this method pertains to those who learn wisdom and the other 
arts by means of study and diligence. Rather, as he himself is the art, the teaching, 
the wisdom, and the Spirit of Truth, he invisibly imparts knowledge of divine 
things to the mind.103  
 
The argument turns on whether the Holy Spirit possesses immediately the divine nature 
common to the Father and the Son, or whether the Holy Spirit receives access to that 
nature by means of an intermediary. If the Holy Spirit is identified with the divine nature 
in the same way that the Father and the Son are, then Scriptural language about the 
Spirit’s “reception” from the Son (e.g., John 16:14) can be read in light of the Holy 
Spirit’s identity as the source and cause of created effects. The Spirit is the “undiminished 
giver.”  
 Didymus maintains Origen’s association of Christ with God’s Wisdom in a number 
of places in On the Holy Spirit. He refers to 1 Corinthians 1:24—which calls Christ the 
“power and wisdom of God”—only twice.104 In both cases, the verse is used to identify 
Christ with Wisdom.  He reasons that what the Apostles “are taught by the Spirit is 
wisdom, which we cannot understand as anything other than the Son.”105  He then turns 
to characterize the Holy Spirit as the “Spirit of Wisdom” and so the Spirit of Christ. 
Wisdom 9:16-18 reads as follows: 
16  We can hardly guess at what is on earth, and what is at hand we find with 
labor; but who has traced out what is in the heavens?  
                                               
102 Didymus, Spir. 140. Cf. John 14:26: ὁ δὲ παράκλητος, τὸ πνεῦµα τὸ ἅγιον, ὃ πέµψει ὁ πατὴρ ἐν 
τῷ ὀνόµατί µου, ἐκεὶνος ὑµᾶς διδάξει πάντα καὶ ὑποµνήσει ὑµᾶς πάντα ἃ εἶπον ὑµῖν ἐγώ. 
103 Didymus, Spir. 141. 
104 Didymus, Spir. 17, 92. 
105 Didymus, Spir. 86. Si ergo Spiritus Patris in apostolis loquitur, docens eos quid debeant 
respondere, et quae docentur a Spiritu sapientia est, quam non possumus aliam praeter Filium intellegere. 
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17  Who has learned your counsel, unless you have given wisdom and sent your 
holy spirit from on high?  
18  And thus the paths of those on earth were set right, and people were taught 
what pleases you, and were saved by wisdom.”  
 
Didymus reads Wisdom 9:16-18 as God’s sending of the Son and the Holy Spirit.106 The 
verse says: “Who has come to know your will, unless you have given Wisdom and sent 
your Holy Spirit from on high?” Didymus is careful to respect what had become, thanks 
to Origen, a strong tradition in Alexandria of associating the Son with the Father’s eternal 
Wisdom. However, he glosses “Wisdom [of God]” as “Only-Begotten Son” so that this 
passage may be taken to refer to the sending of the Spirit and the Son.  
 By highlighting passages that pair the Holy Spirit with God’s Wisdom, Didymus 
moves beyond Origen’s identification of the Son with Wisdom, and he extends the 
association of God’s wisdom to the Father and the Holy Spirit as well. For Didymus, the 
Holy Spirit is the divine “teacher” who makes wise but is not made wise, who teaches 
without having learned. In Spir. 91-95, Didymus offers an expanded argument that the 
Holy Spirit should be characterized in terms of divine Wisdom. God the Father, who is 
Wisdom, both generates Wisdom and makes others wise. Rather than reduce divine 
Wisdom to the Logos, Didymus associates the Father’s eternal production of Wisdom 
with the Son, and the Father’s “making-wise” with the Holy Spirit. The argument is 
premised on the fact that Scripture often speaks of an impartation of divine wisdom to 
creatures, so there must be a divine agent who produces wisdom in created entities. The 
Holy Spirit is that agent of instruction and implementation of the divine Wisdom.  
                                               
106 Spir. 118-119. 
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 Didymus explains that, because the Holy Spirit is one with the divine nature 
shared by the Father and the Son, the Holy Spirit does not learn wisdom and transmit it to 
creatures. He is the wisdom he transmits: 
But [the Holy Spirit] will not teach as an instructor or teacher of a discipline 
which has been learned from another.  For this method pertains to those who learn 
wisdom and the other arts by means of study and diligence. Rather, as he himself 
is the art, the teaching, the wisdom, and the Spirit of Truth, he invisibly imparts 
knowledge of divine things to the mind.107    
 
Didymus thus argues that the Holy Spirit is the very Wisdom that the Son and the Father 
are. The Spirit both teaches Wisdom, i.e., Christ, and is the Wisdom he teaches. This 
argument further strengthens Didymus’s case, against Eunomius, that the Holy Spirit is 
not “filled” with instruction: he is instruction and dispenses wisdom to creatures without 
having it received it from elsewhere. 
 Didymus is careful to exclude the possibility that the Holy Spirit teaches like 
humans teach one another—as having first learned a tradition handed on—and to argue 
that he teaches in the same way that the Father and the Son do:  
In fact, the Father ralso teaches his disciples in this way, as one of those taught by 
him says: God, you have taught me wisdom [Dan 2:23]. And another boldly cries 
out: You have taught me, God, from my youth [Ps. 70:17]. In this way all of them 
have been taught. In addition, the Son of God, who is the Truth and the Wisdom 
of God, teaches those who participate in him in such a way that his instruction is 
imparted, not by some method, but in virtue of who he is by nature. It is for this 
reason that his disciples are taught to call him alone “teacher.” And so, those same 
teachings that the Father and the Son give to the hearts of believers, the Spirit 
provides to those who have stopped living like animals. For the one living like an 
animal does not receive what belongs to the Spirit, thinking that what the Spirit 
says is foolishness [1 Cor. 2:14]. But whoever cleanses his mind of disturbance is 
filled with the teachings of the Holy Spirit (that is, with words of wisdom and 
knowledge), to such an extent that he who has received them says: But God has 
revealed these things through the Holy Spirit [1 Cor. 2:10].108 
 
                                               
107 Spir. 140 
108 Spir. 141-142. 
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So Didymus applies the logic that the Holy Spirit “is participated and does not 
participate” to reading passages where the Holy Spirit is spoken of as a “teacher.” He 
argues that the quelling of passion in the soul is spoken of, in Scripture, as deriving from 
the Holy Spirit through “instruction.” Because the Holy Spirit is the same nature as the 
Father and the Son, the Holy Spirit does not “learn” as a “participant.”  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
Didymus opposes Eunomius’s theology of the Holy Spirit in spite of the fact that 
Eunomius’s pneumatology could have claimed as an ultimate authority Origen’s 
Commentary on John and a well-established anti-monarchian tradition of ordering the 
trinitarian persons hierarchically on the basis of John 16:14. In addition to arguing at 
length and in various ways that the Holy Spirit “is participated but does not participate,” 
Didymus insists that the Holy Spirit “fills” creatures as it is “poured out.” And to be 
“poured out,” Didymus argues, is not a characteristic Scripture attributes to created 
entities like angels. Only the divine nature, and so only the Holy Spirit, can be “poured 
out” in order to “fill” creatures. Didymus’s polemic requires sensitivity to the 
philosophical force of Eunomius’s position. Though he may not have known Plotinus’s 
Enneads, Didymus had to know enough Platonism to recognize a conceptual threat to the 
full divinity of the Holy Spirit when he saw one, and the threat derives from the logic of a 
divine nature that “fills but is not filled.”  
One lesson to take from the case of Didymus’s On the Holy Spirit is that caution 
is appropriate in noticing parallels between fourth-century Christians and Neoplatonic 
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texts. Didymus had a wealth of indirect exposure to Hellenistic philosophy through his 
access to Origen’s writings, as well as the writings that had accumulated in Alexandria’s 
library since Origen’s death. Given the relative lack of contact between Plotinian 
Platonism and Christianity prior to the late fourth century, we should take even more 
caution. If Didymus wrote On the Holy Spirit in 361, he is more likely to have drawn on 
and reacted to Origen’s mediated “Middle Platonism” than Plotinian Platonism, since 
Plotinus’s influence did not penetrate into influential Christian intellectual circles until 
the 380s, beginning with Basil of Caesarea. Yet Didymus should not be dismissed as only 
having absorbed philosophy through “catechetical” means. Though Didymus may not 
have known Plotinus directly, he was shrewd enough to recognize Eunomius’s use of 
Platonism to support a heteroousian pneumatology. Scholarship unaware of connections 
like these could only remain insensitive to them because of a single but important 
presumption that should be abandoned: Didymus the Blind was not a subtle thinker. 
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Chapter 6 
A Single Reception of the Inseparable Trinity 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 In this chapter I detail two distinctive features of Didymus’s “pro-Nicene” 
theology: his commitment to (1) a doctrine of inseparable operations and (2) a pro-
Nicene doctrine of the single power and nature of God. Didymus was one of the first 
Greek-speaking theologians to take this decisive step of arguing in favor of the Trinity’s 
single divine nature. This chapter locates Didymus within a trajectory from Origen to 
Basil of Caesarea. Eunomius provided an impetus for pro-Nicene theologians to develop 
an argument from “inseparable operations” and apply it to the entire trinity, because 
Eunomius extended its inverse to all three persons. Eunomius argued that differentiating 
between the activities of the persons entails that the persons are different substances with 
respectively different natures. Regarding the divinity of the Holy Spirit, Eunomius forced 
an important issue by linking pneumatological prooftexts (e.g. Jn 14:16, Jn 14:26, Jn 
16:14) with a key christological prooftext (Jn 5:19) in Apology 25.  
 I first sketch the features of the “pro-Nicene pneumatology” that results from 
Didymus’s novel application of a doctrine of inseparable operations to all three persons 
of the Trinity. The Holy Spirit is a creative power and divine source in the way the Father 
and the Son are. With Didymus’s pro-Nicene theology in view, we can turn to these key 
texts to see how Didymus’s exegesis of them should be read in opposition to Eunomius’s. 
I first offer a brief history of John 5:19’s utility for portraying the Son as a Demiurgic 
figure, especially in anti-monarchian tradition from Tertullian to Eunomius. I then turn to 
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Didymus’s opposition to Eunomius’s exegesis of two key texts in his Apology: John 5:19 
and John 14:16. Didymus refutes Eunomius’s radicalization of John 5:19, and he offers a 
way around Eunomius’s exegesis of John 14:16. On this point he influences Basil of 
Caesarea’s exegesis of John 14:16.  
 
One Nature, One Power: Didymus’s High Pneumatology 
 
 
 
 I have mentioned Lewis Ayres’ description of the markers of “pro-Nicene” 
theologies. One of those markers is the presence of a doctrine of inseparable operations. 
In addition to this doctrine, Michel Barnes analyzes the development of theologies in the 
third and fourth centuries according to the technical use of “power” in trinitarian 
theologies. I will now show that Didymus possesses both a doctrine of “inseparable 
operation” and a “pro-Nicene” theology of God’s single power.1 I will argue that the 
context for these doctrines is the early pro-Nicene response to Eunomius’s first Apology. 
To begin, then, we should discuss briefly Barnes’s description of “power” theologies, so 
that it will be clear to what extent Didymus may be classified as “pro-Nicene” in terms of 
his use of “power.” I then turn to a reading of key texts at issue between Eunomius and 
Didymus. 
 Barnes defines “pro-Nicene” theologies on the basis of an awareness that “one 
power” theology can be used to support the “one nature” doctrine implied by Nicaea. 
Such pro-Nicene theologies may take their position without danger of a monarchian 
tendency because “one power” theology had been used in the third century in explicit 
                                               
1 Didymus is “pro-Nicene” in such a way that both Barnes and Ayres should recognize, without 
having to enter into a discussion over Barnes’ controversial category, “Neo-Nicene.” For more on this, see 
Ayres, Nicaea, 237-38, and Barnes, Power of God, 169-72. 
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opposition to monarchian theologies in Rome and Carthage.2 Barnes describes three 
“basic doctrines of divine power” from the third through the fourth centuries: (1) an “old” 
Nicene theology of “one power,” in which the Son or Word is the one and only “power of 
God” the Father; (2) a two power theology, in which the only “power of God”—that of 
the Father—is reproduced in a second, “imaged” power—“a power produced by the first 
power”; and (3) a pro-Nicene theology of “one power,” in which there is only one “power 
of God,” and “this single power is the principle of unity in the divine and . . . is possessed 
commonly among the three.”3 Representatives of each group include: (1) old “one 
power”: Marcellus and Athanasius; (2) “two power”: Tertullian, Hippolytus, Origen, 
Eusebius, and Asterius; and (3) pro-Nicene “one power”: Hilary, Ambrose, Gregory of 
Nyssa, and Augustine. I will show that Didymus belongs in group (3) insofar as he hodls 
to a pro-Nicene “one power” theology. 
 
A Theology of Inseparable Operation (ἀχώριστος ἐνεργεία) 
 
 
 
 Before turning directly to the question of Didymus’s theology of “inseparable 
operation,” a note on terminology is appropriate. Jerome translates a term several times 
with inseparabilis/inseparabiliter, and the appearance of this term in the Latin is peculiar 
enough to inquire as to what Didymus’s Greek might have been. A search of the TLG for 
the phrase ἀχώριστος ἐνεργεία reports only a few instances in the fourth century, and all 
but one of them occur in texts associated with, if not authored by Didymus: one in the 
Pseudo-Athanasian Dialogues; two in the Pseudo-Athanasian Contra Sabellianos, one in 
                                               
2 See Michel R. Barnes, “One Nature, One Power: Consensus Doctrine in Pro-Nicene Polemic,” in 
Studia Patristica 29 (1997), 205-23, at 220. 
3 See Barnes, “One Nature, One Power,” 205-206. 
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Pseudo-Basil, Adversus Eunomium, one in a fragment of the Catena on John ascribed to 
Didymus, one in (Ps.-)Didymus De triniate, and one in Gregory of Nyssa’s Contra 
Eunomium.4 Excluding the Pseudo-Athanasian Dialogues and Contra Sabellianos, which 
are as likely to have used Didymus as to have been by Didymus himself, the fragment of 
the Catena on John 5:19 is worth attention.  
If what is said by Jesus, that whatever that one—(clearly “the Father”)—does, 
these things also the Son does likewise [Jn 5:19], refers to the things done 
marvellously by him in the Gospels, one wants to know how the Father did these 
things. To which it must be said: if the Son, being of one substance with the 
Father, has an inseparable activity because he is a spotless mirror of the Father’s 
activity (Wis 7:26), the Son is active simultaneously and inseparably everything 
that the Father does, and what the Son works at, the Father also brings into 
existence immediately, so that in this way neither the Son without the Father nor 
the Father without the Son does anything. This can be seen in the case of created 
things. For when the Father makes things the Son does not bring into being 
different things. For it would follow in this case that [there would be] two suns, 
every one of the beings divided into two beings, but it does not appear that created 
things are like this. So the identity of activity of Father and Son is seen in 
creatures.5  
                                               
4 Ps.-Ath., Dial. PG 28 445.28.45; Ps.-Ath., Contra Sab. PG 28 16.52, PG 28 117.9; Ps.-Basil, AE 
PG 29 761.11; (Ps.-)Didymus, Trin., 2.7.3,14 line 5; Gregory Nyssa, CE 1.1.208.6. Gregory of Nyssa’s use 
of ἀχώριστος ἐνεργεία alone combines the use of these terms with technical philosophical language from 
the commentary tradition on Aristotle. Surprisingly, Alasdair Heron does not include the doctrine of 
inseparable operation as an “orthodox doctrine” advocated by the Didymean texts (cf. Heron, “Trinitarian 
Writings,” Ch. 6, 155-66), yet the doctrine appears in five of the works associated with Didymus. Origen 
uses these terms in proximity only once. See Origen, On Prayer 27.8.21. But here Origen does not describe 
an activity as “inseparable”; he is discussing a Stoic definition of being as “potentially inseparable” from 
qualities. 
5 Joseph Reuss, ed., Johannes-Kommentare Aus Der Griechischen Kirche, (Berlin: Akademie-
Verlag, 1966), fragment 4. I am grateful to Mark DelCogliano for suggestions on how to translate this 
passage (and especially the phrase ἠκολούθει γὰρ τούτῳ δύο ἡλίους καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων διττὸν εἶναι), 
though I take responsibility for it here. I include analysis of only the first half of this fragment, because the 
second half comments not on John 5:19, but on 5:21, and does not appear to be directly related to the 
statement made about John 5:19. This is not to say they are not both by Didymus, or that they did not 
originally occur in sequence, but that one should be cautious. In any event, what Didymus says about John 
5:19 is directly related to the doctrine of “inseparable activity,” whereas what he says about John 5:21 is 
not. Εἰ τὸ λεγόµενον ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ· ἃ γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ποιῇ (δῆλον δὲ ὅτι ὁ πατήρ), ταῦτα καὶ ὁ υἱὸς 
ὁµοίως ποιεῖ, ἀναφορὰν ἔχει πρὸς τὰ παραδόξως ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐν τοῖς εὐαγγελίοις γεγενηµένα, ἐπιστατέον πῶς 
ταῦτα ὁ πατὴρ ἐποίησεν. πρὸς ὃ λεκτέον· ἐπεὶ ὁµοούσιος ὢν τῷ πατρὶ ὁ υἱὸς ἀχώριστον ἐνέργειαν ἔχει τῆς 
τοῦ πατρὸς ἐνεργείας ἀκηλίδωτον ἔσοπτρον ὤν, πᾶν ὅ τι ποιεῖ ὁ πατήρ, ἅµα καὶ ἀχωρίστως ἐνεργεῖ ὁ υἱὸς 
καὶ ὃ ἐργάζεται ὁ υἱός, εὐθὺς καὶ ὁ πατὴρ εἰς ὕπαρξιν ἄγει ὡς κατὰ τοῦτο µήτε τὸν υἱὸν ἄνευ πατρὸς µήτε 
τὸν πατέρα ἄνευ υἱοῦ ποιεῖν τι. ταύτην τὴν θεωρίαν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν δηµιουργηµάτων· οὐ γὰρ ἕτερα κτίζοντος 
τοῦ πατρὸς ἕτερα δὴ οὐσιοῖ ὁ υἱός· ἠκολούθει γὰρ τούτῳ δύο ἡλίους καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων διττὸν 
εἶναι, ἀλλ’ οὐ φαίνεται οὕτως ἔχοντα τὰ κτίσµατα. τὸ ἄρα ταὐτὸν τῆς ἐνεργείας πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ ἐν τοῖς 
κτιζοµένοις θεωρεῖται. Cf. Origen, Cels. 3.72.8, 8.14.10; Jo. 13.25.153.4. 
 202 
 
The terms ἀχώριστος ἐνεργεία do not appear elsewhere in fourth-century Greek theology. 
Didymus’s argumentation in On the Holy Spirit confirms the authenticity of at least the 
first half of this comment in the Catena—the half which concerns John 5:19.6 If Didymus 
wrote On the Holy Spirit around 360-65, then he was the first Greek-speaking pro-Nicene 
theologian to use the term “inseparable activity” to oppose the heteroousian reading of 
John 5:19.  
 Several passages in On the Holy Spirit lead to the conclusion that Didymus belongs 
in the final group, and so belongs to both Ayres’ and Barnes’ classifications of “pro-
Nicene.” Didymus teaches “one power” with the understanding that “one power” means 
“one nature,” and the “one nature” is a divine nature shared by all three persons. As we 
have seen, Didymus states repeatedly that all three persons share a divine nature which is 
“participated in, but does not participate.” Although Didymus makes little explicit 
technical use of terms for “power” (virtus/potestas) in On the Holy Spirit, in a few 
instances Didymus reveals that he knows that “power” and “nature” are terms which 
mutually reinforce one another as markers of divine unity.7  
 An important passage occurs at Spir. 87-92. In Spir. 87, Didymus applies a similar 
logic similar to the Holy Spirit’s Scriptural charcterization as the “finger of God.” 
                                               
6 Ps.-Basil AE V, PG 761, contains a comment based on Didymus’s argument that the entire 
Trinity indwells the soul, and a link between one divine nature and one baptism is explicit: “For when all 
things are worked by God through Jesus Christ in the Holy Spirit, I see an inseparable activity of the 
Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. And through this all the saints are temples of God and Son and the 
Holy Spirit—saints in whom dwells the one divinity and lordliness and one sanctity of the Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit, through the one holiness of baptism.” Ὅταν γὰρ τὰ πάντα ἐνεργῆται ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ διὰ Ἰησοῦ 
Χριστοῦ ἐν Πνεύµατι, ἀχώριστον ὁρῶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ Πατρὸς, καὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ, καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύµατος. 
Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ναοὶ Θεοῦ καὶ Υἱοῦ καὶ Πνεύµατος ἁγίου εἰσὶ πάντες οἱ ἅγιοι, ἐν οἷς οἰκεῖ ἡ µία θεότης, καὶ 
µία κυριότης, καὶ ἁγιότης µία Πατρὸς καὶ Υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου Πνεύµατος, διὰ τὸν ἕνα τοῦ βαπτίσµατος 
ἁγιασµόν. 
7 Most of the occurences of virtus are Jerome’s Latin translation of “virtue,” not “power,” though 
the Latin for both terms is the same. 
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Building upon the idea that the Son is the “hand” of God, Didymus argues that the Holy 
Spirit, too, should be considered the “one power” of God. “Trinity has a single nature and 
power,” he states, as he introduces a number of passages that identify the Holy Spirit as 
the “finger” of God. Here is the full discussion: 
Another scriptural example shows that Trinity has a single nature and power 
(Trinitatis una et natura et uirtus ostenditur). The Son is called the Hand, the 
Arm, and the Right-hand of the Father. Just as we have often taught that these 
terms demonstrate that the one nature lacks difference8 (docuimus ex his 
vocabuilis unius naturae indifferentiam demonstrari), so too is the Holy Spirit 
named the Finger of God because he is conjoined in nature (secundum 
coniunctionem naturae) to the Father and the Son. [88] In one of the Gospels, 
when some were disparaging the miracles of the Lord by saying: He casts out 
demons by Beelzebub, the prince of demons [Lk 11:15], the Savior, asking why 
they said this, replied: If it is by Beelzebub that I cast out demons, by whom do 
your sons cast out demons? But if it is by the Finger of God that I cast out 
demons, then the reign of God has come upon you [Lk 11:19-20]. When writing 
about this same event, another evangelist has the Son say: But if it is by the Spirit 
of God that I cast out demons [Mt 12:28]. These passages show that the Finger of 
God is the Holy Spirit. Therefore, if a finger is joined to a hand and a hand to him 
whose hand it is, then without a doubt the finger is ascribed to the substance (ad 
eius substantiam refertur) of him whose finger it is. [89] But be careful not to 
descend to lowly things, forget what we are now discussing, and thereby depict in 
your mind a variety of bodily limbs and begin to imagine for yourself their sizes, 
their inequalities, and other body parts larger or smaller than they, saying “a finger 
differs in size from a hand by quite a bit and a hand differs likewise from him 
whose hand it is.” For Scripture is speaking here of incorporeal realities, and 
wishes only to demonstrate the unity of a substance, not also its dimensions. [90] 
For just as the hand, through which everything is accomplished and worked (per 
quam cuncta perficit et operatur), is not divided (non diuiditur) from the body, 
and just as the hand belongs to him whose hand it is, so also is the finger not 
separated from the hand of which it is the finger (digitus non separatur a manu 
cuius est digitus). And so, spurn inequalities and dimensions when you think 
about God, and understand the unity that obtains among the finger and the hand 
and the entire body. Now it is by this Finger that the Law was written on tablets of 
stone [cf. Ex 31:18].9  
 
This passage shows that Didymus is familiar with pro-Nicene arguments which began to 
emerge in the 350s, and which responded to anti-Nicene argumentation, which argue for 
                                               
8 cf. Spir. 74. 
9 Spir. 87-90. 
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a single divine nature on the basis of a single power and substance. Didymus’s argument 
bears a tantalizing similarity to that of Hilary, who writes: “by a bodily similitude you 
may learn the power of the one divine nature which is in both [Father and Son]; for the 
nature and the power of the Father is in the Son.”10 When Didymus states that “the one 
nature lacks difference,” he says, “we have taught,” refering back to Spir. 74, which reads 
as follows.  
On the basis of the passages I have brought to our attention (as well as many 
others), we have shown that the Holy Spirit is not a creature and is never 
classified with created things but is rather always placed together with the Father 
and the Son. And so, let us now investigate in what way his is not different from 
either of them.11  
 
Just following this paragraph, the section in which Didymus argues that 2 Cor. 13:13 
proves that there is “a single reception of the Trinity” (una Trinitatis assumptio).12 He 
then states the fact that “there is a single grace of the Father and the Son perfected by the 
activity of the Holy Spirit demonstrates that the Trinity is of one substance.”13 The fact 
that Didymus sets out to show how the Holy Spirit is “not different from” the Father and 
the Son suggests that Didymus is operating in an anti-Eunomian context. His theology of 
the Holy Spirit responds, at any rate, to a heteroousian position. We now turn our 
attention to Didymus’s pro-Nicene theology. 
 
 
 
                                               
10 De trinitate 7.22.48-50. Vt uero per corporalem significationem uirtutem posses eiusdem nosse 
naturae, commemorata est Fili manus manus Patris: quia natura et uirtus Patris esset in Filio. CCSL 62, 
Smulders, ed. See Barnes, “One Nature, One Power,” 216. 
11 Spir. 74. 
12 Spir. 75. 
13 Spir. 76. 
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One Nature: Inseparable Possession as Inseparable Operation 
 
 
 
 Didymus describes the actions of the Son and the Holy Spirit in a way that binds 
their actions to one another, which in turn demonstrates their unity of nature. In several 
places, Didymus characterizes the action of one person in terms that imply and entail the 
divine action of the other.14 To possess the Son, Didymus says, is to possess the Holy 
Spirit, and vice versa. And so it goes with all three: for the Father or Spirit to “indwell” 
the soul is for all three to do so.15 Didymus points out that it was not only the Word that 
came to the prophets, but also the Holy Spirit, “since he too is possessed inseparably with 
the only-begotten Son of God.”16  Didymus extends this logic to the “possession” of the 
Father as well: “he who receives the Son receives the Father, and the Son with the Father 
makes his home in those who are worthy of his presence.”17 
 Didymus also argues that “whenever anyone receives the grace of the Holy Spirit, 
he has it as a gift from God the Father and our Lord Jesus Christ.”18 Didymus’s 
description of inseparable possession is a doctrine of inseparable operation (operatio) that 
demonstrates the unity in substance of the Trinity: “The fact that there is a single grace 
(una gratia) of the Father and the Son perfected by the activity (operatione completa) of 
                                               
14 Didymus introduces the doctrine in Spir. 9 and returns to it in Spir. 125. The reason Didymus 
argues this way is not only to prove the Spirit’s divinity, but also to counteract the doctrine that the Spirit of 
the Prophets and the Spirit of the Apostles are not one and the same Spirit. This argument is the sign of an 
anti-Manichaean polemic in Didymus’ theology, as Didymus is known to have written against Marcionites 
in the late fourth century. For translation and analysis of Didymus’s work Against the Manichees, see 
Byard Bennett, “The Origin of Evil: Didymus the Blind’s Contra Manichaeos and Its Debt to Origen’s 
Theology and Exegesis,” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Saint Michael’s College, Toronto School of 
Theology, 1997. 
15 We will return to the doctrine of “indwelling” in Chapter 7. 
16 Spir. 9; . . . quia et inseparabiliter possidetur cum Vnigenito Filio Dei. 
17 Spir. 125. 
18 Spir. 76. 
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the Holy Spirit demonstrates that the Trinity is of one substance.”19 There is a single 
grace and so there is a single activity of the Trinity. The underlying logic is that there is a 
single giving by God, begun by the Father, continued by the Son, and “completed” by the 
Holy Spirit. The singleness of this activity demonstrates that “the Trinity is of one 
substance,” that the Trinity is single.20  Recall Origen’s similar but ambiguous statement: 
“the Holy Spirit supplies the material of the gifts from God to those who are called saints 
thanks to him and because of participation in him. This material of the gifts which I 
mentioned is made effective from God; it is administered by Christ; but it subsists in 
accordance with the Holy Spirit.”21 Whereas Eunomius, following Eusebius, had used a 
statement like this to argue in favor of the Trinity’s differentiated activities and 
differentiated natures, Didymus uses the scenario to clarify that the Trinity’s gift (gratia) 
is single, and if the gift is single, so too must the Trinity’s substance be one. 
  It is noteworthy that Didymus applies the term “of one substance” (unius 
substantiae) to the entire Trinity.22 In Spir. 87-90 he defends this theory on the grounds of 
the Spirit’s identification as the “finger of God.” He says that “the Son is called the Hand, 
the Arm, and the Right-hand of the Father. Just as we have often taught that these terms 
                                               
19 Spir. 76; Una igitur gratia Patris et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti operatione completa, Trinitas unius 
substantiae demonstrabitur. 
20 As is often the case, Didymus does not make the logic that underlies this argument explicit. The 
logic is that entities that display unified activities must themselves be unified. Or, to put the position 
inversely, unified activities do not arise from plural entities, and the Trinity’s action is single, so the 
Trinity’s substance must be single. 
21 Origen, Jo. 2.77. 
22 See Spir. 81 and 86. If On the Holy Spirit was written ca. 360-62, as is now thought, Didymus 
may have been the first pro-Nicene theologian to state that the Trinity is homoousios. Regarding this issue, 
see also Mark Edwards, “Did Origen Apply the Word Homoousios to the Son?” Journal of Theological 
Studies 49.2 (1998): 658-670, and my discussion of this article in Chapter 4. It is worth noting that, as Mark 
Edwards points out en passent, scholars have used the appearance of an application of the term homoousios 
to the entire Trinity in fragments 14 and 257 of the Catena in Matthaeum. Edwards cites Klostermann, ed., 
Origenes Werke XIII.3.1 (Leipzig, 1941), 21 and 18, and states that the adjective homoousios “pertains on 
both occasions to the whole Trinity, which was unthinkable in Origen’s day” (Edwards, 658n5). It was not 
unthinkable in Didymus’s, and here I suggest we have yet another potential sign of Didymus’s fingerprints 
in the textual tradition of Origen’s texts. 
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demonstrate that the one nature lacks difference, so too is the Holy spirit named the 
Finger of God because he is conjoined in nature to the Father and the Son.”23 In Spir. 87, 
Didymus uses an example from Scripture’s speaking of the Holy Spirit as the “finger” of 
God to argue that “the Trinity has a single nature and power” (Trinitatis una et natura et 
uirtus ostenditur).24  
 Didymus cites several passages which speak of the Holy Spirit as the “Finger of 
God.”25 He concludes that “if a finger is joined to a hand and a hand to him whose hand it 
is, then without a doubt the finger is ascribed to the substance of him whose finger it 
is.”26 Didymus cautions that “Scritpure is speaking here of incorporeal realities, and 
wishes only to demonstrate the unity of a substance, not also its dimensions.”27 Didymus 
uses an argument from the body’s unity to argue for the unity of the three. 
For just as the hand, through which everything is accomplished and worked, is not 
divided from the body, and just as the hand belongs to him whose hand it is, so 
also is the finger not separated from the hand of which it is the finger. And so, 
spurn inequalities and dimensions when you think about God, and understand the 
unity that obtains among the finger and the hand and the entire body. Now it is by 
this Finger that the Law was written on tablets of stone [cf. Ex 31:18].28 
 
Didymus uses his argument to oppose the idea that the finger is “separated from” the 
hand. Analogously, Didymus is working to show that the Holy Spirit is “inseparable” 
from the Father and the Son. 
                                               
23 Spir. 87. 
24 Perhaps Didymus was aware of earlier Latin theology. An argument for “one power from 
common works” was dear to such figures as Tertullian and was “ubiquitous” in Latin theology following 
him (e.g., Novatian, Phoebadius). See Michel Barnes, “Latin Trinitarian Theology,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to the Trinity, ed. Peter Phan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 70-84. 
25 Spir. 88. Luke 11:15, Luke 11:19-20, and Matthew 12:28. 
26 Spir. 88. 
27 Spir. 89. 
28 Spir. 90. Sicut enim manus non dividitur a corpore, per quam cuncta perficit et operator, et in 
eo est cuius est manus, sic et digitus non separator a manu cuius est digitus. Reice itaque inaequalitates et 
mensuras cum de Deo cogitas, et intellege digiti et manus et totius corporis unitatem, quo digito et lex in 
tabulis lapideis scripta est. 
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 Didymus’s choice of comparison with the inscription of the Law by the “same 
Spirit” suggests that he could have had Marcionite views in mind as well as those of 
Eunomius. In either case it is important to note a precedent for this argument for unity in 
the Metaphysics of Aristotle, who also uses the body to describe the kind of unity 
Didymus invokes: a unity of substance.29 In Metaphysics Δ.6, Aristotle explains that “ 
‘one’ means (1) one by accident, (2) one essentially.”30 He then provides the following 
example of things said to be one essentially (καθ’ ἑαυτὰ): 
. . . some are so called because they are continuous, e.g. a bundle is made one by a 
band, and pieces of wood are made one by glue; and a line, even if it is bent, is 
called one if it is continuous, as each part of the body is, e.g. the leg or the arm.31  
 
Aristotle goes on to discuss the various other ways things may be called “one.”32 For our 
purposes, it is important to note the presence in Aristotle’s use of bodily metaphor to 
define “essential (καθ᾽αὐτό)” unity, because Didymus’ purpose in Spir. 87-90 is to back 
up his claim in Spir. 86 that “the Trinity is associated in a unity of substance” (Igitur 
Trinitas substantiae unitate sociatur). Didymus is careful to point out that Scripture “is 
speaking here of incorporeal realities, and wishes only to demonstrate the unity of a 
substance (unitatem . . . substantiae), not also its dimensions.”33 So Didymus has applied 
an Aristotelian argument to a non-Aristotelian definition of “substance.” In effect, 
Didymus has used an Aristotelian definition of substance to underwrite a Platonizing 
definition of the doctrine of undiminished giving. 
                                               
29 That Didymus is familiar with the Aristotelian distinction between substance and accident is 
evident from other passages in On the Holy Spirit, such as Spir. 109-110. 
30 Aristotle, Metaphys. Δ.6.1015b17. Ἓν λέγεται τὸ µὲν κατὰ συµβεβηκὸς τὸ δὲ καθ’αὑτό, κατὰ 
συµβεβηκὸς 
31 Aristotle, Metaphys. Δ.6.1015b35-1016a3. Barnes trans. τῶν δὲ καθ’ ἑαυτὰ ἓν λεγοµένων τὰ 
µὲν λέγεται τῷ συνεχῆ εἶναι, οἷον φάκελος δεσµῷ καὶ ξύλα κόλλῃ· καὶ γραµµή, κἂν κεκαµµένη ᾖ, συνεχὴς 
δέ, µία λέγεται, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν µερῶν ἕκαστον, οἷον σκέλος καὶ βραχίων. 
32 Aristotle, Metaphys. Δ.6.1016a18-1016b17. Barnes trans. 
33 Spir. 89; . . . quia de incorporalibus Scriptura nunc loquitur, unitatem tantum uolens, non etiam 
mensuram substantiae demonstrare. 
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 Next, in Spir. 91-96, Didymus argues from the Spirit’s agency in moral 
transformation and the trinity’s inseparability in the process. I will refer to this idea as a 
doctrine of “inseparable possession.”34 Next, Didymus rebuts Eunomius’s claims by 
showing that the Spirit’s distinct activities do not entail difference in nature.35 In the 
following section, we will also see that Didymus refutes Eunomius’s exegesis of John 
14:16. I will argue that Basil of Caesarea took his cues on this point from Didymus. 
 
One Power: The Holy Spirit, the Power of God 
 
 
 
 In order to support his doctrine of inseparable operation, Didymus shows that 
Scripture speaks of the Holy Spirit as the same divine power as the Father and the Son. A 
good example of this strategy is Didymus’ establishing a link between Acts 1:8 and Luke 
1:35 to interpret Paul’s statements about the “power of God.” Origen had given 
significant weight to the fact that Paul calls Christ “the Power and Wisdom of God” in 1 
Corinthians 1:24.36 Didymus draws attention to another passage in 1 Corinthians 2:4, 
which refers to the “power of God” without stating the identity of the “power,” but which 
mentions the Holy Spirit in such a way that the Holy Spirit could be the “power.”37 In the 
critical edition of the Greek, Paul says: “Both my word and my preaching are not with 
persuasive words of human wisdom,” Paul says, “but with the demonstration of the Holy 
Spirit and the Power (ἐν ἀποδείξει πνεύµατος καὶ δυνάµεως), so that your faith may not 
                                               
34 See Spir. 9; 91-96; 106-109; 125. 
35 Spir. 122. 
36 See Barnes, The Power of God, 111-24. 
37 The Latin virtus appears more than 35 times in On the Holy Spirit, bearing at least the following 
three distinct senses: [1] virtue; [2] angelic power; [3] divine power. 
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be in the wisdom of humans but in the Power of God (ἀλλ᾽ἐν δυνάµει θεοῦ).”38 Didymus 
writes that the Apostle says, “And my word and my preaching are not with persuasive 
words of human wisdom but with the demonstration of the Spirit and the Power of 
God.”39 Here Didymus likely replaces the end of the phrase with and the end of Paul’s 
original sentence. The conflation is important because it reveals the extent to which 
Didymus is trying to show that Paul identifies the Holy Spirit as the “Power of God.”  
 Following this, Didymus glosses the “power” of 1 Corinthians 2:4 as “Christ the 
Lord,” and then quickly redirects our attention to two passages in which Scripture speaks 
of the “power” of the Holy Spirit. This passage (§144-145) is complicated. Here is the 
full quotation:   
[144] It is true that we cannot interpret the power which is equal to the Spirit 
(aequalem . . . Spiritui uirtutem) as another besides Christ the Lord. For he 
himself said to his disciples: For you will receive the power of the Holy Spirit 
when he comes upon you [Act 1:8]. And the archangel said to Mary: The Holy 
Spirit will come upon you, and the Power of the Most High will overshadow you 
[Luke 1:35]. Therefore, when the Holy Spirit came upon the virgin Mary, the 
creating power (creatrix . . . uirtus Altissimi) of the Most High fashioned 
(fabricata est) the body of Christ: using it as a temple, he was born without the 
seed of a man. [145] All this shows that the Holy Spirit is the Creator, as we have 
already shown briefly in our volume On Doctrines. . . . Nor is it particularly 
astonishing if the Holy Spirit is the maker (conditor) of the Lord’s body, since 
along with the Father and the Son he creates all things (creet omnia) which the 
Father and the Son create: Send forth your Spirit, and they are created [Ps 
130:30]. Furthermore, we have already demonstrated at length that the Holy 
Spirit’s activity (operationis) is the same as that of the Father and the Son, and 
that a single substance is implied by the same activity, and, vice versa, that those 
who are ὁµοούσια [the same in substance] do not have an activity that is diverse 
(non . . . diuersam). 
 
Didymus refers to the “creating Power” and argues that, because the Holy Spirit created 
the body of Christ in Mary’s womb. When Didymus says that “we cannot interpret the 
                                               
38 Καὶ ὁ λόγος µου καὶ τὸ κήρυγµά µου οὐκ ἐν πειθοῖς σοφίας λόγοις αλλ᾽ἐν ἀποδείξει πνεύµατος 
καὶ δυνάµεως, ἵνα ἡ πίστις ὑµῶν µὴ ᾗ ἐν σοφίᾳ ἀνθρώπων ἀλλ᾽ἐν δυνάµει θεοῦ. 
39 Spir. 143. Et sermo meus et praedicatio mea non in persuasibilibus humanae sapientiae uerbis, 
sed in ostensione Spiritus et uirtutis Dei. 
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power which is equal to the Spirit as another besides Christ the Lord,”40 he is referring, 
most likely, to Paul’s reference to “the Spirit and the power of God,” which, curiously, is 
implied to mean a power “equal to” the Spirit.   
 A plausible link between the “power of the Holy Spirit” in Acts 1:8 and the “power 
of the Most High” of Luke 1:35 strengthens Didymus’ case. In Acts 1:8, Jesus tells the 
disciples that “you will receive the power of the Holy Spirit when he comes upon you.”41 
Didymus seizes upon the words “when he comes upon you” (ἐπελθόντος . . . ἐφ᾽ὑµᾶς) to 
link Acts 1:8 with Luke 1:35. Luke 1:35 states that “the Holy Spirit will come upon you 
(ἐπελεύσεται ἐπὶ σὲ), and the power of the Most High (δύναµις ὑψίστου) will 
overshadow you.”42 The two verses do not say the same thing about the Holy Spirit, but 
by juxtaposing them Didymus can imply that the Holy Spirit is the “power of the Most 
High.” If the Holy Spirit is that power, Didymus may conclude: “the creating power of 
the Most High fashioned the body of Christ.”43 Scripture singles out the Holy Spirit as the 
creator when it speaks of the production of Christ’s body in Mary’s womb; in this case, 
Scripture does not speak of Christ as creating his own body, but it does speak of Mary as 
conceiving “by the power of the Holy Spirit.” Didymus thus shows that the Holy Spirit 
“creates.”  
 Jerome’s Latin of Didymus’ version does not report the standard wording of Acts 
1:8. Jerome’s Latin reads accipietis enim uirtutem Spiritus Sancti uenientem super uos. In 
turning to the critical text of the New Testament, we find “but you will receive power 
                                               
40 aequalem uero Spiritui uirtutem non possumus aliam praeter Christum Dominum interpretari. 
The phrasing echoes Didymus’ statement to similar effect in Spir. 86. 
41 ἀλλὰ λήµψεσθε δύναµιν ἐπελθόντος τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύµατος ἐφ᾽ὑµᾶς καὶ ἔσεσθέ µου µάρτυρες ἔν 
τε Ἰερουσαλὴµ καὶ ἐν πάσῃ τῇ Ἰουδαίᾳ καὶ Σαµαρείᾳ καὶ ἕως ἐσχάτου τῆς γῆς. 
42 . . . πνεῦµα ἅγιον ἐπελεύσεται ἐπὶ σὲ καὶ δύναµις ὑψίστου ἐπισκιάσει σοι. 
43 Spir. 144. Creatrix igitur uirtus Altissimi, Spiritu Sancto superueniente in uirginem Mariam, 
Christi corpus est fabricate: quo ille usus temple, sine uiri natus est semine. 
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when the Holy Spirit has come upon you (ἀλλὰ λήµψεσθε δύναµιν ἐπελθόντος τοῦ ἁγίου 
πνεύµατος ἐφ᾽ὑµᾶς).” Notice that in our Greek, there is a genitive phrase: “the power of 
the Holy Spirit,” whereas in Jerome’s Latin the “power” (uirtutem) is modified by a 
participle (uenientem), which implies that the “power” comes upon the disciples. The 
difference is subtle but potentially important. Didymus’ version of the biblical text allows 
him to distinguish between the “power of the Holy Spirit” and “the Holy Spirit,” and then 
to emphasize the Holy Spirit’s identification as the divine “power.”44 As the translators 
note, “in the standard text it is ‘the Holy Spirit’ who comes upon the disciples. Here, it is 
‘the power of the Holy Spirit’ which does.”45 On the other hand, Didymus interprets Luke 
1:35 as meaning that “when the Holy Spirit came upon the virgin Mary, the creating 
power of the Most High fashioned the body of Christ.” In both cases, then, Didymus 
distinguishes between the “creating power of the Most High” or the “power of the Holy 
Spirit,” on the one hand, and the Holy Spirit as such. In the case of the disciples, the 
Power comes upon them, but in the case of Mary, the Holy Spirit comes upon her. And 
yet in both cases the Holy Spirit is associated with the “power of God.” Instead, Didymus 
is associating the term power with the Holy Spirit by conflating these two important 
passages. Didymus wants to show that the Holy Spirit is the same “power and nature” as 
the Father and the Son.  
 So Didymus associates 1 Corinthians 2:4, Acts 1:8, and Luke 1:35 with “the 
creating power of the Most High,” and he distinguishes the “power of the Holy Spirit” 
from the angelic powers.46 Next Didymus invokes Psalms 103 and 130 to identify the 
                                               
44 On “power” as a key marker of divine nature among Nicene theologians, see Barnes, The Power 
of God, 220-59. 
45 Works on the Spirit, 188n121. 
46 At Spir. 23.4 and 58.3, Didymus distinguishes an “angelic power.” See also Spir. 30. 
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Holy Spirit as “Creator.” “Nor it is particularly astonishing if the Holy Spirit is the maker 
of the Lord’s body, since along with the Father and the Son he creates all things which the 
Father and the Son create: Send forth your Spirit, and they are created [Ps 130.30].”47  
And, if the Holy Spirit is to be identified with God’s “creating power,” Didymus can 
show that the Holy Spirit plays an essential role in creation: the Holy Spirit creates the 
body of the Son. Didymus concludes this section by invoking his earlier arguments for 
the consubstantiality of the Trinity:  
. . . the Holy Spirit’s activity is the same as that of the Father and the Son,” and “a 
single substance is implied by the same activity, and, vice versa, . . . those who are 
ὁµοούσια [the same in substance] do not have an activity that is diverse.48 
 
In these two compressed paragraphs of Spir. 144-45, Didymus unites a theology of “one 
power” and a doctrine of inseparable operation to support a pro-Nicene theology of the 
trinity. 
 
Key Texts: Didymus and Eunomius on John 5:19 and John 14:16 
 
 
 
 So far we have seen Didymus’ pro-Nicene commitment to a doctrine of inseparable 
operations and a single power and nature of divinity. I will now argue that Didymus 
opposed the exegesis of two key texts linked by Eunomius’s Apology. John 16:13 and 
John 5:19 both say that the Holy Spirit and the Son do not act “on [their] own accord” 
(ἀφ᾽ἑαυτοῦ). Eunomius quotes the phrase ἀφ᾽ἑαυτοῦ:  
he who creates by his own power is entirely different from him who does so at the 
Father’s command and acknowledges that he can do nothing of his own accord 
                                               
47 Spir. 145. 
48 Spir. 145; cf. Spir. 81-86. 
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(ἀφ᾽ἑαυτοῦ), just as the one who is worshipped is different from the one who 
worships.49  
 
In Spir. 160-161, Didymus applies a pro-Nicene reading of John 5:19—that activities 
reveal nature, and that the activities are one—to John 16:13.  
Next, so that no one separates the Holy Spirit from the will and fellowship of the 
Father and the Son, it is written: For he will not speak on his own accord, but he 
will speak as he hears [Jn 16.13]. The Savior said something similar to this about 
himself: As I hear, so I judge [Jn 5.30]. And elsewhere: The Son is not able to do 
anything on his own accord, but only what he sees the Father doing [Jn 5.19]. For 
if the Son of the Father is one, not according to the error of Sabellius who 
confuses the Father and the Son, but according to their inseparability of essence or 
substance, then he is unable to do anything without the Father. The works of 
separate individuals are distinct, but when the Son sees the Father working, he is 
himself also working, yet working not in a second rank and after him. After all, 
the works of the Son would begin to diverge from those of the Father if they were 
not performed by equals.50 
  
I argued in Chapter 5 that Didymus opposed Eunomius’s exegesis of John 16:14. In this 
chapter I focus on the case of John 5:19, a text which featured in previous anti-
monarchian tradition, and a text Eunomius uses to support his heteroousian theology. In 
addition to John 5:19, I will argue that Didymus opposes Eunomius’s exegesis of another 
key text at stake in the debate with heteroousian theology: John 14:16. I will also suggest 
that Didymus influenced Basil’s reading of this verse. 
 
John 5:19, Numenius, and the Demiurgic Son 
 
 
 
 Jesus says in John 5:19, “Truly, truly, I tell you: the Son is not able to do anything 
by himself except what he sees the Father doing; for whatever that one does, the Son also 
                                               
49 Eunomius, Apol. 20.21-2. 
50 Spir. 160-61. 
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does likewise.”51 This passage supported a number of anti-monarchian arrangements of 
the Son as Demiurge. Consider Tertullian, for example.52 Though Tertullian is known 
more for his knowledge and use of Stoicism, his acquaintance with Platonism is not 
lacking in evidence. Against Praxeas shows him giving a Demiurgic reading to John 
5:19, which provides Tertullian evidence of a “handing on” of monarchy from the Father 
to the Son.53 He combines John 5:19 with John 1:3 to argue that the Son acts by 
observing the Father:  
. . . our case stands, that from the beginning he always was seen who was seen at 
the end, and that he was not seen at the end who from the beginning had not been 
seen, and that thus there are two, one seen and one unseen. Therefore it was the 
Son always who was seen and the Son always who conversed and the Son always 
who worked, by the authority and will of the Father, because The Son can do 
nothing of himself, unless he have seen the Father doing it—doing it, of course in 
his consciousness. For the Father acts by consciousness, whereas the Son sees and 
accomplishes that which is in the Father’s consciousness. Thus all things were 
made by the Son, and without him nothing was made.54 
 
Tertullian draws on the same Platonic commonplace of model and copy Origen used in 
the Commentary on John.55 He draws attention to his own understanding of what it 
means for the Son to “see” the Father and act accordingly. The Father acts in sensu, “in 
mind.”56 Evans’ translation of “consciousness” corroborates the Demiurgic picture of 
Middle Platonism exemplified by Numenius, who says that “the First God is the Good 
                                               
51 ἀµὴν ἀµὴν λέγω ὑµῖν, οὐ δύναται ὁ υἱὸς ποιεῖν ἀφ᾽ἑαυτοῦ οὐδὲν ἐὰν µή τι βλέπῃ τὸν πατέρα 
ποιῦντα· ἃ γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ποιῇ, ταῦτα καὶ ὁ υἱὸς ὁµοίως ποιεῖ. 
52 See Tertullian, Prax. 4, 15, and 21. 
53 Prax. 4.1. Tertullian’s arrangement here invites application of John 16:14 to the continuing 
“reception” by the Holy Spirit of the same “monarchy”—a move to be made by Eusebius, as we will see. 
54 Prax. 15 (Evans ed., page 108, lines 6-15): constat eum semper visum ab initio qui visus  fuerit 
in fine, et eum nec in fine visum qui ne cab initio fuit visus, et ita duos esse, visum et invisum. filius ergo 
visus est semper et filius conversatus est semper et filius operatus est semper, ex auctoritate patris et 
voluntate, quia Filius nihil semetipso potest facere nisi viderit patrem facientem—in sensu scilicet 
facientem. pater enim sensu agit, filius vero quod in patris sensu est videns perficit. sic Omnia per fililum 
facta sunt et sine illo factum est nihil; Evans trans., 153 (modified). 
55 See Plato, Tim. 28b and discussion in Chapter 2. 
56 Lewis and Short (s.v.) lists mens and ratio as synonyms for sensus. 
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itself, but the Demiurge is good by imitating the First God.”57 Similarly, the Son observes 
the Father and replicates his thought by acting: the Son creates, or actualizes, the Father’s 
thoughts by imitating the Father in obedience.58 
Novatian interprets John 5:19 in the same terms. He calls the Son the “imitator of 
the Father’s activities and power” (imitator paternorum operum atque uirtutum), a title 
that invokes a similar arrangement.59 The Demiurge creates on the basis of privileged 
access to a more basic, more elevated divinity. When Clement comments on John 5:19, 
he cites Colossians 1:15 to strengthen the Demiurgic picture provided by Numenius. 
According to Numenius, a First God, roughly equivalent with Aristotle’s first Principle, 
Nous, does not act, but thinks; the second God creates. Numenius provides a description 
of the relationship between the First and Second Gods which would tempt Christians to 
                                               
57 Numenius, Frag. 16.14-15, ed. Des Places. ὁ µὲν πρῶτος θεὸς αὐτοάγαθον, ὁ δὲ τούτου µιµητὴς 
δεηµιουργὸς ἀγαθός.  
58 Eusebius quotes Fragment 16 in p.e. 11.22.3-5.  Εἰ δ’ ἔστι µὲν νοητὸν ἡ οὐσία καὶ ἡ ἰδέα, 
ταύτης δ’ ὡµολογήθη πρεσβύτερον καὶ αἴτιον εἶναι ὁ νοῦς, αὐτὸς οὗτος µόνος εὕρηται ὢν τὸ ἀγαθόν. Καὶ 
γὰρ εἰ ὁ µὲν δηµιουργὸς θεός ἐστι γενέσεως, ἀρκεῖ τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὐσίας εἶναι ἀρχή. Ἀνάλογον δὲ τούτῳ µὲν ὁ 
δηµιουργὸς θεός, ὢν αὐτοῦ µιµητής, τῇ δὲ οὐσίᾳ ἡ γένεσις, ἣ εἰκὼν αὐτῆς ἐστι καὶ µίµηµα. Εἴπερ δὲ ὁ 
δηµιουργὸς ὁ τῆς γενέσεώς ἐστιν ἀγαθός, ἦ που ἔσται καὶ ὁ τῆς οὐσίας δηµιουργὸς αὐτοάγαθον, σύµφυτον 
τῇ οὐσίᾳ. Ὁ γὰρ δεύτερος διττὸς ὢν αὐτοποιεῖ τήν τε ἰδέαν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τὸν κόσµον, δηµιουργὸς ὤν, ἔπειτα 
θεωρητικὸς ὅλως. Συλλελογισµένων δ’ ἡµῶν ὀνόµατα τεσσάρων πραγµάτων τέσσαρα ἔστω ταῦτα· ὁ µὲν 
πρῶτος θεὸς αὐτοάγαθον· ὁ δὲ τούτου µιµητὴς δηµιουργὸς ἀγαθός· ἡ δ’ οὐσία µία µὲν ἡ τοῦ πρώτου, 
ἑτέρα δ’ ἡ τοῦ δευτέρου· ἧς µίµηµα ὁ καλὸς κόσµος, κεκαλλωπισµένος µετουσίᾳ τοῦ καλοῦ. “Now if 
essence and the idea is discerned by the mind, and if it was agreed that the mind is earlier than this and the 
cause of it, then mind itself is alone found to be the good. For if God the Creator is the beginning of 
generation, the good is the beginning of essence. And God the Creator is related to the good, of which He is 
an imitator, as generation is to essence, of which it is a likeness and an imitation. For if the Creator who is 
the author of generation is good, the Creator also of essence will doubtless be absolute good, innate in 
essence. For the second god, being twofold, is the self-maker of the idea of Himself, and makes the world 
as its Creator: afterwards He is wholly given to contemplation. Now as we have by our reasoning gathered 
names for four things, let them be these four. The first, God, absolute good; His imitator, a good Creator: 
then essence, one kind of the first God, another of the Second; and the imitation of this essence, the 
beautiful world, adorned by participation in the beautiful.” I refer to the collection of fragments by E. Des 
Places, ed., Numénius: Fragments (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1974). For an English translation of many of 
these fragments, though from a different edition, see Kenneth Guthrie, Numenius of Apamea, the Father of 
Neo-Platonism; Works, Biography, Message, Sources, and Influence (London, Grantwood, N. J: G. Bell 
and sons, 1917). Though I have consulted Guthrie’s translation, I have made enough unmarked changes to 
shoulder responsibility for the Greek translated in the pages to follow. 
59 This quotation is from Novatian, Trin. 21.3. Novatian refers to Jn 5:19, to similar effect, at Trin. 
14.12, 21.3, 22.3, 28.15, and 31.15. 
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construe John 5:19 in similar terms. He says that “the creating God is related (Ἀνάλογον) 
to the good, of which He is an imitator (µιµητής), as generation is to essence, of which it 
is an image and an imitation (εἰκὼν αὐτῆς ἐστι καὶ µίµηµα).”60 Numenius describes the 
Second God’s being an “image” in terms of “imitation.”  
Now as we have by our reasoning gathered names for four things, let them be 
these four. The first, God, absolute good; His imitator, a good Creator: then 
essence, one kind of the first God, another of the Second; and the imitation of this 
essence, the beautiful world, adorned by participation in the beautiful.61 
 
Clement and Origen both draw on Numenius in order to make sense of John 5:19, but to 
different effects. According to Clement, John 5:19 means that the Son reveals the “Name 
of God” because  
as the Son sees the goodness of the Father, God the Savior works, being called the 
first principle of all things, which was imaged forth from the invisible God first, 
and before the ages, and which fashioned all things which came into being after 
itself.62 
 
Here Clement appeals to John 5:19 to depict the Son as the Platonic Demiurge: as the 
Son sees the “goodness of the Father, God the Savior works,” and his work is to make all 
things. Note that Clement uses Colossians 1:15 to strengthen the relationship between the 
Son’s imitation of the Father and his being “image of the invisible God” (Col 1:15).  
 Origen takes a step beyond Clement by using John 5:19 to articulate a doctrine of 
“common operation,” as follows:  
. . . as regards the power of his works, then, the Son is in no way whatever 
separate or different from the Father, nor is his work anything other than the 
Father’s work, but there is one and the same movement, so to speak, in all they do 
(sed unus atque idem, ut ita dicam, etiam motus in omnibus est); consequently 
                                               
60 Numenius, Frag. 16, 6-8 
61 Numenius, Frag. 16, 14-17. 
62 Clement, Strom. 5.38.7. ὄνοµα δὲ εἴρηται θεοῦ. ἐπεί, ὡς βλέπει τοῦ πατρὸς τὴν ἀγαθότητα, ὁ 
υἱὸς ἐνεργεῖ, θεὸς σωτὴρ κεκληµένος, ἡ  τῶν ὅλων ἀρχή, ἥτις ἀπεικόνισται µὲν ἐκ “τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου” 
πρώτη καὶ πρὸ αἰώνων, τετύπωκεν δὲ τὰ µεθ’ ἑαυτὴν ἅπαντα γενόµενα. ANF trans., 455. The only place 
Clement mentions Jn 15:9 is Strom. 1.12.3, where Clement places emphasis on the fact that the Son always 
does what he sees the Father doing as an example of Wisdom’s eternal productivity. 
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[Solomon] has called him an “unspotted mirror,” in order to make it understood 
that there is absolutely no dissimilarity between the Father and the Son. Some 
indeed have said that the Son’s acts are to be compared with a pupil’s work in 
likeness to or imitation of his master, or that such things as the Father has first 
formed in their spiritual essence are made by the Son in bodily material; yet how 
can these opinions be reconciled with the Gospel, which says, not that the Son 
does like things, but that he does the same things (eadam) in like manner?63 
 
Origen makes his case by seizing upon the Greek word ὁµοίως in John 5:19. The point is 
that the Father and the Son enact the same activity in similar ways. Origen wants to show 
that one cannot use this verse to differentiate the activities of the Father and the Son: they 
have the same object as their end. One may only differentiate the manner in which they 
pursue this same end. So Origen leaves open the possibility of a single, common activity 
shared by the Father and the Son, and he leaves open the possibility of differentiated 
modes of operation or activities.64  
 Origen’s reading of John 5:19 is a “fugitive beginning” of a doctrine of common 
operations, because Origen’s emphasis on the identity of the Father and Son’s activity in 
creation does not preclude the possibility that the Son is the Father’s instrument in the act 
of creation. If the Son and Father share a “common operation,” it may not be because 
they share the same nature but because they do not. Furthermore, Origen could be cited in 
favor of an opposing doctrine that differentiates the operations of the three. “The Holy 
Spirit supplies the material of the gifts from God,” he says, “to those who are called 
saints thanks to him and because of participation in him. This material of the gifts which I 
                                               
63 Butterworth trans., 26-27 (modified); Origen, Princ. 1.2.12. Quoniam ergo in nullo prorsus 
filius a patre virtute operum inmutatur ac differ, nec aliud est opus filii quam patris, sed unus atque idem, 
ut ita dicam, etiam motus in omnibus est: idcirco “speculum” eum “immaculatum” nominavit, ut per hoc 
nulla omnino dissimilitudo filii intellegatur ad patrem. Ea sane quae secundum similitudinem vel 
imitationem discipuli ad magistrum a quibusdam dicta sunt, vel quod in material corporali ea a filio fiant, 
quae a patre in substantiis spiritalibus prius fuerint deformata, convenire quomodo possunt, cum in 
evangelio filius dicatur non similia facere, sed eadem “similiter” facere? 
64 Determining the polemical horizon of this passage is difficult. It could respond to a Marcionite 
position that divides the work of the Son from the work of the God of the Old Testament, the Father. On the 
other hand, Origen might have in mind a Gnosticizing reading of John 5:19. 
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mentioned is made effective from God; it is administered by Christ; but it subsists in 
accordance with the Holy Spirit.”65 In a related passage in On First Principles, the three 
have their own spheres of activity: the Father creates, the Son provides rationality, and 
the Spirit makes creatures holy.66 Creatures “obtain first of all their existence from God 
the Father, and secondly their rational nature from the Word, and thirdly their holiness 
from the Holy Spirit.”67  These statements differentiate between the activities of the three, 
and they make sense as an element of Origen’s anti-monarchian polemic.68 Origen’s 
reading of John 5:19 should be contextualized as an attempt to speak of continuity 
between the Father and the Son, but not a continuity that entails that the Father and Son 
share the same nature. 
Origen’s fourth-century readers drew on his differentiation of the activities of the 
three to oppose pro-Nicene monarchianism. Eusebius invokes a similar arrangement, and 
Eunomius follows him. Eusebius uses the Middle Platonic picture that emerges from his 
reading of John 5:19—evident in both the History of the Church and the Preparation for 
the Gospel—to oppose Marcellus.69 In the Preparation for the Gospel, after having 
reproduced a string of references to the First and Second Gods as Primal Good and 
Demiurge from Numenius’ On the Good, Eusebius does not feel obliged to explain 
himself when he states that  
Also the Word of our Salvation says, “The Son can do nothing of Himself, but 
what He seeth the Father doing.” Enough, however, has been said by Numenius 
                                               
65 Origen, Jo. 2.77. Οἶµαι δὲ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦµα τήν, ἵν’ οὕτως εἴπω, ὕλην τῶν ἀπὸ θεοῦ χαρισµάτων 
παρέχειν τοῖς δι’ αὐτὸ καὶ τὴν µετοχὴν αὐτοῦ χρηµατίζουσιν ἁγίοις, τῆς εἰρηµένης ὕλης τῶν χαρισµάτων 
ἐνεργουµένης µὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, διακονουµένης δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ὑφεστώσης δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦµα. 
66 Origen, Princ.1.3.7-8. 
67 Origen, Princ. 1.3.8; Butterworth trans., 38. Cum ergo primo ut sint habeant ex deo patre, 
secundo ut raionabilia sint habeant ex verbo, tertio ut sancta sint habeant ex spiritu sancto. 
68 See Chapter 3 for more on this aspect of Origen’s assignment of distinct and appropriate 
activities to the three. 
69 See Eusebius, h.e. 10.4.25; p.e. 11.18.25. 
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on this subject: and there is no need to add anything to his own words to show 
that he was explaining not his own opinions but Plato’s.70 
 
The location of this statement in the Praeparatio is telling. It occurs in the momentous 
Book 11, which includes Eusebius’s arguments that Moses and Plato can be harmonized, 
as well as a number of extensive extracts from Numenius and Plotinus on the first and 
second causes. In fact, Book 11 is the single most significant source for textual 
reconstruction of Numenius’ lost On the Good.71 Eusebius provides the majority of what 
remains of the work in the Praeparatio, and Book 11 is the most concentrated book of 
Numenius’ fragments within the Praeparatio.72 It is telling, then, that Eusebius cites John 
5:19 in this context. His citation of the text here suggests that he viewed John 5:19 as a 
key instance of Scripture’s testimony to the Son as the “Second Cause” in Platonic terms. 
All of Eusebius’ quotations of Numenius occur in the Praeparatio evangelica, but his use 
of Numenius extends to Eusebius’s anti-Marcellan works. Eusebius “the apologist” 
cannot be played off against Eusebius “the dogmatician.”  
 The Ecclesiastical Theology reproduces Eusebius’ interpretation of John 5:19 in a 
non-“apologetic” context. Eusebius uses John 5:19 to distinguish between Father and Son 
on Platonic ground twice, for example, in Ecclesiastical Theology 3.3-5. This extended 
passage is situated within a section in which Eusebius subordinates the Holy Spirit to the 
                                               
70 Eusebius, p.e. 11.18.25. 
71 On a useful analysis of what remains of this interesting but unfortunately lost work, see Lloyd 
Gerson, From Plato to Platonism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), 210-223. To see Numenius 
within the broader context of “Middle Platonism,” see John Dillon, The Middle Platonists: 80 B.C. to A.D. 
220, 1996 ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), 361-78. 
72 The chief sources for Des Places’s Budé edition of the fragments of Numenius, in order of 
number of citations, most to fewest, are: Eusebius (26); Porphyry (9); Proclus (9); Origen (4); Iamblichus 
(4). In order to place the significance of the extracts contained in Praep. 11 in perspective, it helps to notice 
that the Praeparatio contains fifteen quotations from Numenius, more than the number of quotations of 
Numenius by Iamblichus and Proclus combined. See Des Places, 147-149.  
 221 
Son on the basis of John 16:14—a verse Eunomius obliquely references in Apology 
20.22, also reading it in light of John 5:19. Here is Eusebius:  
But even before the very heavens and those things that are beyond heaven and all 
things in heaven were created (for all things taken together have been shown to 
come from one [source]), the Son of God existed, and was present to and together 
with the Father when He was still contemplating the establishment of all these 
things. For this reason He says, “When He established the heavens, I was there.”73 
Thus like a good painter, taking the archetypal ideas from the Father’s 
calculations, He transferred them to the substance of the works, sculpting and 
giving specific shape to such things, just as He had seen them lying beforehand in 
the Father’s mind. And that He Himself would be a worthy witness of these 
things, He teaches in the gospels in this way: “Truly, truly, I say to you, the Son 
can do nothing of His own accord, but only what He sees the Father doing; for 
whatever He does, that the Son does likewise. For the Father loves the Son and 
shows Him all that He Himself is doing.”74 For this reason, one would quite 
rightly inquire how the Son creates for a second time the things that have once 
been created by the Father. But He Himself resolved that concern, having said, 
“For whatever the Father does, that the Son does likewise.”75 Therefore the things 
that are created by the Son are exactly like the archetypal works that pre-exist in 
the ineffable calculations of the Father. Observing them closely, then, in the mind 
of the Father, the Son made copies of the things He had seen. He showed that He 
looked into the depths of the Father and that this was a work of the Father’s love 
in the next section where He also says clearly, “For the Father loves the Son, and 
shows Him all that He Himself is doing.”76 Consequently, when the Father reveals 
His secrets, the Son, seeing them, completed through those works the works of the 
Father’s will. Therefore co-existing in this way with the Father and being present 
to Him when He was preparing the heavens and what went with it, He taught this, 
saying “When He established the heavens, I was there.”77 The Father rejoiced 
even before the creation of the cosmos, looking at His own only-begotten Son and 
discerning Himself in Him as in an image.78  
                                               
73 Prov. 8:24. 
74 John 5:19-20. 
75 John 5:19. 
76 John 5:20. 
77 Prov. 8:24. 
78 Eusebius, e.th. 3.3.53-57. πλὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὶν γενέσθαι αὐτὸν τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὰ ἐπέκεινα 
οὐρανοῦ τά τε ἐν οὐρανῷ πάντα (ἐξ ἑνὸς γὰρ τὰ πάντα περιληπτικῶς δεδήλωται) ἦν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ τῷ 
πατρὶ παρῆν τε καὶ συνῆν ἔτι βουλευοµένῳ περὶ τῆς τούτων ἁπάντων συστάσεως. διό φησιν “ἡνίκα 
ἡτοίµαζεν τὸν οὐρανόν, συµπαρήµην αὐτῷ.” εἶθ’ ὡς ἀγαθὸς γραφεὺς τὰς ἀρχετύπους ἰδέας ἐκ τῶν 
πατρικῶν λογισµῶν ἀπολαµβάνων ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν ἔργων µετέφερεν οὐσίας, τοιαῦτα ζωοπλαστῶν καὶ 
ὑφιστάµενος, (54.) ὁποῖα τῇ τοῦ πατρὸς διανοίᾳ προϋποκείµενα ἑώρα. τούτων δ’ αὐτὸς γένοιτ’ ἂν µάρτυς 
ἀξιόχρεως, ἐν Εὐαγγελίοις ὧδε διδάσκων· “ἀµὴν ἀµὴν λέγω ὑµῖν, οὐ δύναται ὁ υἱὸς ποιεῖν ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ 
οὐδέν, ἐὰν µή τι βλέπῃ τὸν πατέρα ποιοῦντα· ἃ γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ποιῇ, ταῦτα καὶ (55.) ὁ υἱὸς ὁµοίως ποιεῖ. ὁ 
γὰρ πατὴρ φιλεῖ τὸν υἱὸν καὶ πάντα δείκνυσιν αὐτῷ ἃ αὐτὸς ποιεῖ.” ἔνθα τις εἰκότως ζητήσειεν ἂν πῶς τὰ 
ἅπαξ ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς γεγονότα ὁ υἱὸς αὖθις ποιεῖ; ἐπελύσατο δ’ αὐτὸς τὸν λόγον εἰπὼν “ἃ γὰρ ἂν ὁ πατὴρ 
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Eusebius here uses John 5:19 to portray the Son in Demiurgic terms, applying the 
familiar theme of the Demiurge’s looking to a transcendent Paradigm in the act of 
creating.79 The relationship between Father and Son resembles that of Numenius’s 
primary Being and the Nous: “Thus like a good painter, taking the archetypal ideas from 
the Father’s calculations, He transferred them to the substance of the works, . . . just as 
He had seen them lying beforehand in the Father’s mind.”81 Eusebius calls the Son a 
“good painter” (ἀγαθὸς γραφεὺς).82 The Son’s Demiurgic position explains Jesus’s 
statement, in John 5:19, that he “does what he sees the Father doing.”  
 
Eunomius, John 5:19 and the Single Reception of the Trinity 
 
 
 
 Eunomius presses Eusebius’ interpretation of Origen’s thought further. He argues 
that John 5:19 not only cannot be used to show that the three have the same activity, but 
that it also entails that their activities are different. The difference in activity entails a 
difference of nature among the three.83 Call this doctrine “separable operations.” 
Eunomius argues his point on the ground that John 5:19 says the Son “can do nothing of 
his own accord.” He seizes upon the phrase “οὐ δύναται . . . ποιεῖν ἀφ᾽ἑαυτοῦ οὐδὲν” and 
says it means the Son lacks agency in creation.84 Eunomius reasons that the Son is a 
                                                                                                                                            
ποιῇ, ταῦτα καὶ (56.) ὁ υἱὸς ὁµοίως ποιεῖ.” οὐκοῦν ὁµοιώµατα τυγχάνει τὰ πρὸς τοῦ υἱοῦ γιγνόµενα ἔργων 
ἀρχετύπων ἐν ἀπορρήτοις τοῦ πατρὸς λογισµοῖς. 
79 Cf. Origen, Jo. 1.114-15 and Philo, op. 16-19. Cf. Gerard Watson, “Discovering the 
Imagination: Platonists and Stoics on Phantasia,” in The Question of “Eclecticism”: Studies in Later Greek 
Philosophy, ed. John Dillon and A. A Long (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 222, ad loc. 
81 Eusebius, Ibid. 
82 Cf. Plato, Tim. 29A: “Now if so be that this Cosmos is beautiful and its Constructor good 
(δηµιουργὸς ἀγαθός), it is plain that he fixed his gaze on the Eternal (πρὸς τὸ ἀΐδιον ἔβλεπεν). . . .” 
83 Eunomius, Apol. 20.17-19. 
84 Eunomius, Apol. 20.21. He repeats this exegesis in his confession at Apol. 26.22-3. 
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power inferior to the Father who creates “by his own power” (ἐξουσίᾳ); the Father is 
different from, and superior to, “him who does so at the Father’s command (τοῦ νεύµατι 
πατρικῷ ποιοῦντος).”85 Eunomius links this argument with his exegesis of John 16:14: 
the Spirit/Worshipper (προσκυνοῦντος) is inferior to the Son/One Worshipped 
(προσκυνούµενος). Eunomius thus ties a low pneumatology to John 5:19.  
 As a careful reader of Origen, Didymus was in a strong position to extend 
application of Origen’s idea of inseparable operations to the Holy Spirit. Against 
Eunomius’s exegesis of John 5:19, Didymus makes several exegetical points 
appropriating Origen’s argument that Jesus ascribed to the Father and Son one identical 
activity. However, Didymus applies this argument not only to the Son but also to the 
Holy Spirit.  
 The heart of Didymus’ argument along these lines comes in On the Holy Spirit 
184-191. In a string of exegetical statements on Romans 8:9-1086, Didymus argues that 
we can presume the presence of the Spirit when Paul speaks of the presence of the Son. 
“When [Paul] said: ‘But if Christ is in you, although your body is dead because of sin,’ in 
no way does he mean that the body is a slave to vices and wantonness.”87 In other words, 
even though Paul only said that “Christ is in you,” Paul did not fail to assert the presence 
of the Spirit, which produces the gifts of the Spirit and the life of virtue. In responding to 
faulty exegesis of Roman 8:10a, Didymus assigns idiomatic roles to the Son and the Holy 
Spirit in the generation of virtue. The Son generates virtue in the soul by his presence, as 
does the Holy Spirit. The Son is present when “those who have made their own bodies 
                                               
85 Eunomius, Apol. 20.20-21: πάµπολυ διενήνοχεν ὁ δηµιουργῶν ἐξουσίᾳ τοῦ νεύµατι πατρικῷ 
ποιοῦντος καὶ µηδὲν ἀφ᾽ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖν ὁµολογοῦντος, ὅ τε προσκυνούµενος τοῦ προσκυνοῦντος. 
86 Spir. 184-194 
87 Spir. 192. 
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dead [to sin].”88 The “Spirit of life” is present when those same souls “do righteous 
works” either by correcting “deadly vices” or by believing in Jesus Christ and living 
accordingly.89  Together, then, the Son and the Holy Spirit generate, respectively, the 
death of vice and the life of virtue in the soul. Neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit is 
separable from the other in this divine act of the production of psychological virtue.   
 In Spir. 184, Didymus ties the action of the Holy Spirit to the action of the Son, on 
the grounds that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son.90 He uses Romans 8:9b (“But if 
anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ, he does not belong to Christ”) to reach this 
conclusion. In Romans 8:10a, Paul says, “but if Christ is in you.”  He does not say, “But 
if the Spirit of Christ” is in you. This, Didymus argues, “demonstrates most clearly that 
the Holy Spirit is inseparable from Christ because wherever the Holy Spirit is, there also 
is Christ, and from wherever the Spirit of Christ departs, Christ also withdraws from that 
place.”91 In Spir. 189, Didymus argues from another angle. After quoting Romans 8:9b 
again, he says, “If anyone were to assume the contrary of this conditional proposition, he 
could say: ‘If anyone belongs to Christ such that Christ is in him, then the Spirit of Christ 
is in him.’” Didymus goes one step further, however, and uses this verse to show the 
inseparability of the Holy Spirit, not only with respect to the Son, but also the Father: 
“This same logic can also be deployed likewise in the case of God the Father.” Didymus 
simply replaces the word “Christ” with the word “God” in Romans 8:9b so that it reads, 
“If anyone does not have the Spirit of God, he does not belong to God.”92 This statement 
is then transformed into a contrapositive, leaving us with, “If anyone belongs to God, 
                                               
88 Spir. 192. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Cf. Spir., 111. 
91 Spir. 188. 
92 Spir. 190. 
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then the Spirit of God is in him.”93 This, Didymus says, makes sense of 1 Corinthians 
3:16 and 1 John 3:24/4:13, verses which speak of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit and 
God’s dwelling in people when he gives them his Spirit. Finally, Didymus concludes that 
“all these passages demonstrate that the substance of the Trinity is inseparable and 
indivisible (indissociabilis et indiscreta Trinitatis substantia).”94   
 In On the Holy Spirit 74-80, Didymus adduces several passages to support his 
reading of 2 Cor. 13:13 that “there is a single reception of the Trinity” (una Trinitatis 
assumptio). He introduces his discussion by stating that he is going to show that the Holy 
Spirit “is not different from either [the Father or the Son]” (nunc videamus quam cum 
utroque habeat indifferentiam).95 Among the passages adduced is Zechariah 12:10, which 
shows, Didymus explains, God promising “that he would pour himself out . . . 
(repromittit Deus effusurum se).” God’s gift is the Holy Spirit, but whoever has the Holy 
Spirit has it as a gift from the Trinity:  
For whenever anyone receives the grace of the Holy Spirit, he has it as a gift from 
God the Father and our Lord Jesus Christ. Therefore, the fact that there is a single 
grace of the Father and the Son perfected by the activity of the Holy Spirit 
demonstrates that the Trinity is of one substance (unius substantiae).96 
 
As the translators note, the end of this phrase includes a probable instance of Didymus’ 
original Greek, ὁµοούσια—here translated by Jerome, but elsewhere given by Jerome 
                                               
93 Spir. 190. 
94 Spir. 191. 
95 As the translators note, “the word indifferentia is unusual in Latin, probably representing the 
Gk. τὸ ἀδιάφορον or ἀδιαφορία. It appears also in Spir. 87 and 100” (DelCogliano, Radde-Gallwitz, and 
Ayres, Works on the Spirit, 166n61). 
96 Didymus, Spir. 76. Cum enim quis Spiritus Sancti acceperit gratiam, habebit eam datam a Deo 
Patre et Iesu Christo Domino nostro. Vna igitur gratia Patris et Filii, et Spiritus Sancti operatione 
completa, Trinitas unius substantiae demonstrabitur. 
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without translation.97 In the following paragraphs, Didymus makes a similar argument 
from other passages.98 Then he concludes:  
on the basis of all these passages it is proved that the activity of the Father and the 
Son and the Holy Spirit is the same (eamdem operationem esse Patris et Filii et 
Spiritus Sancti). But those who have a single activity (una est operatio) also have 
a single substance (una est et substantia). For things of the same substance (quae 
eiusdem substantiae)—ὁµοούσια—have the same activities (easdem habent 
operationes), and things of a different substance—ἑτεροούσια—have discordant 
and distinct activities.99 
 
Didymus reasons that because things that have the same substance must have the same 
activity, whatever does the same activity must have the same substance. The reasoning is 
the inverse of Eunomius’s, in the first Apology 20.17-19. Note that Jerome provides the 
Greek ἑτεροούσια, to make it clear that Didymus was opposing the use of that term to 
describe the substance of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Didymus bases his argument 
against the heteroousian view on the logic that all three persons give the same gift, and in 
this way, perform “a single activity.”100 So Didymus argues for the inseparability of the 
trinity in terms of its divine action, and so that it has a single divine power.  
 
 
                                               
97 Didymus Spir. 16, 27, and 145. The phrase in Latin, unius substantiae, is the same phrase Illaria 
Ramellia allows that Origen used in her reading of Origen’s homilies translated by Rufinus. Ramelli does 
not entertain the possibility that in seeing “Origen” in Rufinus’s translation we are actually reading 
Didymus, but this possibility is at least plausible. See Illaria Ramelli, “Origen’s Anti-Subordinationism and 
Its Heritage in the Nicene and Cappadocian Line,” Vigiliae Christianae 65 (2011): 21-49. 
98 Spir. 77-80. 2 Cor 13:13, Jn 14:21, Jn 3:16, Is 33:22, 35:4; Gal 5:22; Rom 5:5; Phil 2:1; 1 Cor 
1:9; 1 Jn 1:7; 1 Jn 1:13. 
99 Spir. 81. Here Jerome provides the original Greek for his readers. Ex omnibus approbatur 
eamdem operationem esse Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti. Quorum autem una est operatio, una est et 
substantia, quia quae eiusdem substantiae ὁµοούσια sunt easdem habent operationes, et quae alterius 
substantiae ἑτεροούσια dissonas atque diuersas. 
100 Elsewhere, Didymus argues along similar lines that the whole Trinity is the agent that 
establishes apostolic authority. See, e.g., Spir. 105. “If those whom Christ sent to evangelize and baptize 
the nations are those whom the Holy Spirit placed in charge of the Church and the Father appointed by his 
decree, there can be no doubt that the Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit have a single activity and approval. 
It follows from this that the Trinity has the same substance.” 
 227 
John 14:16 and Distinguished Activities 
 
 
 
 In John 14:16, Jesus says of the Holy Spirit that  
I will give to you another Paraclete (ἄλλον παράκλητον), so that he will be with 
you forever—the Spirit of truth, which the world is not able to receive (οὐ 
δύναται λαβεῖν), because it neither sees him nor knows him. You know him, 
because indwells you and will be in you (παρ᾽ὑµῖν µένει καὶ ἐν ὑµῖν ἔσται).  
 
Because Jesus refers to the Holy Spirit as “another Paraclete,” John 14:16 offers 
Scriptural warrant for distinguishing between the Son and the Holy Spirit as “different” 
in some way. But to what extent are they “different,” and how? Before turning to 
Didymus’s exegesis of this passage, it is important to note that in a few places Didymus 
alludes to the “distinguished features” of the three persons. So, for example, in Spir. 113-
114, he writes: 
[113] And so, since it is impossible and impious to believe such things about 
incorporeal beings, we ought to understand that the Holy Spirit goes out from the 
Father as the Savior himself goes out from God, to which he bears witness when 
he says: I have gone out from God and have come [Jn 8:42]. And just as we 
separate places and changes of place from incorporeal realities, so too do we 
distinguish emissions (whether internal or external) from the nature of intellectual 
realities, since they belong to bodies which can be touched and have extension. 
[114] And so, we ought to believe the following statements that used ineffable 
words known by faith alone: the Savior has gone out from God [Jn 8:42], and the 
Spirit of Truth comes forth from the Father [Jn 15:26]—the same Father who said: 
The Spirit who comes forth from me [Is 57:16]. Indeed, well-said is the passage: 
he who comes forth from the Father [Jn 15:26]. For even though it is possible to 
say “from God” or “from the Lord” or “from the Almighty,” none of these is used. 
Instead, from the Father is used, but not because the Father is different from God 
Almighty—for it would be criminal to think this! Rather, the Spirit of Truth is 
said to come forth from the Father [Jn 15:26] according to the distinctive feature 
of the Father and the concept of fatherhood.101 
 
The difficulty Didymus faces here is that statements regarding the “emission” from God 
the Father are not to be taken as referring to God’s body, because God is incorporeal. Yet, 
                                               
101 Spir. 113-114. 
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the abstraction from a bodily sense makes it difficult to distinguish between the 
processions of the Son and the Spirit. So Didymus argues that statements such as “come 
forth from the Father” do not imply that God the Father has a body but that God the 
Father has a “distinctive feature” within the Trinity. 
 Now we come to Didymus’s interpretation of John 14:16, in light of his doctrine of 
“distinguished activities.” Didymus opposes Eunomius’ exegesis of another text 
important for Eunomius’ heteroousian position: John 14:16. In John 14:16, Jesus states 
that the Holy Spirit is “other than” the Son. In order to wrest this text back from 
Eunomius, Didymus acknowledges that Jesus calls the Holy Spirit “another Paraclete” 
(alium Paracletum), but he explains the appearance of “another” on the grounds that 
“[the Son and the Spirit] have separate activities” (sed iuxta operationis diuersitatem).102 
The Greek of the title in Jerome’s Latin (alium Paracletum) is ἄλλον παράκλητον, 
translating John 14:16: πατέρα καὶ ἄλλον παράκλητον δώσει ὑµῖν.103  
 This argument directly opposes Eunomius’s reading of the text. In Apology 25.17-
18, Eunomius obliquely refers to this passage. The Holy Spirit, he argues, is not  
identical (ταὐτὸν) with the Only-Begotten (otherwise he would not have been 
numbered after him as possessing his own substance, since the Saviour’s own 
voice is sufficient proof of these things, when he expressly says that the one who 
would be sent to bring to the Apostles’ remembrance all that he had said and to 
teach them would be “another” (ἕτερον). . . .104  
 
Eunomius refers here to Jesus’s statement to the disciples that “the Advocate, the Holy 
Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, will teach you everything, and remind you 
                                               
102 Spir. 120. 
103 Spir. 120. 
104 Οὐδὲ µὴν ταὐτὸν τῷ µονογενεῖ (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ὑπηριθµήθη τούτῳ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχον ὑπόστασιν, 
ἀρκούσης καὶ πρὸ τούτων τῆς τοῦ σωτπηρος φωνῆς δι᾽ἧς ἕτερον ἔφη σαφῶς τὸν ἀποσταλησόµενον εἶναι 
πρὸς ὑπόµνησιν καὶ διδασκαλίαν τῶν ἀποστόλων). . . . 
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of all that I have said to you.”105 The reference to the “other Paraclete” is an oblique 
reference to John 14:16. Notice that, instead of reading John 14:16’s ἄλλον, Eunomius 
has substituted his favored technical term for differentiating the three persons: ἕτερον. 
Instead of ἄλλον παράκλητον, he reads ἕτερον παράκλητον. According to Eunomius’ 
interpretation of this passage, Jesus does not only speak of “another” Paraclete; he speaks 
of “a different” Paraclete. 
 Eunomius’s gloss on John 14:16, however, is not without precedent. As we have 
seen, Eusebius repeats a form of the phrase ἕτερος παρ’ αὐτὸν several times to emphasize 
the distinction between the Son and the Spirit, in opposition to Marcellus.106 He bases the 
phrase on John 14:16’s description of the Spirit as ἄλλον παράκλητον: 
And that the Holy Spirit is other than (ἕτερόν) the Son, our Savior and Lord 
Himself taught clearly and distinctly in the plainest of terms, when He said to His 
disciples, “If you love me, you will keep my commandments. And I will pray the 
Father, and He will give you another Counselor, to be with you forever, even the 
Spirit of truth, whom the world cannot receive.” You see how He says that the 
Spirit is another counselor (τὸ παράκλητον ἕτερον) and other than Himself (ἄλλο 
παρ’ ἑαυτόν).107 
 
A little further along, Eusebius re-states the point more succinctly: “thus from these 
things it is shown that the Holy Spirit is another existing alongside [the Son] (ἕτερον 
ὑπάρχον παρ’ αὐτὸν).”108 Eusebius feels obliged to explain that “Paraclete” does not 
automatically distinguish the Spirit from the Son. This suggests that he, too, read John 
14:16 as potentially a description of the Son as a “Helper.”  
                                               
105 Jn. 14:26. 
106 See Eusebius, e.th. 3.5. 
107 Spoerl trans., MS p. 35; e.th. 3.5. καὶ ὅτι γε ἕτερόν ἐστιν τὸ πνεῦµα τὸ ἅγιον τοῦ υἱοῦ 
διαρρήδην καὶ διαφόρως λευκοτάτοις ῥήµασιν αὐτὸς ὁ σωτὴρ καὶ κύριος ἡµῶν ἐδίδαξεν, ἐν οἷς πρὸς τοὺς 
αὐτοῦ µαθητὰς ἔλεγεν “ἐὰν ἀγαπᾶτε µε, τὰς ἐντολὰς τὰς ἐµὰς τηρήσετε. καὶ ἐγὼ ἐρωτήσω τὸν πατέρα καὶ 
ἄλλον παράκλητον δώσει ὑµῖν ἵνα ᾖ µεθ’ ὑµῶν εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, τὸ πνεῦµα τῆς ἀληθείας, ὃ ὁ κόσµος οὐ 
δύναται λαβεῖν.” ὁρᾷς ὅπως τὸ πνεῦµα τὸ παράκλητον ἕτερον εἶναί φησιν καὶ ἄλλο παρ’ ἑαυτόν. 
108 Spoerl trans., MS 36; e. th. 3.5. πλὴν ἐκ τούτων δείκνυται ἕτερον ὑπάρχον παρ’ αὐτὸν τὸ ἅγιον 
πνεῦµα. 
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 Didymus acknowledges the presence of “another Paraclete” in the words of Jesus, 
but he offers a different explanation for the Spirit’s alterity. He argues that both Jesus and 
the Spirit are “Paracletes,” each to be distinguished from the other because their activities 
can be distinguished. He argues that the fact that Scripture distinguishes between a 
diversity of Trinitarian activities does not entail that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit 
differ in nature. He says, “But do not think that the natures of the Son and Holy Spirit are 
different because they have separate activities.”109 Didymus entertains the possibility of 
two modes of speaking about “difference” among the Trinitarian persons. At the level of 
nature and power, there is no differentiation among the three, who share the same activity 
of creation and the giving of grace. On the other hand, there remains a way to speak of 
each of the three in different ways.  
The works of separate individuals are distinct, but when the Son sees the Father 
working, he is himself also working, yet working not in a second rank and after 
him. After all, the works of the Son would begin to diverge from those of the 
Father if they were not performed by equals.110 
 
By making a clear distinction between the Son’s Demiurgic activity in creation and the 
question of his “ranking,” Didymus repeals the implicit link between John 5:19 and 
Middle Platonic taxis-logic with which a Demiurgic reading of the text had imbued it. 
Didymus reasons that if the Son acts in such a way that there is any kind of ontological 
“gap” between the Father and the Son, then “the works of the Son would begin to diverge 
from those of the Father” (alia quippe Patris, alia Filii opera esse inciperent), and this 
                                               
109 Spir. 122. Verum noli ex Filii et Spiritus Sancti operatione diuersa uarias aestimar naturas. 
110 Didymus, Spir. 161.4-8. . . . quia separatorum diuersa sunt opera, sed uidens operantem 
Patrem, et ipse operator, non in secundo gradu et post illum operans. Alia quippe Patris, alia Filii opera 
esse inciperent, si non aequaliter fierent. 
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would render their work asunder. Didymus clarifies that he does not intend to relapse into 
the doctrine of “Sabellius”:111 
For if the Son of the Father is one, not according to the error of Sabellius who 
confuses the Father and the Son, but according to their inseparability of essence or 
substance, then “he is unable to do anything without the Father.”112 
 
Notice that Didymus seizes upon the pivotal phrase of John 5:19 Eunomius uses to 
differentiate Son from Father: “he is unable to do anything without the Father.” Didymus 
redeems the phrase, making a virtue of what had appeared to be a vice. The Son’s 
“inability to do anything without the Father” turns out to be a feature of the Son’s 
inseparable activity, which the Son shares inseparably with the Father—not, Didymus 
clarifies, as a “Sabellian” would have it, but as a non-Marcellan Nicene would have it: 
the Father and the Son remain irreducibly “Father” and “Son,” but they share the same 
nature and do the same thing. 
 Didymus acknowledges both that the Father, Son, and Spirit perform the same 
activity, namely, the gifts of creation and grace, and that certain other activities may still 
be distinguished. The three are irreducible, and cannot be conflated; to think otherwise 
would not be to read Scripture on its own terms. The subtlety on this point makes it 
possible both for Didymus to oppose Eunomius’s theology and to argue in favor of 
Nicaea without a Marcellan interpretation of ὁµοούσια. 
 Mark DelCogliano has argued convincingly that Didymus, and not Athanasius, 
influenced Basil’s exegesis of John 1:3 and Amos 4:13.113 Another point of contact 
                                               
111 He probably has a more proximate monarchian in mind, such as Marcellus or Photinus. 
112 Didymus, Spir. 161.1-4. Si enim unus est Patri Filius, non iuxta Sabelli uitium Patrem et 
Filiium confundentis, sed iuxta indiscretionem essentiae siue substantiae, non potest quicquam absque 
Patre facere… 
113 Mark DelCogliano, “Basil of Caesarea, Didymus the Blind, and the Anti-Pneumatomachian 
Exegesis of Amos 4:13 and John 1:3,” Journal of Theological Studies 61 (2010): 644–58. 
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between Didymus and Basil is the disputed exegesis of John 14:16. Basil shares 
Didymus’ peculiar reading of John 14:16. Hard on the heels of Basil’s argument that 
Eunomius cannot prove that “in every case [the Spirit has] a different nature,” Basil 
writes: 
Furthermore, God is said to be and is good. The Holy Spirit is also good, 
possessing a goodness that is not adventitious (οὐκ ἐπισκευαστὴν ἔχον τὴν 
ἀγαθότητα), but coexistent with him by nature (ἀλλ’ ἐκ φύσεως αὐτῷ 
συνυπάρχουσαν). Otherwise, it would be possible to say the most irrational thing 
of all: the one who is holy by nature (τὸ φύσει ἅγιον) does not have goodness by 
nature (µὴ φύσει . . . τὴν ἀγαθότητα ἔχειν), but as something supervening and 
accruing to him from without (ἔξωθεν προσγεγενηµένην αὐτῷ). When the Lord 
said: I will ask my Father, and he will give another Paraclete to you [Jn 14:16], he 
indicated that the Spirit, too, is our Paraclete (καὶ αὐτὸς εἶναι Παράκλητος ἡµῶν 
ἐνδείκνυται). Hence the designation “Paraclete” also contributes no small amount 
to the demonstration of the glory of the Holy Spirit.114 
 
Here Basil’s argument turns on the presumption that the title “another Paraclete” not only 
is not a problem, but it is an honorific title. The “other” (ἄλλος) of Scripture includes the 
Spirit with the Son, already a “Paraclete,” or “Helper,” and in this way Scripture 
characterizes the Spirit as possessing divine nature. This reading only works if one 
supposes that the Son is a “Paraclete,” so that when Scripture speaks of “another 
Paraclete,” Scripture is not speaking of a “Paraclete of another nature” but “another 
Paraclete of the same nature.” Basil here adopts Didymus’ peculiar reasoning about this 
difficult passage that gave significant weight to Eunomius’ argument. 
                                               
114 Basil, Eun. 3.3. Καὶ ἀγαθὸς ὁ Θεὸς εἴρηται, καὶ ἔστιν· ἀγαθὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ Πνεῦµα τὸ ἅγιον, οὐκ 
ἐπισκευαστὴν ἔχον τὴν ἀγαθότητα, ἀλλ’ ἐκ φύσεως αὐτῷ συνυπάρχουσαν. Ἢ πάντων ἂν εἴη ἀλογώτατον 
τὸ φύσει ἅγιον µὴ φύσει λέγειν τὴν ἀγαθότητα ἔχειν, ἀλλ’ ἐπιγεννηµατικὴν καὶ ἔξωθεν προσγεγενηµένην 
αὐτῷ. Ἐν ᾧ δὲ εἶπεν ὁ Κύριος ὅτι, Ἐγὼ ἐρωτήσω τὸν Πατέρα, καὶ ἄλλον Παράκλητον δώσει ὑµῖν, καὶ αὐτὸς 
εἶναι Παράκλητος ἡµῶν ἐνδείκνυται.Ὥστε καὶ ἡ τοῦ παρακλήτου προσηγορία οὐ µικρὸν πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν 
τῆς δόξης τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύµατος συντελεῖ. Michel Barnes reads Basil’s Against Eunomius (1:23.17-21) and 
On the Holy Spirit in light of the tradition of pro-Nicene exegesis of John 5:19 he identified in his 
dissertation on Gregory of Nyssa. See Michel Barnes, The Power of God, 162-65. Barnes notes that Hilary 
of Poitiers preceded Basil in his reading of John 5:19, but he does not entertain the possibility that Basil 
had drawn on Didymus’s On the Holy Spirit for his exegesis of John 14:16 in response to Eunomius. He 
does, however, note that the On the Trinity associated with Didymus reads John 5:19 in light of 1 Cor 1:24 
(cf. Barnes, Power of God, 163n117 and Didymus, Trin. 1:16.24, ed. Honscheid, 94). 
 233 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 In this chapter, I have argued three related points. First, Didymus’s On the Holy 
Spirit exhibits a “pro-Nicene” doctrine of inseparable operations. Second, Didymus’s 
doctrine of inseparable operations relies upon his claim that the Holy Spirit’s activity 
reveals the one “power of God.” The third point concerns Didymus’s use of these “pro-
Nicene” insights to counter a prevalent anti-Nicene tradition, which took John 5:19 and 
John 14:16 to differentiate the Son and the Holy Spirit from the Father and from one 
another. Didymus teaches that distinguishing between the activities of the persons need 
not entail a differentiation in nature among the three. When the Son speaks of “another 
Paraclete,” in John 14:16, the reference means only to point out the “distinctive activity” 
of the Holy Spirit; it need not entail that the Holy Spirit differs in nature from the Son or 
the Father. 
 With the features of Didymus’s pro-Nicene theology and the “high 
pneumatology” it generates in view, we may turn to a comparison of Didymus and earlier 
Alexandrian tradition on the Holy Spirit as the “seal” of the divine image in the human 
soul. Didymus’s pro-Nicene theology places him in a strong position to provide a clear 
statement of the Holy Spirit’s agency in the production of virtue in the soul. 
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Chapter 7 
“Sealed by the Promised Holy Spirit” 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 This chapter brings this study of Origen and Didymus to a close. So far we have 
seen that Origen’s use of participation is an anti-monarchian strategy that generates a low 
pneumatology. For Origen, the Holy Spirit transmits holiness. However, because the Holy 
Spirit does not cause holiness to reside in the soul without having received the “ministry” 
of the Word, the Holy Spirit is not a divine agent in the same way or to the same degree 
that either God the Father or God the Son is. Depending upon which features of Origen’s 
theology one emphasizes, the Holy Spirit sometimes comes across as an angelomorphic 
entity. We have also seen that Didymus counteracts the radical, heteroousian position of 
Eunomius by recovering a number of texts from a reading which would subordinate the 
Holy Spirit to the Son and Father. He argues in favor of a doctrine of inseparable 
operation, whereby all of the Trinity’s activities disclose a single divine nature at work in 
the transformation of the human soul. 
 I close by showing how Didymus’s pro-Nicene theology provides added clarity to a 
traditional expression of the Holy Spirit’s activity. In order to emphasize the Holy Spirit’s 
divine nature as a transcendent cause, Didymus characterizes the Spirit in terms of a 
“seal” that causes the soul to become virtuous. The “seal” is a biblical image, drawn from 
Paul, and, so I will argue, it doubles as a reference to Hellenistic psychology. For this 
reason, I offer some background which contextualizes the history of reading the Holy 
Spirit as “seal” in terms of the cause of “cognitive impression.” Didymus retains a 
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theology of the divine image, endemic to Alexandrian tradition, which construes the 
human soul as an image constructed according to a divine archetype, and whose 
conformity to that archetype results in the soul’s perfection. However, Didymus departs 
from his Alexandrian predecessors by initiating a new tradition in Alexandria: the 
“archetype” to which the soul is conformed is not only the Logos, but the Trinity 
considered as a single divine source of moral transformation. According to Didymus, the 
soul does not purify itself, and it cannot be reduced to evil. For these reasons, I argue that 
we should read Didymus as using a pro-Nicene doctrine of the Trinity to buttresses an 
“anti-Manichean” asceticism. 
 
“Until Christ is Formed in You”: Image, Seal, and Soul 
 
 
 
 Didymus’s discussion of the restoration of the divine “image” in the human soul 
agrees with earlier Alexandrian tradition. However, Didymus provides added clarity in 
On the Holy Spirit. Especially if we place two key Pauline texts in a context that includes 
reading “seal” in Hellenistic-philosophical terms, we can see why Didymus seized upon 
them: they provide the Holy Spirit divine agency in the process of moral transformation 
not exploited by Clement or Origen.  
 
Continuities on the Divine Image from Clement to Didymus 
 
 
 
 It is important to note, first, the way in which Didymus’s moral psychology is in 
deep agreement with with that of Origen and Clement of Alexandria. Didymus 
 236 
emphasizes that the soul is conformed to the likeness of a divine image.1 Before turning 
to Origen’s first Homily on Genesis, we should look briefly at an important statement by 
Clement. He writes: 
Rightly then Moses says, that the body which Plato calls “the earthly tabernacle” 
was formed of the ground, but that the rational soul (ψυχὴν δὲ τὴν λογικὴν) was 
breathed by God into man’s face (ἄνωθεν ἐµπνευσθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ εἰς 
πρόσωπον). For there, they say, the ruling faculty (τὸ ἡγεµονικὸν) is situated; 
interpreting the access by the senses into the first man as the addition of the soul. 
Wherefore also man is said “to have been made in [God’s] image and likeness.” 
For the image of God is the divine and royal Word, the impassible man (ἀπαθής); 
and the image of the image is the human mind.2  
 
Clement reads the moment when God “breathes into” (ἐµπνευσθῆναι) the face of the 
human being as the production of the “rational soul” or “mind”—the Logos. The 
Septuagint for Genesis 2:7 states that “God breathed into his face” (ὁ θεὸς . . . 
ἐνεφύσησεν εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον). Clement, by contrast, says that the “rational soul” was 
“breathed into (ἐµπνευσθῆναι) his face.” In John 20:22, Jesus is said to have “breathed 
onto” (ἐνεφύσησεν) the disciples and said, “receive holy Spirit” (λάβετε ἅγιον πνεῦµα). 
Clement’s use of the verb ἐµπνευσθῆναι suggests that he reads John 20:22 into the text of 
Genesis 2:7. For him, when God “breathes into the face” of humanity, God gives 
humanity a rational soul. For Clement, λόγος, πνεῦµα, and ἡγεµονικόν are synonymous 
psychological terms extending to all human beings. The implication, however is that to 
have a “holy spirit” is to be a virtuous soul.3   
                                               
1 On the traditional Alexandrian distinction between “image and likeness,” see Richard Layton, 
Didymus the Blind (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 93-96. Layton cites Clement, Strom. 
2.22.131.6; Origen, Princ. 3.6.1; HomGen 13.4; and Rom. 4.5. See Layton, 94n44. 
2 Strom. 5.14.94.3-5; ANF 2:466. This passage is quoted and discussed by John Egan, “Logos and 
Emanation in the Writings of Clement of Alexandria,” in Trinification of the World: A Festschrift in Honor 
of Frederick E. Crowe, eds. Thomas Dunne and Jean-Marc Laporte (Toronto: Regis College Press, 1978), 
176-209, at 181. 
3 Unfortunately, Didymus’s comment on Genesis 2:7 was probably contained in a stretch of 
papyrus not retained in the papyrus found at Tura. Didymus does cite Genesis 2:7, but he never cites the 
part of the verse that speaks of God’s “breathing into the face” of humanity. When he cites the verse in the 
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 Origen’s reading of these texts is slightly different than Clement’s.4 Origen states 
clearly, in On First Principles, that the Savior’s breathing upon the disciples (John 20:22) 
is an instance of God’s gift of the Holy Spirit. Yet Origen does not make a similar point 
regarding the divine “breath” of Genesis 2:7.5 He reads Genesis 1:26 and 1:27 as 
representing two distinct exegetical moments. Genesis 1:26 indicates, according to 
Origen, that the mind rules over the passions (the “beasts”).6 This is the whole human 
being, body and soul. Of all the other creatures, man alone “has the honor of the sun and 
moon having the promise of shining ‘as the sun in the kingdom of God’.” Genesis 1:27, 
on the other hand, means that, in creating man, God produced a “man” according to the 
image of God. This “man” is not the corporeal human being, but the “inner man, 
invisible, incorporeal, incorruptible, and immortal.7” The “inner man” is the location of 
God’s indwelling, the throne of the divine Glory, and so, the means by which the 
promised “illumination” may take place.8 Origen is careful to point out that only the 
“inner man” is capable of participating in the divine image.9 Origen next argues, quoting 
                                                                                                                                            
Commentary on Zechariah, Didymus uses it to observe that God forms the human body, but God makes the 
soul, or “spirit” (πλασθέντος τοῦ σώµατος, ποιηθείσης τῆς ψυχῆς ἥντινα πνεῦµα καλουµένην ἔπλασεν ἐν 
τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ µετασχοῦσαν ἐκ τῆς συνθέσεως αἰσθητικῆς δυνάµεως. . . . ). See ComZech 4.323; SC 
85:894.19. Didymus does not connect Genesis 2:7 with John 20:22, because doing so would conflate the 
“rational soul” with the gift of the Holy Spirit.   
4 See “Homily 1,” in the collection translated in Ronald Heine, trans., Origen. Homilies on 
Genesis and Exodus, FOTC 71 (Washington, D.C.: CUA Press, 1982), 47-71, based on the Latin text of 
Rufinus’s translation, edited by Doutreleau, in SC 7. 
5 See Princ. 1.3.2. 
6 Origen, FOTC 71:63. On Origen’s imagery of the passions as “beasts,” see Patricia Cox, “Origen 
and the Bestial Soul,” VC 36 (1982): 115-40. 
7 Origen, Heine trans., 63. 
8 Ibid., 64. 
9 As noted in Chapter 5, Origen agrees with the Platonist doctrine that participation is spiritual or 
intellectual, not bodily or material. See, for example, Numenius, fr. 19 (Guthrie, trans., 34): “Whatever 
participates in him, participates in nothing but in thought; in this manner alone will it profit by entrance 
unto the Good, but not otherwise” (Μετέχει δὲ αὐτοῦ τὰ µετίσχοντα ἐν ἄλλῳ µὲν οὐδενί, ἐν δὲ µόνῳ τῷ 
φρονεῖν· ταύτῃ ἄρα καὶ τῆς ἀγαθοῦ συµβάσεως ὀνίναιτ’ ἄν, ἄλλως δ’ οὔ). 
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Colossians 1:15, that the Archetype used to create this “man” is “the brightness of the 
eternal light and the express figure of God’s substance”: Christ.10  
 Origen then narrates the incarnation as Christ (the Archetype)’s taking on the 
“image of the evil one” in order to restore the obscured image of humanity.11  The 
consequence of the incarnation is that  
all . . . who come to him and desire to become participants in the spiritual image 
by their progress “are renewed daily in the inner man”12 according to the image of 
him who made them, so that they can be made “similar to the body of his glory,”13 
but each one in proportion to his own powers.14  
 
Origen describes the process of moral transformation in terms of a uniting of humans 
comparable to that of divine Father and Son. The Apostles become the image of Christ 
just as Christ is the Image of the Father insofar as they become “one.”15 Origen concludes 
his reading of Genesis 1:26-27 by urging his audience to “contemplate that image of God 
so that we can be transformed to his likeness.” For, “by beholding the image of God, 
according to whose likeness [we] have been made by God, [we] will receive that form, 
which was given to him by nature, through the Word and his power.”16 Contemplating the 
“Image,” Christ, results in the reproduction in the soul of Christ’s likeness.  
 Origen closes his homily with a brief mention of “the Holy Spirit whose temple we 
ought to be first of all by our holiness.”17 Origen’s statement represents a small advance 
                                               
10 Ibid., 65. 
11 Ibid., 65. 
12 Quoting 2 Cor. 4:16. 
13 Quoting Phil. 3:21. 
14 Ibid., 66. 
15 Ibid., 66: “The apostles transformed themselves to his likeness to such an extent that he could 
say of them, ‘I go to my Father and your Father, to my God and your God.’ For he had already petitioned 
the Father for his disciples that the original likeness might be restored in them when he says: ‘Father,” grant 
“that just as you and I are one so also they may be one in us’.” 
16 Ibid., 66. 
17 Ibid., 71. For Didymus, “participation” in an image is not only the imitation of a good form, but 
is also linked with the imitation of bad forms. The overall scheme resembles Origen’s ambiguous use of the 
“image of the devil” in Homily 1. There Origen merely opposes the “image of God” as the “inner man” to 
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over the merely rationalistic construal of Clement. The role of Christ, the Word of God, 
as the transcendent Image of God is clear in Origen’s treatment. We are made “according 
to” the Image of Christ, which ensures our potential to grow into the likeness of Christ. 
The nature of the Spirit’s role in the production of Christ’s likeness in the soul, on the 
other hand, is less clear.18 We might infer, from Origen’s remarks in On First Principles 
(e.g., Princ. 1.3.8), that the Holy Spirit is the cause of holiness in the soul, and that 
“holiness” amounts to the likeness of divinity Origen mentions here. However, in On 
First Principles and the Commentary on John, Origen also characterizes the Holy Spirit 
as a mediating, and not an ultimate, cause of holiness, because the Holy Spirit depends 
                                                                                                                                            
the “image of the devil” as the “earthly man.” Didymus has developed that notion.  In a comment on Zech 
11:17 (Hill trans., FOTC 111:283-285), the “Antichrist” participates in the “sight of the king of Assyria, 
taken in a spiritual sense, of whom the Lord himself said, ‘I shall inflict on the lofty mind, on the king of 
Assyria,’ who proudly boasted, ‘I shall plunder the force of the nations, and with the wisdom of 
intelligence I shall abolish the frontiers of nations; with my hand I shall occupy the whole world’ ” 
(referring to 2 Thes 2.9, Is 10.12-14, and 2 Thes 2.8). The Antichrist is described as the one “participating 
in the sight of the king of Assyria, taken in a spiritual sense” (µετέχων τῆς βλέψεως τοῦ νοητοῦ βασιλέως 
τῶν Ἀσσυρίων). Didymus imagines the “Antichrist” as a having a negative ontological status determined 
by his participating in a “vision” of the form of viciousness. This notion of “negative being” or a kind of 
negative hierarchy,  so to speak, is similar to that found in the Commentary on Job, 281, 20, where a 
discussion of “evil’”(kakia) leads to the conclusion that “those participating in it are called ‘non-beings’.” 
For a related appaerance of vice’s defination as a a failure to participate in the good, cf. Arius Didymus, 
Epitome of Stoic Ethics, 5a5-15. 
18 There is an odd passage in On First Principles, which appears to ascribe the Father’s giving of 
“the Spirit” to “all people” as an appropriation of the exegetical moment of God’s breathing into the face of 
Adam. The statement appears to reproduce Clement’s linking of Genesis 2:7 with John 20:22. See Princ. 
1.3.4, Butterworth trans., 31-32: “We, however, think that this peculiar use may be observed in the Old 
Testament also, as when it says, ‘he that giveth spirit to the people who are upon the earth, and spirit to 
them that walk thereon.’ For undoubtedly every one who walks upon the earth, that is to say, every earthly 
and corporeal being, is a partaker of the Holy Spirit, which he receives from God.” The first part of this 
statement rings true to Origen’s authentic work, but the second is an overstatement that warrants suspicion, 
for at least two reasons. First, this passage conflicts with what Origen later says regarding the possession of 
the Holy Spirit “by the saints alone” (Princ. 1.3.8). Second, it contradictis Origen’s earlier statement that 
human beings have to be “purified” in order to participate in God and, presumably to participate in the 
Holy Spirit (cf. Princ. 1.1.2). A third reason is circumstantial: this passage occurs just a few lines after 
Rufinus has Origen declare, in a rather flat-footed way, that “we have been able to find no passage in the 
holy scriptures which would warrant us in saying that the Holy Spirit was a being made or created, not even 
in that manner in which we have shown above that Solmon speaks of wisdom, nor in the manner in which 
the expressions we have dealt with, such as life, or word, or other titles the Son of God, are to be 
understood.” But this is in flat contradiction to what Origen says in the Commentary on John, Book 2. If 
Rufinus could introduce such a drastic change here, it should not surprise us if in fact he altered Origen’s 
statement regarding God’s giving the “spirit” to “the people who are upon the earth.” 
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upon the Father and the Son for its own existence and character; it passes on the 
“likeness” to us as one which has received it.  
 Let us now turn to Didymus’ reading of Genesis 1:26-27 in his own Commentary 
on Genesis.19 He follows Origen’s interpretation closely. In fact, the resemblances 
between the anthropology of Origen’s “Homily 1” and that found in Didymus’ comments 
on Genesis 1:26-27 are striking.20 The “human” of Genesis 1:26 signifies the “composite 
living being, composed of soul and body, and especially the soul.”21 Didymus continues:  
there is an especially preferable sense according to which we may understand the 
preceding text. We have said that “human” is, properly speaking, mind and soul.  
It is that which, participating in God, from that very participation, becomes God’s 
image, as we have said that virtue represents the one participating in it. Paul, 
knowing this doctrine, also taught it, speaking in Christ, when he said to those 
whom he urged to be imaged according to Christ, ‘until Christ is formed in you,’ 
teaching that the true understanding about Christ, once it is born in the soul, 
impresses its marks and representations on the soul according to him.22 
 
Didymus fixes upon Paul’s use of the term µορφόω to underwrite his claim.  According to 
Didymus, Paul is channeling a doctrine of intellectual participation in Christ, the “image 
of the invisible God.”  Origen had asked rhetorically: 
                                               
19 See SC 233:146. προείρηται κυρίως ἄνθρωπος εἶναι ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἡ ψυχή· αὕτη µετέχουσα Θεοῦ 
ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς µετουσίας εἰκὼν αὐτοῦ γίνεται, καθὸ λέγοµεν εἰκονίζειν τὴν ἀρετὴν τὸν µετέχοντα αὐτῆς, 
ὅπερ ἐπιστάµενος καὶ ὁ ἐν Χριστῷ λαλῶν Παῦλός φησιν οἷς προτρέπεται κατὰ Χριστὸν εἰκονισθῆναι· 
“µέχρις οὗ µορφωθῇ Χριστὸς ἐν ὑµῖν,” διδάσκων ὅτι ἡ περὶ Χριστοῦ νόησις ἀληθὴς ἐγγινοµένη ψυχῇ 
χαρακτηρίζει καὶ εἰκονίζει αὐτὴν κατ' αὐτόν. There is a chronological hazard in comparing Didymus’s On 
the Holy Spirit with his Commentaries. If there is no strong consensus about the dating of Didymus’s On 
the Holy Spirit, there is even less of one concerning the Commentaries. Yet, for the purposes of my 
presentation here, the material I analyze does not suggest that Didymus has developed in one direction or 
another; the statements I quote help to clarify Didymus’s compressed claims in On the Holy Spirit, and 
throw into relief Didymus’s relationship to his predecessors in Alexandria. 
20 See SC 233:138-163. 
21 ὅ ἄνθρωπος σηµαίνει καὶ τὸ σύνθετον ζῶον τὸ ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώµατος συνεστὸς καὶ µάλιστα τὴν 
ψυχήν (SC 233:140; ComGen 54.23). 
22 Ἔστιν δὲ µάλιστα κατὰ προηγουµένην διάνοιαν ἐκλαβεῖν τὸ προκείµενον· προείρηται κυρίως 
ἄνθρωπος εἶναι ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἡ ψυχή· αὕτη µετέχουσα Θεοῦ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς µετουσίας εἰκὼν αὐτοῦ γίνεται, 
καθὸ λέγοµεν εἰκονίζειν τὴν ἀρετὴν τὸν µετέχοντα αὐτῆς, ὅπερ ἐπιστάµενος καὶ ὁ ἐν Χριστῷ λαλῶν 
Παῦλός φησιν οἷς προτρέπεται κατὰ Χριστὸν εἰκονισθῆναι· «µέχρις οὗ µορφωθῇ Χριστὸς ἐν ὑµῖν«, 
διδάσκων ὅτι ἡ περὶ Χριστοῦ νόησις ἀληθὴς ἐγγινοµένη ψυχῇ χαρακτηρίζει καὶ εἰκονίζει αὐτὴν κατ' αὐτόν 
(SC 233:146-148; ComGen 57.26-58.3). 
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What other image of God is there according to the likeness of whose image man 
is made, except our Savior who is “the firstborn of every creature,” about whom it 
is written that he is “the brightness of the eternal light and the express figure of 
God’s substance,” who also says about himself: “I am in the Father, and the 
Father is in me,” and “He who has seen me has also seen the Father”?23   
 
Though it is not necessary that Didymus borrowed from Origen on this point, it is at least 
plausible that Didymus agrees with Origen’s statement when he writes that “the image of 
God is his Only-begotten Son. Paul teaches this when he writes, ‘who is the image of the 
invisible God,’ that is, an essential and unchanging image. For ‘He who has seen me has 
also seen the Father’.” 24  
 Like Origen, Didymus teaches that the human being is made up of “soul, body, and 
spirit.”25 However, Didymus clarifies that Paul distinguishes “our spirit” from the Holy 
Spirit. In Romans 8:16, Paul states that “the Spirit himself testifies (Αὐτὸ τὸ Πνεῦµα 
συµµαρτθρεῖ) to our spirit.” Paul’s distinction between the Holy Spirit as “the Spirit 
himself” (Αὐτὸ τὸ Πνεῦµα) and our “spirit” confirms the indelible line Didymus sees 
between the Holy Spirit and all rational creatures.  
                                               
23 Origen, Heine trans., 65. 
24 SC 233:148; ComGen 58.4-7. εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστιν ὁ Υἱὸς αὐτοῦ ὁ µονογενής· Παῦλος τοῦτο 
διδάσκει γράφων· “Ὅς ἐστιν εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου,” εἰκὼν δὲ οὐσιώδης καὶ ἀπαράλλακτος· “Ὁ” 
γὰρ “ἑωρακὼς ἐµὲ ἑώρακε τὸν Πατέρα.” The only other place in the Didymean corpus where the “image” 
is paired with ἀπαράλλακτος is Trin. 3 (789.44), in a passage with other terminology, such as synanarchon, 
which may implie a scholastic context beyond the fourth century. Interestingly, Didymus feels obliged to 
rule out the possibility that there are two images, one of the Father, and one of the Son. This may indicate a 
later stage in ‘Eunomian’ doctrine, which may well have developed its theory into claiming that there were 
two ‘images’: οὐ δεῖ διαφόρους τὰς εἰκόνας λαµβάνειν· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη Πατρὸς καὶ ἄλλη Υἱοῦ τυγχάνει· εἰ 
γὰρ ὁ ἑωρακὼς τὸν Υἱὸν εἶδεν καὶ τὸν Πατέρα καὶ χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως τοῦ Θεοῦ ὁ Υἱός ἐστιν κατὰ 
τὸν µακάριον Παῦλον, οὐ δεῖ ἑτέραν εἰκόνα ἐννοεῖν (SC 233:148; ComGen 58.8-13). Might this be 
Didymus’ characterization of Eunomius’ doctrine of the “activities” of the Father and the Son as 
intermediaries? On this issue, see Michel Barnes, “Eunomius of Cyzicus and Gregory of Nyssa: Two 
Traditions of Transcendent Causality,” Vigiliae Christianae 52.1 (1998): 59-87. 
25 See SC 244:140-43; ComGen 55:12-56.1. Cf. Origen, Princ. 3.4.1. Both Origen and Didymus 
base this psychological model from 1 Thess 5:23, and the common use of this text of Scripture suggest that, 
in this case, Didymus is relying on Origen’s precedent. 
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 As we have seen, in On the Holy Spirit, Didymus makes it clear that the Holy Spirit 
teaches as one who has not been taught.26 What, then, does the Holy Spirit teach? 
According to Didymus, attainment of virtue is conformity to Christ. He includes Paul’s 
statement “until Christ is formed (µέχρις οὗ µορφωθῇ) in you” to show that conformity to 
Christ lies behind the compact statements about the divine image offered by Genesis 
1:26-27. Paul teaches, Didymus says,  
that the intellection of truth about Christ, once it has engendered itself in the soul, 
characterizes and images the soul according to itself. “Let us make man according 
to our image and likeness.” The “image” of God is the only-begotten Son. Paul 
teaches this when he writes “who is image of the invisible God,” an essential and 
unchanging image (εἰκὼν δὲ οὐσιώδης καὶ ἀπαράλλακτος). For “who has seen me 
has seen the Father.” If then it is said to God, “Let us make man according to our 
‘image and likeness,’ ” then it is not necessary to take different images. For the 
Father does not have one, the Son another. For if the one who has seen the Son 
saw also the Father and “character of God’s hypostasis is the Son,” according to 
the blessed Paul, it is not necessary to imagine another image. For none of the 
things generated images and characterizes God according to substance. Thus, the 
text does not read, “Let us make man an image, but according to an image. This 
means that this [human] reproduces and imitates that image (ὅπερ ἐστιν 
ἀπ᾽ἐκείνης εἰκονισθῆναι καὶ µιµήσασθαι ταύτην). For the human being has been 
constructed as capable of receiving the image (χωρητικὸς γὰρ κατεσκευάσθη ὁ 
ἄνθρωπος τῆς εἰκόνος).27 
 
Didymus’s explanation here concords with the Alexandrian tradition of identifying the 
archetypal “image” to which humanity is conformed as the second person, Christ. He 
provides some added clarity that the human being is created with the capability of 
“receiving the image,” but by and in large, Didymus’s reading of this passage is a 
scholastic version of Origen’s exegesis of this passage.28 
 Whereas Clement’s reading of the divine “image” conflates the soul with the Holy 
Spirit, and Origen’s does not ascribe the same kind of causality to the Holy Spirit as to 
                                               
26 See Chapter 5. 
27 SC 233:146-68; ComGen. 58.1-15. 
28 Cf. Origen, Cels. 6.66.1, HomGen 1.13; HomLuke 8.2; Orat. 22.4; and, ultimately, Philo, leg. 
all. 3.96. 
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the Father and Son, Didymus develops the Alexandrian tradition in a pro-Nicene 
direction. The Holy Spirit is the seal of the image in the soul. This model for the Holy 
Spirit’s agency in the process of moral transformation is present in the Commentary on 
Genesis, but it appears with greater clarity in Didymus’s On the Holy Spirit. Before we 
come to that text, it will be useful to explore first the history of terms for “sealing” an 
“image” in the soul in philosophical perspective.  
 
The Holy Spirit as “Seal” and Cause of Cognitive Impression of Virtue 
 
 
 
 So Didymus agreed in broad terms with his Alexandrian predecessors that the 
human being is made in the image of God and conformed to it. In order to understand 
how Didymus adds clarity to the Holy Spirit’s identification as the cause of virtue in the 
soul, it is important to attend to some technical terminology. I first explain how Ephesians 
1:13-14 and 4:30 could have been read in light of Hellenistic psychology, especially the 
notion of “cognitive impression.” I then turn the broad context of these verse’s 
interpretation to what I argue is a shift from Origen to Didymus. Didymus seizes upon 
these verses as key texts for underscoring the Holy Spirit’s inseparably divine agency. 
 
Ephesians 1:13-14 and 4:30 
 
 
 
 Here are Paul’s statement regarding the Holy Spirit’s action as a “seal” on the 
soul.  
In him you also, when you had heard the word of truth, the gospel of your 
salvation, and had believed in him, were marked with the seal of the promised 
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Holy Spirit (ἐσφραγίσθητε τῷ πνεύµατι τῆς ἐπαγγελίας τῷ ἁγίῳ); this is the 
pledge of our inheritance toward redemption as God’s own people, to the praise of 
his glory.29 
 
And do not grieve the Holy Spirit of God, with which you were marked with a 
seal τὸ πνεῦµα τὸ ἅγιον τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐν ᾧ ἐσφραγίσθητε) for the day of 
redemption.30 
 
In each of these texts, Paul states that the Holy Spirit “seals” and implies that the Holy 
Spirit is a “seal” (σφραγίς; signaculum). Modern studies of these lines have tended to 
focus on the question of the relationship between “sealing” and early Christian liturgical 
contexts.31 They have not however drawn attention to an association early Christian 
readers trained in Hellenistic moral psychology would be tempted to make. When Paul 
speaks of the Holy Spirit as a “seal,” he uses a term associated with the philosophical 
notion of “cognitive impression.” Before I come to Didymus and some relevant 
precursors to his interpretation of this verse, a word on the “cognitive impression” and its 
use by Philo is in order. 
 
 
                                               
29 Eph. 1:13-14. 
30 Eph. 4:30. 
31 The classic study in this regard is G.W.H. Lampe, The Seal of the Spirit, 2nd ed. (London: 
SPCK, 1987), especially 235-305. See also Tucker S. Ferda, “ ‘Sealed’ with the Holy Spirit (Eph 1,13-14) 
and Circumcision,” Biblica 93.4 (2012): 557-579. Ferda (559-61) offers a fourfold typology of scholarly 
approaches to the history of Ephesians 1:13-14 in early Christianity: (1) baptism; (2) confirmation; (3) 
spiritual empowerment; (4) magical protection. The absence of a category for reading Eph. 1:13-14 in 
terms of Hellenistic psychology is worth noting, and Ferda here faithfully represents a scholarly tendency 
to overlook the overlap to which I am drawing attention. Lampe does not mention the Stoic tradition of 
“cognitive impression” in his book on the subject. It is also worth mentioning that Ferda includes 
Didymus’s statement in Spir. 20 under the rubric of (3), in which “the focus is not a particular rite (baptism, 
confirmation, etc.), but rather the work of the Holy Spirit on the character of the believer (e.g., righteous 
behavior, robust faith in God, charismatic gifts, etc.).” See Ferda, 560-1. I do not disagree that Didymus’s 
usage reflects a psychological reading of Epheesians 1:13-14, but I also do not think that the use of a 
psychological context excludes reading Didymus as referring the verse to liturgical practicies. Similar 
statements made by the author of De trinitate led Lampe, for example, to characterize Didymus as a good 
example of a figure who read the passage as referring to baptism (cf. Lampe, 249n2). In other words, even 
though Didymus foregrounds the psychological terminology Paul uses, there is no reason to suggest that he 
does so to the exclusion of baptism or confirmation as a human means of the impartation of the Holy 
Spirit’s “impression” on the soul. 
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A Hellenistic Context for “Sealing” 
 
 
 
 In his Commentary on John, in a rare moment of explicit definition of 
“participation,” Origen uses the term ἐναποµάσσοµαι, a word related to “sealing.” The 
term ἐναποµάσσοµαι is Stoic in origin and appears in the classic definition of “cognitive 
impression” (φαντασία καταληπτική) variously ascribed to Zeno and Chrysippus.32 A 
cognitive impression was thought to be “impressed and sealed (ἐναποµεµαγµένη καὶ 
ἐναπεσφραγισµένη) both from and according to a real object, such as it would not be 
from an unreal object.”33 That Stoics spoke of the impression as sealed—
                                               
32 Perhaps because Origen’s relationship to non-Christian philosophy is so often framed in terms 
of his acceptance or rejection of unadulterated Platonism, his knowledge of school Platonism is more 
widely known than the tradition of scholarship that has documented and explored Origen’s deep 
acquaintance with Stoic thought, especially in terms of psychology and logic. See, for example (in 
chronological order), Henry Chadwick, “Origen, Celsus, and the Stoa,” Journal of Theological Studies 48 
(1947): 34-49; Louis Roberts, “Origen and Stoic Logic,” in Transactions and Proceedings of the American 
Philological Association 101 (1970), 433-444; John Rist, “The Importance of Stoic Logic in the Contra 
Celsum,” in Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought: Essays in Honour of A.H. Armstrong, ed. H.J. 
Blumenthal and R.A. Markus (London: Variorum Publications, 1981), 64-78; John Rist, “Beyond Stoic and 
Platonist: A Sample of Origen’s Treatment of Philosophy (Contra Celsum: 4.62-70),” in Platonismus und 
Christentum: Festschrift für Heinrich Dörrie, ed. H.-D. Blume and F. Mann (Münster: Aschendorf, 1983), 
228-238; Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 
especially 21-26; Ronald Heine, “Stoic Logic as Handmaid to Exegesis and Theology in Origen’s 
Commentary on the Gospel of John,” Journal of Theological Studies 44.1 (1993): 90-117; and Michael 
Frede, A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2011), 102-124. 
33 SVF 1:18: ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ κατ᾽αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναποµεµαγµένη καὶ 
ἐναπεσφραγισµένη ὁποία οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ µὴ ὑπάρχοντος. Diogenes Laertius (Lives VII 50) adds the 
descriptor ἐναποτετυπωµένη to this version of the definition found in Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of 
Pyrrhonism II 4. On “cognitive impression” as the hallmark of Stoic epistemology, see Michael Frede, 
“Stoic epistemology,” in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. Keimpe Algra, Jonathan 
Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld, and Malcolm Schofield (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 295-322. 
For a fine-grained reconstruction of the old Stoic theory of action, which incorporates Stoic epistemology, 
remaining unsurpassed is Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1985). For more on Stoic epistemology, see G. Watson, “Discovering the Imagination,” in The 
Question of Eclecticism, ed. Long and Dillon; F. Sandbach, “Phantasia kataleptike,” in Problems in 
Stoicism, ed. by A. A Long (London: Athlone Press, 1971), 9-21, and Josiah Gould, The Philosophy of 
Chrysippus (New York: SUNY Press, 1970), 161-198. Ephesians 1:13-14 would offer early Christians 
knowledgeable of Stoicism an intriguing combination of terms in the Stoic definition. Paul writes that those 
believing in the Gospel had been “sealed by the Holy Spirit of the promise” (ἐσφραγίσθητε τῷ πνεύµατι τῆς 
ἐπαγγελίας τῷ ἁγίῷ). 
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ἐναπεσφραγισµένη—will become important when we come to Didymus, below.34 In 
response to Skeptical criticism, Stoics were said to have distinguished between 
impressions generally, which may or may not correspond to reality, and cognitive 
impressions, which are trustworthy and correspond, in fact, to reality.35  
 The Stoic invention of the “cognitive impression” proved a flexible non-Skeptical 
tool for epistemology. It could be adapted to fit Platonist or Aristotelian, as well as Stoic, 
philosophical ends. In Seneca’s Epistle 65, the “seal” of the Platonic “paradigmatic 
cause” is impressed in corresponding matter like that of a signet ring in wax.36 The 
                                               
34 Note here the presence of the root-word σφραγίς. As Lampe notes, “σφραγίς (signaculum) is 
used to denote a stone in a signet ring, the design or inscription which it bears, the stamp which is made 
with it upon was, and hence a seal which is an authentication, guarantee, or proof” (Lampe, Seal, 8). 
35 Richard Layton ascribes to Didymus awareness of Stoic epistemology generally, and to the 
cognitive impression in particular, in his Commentary on Job. See Layton, Didymus the Blind, 30-35. 
Diogenes Laertius describes the cognitive impression as “an imprint on the soul (τύπωσιν ἐν ψυχῇ): the 
name having been appropriately borrowed from the imprint made by the seal upon the wax.” See Lives, VII 
46: Τὴν δὲ φαντασίαν εἶναι τύπωσιν ἐν ψυχῇ, τοῦ ὀνόµατος οἰκείως µετενηνεγµένου ἀπὸ τῶν τύπων τῶν ἐν 
τῷ κηρῷ ὑπὸ τοῦ δακτυλίου γινοµένων. τῆς δὲ φαντασίας τὴν µὲν καταληπτικήν, τὴν δὲ ἀκατάληπτον· 
καταληπτικὴν µέν, ἣν κριτήριον εἶναι τῶν πραγµάτων φασί, τὴν γινοµένην ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ 
ὑπάρχον ἐναπεσφραγισµένην καὶ ἐναποµεµαγµένην· ἀκατάληπτον δὲ ἢ τὴν µὴ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, ἢ ἀπὸ 
ὑπάρχοντος µέν, µὴ κατ’ αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχον· τὴν µὴ τρανῆ µηδὲ ἔκτυπον. As noted, Diogenes is probably 
channeling Cleanthes’ definition. Compare Cicero’s report (Acad. 1.42) of Zeno’s doctrine that nature 
“bestowed as it were a ‘measuring-rod’ of knowledge and a first principle of itself from which 
subsequently notions of things could be impressed upon the mind (notiones rerum in animis 
imprimerentur), out of which not first principles only but certain broader roads to the discovery of reasoned 
truth were opened up.” See also Cicero, Acad. 2.18 and Zeno’s famous “hand illustration” at 2.145. In 
characterizing cognitive impressions as marking an imprint in wax like a seal, Cleanthes had been working 
with earlier precedent. According to Plato, the soul receives an imprint of the Ideas in wax (κηρός) (Theaet. 
194c5); Timaeus characterizes the Demiurge as a “wax worker” (Tim. 74c). Cleanthes may also have 
appropriated the example of the seal from the signet ring from Aristotle’s De Anima (424a19). Didymus 
picks up on this aspect of Origen’s use of Stoic tradition in On the Holy Spirit. See especially the 
“tropological” interpretation of Noah’s three sons (Gen. 6:10) in ComGn 165.5-166.14, where Didymus 
uses the term ἐκτύπωσις to describe the soul’s “πάθος with a view toward ὁρµή.” Didymus evinces 
knowledge of the Stoic “non-pejorative” or intellectualist doctrine of pathos as the assent to an impression 
leading up to impulse. This is interesting evidence, too, for the rationalistic interpretation of the Stoics and 
Stoic tradition, in which πάθος could be used loosely to refer either to the outworking of a vicious 
movement of the soul, or simply to the “affect” produced by an initial phantasia to the soul in the first 
place. Didymus is aware of this distinction.  
36 For discussion of Seneca, Ep. 65.7, and the scholastic “metaphysics of prepositions” with which 
it is associated, see John Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 137-139; Gregory Sterling, “Prepositional 
Metaphysics in Jewish Wisdom Speculation and Early Christian Liturgical Texts,” in Wisdom and Logos: 
Studies in Jewish Thought in Honor of David Winston, ed. Runia and Sterling (Scholars Press, 1997), 219-
38; and Ronald Cox, By the Same Word: Creation and Salvation in Hellenistic Judaism and Early 
Christianity (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2007). 
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illustration is the same that Cleanthes had used to describe how a cognitive impression 
works.37 By the so-called Middle Platonic period, Platonists had grown accustomed to 
borrowing these Stoic epistemological terms.38 For an unreconstructed Platonist, for 
example, it would have made little sense to speak of “cognitive impressions,” but for 
school Platonists of Philo’s day, it had become possible to think of “impressions” as 
being “cognitive.” 
Consider the following example of Philo’s adaptation of Stoic epistemological 
vocabulary. In Special Laws 1.46-50, Philo casts the contemplation of the Ideas in Stoic 
terms when he speaks of “receiving impressions” (ἐναποµάξασθαι . . . τύπους) in the 
soul—the same terms Origen makes synonymous with µετεχόντων in the Commentary on 
John.39 He relates the familiar scene of Moses’s request to see God’s face and the Lord’s 
response (Exodus 33:12-23 LXX). Philo explains that God’s refusal to allow Moses to 
see his “face” represents the fact that God is beyond all human comprehension, no matter 
how far a soul progresses in knowledge of divine nature. Nevertheless, Moses begs to see 
God’s “glory” if not his “face.” To this God replies that  
the powers (δυνάµεις) which you seek to behold are altogether invisible, and 
appreciable only by the intellect, since I myself am invisible and only appreciable 
by the intellect. . . . And though they are by nature incomprehensible in their 
essence, still they show a kind of impression or copy of their energy and 
operation; as seals among you, when any wax or similar kind of material is 
applied to them, make an innumerable quantity of figures and impressions 
(τύπους ἐναποµάττονται), without being impaired as to any portion of themselves, 
but still remaining unaltered and as they were before; so also you must conceive 
                                               
37 The impression-in-wax model attributed to Cleanthes may or may not go back to Zeno. See SVF 
II.56. Chrysippus, however, found the metaphor problematic and opted for a no-less-materialistic model of 
the impression as an alteration in the pneuma as air. Chrysippus’s adjustment, in turn, allowed for more 
than one impression to reside in the soul at once, whereas the wax model could not explain such 
psychological phenomena. See Josiah Gould, the Philosophy of Chrysippus, 53-55. 
38 See also Alcinous, Didask. 4.4-6.  
39 Jo. 2.52, quoted above. Eusebius, d.e. 4.13, uses the term in a similar way. Note also the 
intriguing application of the term in a liturgical context to describe the impression of the “seal” of baptism 
spoken of, for example, in Ephesians 1:13-14 (v.Polyc. 19). 
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that the powers which are around me invest those things which have no distinctive 
qualities with such qualities, and those which have no forms with precise forms, 
and that without having any portion of their own everlasting nature dismembered 
or weakened.40 
 
Philo has God speaking of the “powers” surrounding him. God tells Moses that some 
refer to the divine “powers” around God as the “Ideas,” because “they give a peculiar 
character (εἰδοποιοῦσι) to every existing thing.”41 This is a clear reference to the causal 
power of the Ideas—the “paradigmatic cause” of Seneca’s Letter 65, for example.42 Yet 
Philo has used Stoic “impression” language to describe the paradigmatic cause. 
Furthermore, the Ideas transmit “figures and impressions” without “being impaired as to 
any portion of themselves.” They give without loss, in other words. Philo applies the 
doctrine of the “undiminished giver” to the Ideas.43 So Philo characterizes Seneca’s 
“Paradigmatic Cause” as supplying the ultimate source for any particular cognitive 
impression. In this way, Philo uses a Stoic epistemological concept, somewhat perversely, 
to circumvent sense-perception as the most basic source of knowledge. For this reason, 
                                               
40 Philo, Spec. leg., 1.46-50: ἃς ἐπιζητεῖς δυνάµεις εἰσὶν ἀόρατοι καὶ νοηταὶ πάντως ἐµοῦ τοῦ 
ἀοράτου καὶ νοητοῦ· λέγω δὲ νοητὰς οὐχὶ τὰς ἤδη ὑπὸ νοῦ καταλαµβανοµένας, ἀλλ' ὅτι εἰ 
καταλαµβάνεσθαι οἷαί τε εἶεν, οὐκ ἂν αἴσθησις αὐτὰς ἀλλ' ἀκραιφνέστατος νοῦς καταλαµβάνοι. πεφυκυῖαι 
δ' ἀκατάληπτοι κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ὅµως παραφαίνουσιν ἐκµαγεῖόν τι καὶ ἀπεικόνισµα τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἐνεργείας· 
οἷαι αἱ παρ' ὑµῖν σφραγῖδες – ὅταν <γὰρ> προσενεχθῇ κηρὸς ἤ τις ὁµοιότροπος ὕλη, µυρίους ὅσους τύπους 
ἐναποµάττονται, µηδὲν ἀκρωτηριασθεῖσαι µέρος, ἀλλ' ἐν ὁµοίῳ µένουσαι – , τοιαύτας ὑποληπτέον καὶ τὰς 
περὶ ἐµὲ δυνάµεις περιποιούσας ἀποίοις ποιότητας καὶ µορφὰς ἀµόρφοις καὶ µηδὲν τῆς ἀιδίου φύσεως µήτ' 
ἀλλαττοµένας µήτε µειουµένας. ὀνοµάζουσι δ' αὐτὰς οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ τινες τῶν παρ' ὑµῖν ἰδέας, ἐπειδὴ 
ἕκαστα τῶν ὄντων εἰδοποιοῦσι τὰ ἄτακτα τάττουσαι καὶ τὰ ἄπειρα καὶ ἀόριστα καὶ ἀσχηµάτιστα 
περατοῦσαι καὶ περιορίζουσαι καὶ σχηµατίζουσαι καὶ συνόλως τὸ χεῖρον εἰς τὸ ἄµεινον µεθαρµοζόµεναι. 
C.D. Yonge, trans., p. 538. 
41 Philo, Spec. leg., 1.48: “And some of your race, speaking with sufficient correctness, call them 
ideas (ἰδέας), since they give a peculiar character (εἰδοποιοῦσι) to every existing thing, arranging what had 
previously no order, and limiting, and defining, and fashioning what was before destitute of all limitation, 
and defination, and fashion; and, in short, in all respects changing what was bad into a better condition” 
(Yong, trans., p. 538). 
42 Seneca, Ep. 65. 
43 For more on this doctrine, see Lewis Ayres, “The Holy Spirit as the ‘Undiminished Giver’: 
Didymus the Blind’s De Spiritu Sancto and the Development of Nicene Pneumatology,” in The Holy Spirit 
in the Fathers of the Church: The Proceedings of the Seventh International Patristic Conference, 
Maynooth, 2008 (Portland: Four Courts, 2010), 57–72 
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Philo may speak of the mind’s having a cognitive impression as receiving access to the 
Ideas. 
For Philo, contemplation of the Ideas remains fundamental, and the Ideas, 
according to Philo, are God’s “powers” made accessible through the Torah. It would 
make sense, then, for Philo to cast contemplation as comprising the study of Scripture. In 
Special Laws 4.159-164, Philo does just that. He describes an ideal king who should 
“write out a copy of the book of the law with his own hand, which shall supply him with 
a summary and concise image of all the laws.”44 The point is not that the ruler should 
know the laws in a remote sense, but that the ruler should come to embody the Torah and 
be transformed into a living example of the law. Philo has him say:  
I wrote all this; I who am a ruler of such great power; without employing any one 
else as my scribe, though I had innumerable servants. Did I do all this, in order to 
fill up a volume, like those who copy out books for hire, or like men who practice 
their eyes and their hands, training the one to acuteness of sight, and the others to 
rapidity of writing? Why should I have done this? . . . I did it in order that after I 
had recorded these things in a book, I might at once proceed to impress 
(ἐναποµάττωµαι) them on my heart, and that I might stamp upon my intellect 
their divine and indelible characters: other kings bear scepters in their hands, and 
sit upon thrones in royal state, but my scepter shall be the book of the copy of the 
law; that shall be my boast and my incontestable glory, the signal of my 
irreproachable sovereignty, modeled according to the archetypal royal power of 
God.45 
 
To “impress” (ἐναποµάττωµαι) the character of the law’s precepts upon the “heart” is the 
point of the ruler’s rewriting, or copying out, the Torah. According to Philo, to 
“contemplate the Ideas” is to assent to the cognitive impressions provided by the 
                                               
44 Philo, Spec. leg. 160. 
45 ἐγὼ ταῦτ' ἔγραψα ὁ τοιοῦτος ἄρχων, µὴ ἑτέρῳ προσχρησάµενος ὑπηρετῶν µυρίων ὄντων· ἆρ' 
ὅπως βιβλίον ἀποπληρώσω, καθάπερ οἱ µισθοῦ γράφοντες ἢ οἱ γυµνάζοντες ὀφθαλµούς τε καὶ χεῖρας, τοὺς 
µὲν εἰς ὀξυωπίαν, τὰς δ' ἵνα ὦσιν ὀξυγράφοι;  – πόθεν; οὐκ ἔστιν – ἀλλ' ὅπως αὐτὰ ἐν βιβλίῳ γράφων εὐθὺς 
εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν µεταγράφω καὶ ἐναποµάττωµαι τῇ διανοίᾳ θειοτέρους καὶ ἀνεκπλύτους χαρακτῆρας. οἱ µὲν 
οὖν ἄλλοι βασιλεῖς βακτηρίας ἔχοντες σκηπτροφοροῦσιν, ἐµοὶ δὲ τὸ σκῆπτρόν ἐστιν ἡ βίβλος τῆς 
Ἐπινοµίδος, καύχηµα καὶ κλέος ἀνανταγώνιστον, παράσηµον ἡγεµονίας ἀνεπιλήπτου πρὸς ἀρχέτυπον τὴν 
τοῦ θεοῦ βασιλείαν ἀπεικονισθείσης. Yonge, trans., p. 632, slightly modified. 
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“paradigmatic cause” of God’s glorious cloud. The wise ruler receives a “scepter” in 
modeling his own power on the “archetypal royal power of God.” In order to construct 
such a model in himself through imitation, he pursues access to God’s “powers” through 
the study of Torah. By copying out the Torah he focuses his attention on it in steady 
contemplation. Such contemplation leads to moral transformation as the ruler assents to 
Torah’s truths. 
 So far, it should be clear that Philo had made available to his Alexandrian heirs a 
use of “impression” which would have both transcended its Stoic origins, so that it could 
be used to refer to the cause of intellectual comprehension. Origen also applied the 
concept of “clear and distinct impressions” in the case of Christian prayer. Prayer is an 
attempt to achieve clarity about the truth. I now want to show how Didymus’s reading of 
Ephesians 1:13-14 and 4:30 draws on this tradition by clarifying the Holy Spirit’s nature 
and agency in moral transformation. According to Didymus, the Holy Spirit is the 
transcendent cause of virtue in the soul. 
 
From Origen to Didymus: The Holy Spirit as Exemplary Cause of Cognitive Impression 
 
 
 
Recall that Origen casts the Son’s “participation in” the Father in cognitive terms, 
as the Son contemplates the “fatherly depths.”46 Origen had used the Platonic notion of 
the Demiurge to explain how the Son reproduces his likeness in creatures. Origen’s 
scheme begins with the Holy Spirit as the primal product of the Son’s creative activities. 
Didymus clarifies the Holy Spirit’s agency in the production of a divine likeness in the 
                                               
46 See Chapter 2. 
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soul and characterizes the Holy Spirit as the image’s “seal.”47 His reading of Paul’s 
statement in Ephesians is worth quoting in full, because it allows Didymus to characterize 
the Holy Spirit as the paradigmatic cause of virtue in the soul: 
The blessed Apostle wrote to the Ephesians and said: Believing in him, you have 
been sealed (signati estis; = ἐσφραγίσθητε) by the promised Holy Spirit, who is 
the guarantee of our inheritance [Eph 1.13-14]. For if some are sealed with the 
Holy Spirit and take on his form and likeness, the Spirit is among those which are 
possessed and do not possess, seeing that those who possess him are imprinted 
with his seal (habentibus illum signaculo eius impressis).48 
 
Recall that, in the Commentary on Genesis, Didymus states that “true understanding 
about Christ, once it is born in the soul, impresses its marks and representations on the 
                                               
47 A comment on Ephesians 1:13-14 in the catena attributed to Origen reads as follows: 
σφραγίζεται δὲ τῷ πνεύµατι τῆς ἐπαγγελίας τῷ ἁγίῳ πᾶς ὁ ἀκούσας τὸν τῆς ἀληθείας λόγον, ὄντα 
εὐαγγέλιον τῆς σωτηρίας τοῦ ἀκούοντος καὶ πιστεύοντος· ὡς εἰ ἀκούσαι µέν, µὴ πιστεύσαι δέ, οὐκ ἂν 
σφραγισθείη. ἄλλος δέ τις ἐρεῖ ὅτι εἰ καὶ πιστεύσαι µέν, µὴ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον δὲ προκόπτοι ὡς ἀκούειν τὸν 
λόγον τῆς ἀληθείας, οὐδ’ οὕτως ἂν χωρήσαι τὴν τοῦ πνεύµατος ἐπαγγελίας τοῦ ἁγίου σφραγῖδα, ἥτις ἐστὶν 
ἀληθῶς ἐκτύπωσις καὶ τράνωσις τούτων ἃ πρέπει ἐκτυποῦσθαι καὶ τρανοῦσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ τῆς ἐπαγγελίας 
ἁγίου πνεύµατος. ζητητέον δὲ καὶ εἴ που εἴρηται πνεῦµα ἐπαγγελίας ἅγιον, καὶ τί ἐκδεκτέον εἰς τὸ πνεῦµα 
τῆς ἐπαγγελίας τὸ ἅγιον. οἶµαι τοίνυν ὅτι ὥσπερ τὸ πνεῦµα τὸ ἅγιον, γενόµενον ἐπί τινι, ἅγιον ποιεῖ, καὶ τὸ 
πνεῦµα τῆς ϲοφίαϲ σοφόν, καὶ τὸ πνεῦµα τῆς ϲυνέϲεωϲ συνετόν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πνεῦµα τῆς ἐπαγγελίας εἶναι 
πως ἤδη ἐν τῇ ἐπαγγελίᾳ. See Origen, Com.Eph. 8.26-39; Gregg, ed., “The Commentary of Origen Upon 
the Epistle to the Ephesians,” JTS 3 (1902): 243. The author of this compressed comment appears to 
address the question of the presence or absence of the definite article. The phrase without definite articles—
πνεῦµα ἐπαγγελίας ἅγιον—does not appear in the immediate context of Scripture. Perhaps it appeared in 
some copies of the text in the author’s context, or perhaps the author refers to one of several cases of the 
unadorned phrase “holy spirit” (πνεῦµα ἅγιον) attested in Scripture—e.g., John 20:22. In any case, the 
author reasons that just as the Holy Spirit is the Spirit which “makes holy,” and the Spirit of “Wisdom” 
makes “wise,” and the “Spirit of Unity” makes unified, so also “the Spirit of the Promise” is “in the 
promise.” The reasoning is that the Holy Spirit is the cause of the promised gifts and this explains Paul’s 
title for the Holy Spirit. If this statement is authentic to Origen, taken by itself it expresses a pneumatology 
similar to that in the Commentary on John: the Holy Spirit makes all the entites inferior to it “holy.” Cf. 
Orat. 20.2 and Jo. 13.3.15, in which Origen appears to acknowledge the existence of “sense impressions.” 
At the very least, the phrase ἐκτυποῦσθαι καὶ τρανοῦσθαι may owe to Origen. However, we should not 
exclude the possibility that here Didymus’s lost Commentary on Ephesians, appropriated by Jerome, has 
influenced the catena tradition. On the other hand, in neither of these other texts does Origen mention the 
Holy Spirit. If this is Origen’s original statement, it appears to be unique in his corpus, and Didymus may 
have drawn on it to clarify the Holy Spirit’s nature as the transcendent cause of virtue. For scholarship on 
the relationship between Jerome’s Commentary on Ephesians and those of Origen and Didymus, see 
Ronald Heine, “Recovering Origen’s Commentary on Ephesians from Jerome,” JTS 51.2 (2000): 478-514. 
For an argument in favor of viewing the catena fragments ascribed to Origen with general caution, see 
Ronald Heine, “Can the Catena Fragments of Origen’s Commentary on John Be Trusted?” Vigiliae 
Christianae 40 (1986): 118-134. 
48 Spir. 20. 
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soul according to him.”49 Here he shows that the Holy Spirit is the divine agent that 
“impresses” the soul with Christ. The Holy Spirit impresses on the soul the “true 
understanding” (νόησις ἀληθὴς in the Commentary on Genesis) of Christ. In a related 
passage, Didymus incorporates elements of Origen’s theology of the Son as image into 
Paul’s identification of the Holy Spirit as the “seal”: 
[95] Since the Son is the Image of the invisible God [Col 1:15] and the Form of 
his substance [Heb 1:3], whoever is fashioned and formed according to this Image 
or Form (quicumque ad hanc imaginem vel formam imaginantur [εἰκονίζεται?] 
atque formantur)50 is led into likeness to God (though attaining such a form and 
image only insofar as the capacity of humans to advance allows). In a similar way, 
since the Holy Spirit is the seal of God, he seals those who receive the form and 
image of God and leads them to the seal of Christ, filling them with wisdom, 
knowledge, and above all faith.51 
 
Note that Didymus here links the Holy Spirit’s action of “sealing” with the Holy Spirit’s 
“filling” the soul. Recall that the Holy Spirit’s activity of “filling” is a key identifier of 
the Holy Spirit’s identity with the divine nature. So Didymus implies that the Holy 
Spirit’s identity as “seal” suggests the same thing as that suggested by the Holy Spirit’s 
identity as the divine “source” which “fills” creatures.  
 Didymus’s statement also contains a number of terms which featured in the 
definition of cognitive impression as Philo adapted it to Platonic purposes. The soul 
encounters the “image” by the Holy Spirit’s agency as “seal,” which “leads” the soul to 
Christ. According to Didymus’s exegesis of Ephesians 1:13-14, the Holy Spirit 
“imprints” or impresses the soul (habentibus illum signaculo eius impressis).52 This part 
of Didymus’s exegesis is not unprecedented, but his explanation for the exegesis is 
                                               
49 ComGen. 58.1-2: ἡ περὶ Χριστοῦ νόησις ἀληθὴς ἐγγινοµένη ψυχῇ χαρακτηρίζει καὶ εἰκονίζει 
αὐτὴν κατ’ αὐτόν. 
50 Cf. Didymus ComGen. 58.14-17: Διόπερ οὐκ εἴρηται· Ποιήσωµεν τὸν ἄνθρωπον εἰκόνα, ἀλλὰ 
κατ᾽εἰκόνα, ὅπερ ἐστν ἀπ᾽ἐκείνης εἰκονισθῆναι καὶ µιµήσασθαι ταύτην· Jerome may have used “imago et 
forma” to render a version of a pair of terms similar to Didymus’s phrase εἰκονισθῆναι καὶ µιµήσασθαι. 
51 Spir. 95. 
52 Spir. 20. 
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telling: “just as someone, who takes up a practice and a virtue, receives into his mind, as 
it were, a seal and an image (signaculum et figuram) of the knowledge which he takes up, 
so too the one who is made a sharer in the Holy Spirit (Spiritus Sancti particeps efficitur) 
becomes, through communion (per communionem) with him, simultaneously spiritual 
and holy.”53 The “reception” of the “seal” into the mind implies the context of an 
“exemplary cause” like that described by Philo—the divine power that reproduces its 
resemblance in others. 
 Later Didymus makes statements that rely on this principle. For example: “And so, 
when the Spirit of Truth himself enters into a pure and simple mind, he will impress upon 
you the knowledge of truth; since he always joins the new to the old, he will guide you 
into all truth.”54 This statement depends upon the Holy Spirit being the divine power that 
causes others to be like it: “When the Holy Spirit comes into the hearts of believers, they 
are filled with words of wisdom and knowledge. When they are made spiritual in this 
way, they receive the teaching of the Holy Spirit which can guide them toward the whole 
Truth.”55 The operative logic is that the Holy Spirit causes believers to be what the Holy 
Spirit is: “filled with words of wisdom and knowledge.” 
 Didymus distinguishes between the “image” and the “seal” that reproduces it. He 
speaks of the mechanism for the reproduction of the divine likeness as a “communion.” 
Plato, in Phaedo 100d, had used the term “communion” to describe the mechanism of the 
beautiful’s presence (parousia) in a particular entity. Though the impetus to use terms for 
“communion” can also be ascribed to Paul’s own terminology, Didymus’s use of such 
terms also makes sense in light of Philo’s Platonized “cognitive impression.” The soul 
                                               
53 Spir. 20. 
54 Spir. 151. 
55 Spir. 149. 
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assents to impressions, and if the impressions are virtuous, the soul becomes virtuous. 
Didymus uses the Stoic model to show that the Holy Spirit is the cause of holiness in the 
soul that assents to impressions caused by the Holy Spirit.  
 Didymus’s pairing of the Holy Spirit’s “exemplarity” with the common metaphor 
of the Son as God’s “image” reinforces Didymus’s doctrine of inseparable divine 
operation ad extra. According to Didymus, the Holy Spirit causes holiness—the likeness 
of the divine image—to reside in the soul. The Holy Spirit plays the role in the Christian 
scheme of Platonism’s “paradigmatic cause” insofar as the Holy Spirit produces the 
appearance of holiness in the human soul. The Holy Spirit’s identity as “paradigmatic 
cause” allows Didymus to maintain, with Origen, that the Holy Spirit is participated in 
“immaterially.” While Didymus does imply that the Son is “image” and the Spirit is the 
“seal,” Didymus is careful not to reduce the identification of the divine “cause” or 
“archetype” to the Logos alone. According to Didymus, the divine archetype of virtue is 
not only the Logos, but the Trinity considered as a single divine cause. This brings us to 
Didymus’ theory of divine indwelling. 
 
The Holy Spirit, the Human Spirit, and the Indwelling Trinity 
 
 
 
 Decisions made at the level of causality set the stage for what it is possible to 
conceive at the level of psychology, and on this point Didymus’ pro-Nicene 
pneumatology conditions his psychology. We have seen that Didymus’s pro-Nicene 
theology gives the Holy Spirit agency as a cause of the human soul’s conformity to a 
divine likeness. I will now show how Didymus uses his pro-Nicene theology to support 
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his moral psychology in two related ways. First, Didymus adapts Stoic themes to his own 
ends: God purifies the soul. Didymus distinguishes clearly between the human spirit and 
the fully divine, Holy Spirit, so that there can be no doubt about the futility of self-
purification. Second, Didymus provides an anti-Manichaean explanation of the soul’s 
vicious behavior. Didymus is able to distinguish between the Holy Spirit and the human 
spirit because he is clear that the Holy Spirit is a divine, and not a human, cause.  
 
The Trinity’s Presence: Indwelling and Serenity 
 
 
 
 First, let us consider Didymus’s use of the theme of “indwelling.” In addition to 
using the Scriptural example of the Son as “image” and the Holy Spirit as “seal,” 
Didymus uses terms of “indwelling” to name the way the Trinity’s gives itself to the soul. 
The Trinity indwells the soul and brings with it a condition of psychological serenity. In 
this way, Didymus develops Alexandrian tradition in a new direction. In a provocative 
but little-noticed article, John Egan suggested that the roots of Augustine’s well-known 
“psychological analogy” of the trinity had roots in Alexandrian soil.56 Whatever a broad 
continuity may stretch from Clement to Augustine, insofar as the soul is made in the 
“image of God,” earlier Alexandrians tended to locate the similarity between the human 
image and the divine exemplar exclusively in the divine Logos. Augustine was not, 
however, without Alexandrian precedent.  
 As Egan points out, according to Clement the Logos was an emanation of the 
divine mind. As such it provided a singular link between human intelligence and divinity. 
                                               
56 See John Egan, “Logos and Emanation in the Writings of Clement of Alexandria,” in 
Trinification of the World: A Festschrift in Honor of Frederick E. Crowe, eds. Thomas Dunne and Jean-
Marc Laporte (Toronto: Regis College Press, 1978), 176-209. 
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On this score, Origen appears to have been no exception to his predecessor in 
Alexandria.57 Egan suggests that Cyril anticipated Augustine’s expansion of the 
relationship between God and the human “image” to a correspondence between the 
“image” of the human being and the “image” of the trinity.58 But the shift did not begin 
with Cyril. It occurred at least as early as Didymus’s On the Holy Spirit. 
 The theme of indwelling is familiar in scholarship on early Christian asceticism or 
spirituality.59 Early Christians ranging in disposition from desert monastics to ecclesial 
officials often find themselves characterized by modern scholars as Platonizing mystics 
who seek an elusive communion with an ever-nebulous divinity, lacking shape, form, and 
content. Plato had initiated an otherworldly quest for that which transcends the here and 
now of concrete, earthly existence. In this mode, “indwelling” names the presence, ever 
so fleeting, of the transcendent.  
 The theme of indwelling is also familiar as a form of Jewish mysticism: God 
himself came to dwell with the people of Israel in their wanderings in the wilderness in 
the form of a pillar of fire by night and a cloud by day. For Christians, God’s dwelling 
became personal in the man Jesus. And yet the incarnation of God’s presence in Christ 
did not keep early Christian theorists from invoking the theme of indwelling in a 
                                               
57 See especially Strom. 5.13.88.1-3, 5.14.94.3-5, and Origen’s comparison of “reason in us” with 
the Word in Jo. 2.20, discussed in previous chapters. 
58 “It is true . . . that Augustine goes beyond the Alexandrian practice of linking man as created ‘to 
the image’ [Egan’s translation of kat’eikona], with the Word alone as the image of the Father; but it should 
be noted that in Alexandria too there was some progress towards the point reached by Augustine. Cyril of 
Alexandria recognized that being in the image of God meant being in the image of the consubstantial 
Trinity, but he granted that our divine sonship is the mark of the Son in us” (Egan, 177). Egan points to 
Cyril’s De dogmatum solutione 4 in order to support this statement, but he could have chosen a number of 
passages from Cyril’s work to make the point. He refers to the translation by Walter J. Burghardt, The 
Image of God in Man according to Cyril of Alexandria (Woodstock, MD: Woodstock College Press, 1957), 
123. 
59 See Columba Stewart, OSB, “Working the Earth of the Heart”: The Messalian Controversy in 
History, Texts, and Language to A.D. 431 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 203-240. 
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Platonizing sense: God may “dwell” here and now in Christian temples and even bodies, 
but the dwelling is always from elsewhere. 
 Such broad strokes are not misplaced. Jews and Christians did long for another 
world. Many even claimed already to live with at least one foot in that other world, 
awkwardly juxtaposed with and not reducible to this one. It was not only, however, 
Platonizing “mystics” who could speak of “divine indwelling.” With their naturalism, 
alleged materialism, and strict adherence to practical morality, Stoics are not the first 
school to come to mind at the mention of the theme of “divine indwelling.” Yet Seneca, 
in a short Epistle, places at the heart of his moral psychology a theory of divine 
indwelling. There is an inexhaustible source at the heart of the virtuous sage, he says. The 
source is virtue itself, and the sage’s possession of virtue is an unending source of 
divinity. The Stoic message is that the sage is able to possess virtue and never cease to be 
virtuous.  
Seneca instructs his addressee, Lucilius, not to seek something from him “when 
you can acquire it from yourself.”60 Stoics do not need to offer prayers, Seneca explains, 
because “God is near you, he is with you, he is within you.”61 Stoics had developed a 
notion of self-reliance that turned the Sage in on himself as his own source of virtue. 
Here is Seneca:  
This is what I mean, Lucilius: a holy spirit indwells within us, one who marks our 
good and bad deeds, and is our guardian. As we treat this spirit, so are we treated 
by it. Indeed, no man can be good without the help of God. Can one rise superior 
                                               
60 See Seneca, Ep. 41.1. Facis rem optimam et tibi salutarem si, ut scribis, perseveres ire ad 
bonam mentem, quam stultum est optare cum possis a te inpetrare. For the Latin text, see L.D. Reynolds, 
ed., L. Annaei Senecae ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales (Oxford: Oxford Classical Texts, 1965, reprinted 
2011); for translation, see Richard Gummere trans., LCL 75. 
61 Seneca, Ep. 41.1-2. prope est a te deus, tecum est, intus est. 
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to fortune unless God helps him to rise? He it is that gives noble and upright 
counsel. In each good man “a god doth dwell, but what god know we not.”62  
 
The God that dwells within is the only God capable of counseling the troubled mind that 
virtue is better than fortune. There is a space in the soul, Seneca suggests, where this God 
dwells, and which is comparable to a sacred grotto or a pagan temple, “a place not built 
with hands but hollowed out into such spaciousness by natural causes.”63 The “sprit that 
is within us” is like this space in nature. Seneca describes one in tune with that spirit, the 
Stoic Sage. The mere appearance of such a person will result in our reverence for him:  
If you see a man who is unterrified in the midst of dangers, untouched by desires, 
happy in adversity, peace amid the storm, who looks down upon men from a 
higher plane, and views the gods on a footing of equality, will not a feeling of 
reverence for him steal over you? Will you not say: ‘This quality is too great and 
too lofty to be regarded as resembling this petty body in which it dwells? A divine 
power has descended upon that man.’ When a soul rises superior to other souls, 
when it is under control, when it passes through every experience as if it were of 
small account, when it smiles at our fears and at our prayers, it is stirred by a 
force from heaven.64 
 
Here Seneca’s description of the sage’s apatheia is familiar enough to those acquainted 
with Stoicism. The Stoic Sage is his own source of virtue: the sage attains virtue through 
himself, as Seneca implies in his opening remarks to Lucilius. Yet in the lines that follow, 
Seneca’s Stoic proclivities give way to something slightly different. The Sage, Seneca 
says, is in touch with a divine source above, “stirred by a force from heaven.” He 
continues: 
                                               
62 Seneca, Ep. 41.2. Ita dico, Lucili: sacer intra nos spiritus sedet, malorum bonorumque 
nostrorum observatory et custos; hic prout a nobis tractatus est, ita nos ipse tractat. Bonus vero nir sine 
deo nemo est: an potest aliquis supra fortunam nisi ab illo adiutus exsurgere? Ille dat consilia magnifica et 
erecta. In unoquoque viruorum bonorum “(quis deus incertum est) habitat deus. 
63 Seneca, Ep. 41.3. non manu factus, sed naturalibus causis in tantam laxitatem excavates, 
animum tuum quadam religionis suspicione percutiet. 
64 Seneca, Ep. 41.4-5. Si hominem videris interritum periculis, intactum cupiditatibus, inter 
adversa felicem, in mediis tempestatibus placidum, ex superior loco homines videntem, ex aequo deos, non 
subibit te veneratio eius? non dices, “ista res maior est altiorque quam ut credi similis huic in quo est 
corpusculo possit”? Vis isto divine descendit; animum excellentem, moderatum, Omnia tamquam minora 
transeuntem, quidquid timemeus optamusque ridentem, caelestis potential agitat. 
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A thing like this cannot stand upright unless it be propped by the divine. 
Therefore, a greater part of it abides in that place from whence it came down to 
earth. Just as the rays of the sun do indeed touch the earth, but still abide at the 
source from which they are sent; even so the great and hallowed soul, which has 
come down in order that we may have a nearer knowledge of divinity, does 
indeed associate with us, but still cleaves to its origin; on that source it depends, 
thither it turns its gaze and strives to go, and it concerns itself with our doings 
only as a being superior to ourselves.65 
 
Just a bit further on Seneca clarifies the identity of this great soul. It is “One which is 
resplendent with no external good, but only with its own. For what is more foolish than to 
praise in a man the qualities which come from without? And what is more insane than to 
marvel at characteristics which may at the next instant be passed on to someone else?”66 
At stake is the indefectibility of virtue. Seneca rules in favor of the Stoic preference for 
virtue over “external goods,” such as good fortune. But there is a tension at the heart of 
Stoic self-reliance, as Seneca belies belief in something like the “unfallen soul” doctrine 
associated, later, with Plotinus. The divine force, or power, descended upon the Sage is 
Reason (Ratio).67 The great Sage’s mind remains fixed on the origin of his greatness, a 
divine source that stirs him to pursue reason. And though this greatness is not “external” 
(it comes from within) and is “his own,” it remains something that has “descended upon 
him” from above. There remains a deep tension in this picture: the Sage must get in tune 
with nature’s order, an order is not established by the Sage, and yet the Sage is supposed 
to be praised for something that is “his own,” not external to him. 
                                               
65 Seneca, Ep. 41.5. Non potest res tanta sine adminiculo numinis stare; itaque maiore sui parte 
illic est unde descendit. Quemadmodum radii solis contingent quidem terram sed ibi sunt unde mittuntur, 
sic animus magnus ac sacer et in hoc demissus, ut propius [quidem] divina nossemus, conversatur quidem 
nobiscum sed haeret origini suae; illinc pendet, illuc spectat ac nititur, nostris tamquam melior interest. 
Quis est ergo hic animus? 
66 Seneca, Ep. 41.6. Quis est ergo hic animus? Qui nullo bono nisi suo nitet. Quid enim est stultius 
quam in homine aliena laudare? quid eo dementius qui ea miratur quae ad alium transferri protinus 
possunt? 
67 “Do you ask what this is? It is soul, and reason brought to perfection in the soul” (Quaeris quid 
sit? Animus et ratio in animo perfecta); Ep. 41.8. Seneca’s speaking of a divine power “descending upon” a 
person is of course mirrored by Luke, which speaks of the Holy Spirit’s “coming upon” Mary. 
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It is helpful to view Didymus’ psychology as informed by the tradition Seneca 
illustrates.68 Didymus locates the source of moral excellence not in the soul itself, but in 
God, and God remains ultimately distinct from the soul. The source of moral excellence 
in the soul, according to Didymus, is the “seal” of Christ, the Holy Spirit. Because the 
Holy Spirit is a fully divine agent, the Holy Spirit has the divine office of serving as the 
source of virtue in the human soul. For this reason, each soul marked by the Holy Spirit is 
given a share in the Trinity and so becomes “Holy.”  
To be holy is also to be virtuous. Didymus’s pneumatology implies that Christian 
life produces the fruits of virtue sought by Stoicism—the extirpation of the passions and 
the mind’s serene direction of the soul—but without recourse to the tension generated by 
the self-productive divine indwelling Seneca describes. Instead, according to Didymus, 
not only the Holy Spirit but the Trinity “indwells the rational soul.” Insofar as the 
Christian participates in this divine source, the Christian becomes virtuous. Without 
access to this divine source, the soul founders, failing to attain stability on its own.  
Didymus does not reflect at length in On the Holy Spirit about all of the 
mechanics of moral psychology one might find in a Stoic handbook on the subject. The 
familiar terms φαντασία and ὁρµή do not appear, for example. However, a few glimmers 
of Stoic vocabulary do appear through the blinds of Jerome’s Latin, suggesting that 
Didymus has in mind a Stoic model for how the soul should operate. He is at least 
thinking in Stoic terms when he describes the kind of psychological serenity—peace and 
                                               
68 There are difficulties with using Seneca as evidence for Didymus’s knowledge of Stoicism. Not 
least of all is the fact that Seneca’s letters would not have been translated into Greek. If Didymus knew 
Stoicism firsthand, which is not improbable, he would have known it in Greek excerpts, not Latin. These 
would more likely have come from collections of Chrysippus or Posidonius, and more likely they would 
have been found in doxographies of mixed sources. Nevertheless, I use Seneca’s letter because it provides 
such a clear example of the kind of amalgamation of Platonic and Stoic themes that were possible in the 
period. 
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stability—achieved by the possession of the Holy Spirit. For example, Didymus describes 
the sanctified soul as a soul that has calmed its temptation to passion. The word Jerome 
uses to translate Didymus’s term for temptations, or disturbances, is perturbationes.69 
Didymus So says: 
God, the bestower of goods, in the power of the Holy Spirit grants the hope he 
promised to those who have the Spirit. With joy and peace he fills those who 
possess undisturbed, peaceful thoughts, and have minds joyful and calmed from 
every storm of the passions (perturbationum). Now whoever obtains the 
aforementioned goods in the power of the Holy Spirit also obtains the correct 
faith in the mystery of the Trinity.70  
 
Didymus here refers generally to the Stoic doctrine of ἀπάθεια. According to Didymus, 
peace of mind, or ἀπάθεια, and doctrine go hand in hand. God, Didymus says, gives the 
“promised Holy Spirit.” The substance of this hope is a serene mind, a soul undisturbed 
by anxious thoughts. Cicero explains that what the Greeks call πάθη, the Latins refer to as 
perturbationes.71 So here it is apt, as the translators have done with the English 
“passions,” to imply the presence, just beneath Jerome’s Latin, of the classic Stoic term 
for the emotions: πάθη.72 
 Didymus draws the generally Stoicizing cast of his moral psychology from Origen. 
However, Didymus has provided the Holy Spirit a causal role Origen did not in 
                                               
69 Perturbatio appears at Spir. 44.5; 109.5; 110.12; 142.8; and 181.5. 
70 Deus autem largitor bonorum spem quam primisit reddit in virtute Spiritus Sancti his qui habent 
illum, et gaudio ac pace complet eos qui, imperturbatam et sedatam cogitationem possidentes, laetas 
habent mentes et ob omni perturbationum tempestate tranquilas. Qui autem in virtute Spiritus Sancti 
praedicta bona fuerint consecuti, etiam rectam fidem in Trinitatis mysterio consequentur (Spir. 44). Cf. 
Spir. 181: “The wisdom of the flesh is directly linked with death and kills those who advance and are wise 
according to the flesh, but the wisdom of the Spirit bestows tranquility of mind (tranquilitatem mentis), 
peace, and eternal life on those who have it [Rom 8:6]. Those who come to possess it will trample under 
their feet all disturbances (omnes perturbationes), every kind of vice (genera vitiorum, and even the 
demons themselves who strive to suggest these things.” 
71 Cicero, Tuscalan Disputations 4.5.10. 
72 Cf. Cicero: “. . . we prefer to apply the term ‘disorders’ rather than ‘diseases’ to what the Greeks 
call πάθη” (quae Graeci πάθη vocant, nobis perturbationes appellari magis placet quam morbos; Loeb 
trans., 339). Following this, Cicero casts his lot with a bipartite psychology he ascribes to Pythagoras and, 
“following him,” Plato. 
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producing a state of serenity in the soul. A relatively clear example of the kind of shift 
that has taken place from Origen to Didymus is evident if we compare Didymus’s 
statements so far with a statement in the opening lines of On First Principles, Book 1. 
Against a Stoic position that characterizes God as a fiery substance, Origen writes: 
Let us rather consider that God does indeed consume and destroy, but that what he 
consumes are evil thoughts of the mind, shameful deeds and longings after sin, 
when these implant themselves in the minds of believers; and that he takes those 
souls which render themselves capable of receiving his Word and Wisdom and 
dwells in them according to the saying, “I and the Father will come and make our 
abode with him,” having first consumed all their vices and passions and made 
them into a temple pure and worthy of himself.73 
 
In this statement, the roots of Didymus’s psychology appear, but with an important 
omission. Origen quotes John 14:23, which has Jesus state that “I and the Father will 
come and make our abode with him.” This binitarian arrangement does not name the 
Holy Spirit as a divine entity that indwells. Origen makes it clear that the saints must 
“render themselves capable of receiving” God’s Word and Wisdom. Unlike the Stoics, for 
Origen, God is the agent of this purification (“[God] having first consumed all their vices 
and passions and made them into a temple pure and worthy of himself”). But Origen does 
not link divine purification to the presence and action of the Holy Spirit. 
 
The Distinction of Spirits and the Possibility of Angelic Indwelling: Zechariah 4:5 
 
 
 
 With Didymus’s pro-Nicene pneumatology and attendant psychology in view, we 
may turn briefly to a consequence that follows from Didymus’s clear distinction between 
the Holy Spirit, which brings about the soul’s purification and serenity, and the human 
spirit. Apparently some ascetics with which Didymus was familiar were teaching that 
                                               
73 Princ. 1.1.2; Butterworth trans., 7-8. 
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angels could “indwell the soul.” Given the prevalence of the idea of demonic possession 
and the fact that demons were “bad angels,” the idea of “angelic indwelling” is not 
strange. Athanasius notes that his opponents use Zechariah 4:5 to argue that the Holy 
Spirit is an angel that indwells the soul of the prophet. The verse states, “Thus says the 
angel who speaks within me.” Athanasius’s opponents, he claims, infer from this 
statement that “the angel who speaks within [the prophet] is the Spirit.”74 John 16:13 
famously declares that the Holy Spirit will “lead you into all truth,” and, though 
Athanasius does not quote John 16:13, it is easy to see how John 16:13’s mention of the 
Spirit as the guide to truth could have been identified as Zechariah’s angelic interpreter.   
 Athanasius argues against this interpretation by asserting that the angel speaking 
within the prophet is not the Holy Spirit. He cites the following two verses, in which 
Zechariah has a vision of a lampstand. The verses include a statement that “ ‘This is the 
word of the Lord to Zerubbabel, saying: ‘Not by great power, nor by strength, but by my 
Spirit, says the Lord Almighty’.” From this Athanasius concludes: 
It is obvious that the angel who spoke within the Prophet was not the Holy Spirit. 
For the angel was an angel, but the spirit was the Spirit of Almighty God, to 
whom the angel ministers and who is inseparable from the divinity proper to the 
Word.75 
 
Athanasius refers to an argument from a few lines earlier that, because Gabriel announces 
to Mary (Luke 1:35) that “the Holy Spirit will come upon you,” the Holy Spirit and the 
Son are “ministered to” by the angel Gabriel. This implies that the Holy Spirit should not 
be identified with the “ministering spirits” mentioned by Scripture. So also in this 
passage, Athanasius argues, the Holy Spirit is ministered to by the angel that interprets 
the vision to Zechariah, and so cannot be identified with that angel. 
                                               
74 Serap. 1.11.2. 
75 Serap. 1.11.4. 
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 Didymus does not address Zechariah 4:5 in On the Holy Spirit. When he does, in 
his Commentary on Zechariah, his response is different from Athanasius’s, but the 
difference probably reflects a shift: the polemical threat of angelomorphic pneumatology 
has disappeared. The distinction between the Holy Spirit and the human spirit, which 
once would have required an argument, now appears as a foregone conclusion. Didymus 
writes: 
the message that the angel gives to the prophet is not given with great power or 
with human strength or anything else: it is said and made clear by the Spirit of the 
Lord. Now, the Holy Spirit of the Lord is repeatedly mentioned in the Scriptures, 
including the Scriptures beyond the passage in hand. The statement is made of 
him also in Isaiah, for example, in these terms, ‘The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, 
for whose sake he anointed me.’ In similar terms the apostle Paul writes in his 
letter to the Corinthians, ‘What human being knows what is human except the 
human spirit that is within? So also no one comprehends what is God’s except the 
Spirit of God, who searches even the mystical depths of God.’ And again in Isaiah 
the one who is the origin and caretaker of all things says, ‘A spirit will come forth 
from me.’77 
 
Didymus lays out a few verses that distinguish clearly between the Spirit of God and the 
human spirit. Paul’s case is especially clear. There is a human spirit, Paul says, and the 
Spirit that searches the innermost mysteries of God. These two are not the same. But 
Didymus presumes that this is so and does not feel the need to make a case. The shift 
only confirms Doutreleau’s dating of the Commentary on Zechariah to the 380s.  
 However, reflected in Didymus’s remarks on this verse is a concern not for 
establishing that the Holy Spirit is divine, but that the human spirit and the Holy Spirit 
not be confused. Such confusion might lead the human being to suppose it is capable of 
                                               
77 Hill trans., FOTC 111:89; SC 83:348. Doutreleau dates the Commentary on Zechariah between 
386 and 393 with the probable date of composition being 387, shortly after Jerome requested the 
commentary to have been produced by Didymus (Doutreleau, ed., SC 83:23-27; cf. Jerome, De viris 
illustribus, 109). There can be little doubt that Didymus had already written On the Holy Spirit when he 
came to comment on Zechariah 4:5. 
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more than it is. The human soul must know its limits. On this point, Didymus’s exegesis 
comports with the moral psychology of On the Holy Spirit. Didymus states that  
it was by this Spirit that what was shown in the sight of Zerubbabel was made 
clear, not by the great power or strength of any created person; of a different kind 
is the power conferred with the Spirit to those who are worthy, the savior saying 
of it to his disciples in the Acts of the Apostles when ascending to heaven and to 
his Father, “You will receive power form the Holy Spirit coming upon you.”79  
 
Didymus notes that the savior promised that the Holy Spirit would descend upon them 
from on high (Acts 1:8). He then cites several instances, as though to prove that the 
donation occurred, in which the Holy Spirit is responsible for transmitting divine power 
to a prophetic or wise figure in Scripture, whether Paul (1 Cor 1:24), John (unknown 
citation), or Mary (Luke 1:35). He concludes that “it was with the Spirit of god 
mentioned in the passages cited . . . that the announcement was made in the presence of 
Zerubbabel and of the power associated with him, and not with any other great power 
and strength, which would be inferior, even if divine and much to be desired.”81 
 
An Anti-Manichaean Commonplace 
 
 
 
 The idea that an angelic presence might descend upon a monk and possess him, 
giving him great insight or wisdom, is understandable in the context of Egyptian 
monasticism. Such an experience is even more intelligible if the lines between the Holy 
Spirit and the angelic host had been blurred, since Scripture speaks frequently of the 
“indwelling” of the Spirit in human beings. Furthermore, Alexandrian asceticism aims to 
become like the angels, if not to become angelic. How better to become an angel than for 
                                               
79 Hill trans., FOTC 111:89; SC 83:348. 
81 Hill trans., FOTC 111:90; SC 83:350. 
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an angel to come to rest within one’s soul? By the same token, if a virtuous angel could 
“dwell in” the soul, it might also be possible for a bad angel to dwell in the soul. In other 
words, it might be possible for a bad monk to be characterized as inhabited by a demon. 
That sort of “indwelling” might in turn be viewed as generating a psychological situation 
beyond repair.  
 Didymus uses his pro-Nicene pneumatology to support an “anti-Manichean” moral 
psychology. His moral psychology is “anti-Manichean” in the sense that it draws on 
existing anti-heretical literature, which portrays Manicheans as teaching that it is possible 
for a soul to become evil “essentially” as opposed to “accidentally.”  
 Near the end of On the Holy Spirit, Didymus reminds the reader that “we argued 
above that the soul and mind of a human being cannot be filled with a created thing 
according to substance, but by the Trinity alone, since the mind is filled with created 
things only according to activity and the will’s error or virtue.”83 He then responds to an 
objection.84 Someone worried that “there is a created substance called Satan in the 
Scriptures that enters into certain people and is said to fill their heart.”85 Didymus asks:  
How can Satan fill the mind and commanding faculty of someone without 
entering into him and into his mind and (so to speak) without stepping through the 
doorway of his heart, since this power belongs to the Trinity alone?86 
 
So Didymus dismisses the example of Acts 5:3, and turns to the case of Judas, in John 
13:27. He explains the case as follows: 
[264] Therefore, when this thought occurred to Judas, it gave Satan the 
opportunity to enter into his heart and fill him with the worst kind of will. Yet he 
did not enter according to substance, but rather according to activity, since 
entering into another belongs to the uncreated nature which can be participated in 
                                               
83 Spir. 257. 
84 Spir. 257-268. Cf. Didymus, Contra Man. 19. 
85 Spir. 258. 
86 Spir. 260. 
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by many (quia introire in aliquem increatae naturae est et eius quae participetur 
a pluribus). The devil is not capable of being participated in, seeing that he is not 
the Creator but a creature. For this reason too, being capable of change and 
alteration, he fell from holiness and virtue. [265] We said above that τὸ µεθεκτόν 
(that is, “that which is received by participation”) is incorruptible and immutable 
and consequently eternal, but that that which is able to be changed is made and 
has a beginning. In addition, that which is incorruptible is everlasting whether one 
looks at ages past or ages to come. Therefore, it is not the case, as certain people 
think, that a person is filled with the devil or becomes indwelt by him through 
participation in his nature or substance. Rather, we believe that he indwells the 
person whom he fills through fraud, deception, and malice. . . . [267] If those who 
are called his sons in Scripture are not capable of receiving the devil through 
participation in his substance (for time and again we have shown that this is 
impossible for creatures), then no one else can receive him through participation 
in his substance, but only by adopting his most deceptive will. [268] After all, we 
have said that, in the case of creatures, activity and zeal can participate in works 
both good and bad. But the nature and the substance of the Trinity alone is able to 
enter into others. 
 
Didymus here uses his definition of the Holy Spirit as “participated in, but not 
participating,” in order to distinguish between the Holy Spirit and the Trinity, as having a 
divine nature that can “indwell” or “enter into others,” and creatures, such as the devil, 
which cannot “enter according to substance, but rather according to activity.” Elsewhere 
in On the Holy Spirit, Didymus invokes this distinction to make the same point. He says: 
After all, it is possible for that which we have learned (I mean the virtues and the 
arts), and for the disturbances, ignorance and passions contrary to these, to dwell 
in souls, yet not as substances but as accidents. But it is impossible for a created 
nature to dwell in the mind.87  
 
In context, this statement is part of a proof that the Holy Spirit may “dwell in the mind” 
because the Holy Spirit is not a “created nature.” But the distinction between “accidental” 
and “substantial” indwelling is the same. The distinction depends upon an adaptation of 
the scholastic distinction between “substance” and “accident,” taken over from Aristotle. 
However, Didymus uses the distinction not with an Aristotelian sense of “substance” as a 
                                               
87 Spir. 109. 
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particular thing, but with substance standing in for the kind of entity which can be 
participated immaterially, as an intellectual cause.  
 Didymus knows an earlier tradition, drawn from Methodius by the unknown author 
of a late third-century dialogue against Manichaean and Gnostic moral psychologies. In 
the course of this dialogue, a figure named “Adamantius” opposes various versions of 
psychological dualism, according to which there are two uncreated realities, one good 
and the other evil. Adamantius argues against this dualism by appealing to a theory of 
evil according to which evil can never be thought to be “substantial.” Here is an 
important example: 
All these things [such as murder, adultery, theft, immortality, and whatever the 
Law forbids] are of an “accidental” nature. Murder is not substance, nor again is 
adultery, nor are any of the similar evils. But just as the grammarian is named 
from Grammar and the rhetorician from Rhetoric . . . , Yet neither Rhetoric nor 
Grammar is substance, but it receives its name from those things which are 
“accidental” to it, and from which it seems to be thus named, although it is none 
of them, so, it seems to me, the substance receives its name from what are 
considered to be evil results, though it is none of them. The producer of evil 
results is called evil; yet what a man produces is not himself, but his actions, and 
it is from these that he receives the designation “evil.” Should we say that he is 
himself what he does, when he commits murders, adulteries, thefts, and all such 
like things, he will himself be these things. Now if he is these things, and they 
have existence only when they are committed, but cease to exist when they are 
not committed; and furthermore if they are committed by men, men will be their 
own makers, and conversely, the cause of their own non-existence! But if you 
affirm that these vices are his actions, then Man is held to be “evil” because of 
what he does, and not because of what he is in substance (ἐξ ὧν ποιεῖ τὸ κακὸς 
εἶναι ἔχει, οὐκ ἐξ ὧν ἐστὶν οὐσίᾳ). We said that a human is called evil from things 
that are “accidental” to his or her substance (κακὸν δὲ εἴποµεν λέγεσθαι ἀπὸ 
συµβεβηκότων τῇ οὐσίᾳ)—things which are not the actual substance just as a 
craftman [sic] takes his name from his craft. Now if Man is evil as a result of what 
he does, and what he does has a beginning of existence, then Man himself began 
to be evil, and these evil things also began to be; but if this is so, Man was not 
originally evil, nor are evil things uncreated (οὐδὲ ἀγένητα τὰ κακά), for they 
prove to be created by him.88  
                                               
88 W.H. van de Sande Bakhuyzen, ed. Der Dialog des Adamantius Περὶ τῆς εἰς θεὸν ὀρθῆς 
πίστεως, GCS 4 (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1901), 160-62 = De la Rue 847a; Robert A. Pretty, trans., Adamantius. 
Dialogue on the True Faith in God (Leuven: Peeters, 1997), 137-8. 
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This elaborate proof serves an anti-Manichaean point that evil things are not without a 
beginning, and that beginning lies in the action of the human soul. Notice that 
“Adamantius” explains that the person who commits an evil act should not be identified 
with that evil act. There is an indelible distinction between vices as “actions” and the 
person held accountable for those actions because of what he does, and not because of 
what he is in substance. The distinction between the substance of a person and that 
person’s evil actions allows “Adamantius” to prove that “Man was not originally evil, nor 
are evil things uncreated, for they prove to be created by him.”  
 Didymus appears to have drawn on the tradition represented by this dialogue. 
However, Didymus provides the “anti-Manichaean” reasoning of “Adamantius” with 
additional theological coherence: Didymus shows that pro-Nicene theology counteracts 
the extreme case of the Devil himself “indwelling” a human soul and the possibility of a 
monk’s “demonization.” Didymus’s pneumatology prevents this possibility by rendering 
evil as incapable of substantial existence. According to Didymus, neither the Devil nor 
sin can reside in the soul in the same way that the Trinity does—“substantially.” 
Important consequences follow from this, not the least interesting of which is that no 
monk, however tempted or withdrawn from the Holy Spirit’s presence, can become pure 
evil. And yet, paradoxically, no good monk can ever claim to be the cause of goodness in 
his own soul: that honor belongs to the Spirit alone. The effect of Didymus’s moral 
psychology precludes two dangerous extremes in an ascetic context: the possibility that a 
monk might ever be beyond hope of conversion, and so a temptation to demonize other 
monks; and the possibility that any good monk can claim ultimate responsibility for his 
own goodness. That honor belongs to the Holy Spirit alone. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 Regarding the resemblance between the Trinity and the human soul, a decisive turn 
in Alexandrian theology took place with Didymus the Blind’s On the Holy Spirit. 
Didymus’ argument that the entire Trinity—and not just a single “member” of the three—
indwells the human soul, reformulated Alexandrian tradition according to pro-Nicene 
standards. Didymus’s pro-Nicene pneumatology precludes humanity’s self-purification 
and resists the reduction of any soul’s vicious inclinations to that soul’s essence. Didymus 
puts his theology of trinitarian indwelling to the service of an anti-Manichean point: no 
monk can become identified with vice beyond hope of restoration to the shape of the 
divine image. In this way, Didymus contributes to a consensus view on the Holy Spirit 
which establishes a deep and widely held grammar of “participation” stretching back to 
Origen.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 In this study I have argued two points. The first regards the consequences of 
“participation” for Origen’s theology and pneumatology; the second concerns the nature 
of Didymus’s “correction” of such dynamics for a new period in Christian theological 
development. These two points, taken together, trace a shift from Origen to Didymus. 
With Origen, it is possible to believe that the Holy Spirit “participates in” the Son, and 
that the Son “participates in” the Father. With Didymus, no member of the Trinity 
“participates in” any other; instead, all created beings “participate in” the Trinity as a 
unified divine cause. 
 I have argued that Origen adapts philosophical tradition prior to him in order to 
oppose a contemporary threat to what he considered to be Christian orthodoxy. Origen 
opposed monarchian theology by distinguishing between the Son and Father, and the 
Spirit and the Son, with a grammar of participation that ranged the three hypostases in a 
tiered hierarchy of successive causes (Chapters 1-3). This arrangement yields a low 
pneumatology, which borders on being angelomorphic (Chapter 4).  
 An important feature of this first argument is that I have argued for a “low” 
pneumatology in Origen by appealing to texts whose authenticity cannot be questioned, 
and which employ Platonic participation in the service of a tiered ontological scheme. 
Because these texts cannot be called into question in terms of later “tampering” by 
Origen’s friends or foes, I have isolated a fundamental dynamic in Origen’s thought. The 
dynamic is central, and it brings into focus a central feature of Origen’s theology: each 
trinitarian figure participates in that which causes its production. When Origen’s critics 
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accuse him of dynamics like these, we should take them seriously. On this basis, I have 
argued that at least some of the controversial fragments ascribed to Origen do not depart 
significantly from the spirit, if not the letter, of Origen’s original formulation. I have also 
forced a choice for Origen’s modern readers: one may either have a “philosophical” and 
anti-monarchian Origen, or one may have a non-philosophical and “proto-Nicene” 
Origen, but one may not have an anti-monarchian and proto-Nicene Origen. The final 
option is incoherent given the evidence brought forward in this study, but it is an 
incoherence not lacking in current accounts of Origen’s theology. 
 The second main argument of my thesis is that Didymus the Blind’s On the Holy 
Spirit represents a significant contribution to pro-Nicene theological development, for 
several reasons. Didymus transformed the way “participation” should be applied to the 
Trinity, in light of a shift in thinking toward “pro-Nicene” theology in the second half of 
the fourth century. Didymus not only avoided Origen’s graded hierarchy, in which the 
Holy Spirit participates in the Son, and the Son participates in the Father. He also offered 
a theological rationale for explaining texts which had been used to oppose monarchian 
theology, and which, in anti-monarchian tradition, produced dynamics similar to those 
exemplified by Origen. So, in Chapter 5, I argued that Didymus opposed the use of 
Platonist philosophy by Eunomius to argue that the Holy Spirit is “filled” with 
“instruction.” He opposed Eunomius’s application of Plotinus’s philosophy to the Holy 
Spirit by pointing to several key texts which characterize the Holy Spirit as “poured out,” 
and so identified the Holy Spirit as a non-participating cause. In Chapter 6, I showed that, 
in addition to arguing that the Holy Spirit should be considered fully divine, Didymus 
provided an argument, based on extensive exegetical foundations, for a doctrine of 
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inseparable operation of the three. Depending upon the dating of On the Holy Spirit, 
Didymus’s argument for inseparable operation represents one of the earliest such 
arguments in Greek pro-Nicene theology. Finally, in Chapter 7 I argued that, because 
Didymus applies a pro-Nicene theology to his doctrine of the Holy Spirit, he is able to 
clarify the Holy Spirit’s role as a transcendent cause of virtue in the soul. Didymus is able 
to distinguish between the “human spirit” and the Holy Spirit to the effect that the soul 
can neither purify itself nor find itself reduced to irredeemable evil. All of these 
achievements result from Didymus’s re-ordering of Origen’s dynamics of participation 
and his disavowal of any application of participation to the second or third persons.  
 So I have argued that Didymus corrects a central tendency at the heart of Origen’s 
theology of the trinity. Several consequences follow. One concerns scholarly readings of 
Origen’s theology; three have to do with scholarship on fourth-century doctrinal 
development. First, then, consider the reading of Origen’s theology for which I have 
argued. It is not without precedent in scholarship. Previous scholars have pointed out 
Origen’s indebtedness to Platonism.89 And many earlier readings have been ready to 
acknowledge the plausibility of Jerome and Justinian’s allegation that Origen taught a 
hierarchical trinity which produces necessary difficulties in light of a pro-Nicene 
                                               
89 In fact, almost no scholar has not recognized Origen’s debt to “Platonism,” though two 
observations bear keeping in mind. First, it is so common to claim that Origen “Platonizes” that, while 
claims to that effect are not meaningless, they do necessitate further qualification and clarification. What, 
exactly, does any given scholar actually mean by referring to Origen as “Platonizing”? I have tried to offer 
a precise account of my own terms in this regard. Second, all too frequently, such acknowledgments have 
resulted in bizarre statements that imply not only that Origen might represent currents contemporary with 
Plotinus, but also that he certainly was influenced by currents of “Neoplatonism.” This in spite of the fact 
that Neoplatonism’s founder, Plotinus, only set pen to paper a year before Origen’s death in 254 CE. I have 
tried to distance my own account from such anachronistic treatments. See, for example, Salvator R.C. Lilla, 
“The Neoplatonic Hypostases and the Christian Trinity,” in Studies in Plato and the Platonic Tradition: 
Essays Presented to John Whittaker, ed. Mark Joyal (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1997), 127-190, at 128. 
Salvator R.C. Lilla, “Neoplatonic Hypostases ,” in Studies in Plato and the Platonic Tradition: Essays 
Presented to John Whittaker, ed. Mark Joyal (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1997), 127-190, at 128. 
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perspective.90 However, at present several scholars have offered what I would call a neo-
Crouzelian approach to Origen. Henri Crouzel was no mean scholar, and his own reading 
of Origen’s theology is as deeply informed by Origen’s texts as it is debatable. But 
Crouzel was intent on downplaying the consequences of Origen’s debts to Platonism—
especially those debts which produce a hierarchical trinity. In short, Crouzel wanted an 
Origen simultaneously both anti-monarchian and proto-Nicene.  
 My analysis of Origen confronts Crouzel and his latter-day heirs.91 The argument in 
the first part of this dissertation was developed in order to persuade such heirs, who read 
Origen’s trinitarian theology non-philosophically, that such readings contain inherent 
difficulties. Origen’s grammar of participation is the heart of this issue. Those convinced 
by my presentation will hopefully revise their own claims about Origen’s hierarchical 
trinity. It was a central feature of his thought and was part and parcel with his response to 
monarchian theology.  
 Turning to Didymus, consider the following points of departure for further 
investigation. First, if it is true that Didymus was offering a pro-Nicene theology of the 
Holy Spirit as early as 360, then this dissertation has placed Didymus’s contribution in 
view for further studies to take more seriously Didymus’s role in the development of 
theology in the crucial period 360-380, when the Cappadocians were at work developing 
                                               
90 See, for example, Nigel Rowe, Origen’s Doctrine of Subordination: A Study in Origen’s 
Christology (New York: P. Lang, 1987). Throughout this study, I have avoided speaking of Origen’s 
“doctrine of subordination” (if I have not always avoided the word “subordination”—which Origen does 
use) because I think doing so takes a step too far toward anachronism. To acknowledge a hierarchical 
ordering at work in Origen’s thought is one thing; to insist on his “subordinationism” implies an awareness 
I do not think Origen had. For him, the question of hierarchical orderings as potentially threatening the “full 
divinity” of the Son was not raised as an issue in the way that it later would be, and just so, to speak of 
“Origen’s subordinationism” takes a reading from historical to normative theology. 
91 I have in mind especially Christopher Beeley, Sarah Coakley, and Ilaria Ramelli, who in the last 
decade or so have offered relatively influential readings of Origen’s trinitarian theology which exhibit the 
tendency epitomized by Crouzel. 
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a pro-Nicene consensus that would be inscribed in the Constantinopolitan Creed. 
Didymus influenced Basil on exegetical matters related to Basil’s debate with Eunomius. 
We do not need to overstate the significance of Didymus’s influence in order to wonder 
whether Gregory of Nyssa or Gregory of Nazianzus might also have availed themselves 
of Didymus’s endeavors. Gregory of Nazianzus studied in Alexandria and may well have 
encountered Didymus personally. Too many scholars have dismissed out of hand 
possibilities like these, and my description of Didymus’s theological contribution is 
meant to enable other scholars to provide more traces of Didymus’s influence on 
theologies of more widely influential figures from the period. 
 Second, we should take more seriously the possibility that Didymus influenced 
Rufinus’ version of On First Principles in areas related to trinitarian doctrine, as well as 
related matters in Jerome’s biblical commentaries. Didymus’s influence on Ambrose is 
well known. That he may have indirectly influenced Augustine is an afterthought in the 
minds of the few who would even entertain it. But Didymus’s influence in the Latin West 
promises to be an interesting subject for inquiry. We know, for example, that Jerome’s 
translation of his On the Holy Spirit enjoyed a wide circulation in medieval witnesses in 
the West. How much more of Didymus might lay behind major figures in the West is a 
question worth pursuing. John Cassian comes to mind, as does Gregory the Great, among 
others.  
 Finally—and related to the question of Didymus’s influence—is the matter of the 
authorship of the Pseudo-Athanasian Dialogues, Pseudo-Basil’s Against Eunomius (IV-
V), and the anonymous On the Trinity associated with Didymus. There can be little doubt 
that whoever wrote these works borrowed from Didymus’s authentic corpus, if not from 
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his personal tutelage. By contextualizing Didymus’s On the Holy Spirit within an arc 
from Origen to the latter part of the fourth century, I hope to have provided others a better 
position for exploring similarities between On the Holy Spirit’s polemical context and 
exegetical moorings to those of pseudonymous (and anonymous) fourth-century 
literature. Further studies should revisit the question of authorship in order to carry the 
work begun by Alasdair Heron to completion; these nebulous texts should find speedy 
translation into English so that they can receive more attention than they have enjoyed to 
this stage. At the very least, I hope to have shown that Didymus’s thought is sufficiently 
compelling, in terms of the doctrinal debate of his own day, to warrant another look as a 
figure worth considering on his own terms. 
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